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The aim of this thesis is to examine the British Government's 
policy for dealing with Italy in the early stages of the 
Second World War, a period during which the Italians, though 
formally allied to Germany, remained aloof from the conflict. 
This neutrality, or non-belligerence as Rome perhaps more 
accurately termed it, was considered advantageous to the 
Allied cause by London, so the general aim of British policy 
was to endeavour to maximize the prospects of Italy continuing 
not to fight on the German side. 
The thesis traces the development of British policy for 
maintaining Italian neutrality from the start of the war 
through to Italy's intervention on Germany's side, examining 
political, economic, and military issues. As London 
effectively decided to base its policy to a large extent upon 
what Italian policy appeared to be, the thesis also examines 
British views of the situation in Italy and assesses their 
accuracy. 
For most of the period under consideration, the British 
adopted a somewhat passive approach to the problem confronting 
them, avoiding vigorous efforts either to bribe or bully the 
Italian Government. Instead, they sought, through an attitude 
of goodwill and conciliation, to leave the way open for Italy 
to gravitate increasingly towards them as the widespread 
unpopularity of the German alliance in Italy, insensitive 
German behaviour, and the anticipated growth in Anglo-French 
military strength vis-a-vis Germany as the war progressed 
hopefully weakened the Axis. When it became apparent in early 
1940 that this was not working, policy towards Italy was 
reconsidered and a slightly more active approach adopted, some 
effort being made both to intimidate and bribe Rome into 
remaining aloof from the conflict. In the face of Germany's 
spectacular success on the Western Front, however, all efforts 
to prevent Italy from entering the war failed. 
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FOREWORD 
The strategic and diplomatic predicament in which Britain 
found itself in the late 1930s and early 1940s and its 
government's efforts to resolve it have attracted a great deal 
of interest and comment in the decades since. Hitherto, by 
far the greatest attention has been focused upon Britain's 
relations with and strategy towards Germany, and this is to a 
large extent understandable, for the Third Reich undoubtedly 
provided the most menacing challenge to British interests, a 
fact of which statesmen and strategic planners of the period 
were keenly aware. However, the Germanocentric nature of the 
bulk of research into British policy at this time distorts our 
understanding of Britain's problems by excluding or pushing to 
the margins London's relations with and strategy towards its 
two other major adversaries of the age, Japan and Italy. 
This study is a contribution towards redressing the balance. 
By focusing upon British policy towards Italy in the early 
stages of the Second World War, I hope to draw attention to an 
area which has thus far been surprisingly understudied by the 
historical community at large, and also to shed fresh light 
upon the wider issues of Britain's predicament in this period 
and its efforts to come to terms with it. 
As alluded to above, the amount of research hitherto 
undertaken into British policy towards Germany in the late 
1930s and early 1940s far outweighs that done on policy 
towards Italy. For the period up to the outbreak of war in 
September 1939, however, there is a reasonable corpus of 
material on London's policy towards Rome. Much of this is to 
be found in books on the build-up to the start of the Second 
World War in general, such as Charmley's Chamberlain and the 
Lost Peacel or Taylor's classic Origins of the Second World 
War, but a handful of books and articles have addressed the 
issue more specifically. The most recent such work is Richard 
'For full details of works referred to in the foreword, 
see the bibliography. 
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Lamb's Mussolini and the British, but this is unfortunately a 
deeply flawed piece in which scant evidence is provided for 
many arguments put f orward by the author. More reliable, 
though with its focus more on strategy than diplomacy, is 
Lawrence Pratt's East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's 
Mediterranean crisis, 1936-1939, and the final major work 
which adopts British policy towards Italy in the late 1930s as 
its chief theme, a thesis by Paul Stafford entitled Italy in 
Anglo-French Stratecry and Diplomacy, October 1938-Sentember 
1939, complements and expands upon Pratt's earlier research. 
Also worth a mention, though less important than the major 
works referred to above, if only due to the fact that they are 
much shorter, are articles on Anglo-Franco-Italian relations 
in the late 1930s by P. Renouvin and D. C Watt published in Les 
Relations Franco-Britanniques de 1935 a 1939. 
If British Policy towards Italy in the late 1930s has received 
at least a tolerable amount of attention, however, London's 
efforts to deal with Italian non-belligerence during the early 
phase of the Second World War has never before been examined 
in any real depth. It is certainly touched upon, to a greater 
or lesser extent, in works on Italian foreign policy during 
the non-belligerence period, of which the best is MacGregor 
Knox's Mussolini Unleashed, ' but the prime concern of these 
studies is naturally Rome rather than London. Some 
information can also be gleaned from biographies of British 
individuals involved in policymaking at this time, but the 
only one worthy of particular note is Professional Diplomat, 
the biography of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador in 
Rome, by Gordon Waterfield. Insofar as attention has been 
given directly to the issue of British policy towards Italy in 
the early phase of the Second World War, the body of work to 
date is very limited. Some of the British official histories 
'The other main works which cover Italian policy during 
the non-belligerence period in any detail are Renzo De 
Felice's Mussolini il Duce - Vol. 2, Mussolini's Roman 
Empire by Denis Mack Smith, and Rosaria Quartararols, Roma 
tra Londra e Berlino. 
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of the war address policy towards Rome, ' but in no great 
detail and without very much analysis. Beyond these, there 
are a few thousand words in Lamb's rather unsatisfactory 
Mussolini and the British and some consideration of British 
policy towards Italy in the opening few weeks of the war in 
Stafford's thesis. Finally, there are a handful of articles. 
Most of these give only an outline of the issue, ' but one, 
Robert Mallett's 'The Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations, 
Contraband Control and the Failure to Appease Mussolini, 1939- 
401 in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 8 (1997), provides a 
more detailed, though by no means definitive, account of one 
aspect of British policy. 
Thus the need for-a comprehensive and wide-ranging analysis of 
London's policy towards Italy during that country's period of 
non-belligerence in the early stages of the Second World War 
is apparent, and it is the chief purpose of this thesis to 
meet that. requirement. 
'See Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War - Vol. 1, Medlicott, The Economic Blockade - Vol. 
1, Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East - Vol. 1, and 
Butler, Grand Strategy - Vol. 2. 
2 See Deakin, W., 'Les Relations Franco-Anglaises et le 
Probl&me de la Neutralit6 Italienne (Septembre 1939-Juin 
1940)1, and d'Hoop, J-M., 'La Cooperation Franco-Britannique 
devant le Probleme Italien', in Frangais et Britannigues 
dans la 
, 
Drole de Guerre, and Woolf, S. J., 'Inghilterra, 
Francia e Italia: Settembre 1939-giugno 19401 in Rivista di 
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KEY POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC & MILITARY OFFICE HOLDERS, 1939-40 
BRITISH 
*= member of Chamberlain's War Cabinet 
#= member of Churchill's War Cabinet 
HEAD OF STATE: King George VI 
PRIME MINISTER: Neville Chamberlain (to 5/40)* 
Winston S. Churchill # 
FOREIGN SECRETARY: Lord Halifax # 
PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY AT FO: Richard A. Butler 
CHIEF DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR: Sir Robert Vansittart 
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY AT FO: Sir Alexander Cadogan 
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY AT FO: Sir Orme Sargent 
HEAD OF SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF FO: Philip Nichols 
CLERK AT SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF FO: Sir Andrew Noble (to 4/40) 
Sir Pierson Dixon 
HM AMBASSADOR, ROME: Sir Percy Loraine 
HM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, ROME: Sir Noel Charles 
HM REPRESENTATIVE TO THE HOLY SEE: D'Arcy Osborne 
HM AMBASSADOR, PARIS: Sir Eric Phipps (to 9/39) 
Sir Ronald Campbell 
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir John Simon (to 5/40)* 
Sir Kingsley Wood 
MEMBER OF TREASURY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITALY: Edward Playfair 
MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE: Ronald Cross (to 5/40) 
Hugh Dalton 
MEMBER OF MEW RESPONSIBLE FOR ITALY: Francis Rodd 
HEAD OF BRITISH DELEGATION TO THE ANGLO-ITALIAN JOINT STANDING 
COMMITTEE: Sir Wilfred Greene 
LORD PRIVY SEAL: Sir Samuel Hoare (to 4/40)* 
Sir Kingsley Wood (to 5/40)* 
Clement Attlee # 
LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL: Earl Stanhope (to 5/40) 
Neville Chamberlain # 
MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO: Lord Hankey (to 5/40)* 
Arthur Greenwood # 
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MINISTER FOR COORDINATION OF DEFENCE: Lord Chatfield (to 4/40) * 
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Winston S. Churchill (to 5/40)* 
Albert Alexander 
WAR MINISTER: Leslie Hore-Belisha (to 1/40)* 
Oliver Stanley (to 5/40)* 
Anthony Eden 
AIR MINISTER: Sir Kingsley Wood (to 4/40)* 
Sir Samuel Hoare (to 5/40)* 
Sir Archibald Sinclair 
FIRST SEA LORD: Sir Dudley Pound 
CIGS: Sir Edmund Ironside (to 5/40) 
Sir John Dill 
CAS: Sir Cyril Newall 
C-in-C MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: Sir Andrew Cunningham 
GOC-in-C MIDDLE EAST: Sir Archibald Wavell 




HEAD OF STATE: King Victor Emmanuel III 
THE DUCE: Benito Mussolini 
FOREIGN MINISTER: Count Galeazzo Ciano 
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES: Pietro Badoglic, 
AMBASSADOR, LONDON: Giuseppe Bastianini 
AMBASSADOR, PARIS: Raffaele Guariglia 
FRENCH 
HEAD OF STATE: President Albert Lebrun 
PRIME MINISTER: Edouard Daladier (to 3/40) 
Paul Reynaud 
FOREIGN MINISTER: Georges Bonnet (to 9/39) 
Edouard Daladier (to 3/40) 
Paul Reynaud (to 5/40) 
Edouard Daladier (to 6/40) 
Paul Reynaud 
SECRETARY-GENERAL AT FOREIGN MINISTRY: Alexis L6ger (to 5/40) 
Francois Charles-Roux 
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AMBASSADOR, ROME: Andre Frangois-Poncet 
AMBASSADOR, LONDON: Charles Corbin 
C-IN-C ARMED FORCES: Maurice Gamelin (to 5/40) 
Maxime Weygand 
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF KEY EVENTS 1939-40 
1939 
Sep. 1 German forces invade Poland 
I Italy declares its non-belligerence 
3 Declarations of war by Britain and France 
4 Japan promises to keep out of war in Europe 
17 Soviet Union invades Poland 
27 Fall of Warsaw 
Oct. 6 Hitler gives speech in Reichstag calling for peace 
19 Anglo-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Turkey 
signed at Ankara 
31 Mussolini reshuffles his cabinet 
Nov. 28 King George VI approves War Cabinet decision to 
introduce enemy export control 
30 USSR invades Finland 
Dec. 7 Fascist Grand Council reaffirms alliance with 
Germany and Italian non-belligerence 
14 League of Nations expels USSR 
16 Ciano addresses Italy's Chamber of Deputies 
1940 
Jan. 10 Enemy export control begins in Mediterranean 
10 Belgians capture German plans f or assault on the 
West 
15 British War Cabinet approves plan for large reserves 
in Middle East 
16 Hitler cancels plans for assault on West 
Feb. 5 SWC decides to prepare a force of 3-4 divisions for 
deployment to Scandinavia to seize Swedish orefields 
8 Mussolini bans sale of Italian armaments to Britain 
24 Italo-German trade agreement signed 
Mar. 1 Stoppage of seaborne German coal supplies begins 
10 Ribbentrop arrives in Rome for talks with Mussolini 
13 Finland capitulates to USSR, resulting in 
postponement of Allied plan to deploy 3-4 divisions 
to Scandinavia 
18 Hitler and Mussolini meet at the Brenner 
20 Daladier resigns as French Prime Minister and is 
replaced by Reynaud 
28 SWC resolves that any armistice or peace must be 
mutual 
Apr. 3 War Cabinet accepts Churchill's plan to mine 
Norwegian waters in order to cut iron ore supplies 
to Germany 
8 Royal Navy starts minelaying operation off Norway 
9 Germany invades Denmark and Norway 
10 Denmark capitulates 
14 First Allied forces land in Norway 
14 
May 3 Allies evacuate central and southern Norway 
10 Germany launches assault in the West 
10 Chamberlain resigns as Prime Minister and is 
replaced by Churchill 
13 Germans cross the Meuse at Sedan 
15 Germans break out from bridgehead across the Meuse 
Holland capitulates 
20 German forces reach the Channel 
20 Weygand replaces Gamelin as French C-in-C 
25 Germans capture Boulogne forcing Allied forces in 
north to fall back on Dunkirk 
26 Beginning of evacuation from Dunkirk 
28 Belgium capitulates 
28 Mussolini breaks off all negotiations with Allies 
and Ciano informs Allies that Italy will enter war 
shortly 
June 4 Completion of evacuation from Dunkirk 
4 Beginning of evacuation from northern Norway 
9 Norway capitulates 
10 Italy declares war on Allies 
14 Fall of Paris 
17 French Government asks Germans for an armistice 
22 Franco-German armistice 
24 Franco-Italian armistice 
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NOTE ON THE BRITISH AND ITALIAN POLICYMAKING STRUCTURES 
Britain 
As the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), a body made up of 
the most senior Cabinet ministers and military advisors which 
had been responsible during the inter-war period for the 
strategic and operational direction of the armed forces, was 
dissolved by the Prime Minister on 1 September 1939, the 
supreme British policymaking unit during the period covered by 
this thesis was the War Cabinet. As established by 
Chamberlain on 3 September 1939, it consisted of nine members: 
the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
Foreign Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the War Minister, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, the Air Minister, the Minister 
for Coordination of Defence, and a Minister without Portfolio. 
The Chiefs of Staff (COS) were also generally present at 
meetings of Chamberlain's War Cabinet. 
When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, he 
endeavoured to slim the body down and, for the opening weeks 
of his premiership, ultimate responsibility for British policy 
rested with an inner circle made up of Churchill himself, 
Chamberlain (now Lord President of the Council), Halifax 
(still Foreign Secretary), and, representing the Labour Party 
in the new National administration, Attlee (Lord Privy Seal) 
and Greenwood (Minister without Portfolio). 
The most important permanent body beneath the War Cabinet was 
the COS committee, which met almost every day and advised the 
War Cabinet on military issues. The COS themselves received 
advice from a variety of committees, including the Joint 
Planning Committee (JPC), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) 
committee, and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). All 
three Services were represented on each of these committees. 
Liaison with the French Government was effected at the highest 
level by the occasional meetings of the Supreme War Council 
(SWC) . This was attended by the premiers of Britain and 
France and such other ministers and military leaders as each 
16 
side chose to bring. Although the decisions of the SWC 
carried great weight, they were always subject to the approval 
of the national cabinets. On a more regular basis, Anglo- 
French political liaison continued through normal diplomatic 
channels, but, for military affairs, a Permanent Military 
Representatives (PMR) committee was established in London, 
though with a purely advisory and consultative capacity. 
Italy 
The Italian policymaking structure was very different to that 
in Britain. As Italy was a dictatorship, policymaking centred 
on one man, the Duce. As well as being head of government, 
Mussolini held the portfolios in 1939-40 of all three Service 
ministries and of the Interior. The Foreign Ministry, 
however, was headed by Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Duce's son- 
in-law, and this made him the only man other than Mussolini 
who had any serious input into Italian foreign policy, though 
that input was most definitely subordinate to that of the 
Duce. 
Despite his extremely strong position, Mussolini did have to 
take into account, - to a greater or lesser extent, the opinions 
of certain groups and individuals in determining Italian 
policy. The most important of these, at least theoretically, 
was the Crown. Unlike the Fuehrer in Germany, the Duce was 
not the head of state, but merely the King's first minister. 
Victor Emmanuel III therefore not only commanded the first 
loyalty of the Italian armed forces, particularly the Army, I 
but retained sufficient constitutional power to restrict 
severely Mussolini's foreign policy options. Royal assent was 
required, for example, for any declaration of war. 2 As events 
turned out, the King showed little inclination to use his 
power to restrain the Duce, but the f act that he had such 
power meant that Mussolini had at least to consider the 
Crown's position in determining Italian policy. 
'Overy, R. J. & Wheatcroft, A., The Road to War (London, 
1989), p. 150. 
2 Mack Smith, D., Italy and its Monarch (London, 1989), 
p. 287. 
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Another group whose opinions the Duce had to consider was the 
armed forces, or, more specifically, their professional heads. 
Although he held all the Service portfolios, the general 
running of the armed forces was left to the under-secretaries 
of state, who were also the chiefs of staff (though from the 
end of October 1939, the position of under-secretary and chief 
of staff of the Army was divided between two men) . These men, 
along with their superior, Marshal Badoglio, the Chief of 
General Staff of the Armed Forces, were responsible for 
advising the Duce on military matters and strategy, not that 
he always sought or heeded their advice. Given the executive 
power at their disposal, however, Mussolini could not afford 
to dismiss the views of the armed forces on the key issue of 
entry into the war lightly, and it is interesting to note that 
he only committed Italy to intervention when his military 
advisors finally gave their consent to it. 
A third group whose views the Duce had to take into account 
was his fellow Fascists. Indeed, ultimate responsibility for 
Italian policy lay theoretically with the Fascist Grand 
Council, a body of senior Fascists that met intermittently to 
discuss key issues, but, as the Grand Council could only be 
called by Mussolini to debate an agenda of his choosing, it 
was effectively little more than a rubber stamp for policies 
already dictated by the Duce. 1 There were, of course, other 
means by which members of the Fascist Party could try to 
influence policy, such as through the tenure of ministerial 
posts or direct conversation with Mussolini, and there was a 
strong desire held by many Fascists for a foreign policy 
different than that favoured by the Duce, but, due to the cult 
of obedience to the leader inherent in Fascist ideology, which 
in many ways had made Mussolini more important to the Fascist 
Party than it was to him by the late 1930s, the probability 
was always that Fascists would fall into line behind their 
leader no matter what course he chose. 2 
'Dear, I. C. B. (ed. ), The oxford Companion to the Second 
World War (oxford, 1995), p. 586. 
2 Gallo, M., Mussolini's Italy: Twenty years of the 
Fascist era (New York, 1973), p. 312. 
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The Catholic Church was a further body which Mussolini had to 
consider in formulating policy. The Church retained a great 
deal of moral and spiritual influence amongst a still devoutly 
Catholic people, and a forceful stance by Pope Pius XII 
against Italian intervention in the war would undoubtedly have 
made it more difficult for the Duce to have dragged Italy in. 
However, although the Vatican opposed Italian intervention, ' 
it never adopted a strong position on the issue and the 
limitations placed upon Mussolini's policy options by it were 
consequently much less severe than they might have been. 
The final potential brake on the Duce was the Italian public, 
but after almost twenty years of Fascist indoctrination and 
subject to powerful instruments of repression and propaganda 
closely directed by Mussolini himself, there was always a good 
chance that it could be made to obey its dictator's will, at 
least in the absence of any major figure standing up to the 
Duce and offering the people an alternative. The possibility 
of a popular revolt against a widely unpopular development in 
Italian foreign policy could not be entirely ruled out by 
Mussolini, however, and so the state of public opinion had at 
least to be considered before any drastic action was taken. 
Thus, although Mussolini was not able to determine Italian 
policy untrammelled, his was the will shaping the general 
thrust of that policy, with other individuals and groups only 
acting generally as factors to be taken into account, to 
varying degrees, in his deliberations. Obviously, because of 
the myriad demands imposed by the centralisation of power upon 
himself, the Duce was unable to take every decision involved 
in Italian policy, and this gave others, most notably Ciano, 
the ability to influence it to a greater or lesser extent at 
differing times. In the final analysis, however, the guiding 
'Knox, M., Mussolini-Unleashed. 1939-1941 (Cambridge, 
1982), p. 11. 
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spirit and force behind all major policy decisions was 
undoubtedly Mussolini. ' 
'See, for example, the comment of Gianluca Andre in 'La 
Politica Estera del Governo Fascista Durante la Seconda 
Guerra Mondiale, in De Felice, R. (ed. ), L'Italia fra 
Tedeschi e Alleati: La politica estera fascista e la seconda 
querra mondiale (Bologna, 1973), p. 115, that, 'in Italy, 
decisions in foreign policy were taken by Mussolini ... the 
only will that really counted was his, ('in Italia, le 
decisioni di politica estera, le prende Mussolini ... 11unica 
volontc! che veramente conta & la sual). 
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CHAPTER ONE - BRITAIN AND ITALY TO SEPTEMBER 1939 
Britain and the Aims of Italian Foreign Policy 
The roots of the war that raged between Britain and Italy from 
1940 to 1943 go back to the nineteenth century. The chief 
objective of Italian foreign policy from unification through 
to the early 1940s was to make Italy a Great Power. ' To 
achieve this, and to absorb Italy's rapidly expanding 
population, most of which was being 'lost' in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the Americas, 
Italians generally agreed that they must build an empire. 2 By 
the early 1920s, some advances had been made towards this, 
most notably with the capture from the Ottomans of Libya and 
the Dodecanese Islands, but Italy's humiliation at Adowa in 
1896, at the hands of an Abyssinian army whose country Rome 
was seeking to annex, and the poor showing of the Italian 
armed forces in the Great War made it painfully clear that 
Italy did not yet truly rank amongst the Great Powers. 
Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of Italy's failure to 
become a true Great Power, however, was its treatment at the 
peace conferences following the end of the First World War. 
In order to secure Italian participation on their side during 
the conflict, Britain and France had promised Rome a series of 
territorial concessions at the expense of Austria-Hungary. 
Although the most important of these, cession of Trentino, was 
fulfilled, others, in particular the cession of most of 
Dalmatia, were not. This infuriated most Italians, who felt 
that they deserved the full reward promised them for 
contributing to the defeat of the Central Powers, especially 
when their ers twhile allies, the British and French, expanded 
their empires at the expense of the Ottomans and Germans. 
The I mutilated peace I, as it was termed, not only estranged 
Italy from Britain and France, but contributed to the rise to 
'Mack Smith, D., Italy: A modern history, 2nd edn. 
(Michigan, 1969), pp. 119-20. 
'Overy & Wheatcroft, p. 144. 
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power of Benito Mussolini and the Fascist Party. This was of 
profound significance for the future of Anglo-Italian 
relations, for Mussolini and the Fascists, even more than any 
of unified Italy's previous governments, were committed to a 
comprehensive programme of imperial expansion. ' In the wake 
of the First World War, the leader of Fascism became utterly 
convinced of Italy's right to both predominance in the 
Mediterranean and an empire to absorb its expanding 
2 population. He also readily adopted from Liberal Italy the 
goal of political primacy in the Balkans and claims against 
France over the status of Corsica, Tunis, Nice and Savoy based 
upon the sizeable Italian-speaking minorities living in those 
areas. 3 Perhaps his key objective in foreign policy, though, 
was free access to the oceans. As he explained to the Fascist 
Grand Council in February 1939, in the nearest thing we have 
to a Mussolinian Mein Kampf, to be truly independent, a nation 
must have free access to the oceans, yet Italy did not and so 
was a prisoner in the Mediterranean. The bars of its prison 
were Corsica, Tunis, Malta and Cyprus, and the guards, Suez 
and Gibraltar. Italy's task was to break the bars of the 
4 prison and then march to the oceans. Only by so doing would 
Italy have a real opportunity to take its place amongst the 
Great Powers, for through their control of the eastern and 
western exits from the Mediterranean, Britain and France had 
the ability to sever at a stroke well over half of all Italy's 
imports. 5 It was therefore the need 'to resolve the problem 
'Overy &: Wheatcroft, pp. 149-50. 
2 Knox, M., 'Conquest, Foreign and Domestic, in Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany' in Journal of Modern History, Vol. 
56 (1984), pp. 17-19. 
3 Mack Smith, D., Mussolini's Roman Empire (London, 
1976), pp. 5,51. 
Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 40. 
5 Monroe, E., The Mediterranean in Politics (London, 
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of its maritime frontiers' that Mussolini singled out in June 
1940 as the prime reason why Italy was entering the war. ' 
The foreign policy aims of Fascism thus encroached directly 
upon British interests, for some of the key targets of Italian 
imperial expansion, such as Malta, Cyprus, Gibraltar and 
Egypt, were part of the British Empire. None of these was of 
any great economic value to Britain, unlike India and the 
territories of the Far East, 2 but strategically they were 
vital. First, they guarded the shortest and quickest route 
between the home islands and the East. Although Britain could 
always f all back on the route round the Cape of Good Hope 
should the one via Suez be closed, this added dramatically to 
the distance ships plying between east and west had to 
3 travel, and so was much inferior both economically and 
strategically. Second, the ability to control ingress and 
egress to the inland'sea from west and east, and to maintain 
a strong naval presence in the region was considered crucial 
for the effectiveness of any future blockade of a European 
power in the event of war, a major consideration given the 
importance traditionally attached by the British to economic 
warfare. ' Finally, possession of Gibraltar gave strategic 
cover to Britain's vital lines of communication across the 
Atlantic whilst the British presence in the eastern 
Mediterranean protected both the oil reserves of the Middle 
East and the land route to India. London thus had no 
intention of yielding its position in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, a stance which made Britain an obstacle to the 
fulfilment of Mussolini's aspirations. 
'As cited in Burgwyn, H. J., Italian Foreign Policy in 
the Interwar Period 1918-1940 (Westport, 1997), p-216. 
2 Pratt, L. R., East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's 
Mediterranean crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 1975), p. 13. 
'See the figures in Monroe, p. 11. 
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Fascist Italy Amongst the European Great Powers: to early 1936 
Despite the obvious clash of interests between Mussolini's 
Italy and Britain, the threat from Rome was given very limited 
consideration in London before the mid 1930s. Indeed, Italy 
was regarded in 1934 as as unlikely an opponent for Britain in 
the near future as France or the United States. ' Nor was this 
an entirely unreasonable assumption, for there was little 
indication before the mid Thirties that Rome would or could 
mount a challenge to British interests that was any more 
serious than ineffectual propaganda aimed at undermining 
Anglo-French influence in the Middle East or similarly 
ineffective financial support for nationalist movements in the 
region and Italian irredentists in Corsica, Tunisia and 
Malta. 2 
Italy's relative quiescence in the 1920s and early 1930s is 
easily explained. So long as the French military remained 
dominant on the Continent and Britain was able to concentrate 
the bulk of its fleet, should it require, in the 
Mediterranean, Italy was in no position to achieve any of its 
major foreign policy objectives against the will of the more 
powerful western European democracies. By 1935, however, 
everything had changed. First, the rise of a Japanese threat 
to British interests in the East in the early Thirties had put 
a question mark over the Royal Navy's ability to dominate the 
Mediterranean as and when it chose. Then, even more 
importantly, the resurgence of an aggressive Germany under 
Adolf Hitler from 1933 both challenged France's military 
dominance in Europe and increased the strain on the British 
Navy further still. The balance of power and resources was 
beginning to shift against Britain and France, and this 
created a situation in which, although entirely confident of 
'Pratt, pp. 15-18. 
2 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 33-4,89-90. 
Italian forces did occupy Corfu in 1923, of course, but 
Mussolini was persuaded to withdraw them swiftly by the 
British and French. 
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their ability to beat Italy in a straight f ight, ' the western 
European powers nevertheless had reason to fear a war in the 
Mediterranean, for anything but the quickest and easiest of 
conflicts in this region threatened to deprive them of 
valuable and scarce resources which they needed to guard 
against the more dangerous and important German and Japanese 
menaces. 
Mussolini had realised since the early 1920s that an alliance 
with a resurgent Germany might open up possibilities for 
expansion in the face of western European opposition, and 
Hitler made it patently clear to the Duce within hours of 
coming to power that he foresaw a future in which Germany 
dominated northern and eastern Europe while Italy was 
2 predominant in the Mediterranean . The Italian dictator was 
not yet ready to join with the Nazis, however, for two main 
reasons. First, German power in the early Thirties was more 
potential than actual. Second, and perhaps more important, 
Italy had reason to fear as well as welcome Germany's revival. 
The major achievement for Italy of the First World War had 
been to remove a Great Power from its northern frontier. Now, 
as the Fuehrer made no attempt to hide from Mussolini, the 
Germans wanted to effect an Anschluss with Austria. This 
would not only destroy the greatest advantage accruing to 
Italy from its victory in 1918, but would put the Third Reich 
in a position to dominate the Danube basin and all of South- 
East Europe, an area in which the Duce was determined Italian 
influence should be paramount. 3 
At first, Mussolini was not prepared to forsake Austrian 
independence. Indeed, he sent Italian troops to the border in 
July 1934 in a successful attempt to warn the Germans not to 
'See, for example, the comment of the First Sea Lord in 
1935 that 'the final outcome of a conflict with Italy cannot 
be a matter of doubt, in Marder, A. J., 'The Royal Navy and 
the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-61 in American Historical 
Review, Vol. 75 (1970), p. 1338. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 23,48-9. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 45. 
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intervene in an effort by the Austrian Nazis to overthrow the 
government in Vienna and effect the Anschluss. This first 
attempt to absorb Austria within the Third Reich led to a 
severe deterioration in Italo-German relations and prompted 
Rome to pursue closer relations with the western European 
democracies. In January 1935, the Rome Agreements were 
concluded, apparently resolving long running points of dispute 
between France and Italy in North and East Africa, most 
notably the status of the large Italian minority in Tunisia 
which was to lose its special privileges and Italian 
nationality over a thirty year period. ' This was followed up 
in April at a conference at Stresa at which the British, 
French and Italian governments committed themselves to 
preventing the Anschluss. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly of all, in June 1935, Franco-Italian military 
talks took place and addressed the subjects of joint action 
against Germany should it attack not only Austria, but France 
or Italy as well. 2 
Whether this period of good relations between Rome and London 
and Paris could have continued had Mussolini not calculated 
that Anglo-French concern about a resurgent Germany would 
preclude any western European opposition to an Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia in autumn 1935, or had the western 
European powers not responded to the Italian aggression by 
leading the League of Nations in imposing limited economic 
sanctions on Italy in a half-hearted effort to enforce 
collective security, is open to debate. On the one hand, the 
Fascist Government's foreign policy objectives in the 
Mediterranean potentially set Italy at loggerheads with 
Britain and France long before the Abyssinian Crisis, and, 
indeed, when planning the war in East Africa, Mussolini had 
singled out Egypt, the Sudan and possibly Kenya as future 
'Renouvin, P., 'Les Relations de la Grande-Bretagne et 
de la France avec l'Italie en 1938-19391 in Les Relations 
Franco-Britannigues de 1935 A 1939 (Paris, 1975), p. 296. 
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targets for Italian expansion. ' ý However, on the other hand, 
the Duce had timed the Abyssinian campaign so that the bulk of 
the Italian Army would be back on the northern frontier before 
the German Army was likely to be strong enough to move against 
Austria. 2 There is thus some reason to believe, as indeed the 
German ambassador in Rome had darkly warned in the first half 
3 of 1935, that if the western European democracies had 
acquiesced in a certain amount of Italian expansion in Africa, 
the Duce might have proved willing to work with rather than 
against the British and French in the interests of averting 
the Anschluss. 
In the final analysis, however, it is impossible to predict 
with any degree of certainty how Italy's relations with the 
European Great Powers would have developed had history taken 
a different course. What can be asserted, though, is that the 
imposition of sanctions, even though deliberately limited by 
Britain and France so as to avoid a situation in which a 
serious threat to the ultimate success of Rome's campaign in 
East Africa would force the Italian Government to choose 
between surrender to the League and war against the western 
European powers, 4 infuriated Mussolini and shattered the 
Stresa Front. The Duce was appalled that Italy, a supposed 
Great Power, had been treated as a pariah nation and was 
disgusted that the western European democracies had supported 
Africans against Europeans. As Britain would clearly never 
willingly allow Italy to take its rightful place amongst the 
international elite, he raged that it must be destroyed. 5 
The door had clearly been opened to an Italo-German 
rapprochement, and Hitler lost little time in making sure that 
'Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 69. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p-60. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 62. 
'Reynolds, P. A., British Foreign Policv in the Inter- 
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one took place. Not being a member of the League, Germany did 
not impose sanctions upon Italy but instead made generally 
sympathetic noises about the Italian aggression in East 
Africa. Indeed, the Germans provided material aid for Rome's 
war by making up the shortfall in coal supplies consequent 
upon the severing of the export of British coal to Italy due 
to sanctions. ' As early as 1923, the British ambassador in 
Rome had warned the Foreign office (FO) that 'Italy must 
inevitably gravitate towards the Power or group of Powers 
ready to assist her in the expansion towards which she must 
eventually be driven by irresistible force'. 2 The differing 
reaction of Germany and the western European powers to Italy's 
invasion of Abyssinia was therefore of profound significance, 
and, as a result of it, Italo-German relations improved 
dramatically following their nadir in the first half of 1935 
so that, by January 1936, Mussolini informed Hitler that 
although he would not yet accept the Anschluss, he was 
prepared to see Austria become an area of German rather than 
3 Italian predominance . 
Fascist Italv AmoncTst the European Great Powers: to May 1939 
From early 1936 through to the signature of a formal military 
alliance in May 1939, Italy moved ever closer, albeit 
tentatively at times, towards the Third Reich, a diplomatic 
development which, as one historian has recently illustrated, 
prompted and was mirrored by an evolution in Italian military 
planning that focused overwhelmingly upon preparing to fight 
a future war against one or both of the western European 
powers in conjunction with Germany. ' 
'Barnett, C., The Collapse of British Power (London, 
1972), p. 379. 
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An important factor in the development of closer ties between 
the regimes in Rome and Berlin was the reaction of the 
European Great Powers to the Spanish Civil War which erupted 
in July 1936. From September, both Mussolini and Hitler began 
to send aid to Franco's Nationalists and this strengthened the 
ideological link between the Fascist and Nazi regimes. 
Conversely, the French, who were petrified that a Nationalist 
victory would complete the encirclement of France by fascist 
powers, were inclined to give help, albeit tentative and 
intermittent, to the Republicans. The British, meanwhile, 
fearing that the ideological conflict in Iberia could spill 
over into a general European war, adopted a policy of non- 
intervention, but occasional attempts over the next three 
years to contain the civil war by limiting the intervention of 
others strained relations with Rome, though not so much as 
France's occasional efforts to aid the Republicans. ' 
Shortly after the two fascist dictators began to send aid to 
Franco, the Duce announced to the world the existence of the 
Axis, an informal union of the Italian and German states. As 
the Axis did not guarantee Italy German support, however, 
Mussolini was unwilling at this stage to alienate both the 
western European powers, and so decided to offer the prospect 
of better relations with Rome. to one of them, a policy which 
might also serve to create friction between the democracy to 
which the offer was made and the one that was shown little 
sign of Italian goodwill. Given that the Popular Front which 
governed France for around two years from June 1936 was 'an 
electoral coalition forged in the flame of anti-fascism', 2 
London was the obvious target for the offer of improved 
relations, and the Duce used the very same speech in which he 
proclaimed the existence of the Axis to announce his desire 
for 'a sincere, rapid and complete agreement' with Britain 
'Renouvin, 'Les Relations avec l'Italiel, pp. 296-7. 
2 Young, R. J., 'French Military Intelligence and the 
Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933-19391 in Historical Journal, 
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, based on the recognition of reciprocal interests'. ' The 
British responded positively to this and, in January 1937, the 
so-called 'Gentleman's Agreement', a statement of the two 
countries' intention to respect the status quo in the 
Mediterranean and- Middle East, was signed. Rather than 
building upon this to improve Italo-British relations further, 
though, the Duce now sent large numbers of volunteers' to 
fight in Spain, intensified Radio Bari's campaign of anti- 
British propaganda in the Middle East, and encouraged the 
Italian press to adopt a strongly anti-British line. 2 
These actions reaffirmed the belief of Anthony Eden, the 
British Foreign Secretary, that Italy was fundamentally 
opposed to Britain, 3 and strengthened his conviction that Rome 
would only genuinely pursue a foreign policy that did not 
threaten British interests if Britain adopted a firm approach 
4 incorporating military deterrence in the Mediterranean. 
Unfortunately for Eden, though, it had been decided as early 
as November 1935 that 'Our defence requirements are so serious 
that it would be materially impossible ... to make additional 
5 provision for the case of a hostile Italy'. 
A tough line towards Italy did not thus seem very practicable, 
and when Neville Chamberlain acceded to the premiership in May 
1937, he hoped, through a general policy of goodwill and minor 
concessions, particularly the granting of de jure recognition 
of Italian rule in Abyssinia, to effect a permanent 
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rapprochement with Italy which might weaken, or even break, 
the Axis. The new Prime Minister therefore wrote to Mussolini 
at the end of July, expressing his willingness to enter upon 
conversations with a view to clarifying the whole situation 
and removing all causes of suspicion or misunderstanding' ,1 
and, to his delight, the Duce's reply was favourable. Eden's 
opposition to such talks and an ephemeral Italian submarine 
campaign against shipping in the Mediterranean were sufficient 
to put the brakes on for the moment, however, and Anglo- 
Italian conversations had yet to begin by the end of the 
year. 2 
By this time, London's chances of dragging Italy away from the 
Axis had become worse than ever. In September 1937, a visit 
to the Reich seems to have left Mussolini with a lasting 
impression of Nazi military might and convinced him that any 
revision of the status quo in Italy's favour would have to be 
3 achieved with Hitler and not against him. Partly as a result 
of this, Italy joined Germany and Japan in the Anti-Comintern 
Pact in November and withdrew from the League of Nations a 
month later. 
The key event in cementing the Axis, however, was the 
Anschluss in March 1938. Although Italian pique at Hitler's 
action, and Eden's resignation, led to discussions which 
resulted in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938, the 
centrepiece of which was an arrangement whereby Britain would 
recognise Italian rule in Abyssinia once Italy had withdrawn 
its forces from Spain, ' the Anschluss did far more to 
strengthen than weaken Italo-German relations in the long run. 
Not only did it remove at a stroke the major reason Italy had 
had since 1933 for si'ding with the western European powers 
'As cited in Charmley, J., Chamberlain and the Lost 
Peace (London, 1989), p. 24. 
Lamb, Mussolini, pp. 182-7. 
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against Hitler, but, by, removing the buf f er between Italy and 
the might of the Third Reich, it made good relations between 
Rome and Berlin more important than ever. Mussolini remained 
reluctant for the moment to conclude the formal military 
alliance the Germans now pressed him for, but this was 
principally because he was aware that Italy was not yet in any 
fit state to fight a major European war and feared that the 
signing of an alliance would encourage Hitler to pursue an 
even more aggressive foreign policy that was likely to bring 
one about. ' 
Events between mid 1938 and late spring 1939 saw the Duce move 
ever closer to a formal military alliance, however. In the 
wake of the Anglo-French capitulation at Munich, the British 
decided, in a somewhat desperate attempt to weaken the Axis, 
officially to recognise Italian rule in Abyssinia, despite the 
continued presence in Spain of large numbers of Italian 
troops, and followed this up by proposing that Chamberlain 
visit Rome. Although this latter proposal was accepted, a 
more accurate gauge of Italian policy at this time is provided 
by the fact that, even though the post-Popular Front 
government in Paris gave de facto recognition of Italian rule 
in Abyssinia in October, 2 the Duce launched a campaign towards 
the end of 1938 for political and territorial concessions from 
the French over Corsica, Nice, Savoy, the Suez Canal, 
Djibouti, and Tunisia. 
The French Government's initial reaction to these Italian 
claims was a firm no. It was with Franco-Italian relations in 
a trough, therefore, that Chamberlain visited the Italian 
capital in January 1939 with Lord Halifax, the Foreign 
Secretary. The hearty reception the British entourage 
received, the desire Mussolini professed to have during talks 
for peace and armaments limitation, and the avoidance of 
'Lowe & Marzari, pp. 319-20. 
2 Shorrock, W. I., From Allv to Enemy: The eniqma of 
Fascist Italy in French diplomacy, 1920-1940 (Ohio, 1988), 
pp. 235-6. 
32 
issues of great sensitivity in Anglo-Italian relations served 
to convince the Prime Minister and, to a lesser extent, the 
Foreign Secretary that the trip had been a great success. ' 
The truth was rather different, however, for the Duce had been 
less than impressed with his visitors, concluding that they 
were I the tired sons of a long line of rich men, and they will 
lose their empire'. 2 
The impression of democratic weakness in Rome can only have 
been further enhanced in the wake of the Chamberlain-Halifax 
visit, for, despite its initial firm stand on the question of 
Italy's claims, Paris showed signs that it did not completely 
rule negotiations out. A secret mission, headed by a French 
banker, Paul Baudouin, was despatched to Rome at the start of 
February to discover exactly what it was that Italy wanted 
from France. In conversation with Count Ciano, the Italian 
Foreign Minister and Mussolini's son-in-law, Baudouin was 
informed that Rome desired a free zone in Djibouti with dock 
facilities linking up to the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, the 
cession of French shares in the portion of that railway 
located within Abyssinia, several seats on the council of 
administration of the Suez Canal Company, and reaffirmation of 
the right of Italians in Tunisia to remain Italian subjects. 
It is difficult to say whether the French Government would 
have acted on this information, for Baudouin's mission was 
exposed in the French press shortly after it had taken place 
and the backlash amongst the public forced the French Prime 
Minister, Edouard Daladier, to disassociate his government 
from it. 3 
The annexation of the rump of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 
provided yet another step towards a formal Italo-German 
alliance. Initially, Mussolini was infuriated by the action, 
'Stafford, P. R., 'The Chamberlain-Halifax Visit to 
Rome: A reappraisal' in English Historical Review, Vol. 98 
(1983), pp. 85-92. 
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as it destroyed the Munich settlement that he had received 
such praise for mediating. This pique did not last long, 
however, and the more enduring result of Hitler's aggression 
was further to convince the Duce of German might and the 
consequent need to work with rather than against it to achieve 
his foreign policy objectives. ' 
Chamberlain and the Foreign Off ice responded to this latest 
German aggression by strongly supporting those in France who 
favoured a conciliatory policy towards Rome, notably the arch- 
appeaser, Pierre Laval, and the similarly-minded Foreign 
Minister, Georges Bonnet, in urging Prime Minister Daladier to 
seek to open discussions with the Italians on their claims in 
the hope of effecting a rapprochement. The French Premie3ý did 
not rule such discussions out, but, mindful of public opinion, 
he did make them contingent upon Italy making the first move, 
lest France be seen as weak or desperate. The Italians, 
however, were equally determined that the French should take 
the initiative in opening discussions for fear of upsetting 
Germany and lest Italy look weak. An unproductive impasse 
inevitably resulted. ' 
Despite the first sign of a tougher Anglo-French attitude 
towards Germany, in the form of the joint guarantee of Polish 
independence issued at the end of March, Mussolini felt 
emboldened enough to order Italian forces to invade Albania in 
early April. The western European powers responded by issuing 
a joint guarantee to Greece and making common efforts to 
secure a military alliance with Turkey. This, and the fact 
that the British and French had at last engaged in staff 
talks, finally convinced Mussolini of the need for a formal 
military alliance with Germany lest a general European war 
erupt without Italy having secured the German support it would 
'Overy & Wheatcroft, p. 173. 
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so desperately require against the western European powers., 
The result was the Pact of Steel, signed in Berlin on 22 May 
1939, committing Italy and Germany to fight by each other's 
side in the event of a major European conflict brought about 
by any means. Italy's transition from partner to Britain and 
France against the Anschluss to enemy seemed to have been all 
but completed. 
The Approach of War: summer 1939 
Contrary to the impression it gave, the Pact of Steel was not 
intended as the signal for an imminent Axis war against the 
western European democracies. Indeed, although sloppy Italian 
diplomacy ensured that no formal guarantee was written into 
the pact itself, the Germans assented at the end of May to a 
plea from Mussolini that, as Italy was not yet ready for a 
general European conflict, no such clash should be provoked 
before 1942 at the earliest. 2 For both Berlin and Rome 
therefore, the alliance was primarily intended to reassure 
their own people that if a major European war did break out in 
the near future they would not be alone, and, by alarming 
London and Paris, to make such a war less likely. To be sure, 
the Italo-German agreements of May 1939 did imply that a war 
against the western European powers for predominance in Europe 
and the Mediterranean would be provoked once the Italians were 
ready for such a struggle, but, for the time being, a good 
deal of mistrust remained between the Germans and Italians 
which meant that they were not willing to work as closely 
together as were the British and French, and so avoided 
3 intimate military and diplomatic cooperation. 
To the western European powers, however, the conclusion of the 
Pact of Steel unsurprisingly seemed to indicate that Italy was 
now firmly entrenched in the German camp. Therefore, although 
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information reached Paris from certain Italian sources 
throughout the early summer that Rome remained willing to 
negotiate over its claims, the French Government had no 
inclination to explore the issue. ' Any hope the British 
entertained of weakening the Axis through efforts to address 
Italy's claims was dealt a massive blow by the Italo-German 
pact too. Sir-Percy Loraine, the new ambassador in Rome, 
advised when in London for consultations in June, for example, 
that I the time was past when we could expect to wean Italy 
from her German partner, and ... direct attempts to do so would 
fail and merely expose us to a check' ,2 and Lord Halifax 
commented in early July that, 'Though Italian policy is of the 
weathercock variety, it can hardly be expected to veer round 
so suddenly'. 3 
Some in Britain, however, now latched on to the idea of 
political concessions as an inducement to Mussolini to 
restrain Hitler in regard to the Danzig Crisis. Despite his 
assurances to the Duce at the end of May that Germany would 
not provoke a war with Britain and France before 1942, Hitler 
increased the pressure on Warsaw to cede Danzig and the Polish 
Corridor to the Reich in the wake of the Pact of Steel. 
Chamberlain, eager to resolve the crisis without recourse to 
war, therefore urged his French counterpart in mid July to 
offer Mussolini political concessions in return for him using 
his influence with the Fuehrer to temper German policy. 
Daladier's reply was unequivocal. Not only did he reiterate 
his opposition to making concessions to Italy in the hope of 
breaking, or at least weakening, the Axis, on the basis that 
Italy was now too firmly tied to Germany and was committed to 
a programme of maximum expansion in the Mediterranean, but he 
also pointed out that reports coming into Paris suggested that 
'Shorrock, pp. 269,266. 
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the Duce was desperate to avoid a general European war and was 
therefore already trying to restrain Hitler anyway. ' 
Indeed, Chamberlain's plea to Daladier notwithstanding, the 
Italians' keen desire that a general European war should not 
break out over Poland was becoming clear in London too by mid 
summer. The British were aware of serious Italian military 
deficiencies which militated against engaging in a major 
conflict with the western European powers, 2 and Loraine wrote 
in late June of Rome's clear wish for a period of 
recuperation ... without risking hostilities'. 
3 Even more 
explicitly, Sir Robert Vansittart, Britain's Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, informed Halifax at the same time that he had been 
told by a quite certain source' that Mussolini wanted to 
avoid war and was trying to get the Germans to put it off for 
a year. ' 
As Europe moved closer to war throughout the summer, Rome's 
extreme discomfort at the prospect of a major conflict 
erupting over Poland became ever clearer. The distinct 
possibility of Italy being dragged into a war for which it was 
not prepared forced the Duce's military advisors to drop the 
deceit and bluff with which they habitually concealed Italian 
weakness from him and to make it clear to him just how unready 
the armed forces were for a major conflict. ' Mussolini was 
'Shorrock, p. 270 & Du Reau, E., Edouard Daladier 1884- 
1970 (Paris, 1993), p. 334. For the text of Chamberlain's 
letter to Daladier and the reply, see DBFP, 3rd Series, Vol. 
VI, Nos. 317 & 428, Chamberlain to Daladier & reply, 13 & 24 
July 1939, pp. 350-2,471-4. 
2 See, for example, the comments of the British military 
attach6 in Rome upon returning from a tour of Libya in PRO 
FO 1011/204, Loraine to Sargent, 5 June 1939, p. 2. 
PRO FO 1011/205, Loraine to Smart, 22 June 1939, p. 2. 
4 PRO FO 800/319, H/XIX/46, Vansittart to Halifax, 23 
June 1939. 
5 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 194-5. For 
example, the Army's armoured divisions were made up of 
armoured cars rather than tanks, it only had 1.3 million 
rifles, most of which dated from the nineteenth century, 
there was an almost total absence of AA guns, and the bulk 
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clearly shaken by these stark revelations, for, convinced that 
a war over Poland could not be localised, he responded to them 
by despatching Ciano to Salzburg in early August to insist to 
the Germans that all military action be avoided and that a 
negotiated settlement via a European conference be sought. ' 
Ciano duly met Hitler and Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign 
Minister, between 11-13 August, but was abruptly informed that 
Germany would invade Poland in the coming weeks. The Italian 
protested, but this was, met by glib assurances that the 
British and French would not fight for Danzig and the 
suggestion that Italy should exploit the German action by 
annexing Croatia and Dalmatia at the same time as the 
2 Wehrmacht attacked Poland . Ciano was angry at both the 
glibness with which his objections had been dismissed and the 
arrogance and insensitivity which the Germans had shown in 
failing even to consult Rome before taking the decision to 
invade Poland. When, therefore, the Nazis unilaterally 
released a press statement after the meetings falsely claiming 
that Italy agreed entirely with German policy and was ready to 
stand by the Reich come what may, the Italian Foreign Minister 
erupted .3 Hitherto, a strong advocate of close Italo-German 
relations, ' Ciano raged on 13 August that he was 'completely 
disgusted with the Germans, with their leader, with their way 
of doing things', and, the next day, not only thundered that 
the Germans are traitors and we must not have any scruples in 
of the Army's other artillery was of Great War vintage. The 
Italian Air Force had far fewer planes than propaganda 
claimed, and nearly all of them were obsolescent, while the 
Navy had fast, but poorly armoured ships, outmoded, 
vulnerable submarines, and no aircraft carriers (ibid., 
pp. 171-3,177-80). 
'Lamb, Mussolini, p. 253. 
2 Ciano, Count G., Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, ed. M. 
Muggeridge (London, 1948), records of conversations with 
Ribbentrop & Hitler, 11-13 August 1939, pp. 297-304 & Lowe 
Marzari, pp. 337-9. 
Lowe & Marzari, pp. 339-40. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 140. 
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ditching them', but pledged himself to do all in his power to 
convince Mussolini to abandon the Axis. ' 
Unfortunately, the Duce did not react to German arrogance and 
insensitivity in the same way as his son-in-law. He was torn 
by the revelation that there would be a war between the logic 
of staying out of it, due to Italy's military unpreparedness, 
and his desire to join in, in the hope of seizing some spoils 
while Germany bore the brunt of fighting the British and 
French. 2 After much agonizing, logic prevailed, and Mussolini 
informed Hitler that, 'If Germany invades Poland and Poland's 
allies attack Germany, I do not propose myself to take any 
military action, unless 'Germany at once provides us with the 
arms and raw materials to withstand the attack which the 
British and French will direct primarily against us'. Hitler 
asked for a list of Italian requirements, but what he was sent 
was an inventory calculated to be well in excess of what could 
3 be spared from German stocks . When this was confirmed on 26 
August, the Duce at last reluctantly accepted that Italy would 
not be taking part in the imminent war, in the near future at 
4 least. 
In London, meanwhile, the likelihood of Italy reneging on the 
Pact of Steel and remaining aloof from an Anglo-French war 
with Germany had become patently clear by late August. 
Loraine reported on 20 August that he sensed that 'in Italy 
the feeling against being dragged into war is stronger than 
ever and is spreading even to high placed pro-German 
Fascists I, and on the 23rd went so far as to state that he was 
, now confident that Italy will not join with Germany if Herr 
'Ciano, Count G., Ciano's Diary 1939-1943, ed. M. 
Muggeridge (London, 1947), 13-14 August 1939, pp. 125-6. For 
the authenticity and reliability of this most important 
source, see Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 291-2. 
Ciano, Diary, 13-26 August 1939, pp. 125-36. 
3 PRO CAB 146/1, 'Axis Plans and Operations in the 
Mediterranean: September 1939-February 19411, March 1950, 
Part I, pp. 4-5. 
Ciano, Diary, 26 August 1939, pp-135-6. 
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Hitler makes war, and advised that military preparations be 
made on the assumption that the Italians would not fight. ' 
Oliver Harvey of the FO was clearly impressed by Sir Percy's 
bold comments, noting in his diary that evening that there was 
'No doubt of reluctance of Italians to fight', 2 as was the 
Prime Minister, who commented in a letter to his sisters on 27 
August that 'we may be fairly certain now that ... Italy will 
not come in if Hitler goes to war over Poland'. 3 The most 
convincing evidence of Italy's desire to avoid war, however, 
came at the very end of August. On the eve of the invasion of 
Poland, the Duce, in order to appease Hitler, initiated 
warlike preparations, such as blackouts, so as to leave the 
democracies guessing as to Italian intentions and thereby 
wrong-foot them. This backfired, though, for the British 
responded by cutting all telephonic communications with Italy, 
convincing Ciano that an Anglo-French attack was imminent. 
Mussolini was similarly perturbed and lost his nerve, ordering 
his Foreign Minister to inform Loraine at once of Italy's 
intention to stay out of the forthcoming conflict, some 
fifteen hours ahead of the formal announcement of non- 
belligerence. ' 
In spite of the German invasion of Poland in the morning of 1 
September and the perhaps somewhat premature Italian 
declaration of non-belligerence that afternoon, the western 
European democracies did not declare war on Germany until two 
days later, and this was largely due to a last ditch attempt 
by Rome to avert a major European conflict. Mussolini was 
bitterly unhappy at the prospect of having to renege on the 
'DBFP, 3rd Series, Vol. VII, Nos. 86 & 173, Loraine to 
Halifax, 20 & 23 August 1939, pp. 84,147-8. 
2 Harvey, 0., The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 
1937-1940, ed. J. Harvey (London, 1970), 23 August 1939, 
p. 304. 
3 BUL NC 18/1/1115, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 
August 1939, f. 4. 
4 Waterfield, G., Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy 
Loraine of Kirkharle Bt., 1880-1961 (London, 1973), pp-242- 
5. 
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Pact of Steel, and so, at the very end of August,, proposed via 
Ciano that if London and Paris would agree to the return of 
Danzig to Germany, he would ask Hitler to accept a conference 
to resolve Europe's differences. The British had twice 
informed the Italians in late August that they would not be 
averse to a negotiated settlement of the Danzig dispute and 
would welcome Italian participation in attempts to reach one, ' 
and the French Foreign Minister and ambassador in Rome had 
actively courted Italian mediation to secure peace, 2 but there 
remained a fundamental stumbling block; the Italians insisted 
that the Poles must give up Danzig ahead of a conference, 
whilst the British were equally insistent that any such Polish 
concession must only be given freely and at a conference, not 
before one. Despite this British sine qua non, the French 
were encouraged by Mussolini's initiative and endeavoured to 
get London to agree to a draft response which was essentially 
positive. This persuaded the Italians to make a second 
attempt, on 2 September, to get the British Government to 
agree to the idea of a conference, but events had overtaken 
the situation with the commencement of the German invasion of 
Poland the day before. Now, London refused to negotiate 
unless German forces were withdrawn from Polish territory. 
Aware that Hitler would never agree to this, Ciano did not 
even bother putting the idea of talks to the Fuehrer. 3 
In the wake of the failure of Italy's last minute peace 
offensive, the western European powers were left with little 
choice but to declare war on Germany, which they duly did on 
3 September. The British and French governments had failed to 
avert the clash with the Third Reich they had been so eager to 
avoid, but Italy's declaration of non-belligerence at least 
'Ciano, Diar , 20 & 28 August 1939, pp. 130,138. 
2Stafford, P. R., 'The French Government and the Danzig 
Crisis: The Italian dimension, in International History 
Review, Vol. 6 (1984), pp. 59,63. 
3 Woodward, L., British Foreign policy in the Sacond 
World War - Vol. 1 (London, 1970), pp. 3-5. 
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meant that the Allies would have just the one enemy to contend 
with at the start of their latest war. 
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CHAPTER TWO - ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH 
ITALIAN NON-BELLIGERENCE 
Italian Neutrality and Anqlo-French Grand Strategy 
As we have seen, Italy's decision to remain aloof from the war 
which broke out in September 1939 came as no surprise to the 
British. Indeed, as early as 18 July, the COS produced a 
crucial paper addressing the fundamental issue of whether 
Italian neutrality in the forthcoming conflict should be 
welcomed or resisted by the western European powers in the 
light of Anglo-French grand strategy. 
To consider resisting Italian neutrality and voluntarily 
adding to one Is list of enemies might seem bizarre, but at the 
time the COS compiled their report, official Anglo-French 
grand strategy for a major European war envisaged attempting 
to defeat Italy within a short period of time from the 
commencement of hostilities. The aim of this Mediterranean 
offensive was to free resources, especially battleships, 
earmarked to guard against the Italian threat for use against 
Britain's more dangerous enemies. ' It thus offered great 
advantages, but also carried with it considerable risks. An 
offensive aimed at knocking Italy out of the war would require 
greater resources while it was being conducted than a 
defensive stance in the Mediterranean, and as these resources 
could only be found by temporarily diverting forces earmarked 
to guard against either the German or Japanese menaces, the 
already serious short-term threat from these quarters would 
inevitably be increased until Italy were defeated. Moreoverl, 
if a Mediterranean offensive failed to defeat Italy, or at 
least to cripple the Italian war effort, within a short period 
of time, the losses incurred while conducting it, which were 
likely to be greater than if a defensive stance were adopted, 
combined with Italy's continued existence as a drain on 
resources, threatened to alter the balance of power in the 
early phases of a war against rather than in favour of Britain 
and France. 
'Pratt, pp. 170-1. 
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Despite these risks, the idea of a Mediterranean offensive, 
formulated and strongly advocated in the wake of Munich by the 
leadership of both the British and French admiralties, ' had 
been formally adopted by both London and Paris in spring 
1939.2 However, this step had perhaps reflected a propensity 
amongst British and French policymakers to grasp at anything 
that offered to make their global strategic predicament more 
manageable, for, once serious consideration of the details of 
such a strategy had begun to be considered shortly afterwards, 
major problems had surfaced. First, the French had 
effectively ruled out any land offensive against mainland 
Italy at the start of a war by insisting that the 30 divisions 
required for it could not be spared from guarding against the 
German threat until British units could take their place. 
Then, the French had estimated that an attack on Libya, for 
which they were to bear by far the greatest responsibility, 
could not be launched in under two months from the 
commencement of hostilities, and, even then, only if Spain 
were neutral. As for an air offensive against Italy, the RAF 
considered itself incapable at this time of mounting raids on 
any appreciable scale, and the French were unwilling to divert 
any of their bombers from guarding against Germany until the 
British replaced them. 3 
Thus it would be left almost entirely to naval power to bring 
about Italy's defeat within a short period of time. The men 
at the Admiralty in London who had devised the idea of a 
Mediterranean offensive in early 1939 had great faith in the 
potential of seapower to bring about spectacular results 
through such measures as coastal bombardment, attacks upon 
'Pratt, pp. 170-1, Stafford, P. R., Italy in Anglo-French 
Strateqv and DiDlomacv, October 1938-SeiDtember 1939 
(D. Phil., Oxford, 1984), pp. 87-91,99-102 & Salerno, R. M., 
'The French Navy and the Appeasement of Italy, 1937-91 in 
English Historical Review, Vol. 112 (1997), pp. 82-96. 
Pratt, pp. 178-9. 
3 Neave-Hill, W. B. R., 'Franco-British Strategic PolicY, 
19391 in Les Relations Franco-Britannicrues, pp-343,346 
Fridenson, P. & Lecuir, J., 'LlAviation dans les Projets 
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Italian naval forces and blockade, ' but Admiral Sir Dudley 
Pound, who had unexpectedly become First Sea Lord in June 
following the sudden death of Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, one 
of the Mediterranean offensive's keenest supporters, crucially 
was not one of them. In a letter in July to Admiral Sir 
Andrew Cunningham, recently installed as Commander- in- Chief 
(C-in-C) Mediterranean and an advocate of the Mediterranean 
offensive, 2 Pound commented, 
Italy can only be "knocked out" either by her armies 
being defeated, or by Italy being laid waste by air. We 
cannot do either of these things at the beginning of the 
war and it is left to the Navy to do the "knocking out". 
I can only imagine that they thought the Fleet would 
steam slowly along the Italian coast and blow it to bits, 
which, even were it possible, would not "knock Italy 
out". 
During the early stages of a war, Anglo-French action against 
the Italians would be restricted to 'cutting off their 
supplies, interfering with their communications, bombarding 
their ports, killing their submarines and later on the capture 
of Libya and some of the Dodecanese Islands', which was 'all 
part of "throttling" them, not knocking them out'. only if 
the Italians were truly gutless' would the throttling bring 
about their surrender, and even then only in time'. 3 
With serious problems having already emerged in regard to land 
and air attack, Pound's installation as professional head of 
the Royal Navy spelt the end of the Mediterranean offensive, 
and the COS report of 18 July which he helped to produce 
served as the final nail in its coffin. The paper began by 
outlining the -advantages and disadvantages of Italian 
neutrality. The advantages were: 
'Pritchard, R. J., Far Eastern Influences upon British 
Stratecry Towards the Great Powers. 1937-1939 (New York, 
1987), p. 146. 
Stafford, Italy, p. 101. 
3 BL Cunn. Add. MSS 52560, Pound to Cunningham, 24 July 
1939, pp. 4-5. Interestingly, in his reply, Cunningham 
opined that the action Pound described as throttling would 
cause the Italians to lose heart and sue for peace in around 
six months (ibid., Cunningham to Pound, 26 July 1939, p. 3). 
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(a) increased probability of Spanish and Japanese 
neutrality. 
(b) removal of the danger of Anglo-French losses in 
capital ships in the Mediterranean which might affect the 
balance of naval forces globally. 
(c) less demand on resources in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East due to the need only to maintain a guard in 
the theatre rather than to wage war actively. 
(d) the Mediterranean route would remain open. 
(e) the threat to Turkey and Greece would be reduced. 
(f) the longer Italy remained neutral, the more mobilised 
would be the resources of the British Empire and 
therefore the better able to meet an Italian attack 
should one fall. 
Conversely, the only significant disadvantage cited by the COS 
was a weakening of economic pressure on Germany due to it not 
having to prop up the Italian war effort. 
The list of pros and cons thus seemed to favour Italian 
neutrality over Italian belligerence, and an outline by the 
COS of what action could be taken against Italy at the outset 
of hostilities provided further reasons for preferring not to 
fight the Italians, for Britain's chief military advisors 
concluded that this was limited. The difficulties of mounting 
major land and air operations were highlighted, while at sea, 
there was economic pressure, the results of which would not be 
immediate, and coastal raids, which, it was argued, have 
'never been a very effective form of warfare, and might 
involve risks (to the battlefleet] disproportionate to the 
results likely to be achieved'. There was thus held to be no 
realistic possibility that Italy could be defeated within a 
short period of time, and this led the COS to conclude not 
only that the idea of attacking Italy as a means of relieving 
pressure upon Poland was unwise, as it was felt that the 
assault would not be dangerous enough to compel the Germans to 
divert forces from the Eastern Front, but, more importantly, 
that the implications of having the Italians as enemies for 
the overall strategic position would be unfavourable. ' 
The CID considered this report on 24 July. It came as 
something of a rude shock, as most British ministers, 
'PRO CAB 66/1, Paper 1, COS Report (18 july 1939), 3 
September 1939. 
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including Chamberlain, had seized upon the idea of a 
Mediterranean offensive with enthusiasm. They had spent the 
early summer speaking of the value of and even need f or a 
great success against Italy in the early stages of a war in 
order to impress the Balkan states, the USA, and Japan, and 
had even begun to consider that the Italians should be forced 
into the war if they looked like remaining neutral. ' In the 
f ace of the COS withdrawing its support for the strategy, 
however, the only man at the CID meeting to support compelling 
Italy to f ight if it should choose not to was Leslie Hore- 
Belisha, the Secretary of State for War. He commented, 
Even if Italy remained neutral, we still had to leave our 
forces in the Mediterranean to watch her. It would be 
preferable to devise means to smash Italy and thus 
release those forces for action elsewhere. As a neutral, 
Italy would sustain Germany, whereas as an ally she would 
constitute a drain on German resources. An ultimatum 
delivered to Italy on the first day of the war would 
force her either to come in with us or go in with 
Germany, in which case her people would be most unwilling 
allies. 
The War Minister's words had little effect, though, for the 
CID agreed with and approved the COS report. 2 
Thus the idea of compelling Italy to fight from the start of 
a general European war in the hope of defeating it within a 
short period of time was effectively killed in late July, 
though there initially remained a possibility that the 
Italians would be forced into a war for another reason. The 
French Government was absolutely adamant about not launching 
a major offensive against Germany in the opening phase of a 
conflict ,3 so, if Germany were to be the only enemy, the 
prospects for the kind of offensive military action that might 
allow the western European powers to take the initiative 
appeared to be poor. This was acceptable to most policymakers 
in Britain, who were content merely to build up their strength 
'Pratt, pp. 192-3 &: Pritchard, p. 147. 
2 PRO CAB 66/1, Paper 1, CID Meeting (24 July 1939), 
3 September 1939. 
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and exercise the blockade during the initial period of war, 
but the French sought a more dynamic approach in order to keep 
up morale and maintain political stability at home. ' Even in 
the wake of the demise of the Mediterranean offensive in 
Britain, therefore, there remained in some important quarters 
in France a desire to make sure Italy was involved in any war 
from the start in order to open up possibilities for offensive 
action and military successes. The French Navy's C-in-C in 
2 the Mediterranean seems to have held this belief, as did 
Campinchi, the Minister of Marine. 3 Most significantly, 
Daladier told Hore-Belisha as late as 21 August that the 
Italians should be compelled to fight against the western 
European democracies if they did not declare for them in order 
to create chances for early military victories. ' 
Some British, such as Admiral CunninghaM5 and Leo Amery ,6a 
renowned hardliner on foreign and imperial issues, shared this 
French view, but any prospect that London might be persuaded 
to reverse its decision of late July and advocate a policy of 
compelling an unwilling Italy to fight disappeared in the wake 
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late August. With the prospect of 
Soviet assistance in the east destroyed, French confidence was 
shattered and the idea of voluntarily adding to one's enemies 
7 became much less attractive. Thus, when the French 
ambassador in Rome returned to Paris at the start of September 
'Barker, E., British Policy in South-East Europe in the 
Second World War (London, 1976), p. 13. 
2 BL Cunn. Add. MSS 52560, Cunningham to Pound, 26 July 
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3 Flandin, P-E., Politigue Fran! ýaise 1919-1940 (Paris, 
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48 
to receive instructions, he was told to make every effort to 
keep Italy out of the war by President Lebrun, by Prime 
Minister Daladier, by General Gamelin, the Commander-in-Chief 
of France's armed forces, and, presumably under instructions 
from above, even by the Italophobic and hard-line Secretary- 
General at the French Foreign Ministry, Alexis L6ger. ' 
Both western European powers thus entered the war determined 
to maintain Italian neutrality. However, as Hore-Belisha 
argued at the CID meeting on 24 July, and as Williamson Murray 
has contended at greater length in a pioneering article, 2 the 
requirements of economic warfare, the linchpin of Allied 
strategy in the early stages of the conflict, might have led 
the Anglo-French strategic planners to insist upon Italy being 
forced to enter the war. With Italy neutral, Germany would 
have a potential conduit for the supply of contraband goods, 
but closing this tightly was not the major reason for 
compelling the Italians to fight. The prime argument for 
involving Italy, as the Defence Preparedness Committee was 
pointing out as late as 1 September 1939, was that Italy would 
almost certainly prove as great a strain on Germany in the 
coming conflict as Austria-Hungary had been in the First World 
War. 3 
It was common knowledge in the late 1930s that Italy produced 
almost no valuable strategic raw materials, had very limited 
stockpiles of such, had a weak industrial base ill-suited to 
the production demands of modern war, and was on the verge of 
fiscal collapse and so in no position to do much to remedy its 
deficiencies by buying large amounts of supplies from abroad. 
As if all this was not bad enough, the Allies were in a 
position, due to their naval predominance in the Mediterranean 
and control of Gibraltar and Suez, to cut of f at a stroke 
'Franr, ois-Poncet, A., Au Palais Farn6se: Souvenirs 
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upwards of 75 per cent of Italy's peacetime imports. It was 
therefore appreciated that, in the event of Italy becoming 
involved in a general war, Germany would be forced to prop up 
the feeble Italian economy industrially and financially, and 
to attempt to meet a list of Italian supply deficiencies which 
was uncomfortably similar to the Reich's own, largely via 
Eastern Europe's poor network of land communications. ' The 
inevitable result of all this would be to increase the strain 
on the German war economy severely, and thus render it more 
vulnerable to economic pressure. 
The value of this increase in strain on the German war economy 
would, of course, be outweighed by the Italian armed forces 
being able to cause serious military problems for the Allies 
in the context of the greater struggle against Germany, and, 
as we have seen, it was primarily the desire not to add 
unnecessarily to their military burden that had led the 
western European powers to favour Italian neutrality. 2 In the 
light of how relatively little trouble the Italian armed 
forces were able to cause the Allies once Italy had entered 
the war, however, in conditions far more favourable to Rome 
3 than those obtaining in autumn 1939 , there is good reason to 
believe that Italian involvement from the start of the 
conflict would in fact have had a less detrimental effect upon 
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Thus the British and French might have been better advised to 
have compelled Italy to fight in 1939 after all, but such an 
argument relies heavily upon hindsight, for, although there 
was an awareness in late summer 1939, via sources such as 
British Intelligence, of the poor state of preparedness for a 
major war of the three Italian armed forces, ' this did not, as 
we have seen, lead to the conclusion that those armed forces 
would be incapable of causing the Allies serious problems in 
the context of the greater struggle against Germany. From the 
contemporary perspective, therefore, British policymakers were 
being perfectly rational in favouring Italian neutrality over 
Italian belligerence, for without assurances from the military 
advisors that Italy could be defeated within a short period of 
time, and in the absence of knowledge, or even advice, as to 
just how ineffectively the Italian armed forces would 
generally perform once Italy had entered the war, the logical 
choice was surely to keep one's enemies as few in number as 
possible. 
General Thoughts on Handling Italian Neutrality 
Having decided in late July 1939 that Italian aloofness from 
a major European war would be preferable to Italy's active 
involvement, British policymakers had now had to establish a 
framework upon which the handling of Italian neutrality should 
be based. The COS had offered recommendations for this in 
their report of 18 July. For them, the key factor was the 
nature of Italy's neutrality. If the Italian Government 
appeared to be behaving in a genuinely neutral manner and 
seemed anxious to avoid entering the war, it should not be 
pressured in any way. If, however, Italy was being used as a 
conduit f or supplies f or the German war ef f ort, some rationing 
of Italian imports would be necessary. Finally, if it allowed 
Germany use of its bases or appeared to be about to enter the 
war, it might be necessary to compel it to declare its 
position forthwith, perhaps by demanding that it withdraw from 
the Axis or even by launching a pre-emptive strike against it. 
In any event, the COS had urged that Britain should I be taking 
'Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second 
World War - Vol. 1 (London, 1979), p. 200. 
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the same precautionary measures, and maintaining the same 
forces in the Mediterranean, as if Italy were openly 
hostile'. ' The CID had approved these recommendations at 
their 24 July meeting, and the importance placed by the COS on 
Italian neutrality being genuine, rather than a ruse adopted 
to benefit Germany, had led the committee to conclude that for 
that neutrality to be decidedly to the Allies' advantage, it 
would have, in some way, to be assured. 2 
The question of assuring Italian neutrality was a difficult 
one, however, and it greatly troubled the Service chiefs in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East as war approached. All 
three, Wavell of the Army, Mitchell of the RAF, and Cunningham 
of the Navy, were suspicious of Italy and concerned that it 
I may be more dangerous as a neutral than as a foe I, 3 and so 
considered it essential that any Italian declaration of 
4 neutrality be accompanied by concrete guarantees. The Middle 
East Joint Planning Staff (MEJPS) therefore came up with ideas 
for such guarantees, including the 'locking up of the Italian 
fleet in British ports', the control of troop movements, the 
locking up of aeroplanes, and a ban on anti-British 
propaganda. 5 By the time these draconian suggestions reached 
London in late August, however, the growing obviousness of the 
Italian Government's desire to stay out of the impending 
conflict had greatly undermined any inclination British 
policymakers might have had to risk war with Italy by 
presenting Rome with such provocative demands, and so a 
'PRO CAB 66/1, Paper 1, COS Report (18 July 1939), 3 
September 1939, pp. 2-3. 
2 PRO CAB 66/1, Paper 1, CID Meeting (24 July 1939), 
3 September 1939. 
PRO WO 201/2119,7A, Wavell to Gort, 29 August 1939, 
p. 2. 
4 PRO WO 201/2119,3C, 'Note on Strategical Situation in 
Middle East' by Wavell, 14 August 1939 & 5A, Wavell to Gort, 
18 August 1939. 
5 PRO WO 169/3, Vol. 1,1st Meeting MEJPS, 21 August 
1939, para. 15. 
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communication was sent preventing these notions f rom being 
taken any further. ' 
Certain f igures back in Britain shared the concern of the 
Commanders - in- Chief in the Mediterranean and Middle East as to 
the problem of Italian neutrality not being assured .2 Most 
notable of these was Leo Amery, who wrote to Lord Halifax in 
late August. He was concerned that Mussolini would use a 
position of neutrality to benefit the Germans and make things 
difficult for the Allies. He therefore suggested that, upon 
threat of military action, the Italians should be asked to 
prove the genuineness of their neutrality by denouncing the 
Axis, closing the Italo-German frontier to transit trade to 
Germany, opening the Adriatic to Allied warships, and reducing 
the Libyan garrison to the bare minimum for the maintenance of 
internal order. Amery appreciated that 'All this may seem 
high-handed I, but he f elt that I things are f ar too serious now 
for any policy of hesitation, or of pretending to treat as 
neutral someone who means to pounce on you at his selected 
moment'. 3 Amery was very much at this time still in the 
political wilderness, however, and no one in a position of 
power or influence within the British Government seems to have 
been any more in favour his proposals that they were those of 
the MEJPS. 
The manner in which Italy declared its decision to remain 
aloof from a major European war can only have exacerbated any 
lingering concerns about Italian neutrality not being assured, 
however. All the Italian announcement of 1 September said was 
that 'Italy will take no initiative in the way of military 
operations'. 4 At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
'PRO WO 169/3, Vol. 1,7th Meeting MEJPS, 31 August 
1939, para. l. 
2 See, for example, PRO FO 800/319, H/XIX/63, Selbourne 
to Halifax, 2 September 1939. 
PRO FO 800/319, H/XIX/60, Amery to Halifax, 25 August 
1939. 
4 PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 23, Loraine to Halifax (by 
telephone), 1 September 1939. 
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Rome that approved this statement, Dino Grandi, former 
ambassador in London and an Anglophile, had suggested instead 
a formal declaration of neutrality and denunciation of the 
Pact of Steel, only to be angrily cut short by the Duce. 1 
London was, of course, unaware of this, but the British did 
soon learn via its ambassador in Belgrade that Ciano had 
explained to the Yugoslav Minister in Rome on 2 September that 
non-belligerence, as the Italian Government was terming its 
position, was not the same as genuine neutrality and that, at 
least as yet, 'There was no real rapprochement between Italy 
on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other I. 2 
This was clearly a far from ideal situation, but the British 
Government remained fairly sanguine, the Foreign Office 
concluding on 1 September that, although 'Italian neutrality 
will have to be regarded with suspicion... it is not so certain 
that (it] is really part of a cunning Axis plot' 3 The 
Italian declaration had made it clear that non-belligerence 
had nothing to do with a genuine and marked shift in policy 
away from the Axis and towards the Allies, but London still 
had every reason to believe that, due to its lack of military 
preparedness, Rome was sincere in wishing to avoid fighting 
the Allies. Indeed, the continued existence of the Italo- 
German alliance notwithstanding, it was predicted that, in the 
near future at least, the Italians were unlikely to intervene 
militarily unless the Allies took action directly contrary to 
their interests or, and this was the crucial point, unless the 
Germans appeared to be winning the war. ' 
In Paris, meanwhile, Italy's declaration of non-belligerence 
caused rather more consternation. Like the British, the 
French had toyed in August with the idea of demanding 
'Collier, R., Duce!: The rise and fall of Benito 
Mussolini (London, 1971), pp. 165-6. 
PRO T 188/157, telegram from Campbell, 3 September 
1939. 
As cited in Waterfield, p. 248. 
Woodward, 1, pp. 20-1. 
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guarantees of Italian neutrality, but, although both Daladier 
and France's military chief, General Gamelin, had supported 
the idea in principle, they had become far less sanguine in 
the wake of the Nazi-Soviet Pact about the possibility of war 
with Italy being provoked by such a policy and so had opposed 
its adoption. ' Now, the hardliners in Paris, particularly 
L6ger and Campinchi, pushed for an ultimatum to be delivered 
to Rome to clarify its position as proper neutrality or face 
attack. It was fully appreciated that this might mean war, 
but the hardliners, convinced that Italian intervention was 
inevitable at some point, considered that, if that was the 
outcome of an ultimatum, better that Mussolini's hand should 
be forced than that he should be left to choose the moment of 
2 intervention that best suited Italy . As over the matter of 
guarantees of neutrality, however, the issuing of an ultimatum 
was considered too aggressive and too risky a step to take by 
those ultimately responsible for French policy. 
Despite the general trust placed in Italy's desire to avoid 
war in autumn 1939, at least in London, both the British and 
French remained wary at this time of Rome's future intentions 
and suspected that non-belligerence was not intended as a 
permanent policy, but that efforts would be made to overcome 
3 the factors working against Italian intervention. The task 
for the Allied governments, therefore, was to try to prevent 
these factors from being overcome and to weaken the desire of 
those in Italy who wished to intervene on Germany's side at 
some point in the future. 
Some in a position to influence policy in Britain felt that a 
tough line was needed to achieve these objectives. 
Vansittart, for example, had been of this opinion at least 
since the start of May, and he reiterated his belief early in 
'Stafford, 'French Government', pp. 64-5. 
Shorrock, p. 274 & Flandin, p. 356. 
3WOodward, 1, pp. 20-1 & Villelume, P. de, Journal dlune 
D6faite: 23 aoft 1939-16 juin 1940 (Paris, 1976), 2 
September 1939, p. 19. 
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the war that the Italians needed to be shown that Britain was 
strong and active. ' Eden, unsurprisingly, held similar 
convictions, as did his former Principal Private Secretary 
(PPS), Oliver Harvey, who noted that Mussolini 'will be won 
over by a display of great strength, not by any sign of 
weakening'. 2 
As the record of appeasement up to the outbreak of war 
demonstrates, though, such men were in the minority in 
government during Chamberlain's premiership. Nevertheless, a 
hard-line policy aimed at intimidating the Italians into 
remaining out of the war might still have been adopted had it 
won the support of Britain's chief advisor on Italy, Sir Percy 
Loraine. During the early weeks of his ambassadorship, 
Loraine had indeed favoured a firm approach, ' but his views 
had soon changed. In a vitally important letter to the 
Foreign Secretary dated 21 July, Sir Percy had given his 
considered advice on policy towards Rome. He had commented 
that, although it was 'possible to make out a pretty 
convincing case for taking up a more active and considerably 
less tolerant attitude towards Italy ... my instinct urges 
strongly that it is far more politic not to do so'. Instead, 
he had advised that 'we should persevere in our attitude here 
of patience, even temper, watchfulness and good personal 
relations'. Several factors had led him to this conclusion. 
First, Britain had enough on its plate already with Germany 
without stirring up trouble with Italy; second, a harsher 
attitude would only make Mussolini madder at the western 
European democracies and might solidify Italian public 
opinion, which was generally anti-war and anti-German, behind 
him; and third, and most important, there was reason for 
hoping that, so long as the British and French did not 
alienate Rome too much, German insensitivity, anti-German 
feeling amongst the Italian public, especially in the 
'CACC VNST 2/43, minutes by Vansittart, 3 May & 16 
September 1939. 
Harvey, Diaries, 26 August 1939, p. 306. 
waterfield, pp. 231-4. 
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industrial north, and the growth of Anglo-French military 
strength might lead to the weakening of the Axis, perhaps 
terminally, over time. ' 
Loraine was thus convinced that it was better to try to coax 
rather than bully Rome into pursuing the course of action 
desired by Britain, so, when Lord Halifax sent a telegram to 
him on 3 September asking how to best proceed 'with a view to 
clarifying and stabilizing (Italy's] attitude and if possible 
bringing her in on our side', 2 Sir Percy strongly advocated a 
policy of goodwill and conciliation. He was most reluctant to 
press the Italian Government to clarify its position, fearing 
that it might provoke Mussolini into declaring forcefully for 
Hitler, and instead advocated an unquestioning acceptance of 
the genuineness of Italian neutrality. As regarded policy 
generally, he urged that the Italians be handled with great 
care and discretion, every allowance being made for their 
national pride and susceptibilities, lest they abuse their 
position to benefit Germany. A particularly tricky issue in 
this regard was likely to be the exercise of contraband 
control in the Mediterranean, which the Duce liked to think of 
as an Italian lake. 3 This, essentially, was to remain 
Loraine's position throughout all but the last couple of weeks 
of Italy's period of non-belligerence and he reiterated it 
during a visit to London in late October, advising, 
Continued attitude of goodwill; Consideration of Italy's 
own position and difficulties; Abstention from comment on 
Italian internal affairs, from acts or words that would 
compromise Italy with Germany, from bringing any pressure 
to bear on Ital Y as regards declaring herself for or 
against Germany. 
When the newly formed War Cabinet discussed the question of 
Italian neutrality for the first time on 4 September, then, it 
'PRO FO 1011/66, Loraine to Halifax, 21 July 1939, 
pp. 6-8. 
2 PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 27, telegram to Loraine, 3 
September 1939. 
Waterfield, p. 248. 
'Waterfield, p. 254. 
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concluded that, for the moment at least, Britain should not 
force the Duce to 'show his hand as a neutral'. In any case, 
such a move was unnecessary at present as Italian neutrality 
seemed likely to be genuine enough given that Mussolini 
appeared to be 'as anxious to avoid becoming involved in a war 
against us as he was to keep out of a war with Germany'. The 
possibility of Italy coming over to the Allies at some point 
was not ruled out, though it was realised that this would be 
more difficult than it had been in the First World War, and, 
as a means of encouraging this, the War Cabinet decided that 
when the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) considered the 
problem of Italy's involvement in the blockade of Germany, due 
consideration would have to be given to the political aspect 
of avoiding antagonising Rome. ' 
The essence of British policy towards Italy at the start of 
the Second World War, then, was to sustain Italian neutrality 
on as favourable a standing as possible by means of the 
adoption of an attitude of goodwill and compromise, whilst 
maintaining, as the COS had urged and the CID approved in 
July, a level of military wariness in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East. Fortunately for the British Government, those in 
control in France broadly agreed with this approach, as we 
shall see, though this did not prevent disputes arising 
between Paris and London, particularly over the Balkans, in 
which there were clear divergences of opinion involving the 
issue of how best to maintain Italian neutrality. In adopting 
such an approach, London hoped to encourage Rome to move ever 
closer to the Allied side as the Axis was hopefully weakened 
by German insensitivity towards Italy, the opposition of most 
Italians to the alliance with Hitler, and the growing military 
might of the Allies. Unfortunately, the British did not, as 
we shall see, take sufficient account of the determination of 
either Mussolini or Berlin to thwart their plans and prevent 
the Axis breaking up. 
'PRO CAB 65/1,2nd Meeting, 4 September 1939,2nd 
minute. 
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Initial Thoughts on the Various Strands of Policy Towards 
Italv 
Having decided that Italian neutrality was strategically 
advantageous and that efforts should be made to sustain it by 
means of conciliation and goodwill rather than uncompromising 
firmness, the British had now to consider the development of 
the various strands of policy towards Italy. There were four 
main such strands; Italy's political and territorial claims, 
economic relations, military policy in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, and the Balkan question. (The issue of 
propaganda and the press is also addressed in this section). 
Britain and Italy's Political and Territorial Claims 
When Italy had declared its neutrality at the start of the 
First World War, the Allies had proved willing to promise to 
meet some of Rome's major political and territorial claims in 
order to win Italian support for their cause. This had 
resulted in the Treaty of London of April 1915, by which Italy 
agreed to enter the war on the Allied side in return for the 
cession of lands under Habsburg rule at the end of the 
conflict. In 1939, despite the fact that Allied relations 
with Italy were worse than they had been in 1914, a similar 
approach aimed at cementing Italian neutrality or, as in 1915, 
turning it into alliance remained a viable option for the 
western European powers to try. However, Italian aspirations 
now primarily focused upon territory and influence held by the 
Allies themselves rather than upon that currently possessed by 
their enemies, and this inevitably made an attempt to buy 
Italy outright by means of major concessions considerably less 
attractive than it otherwise might have been. ' 
'The idea was briefly mooted at the start of the war, 
mainly in France, of offering Rome Imperial Germany's former 
colonies, which the Allies currently administered, but this 
was swiftly dropped on the grounds that these lands would 
not interest Mussolini (PRO FO 371/23787, R7766/1/22, 
memorandum by FO, 19 September 1939, p. 4). 
In a similar attempt to find a means of offering Rome a 
bribe that would not cost the Allies themselves too dearly, 
the suggestion was put forward in Paris early in the war 
that Italy might be offered a free-hand in Croatia and 
Dalmatia. This was also rapidly abandoned, however, 
principally on moral grounds. After all, the western powers 
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As we have seen, Italy had been agitating for concessions from 
the French over Tunisia, Djibouti, the Suez Canal, Corsica, 
Nice, and Savoy since late 1938, so the adoption of a 
compromising attitude over some or all of these issues was an 
obvious means by which relations with Rome might be improved. 
It will be recalled, though, that Daladier had firmly ruled 
out such a policy in the wake of the Pact of Steel on the 
grounds that Italy was too firmly entrenched within the Axis 
and had too great ambitions in the Mediterranean for 
compromise to achieve anything substantial. 
The fact that Rome reneged on the Pact of Steel on 1 
September, however, made Daladier question whether Italy 
really was irretrievably tied to Germany and made him much 
more amenable to the ideas of those in Paris who argued that 
political concessions would pay great dividends. ' Before 
France had even entered the war, therefore, the French 
Government, via its ambassador in Rome, Andre Frangois-Poncet, 
privately offered to discuss all issues of dispute with Italy, 
except Corsica, Nice and Savoy. 2 This failed to elicit an 
official response, so, the dismissal as Foreign Minister of 
the arch-appeaser Bonnet on the 13 September notwithstanding, 
Frangois-Poncet was instructed to raise the issue once again. 
This time he informed Ciano that the French Government was 
willing to discuss all issues of dispute between the two 
countries, but he added that it would be left up to the 
Italian Government to initiate talks if they desired them. 3 
The Italian Foreign Minister's reply to this demarche was 
had no right to offer Yugoslav territory to Italy, and to 
have done so would have done untold damage to support for 
the Allied cause in other neutral states, particularly the 
USA (Villelume, Journal, 2&6 October 1939, pp. 51,57). 
'Shorrock, pp. 274-5. 
Shorrock, p. 272. 
Shorrock, p. 276. 
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hardly encouraging; he simply warned the Frenchman against 
attempts to buy Italy off. ' 
Exactly how much Paris would have been willing to offer Rome 
had the Italians responded positively to its tentative 
demarches of early September is unclear, though, given the 
opposition amongst the French public before the war to 
yielding to Italian demands, it. seems reasonable to assume 
that no major concessions would have been made unless Italy 
was prepared to join the Allied side or at least cement its 
neutrality in some tangible way. Such a dramatic development 
in Italian policy was never likely at this early stage of the 
war, however, and the fact that the French made no concrete 
offers and were content, having informed Rome of their 
willingness to engage in discussions, to leave it up to the 
Italians to take the next step suggests that the approaches 
were not a serious attempt to buy Italy at this stage but 
rather a move designed to show the Italian Government that, if 
it were to consider abandoning Germany in the future, France 
would be willing to provide an incentive for it so to do. 
Despite their efforts in the spring and summer of 1939 to 
encourage the French Government to discuss political and 
territorial issues with Rome, the British remained aloof from 
the French initiatives of early September. At the end of 
July, Halifax had written to Loraine to ask for his opinion on 
efforts to meet Rome's claims and the reply he had been sent 
was crucial in determining British policy towards Italy over 
the next year. Although Sir Percy had expressed himself in 
favour of discussions of political and territorial questions 
in principle, at least between Italy and France, he had 
opposed any approach on such lines for the foreseeable future, 
as he judged that it would weaken the impression of Allied 
determination, thereby both encouraging potential enemies and 
undermining the confidence of states who had joined, or might 
join, the Anglo-French bloc. Moreover, Loraine had expressed 
serious doubts about the effectiveness of any attempt to meet 
'Duroselle, J-B., L'Abime 1939-194S (Paris, 1982), 
p. 37. 
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Italian claims. He not only believed that it would take 
nothing less than the transformation of the Mediterranean into 
an Italian lake to sate the Duce, but also that an approach on 
political lines under current circumstances, rather than 
weakening the Axis, would only confirm Mussolini in his 
conviction that adherence to the German alliance would yield 
great benefits. once the balance of armed strength had turned 
visibly in favour of the Allies, and especially if the Duce 
were to show signs of uneasiness with his German partner, 
'then perhaps we can show him that there is a way out. But I 
think the wheels must grind a good deal more before we reach 
that point'. ' 
Perhaps the key reason why Britain remained aloof f rom the 
French attempts in early September to raise Italy's claims, 
however, was the belief that it was not necessary to do so in 
order either to prevent Italy from fighting on Germany's side 
or even perhaps to break the Axis. As we have seen, Rome's 
unwillingness to engage in a major European war had become 
increasingly clear to the British as the summer of 1939 wore 
on, and it was hoped that German insensitivity, anti-German 
feeling amongst most Italians, and the growth of Anglo-French 
military strength would, in time, lead to the collapse of the 
Axis without the Allies having to make any major political 
concessions to Rome at their own expense. Theref ore, as 
Chamberlain put it at the f irst meeting of the Supreme War 
Council (SWC) on 12 September, the British Government 
considered that it was not necessary to go exactly "cap in 
hand" to Mussolini I. 2 
In the light of the French demarches, Loraine reaffirmed his 
opposition to efforts to open discussion of Italy's claims a 
f ortnight into the war, fearing that they would be regarded in 
Rome as pressure to force Italy to declare for one side or the 
'PRO FO 1011/66, Halifax to Loraine & reply, 25 July 
1 August 1939. 
PRO CAB 99/3, Ist Meeting, 12 September 1939, p. 6. 
62 
other, 1 pressure which Ciano had made clear in no uncertain 
terms was unwelcome and would result in Italy I being forced to 
take up a position directly opposed to that country which had 
attempted to impose a line of conduct upon us'. 2 The Foreign 
Office broadly agreed with Sir Percy's views, though, rather 
than ruling out the idea of political concessions entirely, it 
decided that, 'If the Italian Government were ... to make the 
first approach, the position would be different and His 
Majesty's Government, and doubtless the French Government, 
would be ready, if necessary, to pay something to secure 
Italian support'. 3 
Thus British policy over the issue of political concessions 
essentially matched that adopted by the French by the middle 
of September; a new Treaty of London involving major 
concessions to Italy would not actively be sought by the 
Allies, but should Rome take the first step in opening 
discussions on political and territorial questions with the 
aim of improving relations between the Allies and Italy in 
some concrete form, it would find London and Paris sympathetic 
to its approach and willing, if required, to make some minor 
concessions as an incentive to the Italian Government to do a 
deal. 
Anglo-Italian Economic Relations 
The decision to avoid political questions in dealings with 
Rome unless the Italians took the lead pushed economic matters 
to the forefront in Anglo-Italian relations during the Phoney 
War period. Broadly speaking, these divided into trade issues 
and blockade issues, though often the two areas became closely 
linked, especially as responsibility for both came under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. 
'PRO FO 371/23820, R7686/399/22, telegram from Loraine, 
17 September 1939. 
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The most important of these issues f or the British was the 
blockade, as the restriction of supplies to Germany was the 
cornerstone of Allied strategy in the early stages of the war. 
It was realised, however, that the more stringently the Allies 
implemented contraband control in the Mediterranean, the more 
likely the blockade would be to cause friction with Italy, as 
it would remind Mussolini of the sanctions of the Abyssinian 
Crisis period and make clear to him that Italy was not master 
in its own sea. There was thus an obvious clash between the 
interests of economic warfare against Germany and those of 
fostering good relations with Italy. The British therefore 
hoped for an agreement with Rome on the level, nature and 
destination of Italian imports and exports, with the aim of 
reducing to a minimum the physical imposition of economic 
control by British warships on Italian shipping. 
It was appreciated from the start, however, that, unlike with 
the smaller neutrals, London, which was given the 
responsibility by Paris for negotiating with Italy on blockade 
issues, ' would have little hope of getting Rome to agree to a 
standard war trade agreement limiting imports of strategically 
important goods without some substantial quid pro quo, as that 
would offend Italian susceptibilities as a supposed Great 
Power. Instead, some kind of ad hoc agreement would have to 
be sought, though hopefully this would amount, in effect, to 
a rationing system which would prevent Italy from becoming a 
major leak in the blockade. 2 
Alongside attempts to reach agreement over the blockade, 
considerable emphasis was placed by London upon increasing 
Anglo-Italian trade. Obvious reasons for wishing so to do 
were the desire to secure certain supplies from Italy, to 
demonstrate goodwill and the wish for cooperation in general, 
and the hope that the stronger economic relations between the 
two countries became, the more unlikely it would be that Rome 
'Medlicott, W. N., The Economic Blockade - Vol. 
(London, 1952), p. 37. 
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would wish to break with Britain. At a more sophisticated 
level, it was hoped that the prospect of increased trade could 
be used as a lever in blockade negotiations. As Francis Rodd, 
son of the British ambassador in Rome during the Great War and 
now member of the MEW with particular responsibility for 
policy towards Italy, pointed out at an interdepartmental 
meeting in mid October, 'The bait by which the Italians could 
be attracted into suitable arrangements was the prospect of 
obtaining the supplies they themselves needed'. ' Finally, 
there was also the belief that, as Sir Andrew Noble, the clerk 
at the Southern Department of the Foreign Office responsible 
for Italian affairs, minuted on 4 September, there seemed to 
be 'a good chance of being able to bribe the Italians with 
lucrative orders" into remaining out of the war, for, as 
Noble again commented, 'If the Italians find neutrality 
profitable they are much less likely to join the Germans. 
However distasteful it, may be to put money into Italian 
pockets, it is cheaper and less dangerous than making 
political concessions'. 3 
There were to prove to be many problems, however, with a 
policy of increasing Anglo-Italian trade. Perhaps the 
greatest of these was that any substantial increase in the 
level of Italy's overall trade would provide the Italians with 
the financial wherewithal to increase their importation of 
goods which could either be used to improve Italy's own 
military preparedness or forwarded to Germany to assist the 
Reich's war effort. This made the British unwilling to see 
overall Italian trade increase too greatly, the emphasis 
instead being placed on expanding commercial activity with 
Rome at the expense of Italy's trade with other nations, 
particularly Germany, even though this was bound to lessen the 
'PRO FO 837/493, 'War Trade Arrangements with Italy', 
17 October 1939, p. 3. 
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impact which an increase in Anglo-Italian trade might have in 
improving relations and in cementing Italian neutrality. 
Fortunately f or the British Government, the Italians were 
responsive to the idea of'. expanding their commercial relations 
with Britain. The British embassy in Rome learned in early 
September that Germany was significantly in arrears with its 
commercial payments to Italy (perhaps by as much as E27 
million) , and that the Italian Government was consequently 
keen to increase its trade with other countries. ' The War 
Cabinet therefore agreed on 6 September that Loraine should 
make an official but informal approach to Count Ciano to test 
the water concerning increasing trade. 2 
This approach went well, 3 and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Sir John Simon, produced a preliminary report entitled 
'Promoting Trade with Italy', which was circulated to the War 
Cabinet on 11 September. In essence, this listed the imports 
and exports which Simon felt should form the basis of an 
increase in trade with the Italians. Desired imports ranged 
from arms, explosives and machine tools to hemp and lemons, to 
pay for most of which Simon proposed that Britain offer to 
increase its exports of coal. ' 
At f irst sight, such a deal was unlikely to appeal to the 
Italians, for, although Italy had a very limited supply of 
coal of its own, it was already importing sufficient from 
Britain to meet its requirements, which stood at 12 million 
5 tons per annum, when this was added to the majority of 
supplies it received from Germany. In the opening weeks of 
the war, though, congestion on the German railway system and 
'Medlicott, pp. 283-4. 
2 PRO CAB 65/1,5th Meeting, 6 September 1939,5th 
minute. 
3 PRO FO 371/23804, R7336/41/22, telegram from Loraine, 
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an unwillingness on the part of some neutral countries to risk 
Allied displeasure by continuing to carry German exports in 
its merchant ships led to a dramatic short-term fall in the 
level of Italian coal imports from the Reich. ' This certainly 
put the issue of Italy's coal supplies in question, but the 
railway congestion caused by German mobilisation and the 
reluctance of some neutrals to ship German coal were problems 
that could be overcome relatively easily and did not pose that 
serious a threat in the mid to long-term to the level of 
German coal supplies to Italy. However, the fact that much of 
this coal arrived by sea, and so was liable to be interrupted 
if and when the Allies decided, as they were almost certain to 
do, to place an embargo upon enemy exports as part of their 
economic warfare, meant that there was a genuine long-term 
threat to Italianýimports of, coal from Germany. The British 
believed that, when enemy export control was introduced, Rome 
would be forced to increase its importation of coal from non- 
German sources, and so greatly increased supplies of British 
coal might prove to be a good bargaining lever in economic 
2 negotiations after all. This explains why the War Cabinet 
felt that the prospects of securing an agreement to increase 
trade with Italy were favourable, even though it determined 
that this should be based on British blockade policy and the 
'genuine requirements of Italian trade,, 3a veiled reference 
that there should be no significant increase in the overall 
level 6f peacetime Italian imports of contraband goods. To 
what extent such an agreement would serve to improve Anglo- 
Italian relations and cement Italian neutrality, however, was 
open to question, as Rome's ability to 'cash in, on its non- 
belligerence would clearly be restricted by the fact that any 
'Mallett, R., 'The Anglo-Italian War Trade 
Negotiations, Contraband Control and the Failure to Appease 
Mussolini, 1939-401 in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 8 
(1997), pp. 141-2,145. 
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increase in trade with Britain would predominantly be at the 
expense of trade with Germany. 
Meanwhile, the blockade was introduced in the Mediterranean in 
the opening days of the war with hardly any Italian reaction. 
This was largely due, however, to the fact that, at this early 
stage, the blockade existed in little more than name. On the 
day war broke out, instructions were given that no Italian 
ships were to be interfered with in the inland sea, but this 
order was overturned on 6 September, for fear that it would 
anger other neutrals. The new instructions, though, were to 
divert only ships known to be carrying goods openly consigned 
to Germany, the approach adopted in all other waters in the 
opening days of the war so as to avoid too abrupt an 
introduction of the contraband control system, and they 
stressed, moreover, the 'over-riding consideration of not 
provoking incidents with Italian ships'. ' In effect, 
therefore, the exercise of contraband control of Italian 
shipping in the near future would only be marginally greater 
than the complete absence thereof initially ordered. 
There were certainly those who questioned the wisdom of such 
an approach. In the early weeks of the war, - consideration was 
given by a few hardliners, both inside and outside the MEW, to 
the alternative policy of exploiting British naval power and 
command of two of the three entrances to the Mediterranean to 
introduce the forcible rationing of Italian imports. Those 
who advocated this tough stance argued that, as well as making 
it more difficult for Italy to provide its German ally with 
contraband, the forcible restriction of Italian imports to the 
level of peacetime consumption, less existing stocks and 
peacetime exports to the enemy, would soon make it impossible 
for Italy, given its shortages of raw materials, to enter the 
war. 2 
'PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
Section II, pp. 4-5 & Medlicott, p. 71. 
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Thus there were certainly powerful arguments for the adoption 
of a hard-line approach over the blockade in the 
Mediterranean, but such a drastic and hostile measure as the 
introduction of forcible rationing not only ran counter to the 
general Allied policy of goodwill and conciliation towards 
Rome, but would have risked an immediate Italian declaration 
of war, and so was 'eschewed by the British Government. 
Nevertheless, it was appreciated that the initial leniency of 
economic control could not be allowed to last for long. In 
the Mediterranean particularly, there was concern that the 
laxness of control would encourage a thriving contraband trade 
to develop, and the Director of the Economic Warfare 
Department at the Admiralty therefore argued in mid September 
that 'Full procedure should ... be started as soon as possible, 
before important commercial interests take a hand in the 
contraband trade'. ' 
Thus the tone set by the British at the start of the war in 
regard to economic issues in Anglo-Italian relations was 
fairly balanced between the requirements of economic warfare 
against Germany and the desire to appease Italy. The blockade 
in the Mediterranean had been introduced leniently, to say the 
least, but such leniency was the norm in these early days and 
there was an appreciation of the need, as well as a desire, to 
tighten contraband control in the near future. As for trade 
with Italy, the British were certainly keen to increase it, 
but this was mainly to be at the expense of Italo-German trade 
and was only to be done in ways that would not allow the 
Italians to improve their military preparedness markedly or 
undermine the blockade too seriously. It was a delicate 
balancing act. 
British Military Policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East 
Another area of British policy which clearly had the potential 
to be of great importance in determining Italy's course was 
that of military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East. 
'PRO ADM 116/4249, EWD 4/39, 'Contraband Control in 
Mediterranean' by Taylor, 18 September 1939. 
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Here, the British Government was faced with a dilemma. Should 
it actively prepare for war in the theatre, including 
increasing its military presence in the region, at the risk of 
antagonising the Italians in the hope that Italy would thereby 
be deterred from entering the war and in order to be better 
prepared for such an eventuality should it occur? or should 
it rather maintain the current level of forces, or, in 
contravention of the advice given by the COS and accepted by 
the CID in July, even reduce it, so as to appease Rome and 
leave more resources free for the struggle against Germany in 
other theatres? 
Certainly, there was no pressing need to reinforce the region 
heavily in order to achieve a tolerable level of short-term 
security against the Italian threat. Both the British 
Mediterranean Fleet, stationed in the eastern Mediterranean 
and comprising three battleships and one aircraft carrier, and 
the French Mediterranean Fleet, stationed in the western 
Mediterranean and centred upon a force of three capital ships, 
were individually superior to the Italian Fleet of just two 
battleships, though this would change once Italy added two 
modernised and two new battleships currently being worked on 
and expected in service within a year. ' On land too, although 
British forces in the Middle East and East Africa were 
numerically inferior to the Italian opposition, the geography 
of western Egypt in the former case and the prospect of a 
major Abyssinian revolt in the latter meant that troop numbers 
were already broadly adequate to meet defensive requirements. 2 
The British did have a problem in the region with a lack of 
3 air forces and anti-aircraft (AA) defences, however. This 
aerial deficiency would not only prove a hindrance to land 
operations (for example, it was feared that the bombing of the 
Egyptian civil population would create widespread panic and 
'Butler, Grand Strategy, pp. 26,23, n. 1. 
2 PRO WO 193/955,4A, 'Note on the Situation in-the 
Middle East', 19 September 1939, paras. 3(a), 3(b), 5,6. 
3 PRO WO 201/2119,6B, 'Notes on Strategical Situation 
in Middle East' by Wavell, 24 August 1939, para. 6. 
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necessitate the diversion of land forces which should be 
holding up an enemy advance to the restoration of internal 
stability) , but was also expected to render the route for 
supplies and reinforcements through the Red Sea unusable in 
the event of hostilities, at least in the short-term. ' 
Serious as this aerial weakness was, though, it did not alter 
the overall belief that the British position in the region was 
tolerably secure. 
Although there was thus no pressing need for heavy 
reinforcements in the Mediterranean and Middle East at this 
stage, the British Commanders -in-Chief in the region were 
nonetheless keen that they should be sent further forces, both 
to render the position even more secure and in the hope of 
deterring Italy from intervening. Sir Archibald Wavell noted 
shortly after arriving to take up his post as General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Middle East, for example, that, 'We must 
aim at placing ourselves in a sufficiently strong position in 
the Mediterranean to issue an ultimatum to Italy and force her 
to declare her intentions at once', 2 and Cunningham told Pound 
at the end of the first month of the war that 'nothing short 
of sufficient military and air forces in Egypt and Tunis to 
make an attack on Libya a certain success will enable us to 
make [the Italians] declare their hand,. ' 
This desire to reinforce the Mediterranean and Middle East was 
shared by some important figures connected with the armed 
forces in London. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on 7 
September, for example, the newly appointed Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS) , Sir Edmund Ironside, urged that 
a brigade be sent from India to Egypt at once to aid in the 
maintenance of internal security in the event of Italy 
'PRO WO 193/955,4A, 'Note on the Situation in the 
Middle East', 19 September 1939, paras. 5-6. 
2 PRO WO 201/2119,1B, 'Notes for B. G. S., Middle East 
Command' by Wavell, 31 July 1939, p. 2. 
3 BL Cunn. Add-MSS 52560, Cunningham to Pound, 28 
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becoming hostile. ' This was approved, and the unit's arrival 
was reported to the War Cabinet on 4 October. 2 
At the same meeting on 7 September, Churchill, back as First 
Lord of the Admiralty, suggested to the War Cabinet that, as 
the Home Fleet was more than strong enough in capital ships to 
deal with the German Fleet, certain units should be moved to 
3 Gibraltar. His reasons for this move are not recorded in the 
minutes of the meeting, but the main one is to be found in the 
files of the Foreign Office. Churchill hoped that the 
establishment of a sizeable force at Gibraltar would encourage 
the Italians into staying out of the war. This scheme was 
hardly in line with the Foreign Office's view that provocation 
of Italy should be avoided, and it quickly drew opposition 
from that quarter. Halifax was disconcerted by the idea and 
Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary of State 
at the FO, minuted as to the inadvisability of doing anything 
that will look like intimidation to Mussolini', 4 and this 
opposition was sufficient to block Churchill's plan. Indeed, 
it was probably only because the Italians reinforced Libya 
heavily in the early weeks of the war 5 that the Foreign Office 
made no objection to the move of a brigade from India to Egypt 
at this time. 
It was thus not clear at this early stage whether Britain 
would ultimately increase, maintain at the current level, or 
even reduce its armed forces deployed in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East in the light of Italian non-belligerence, but 
there was little doubt as to how British commanders were to 
'PRO CAB 65/1,7th Meeting, 7 September 1939,4th 
minute. 
2 PRO CAB 65/1,36th Meeting, 4 October 1939,3rd 
minute. 
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direct those forces. Telegrams despatched overseas on 1 
September warning Commanders-in-Chief to take precautions for 
a possible general European war added that no action is to be 
taken which might be considered provocative by Italy'. ' This 
directive was hardly compatible with the advice given by the 
COS in July that Britain should take the same precautionary 
measures in dealing with a neutral Italy as with an openly 
hostile one, but it nonetheless remained firmly in place until 
the spring of 1940 and was rigidly applied. For example, in 
mid October, the COS, following the general policy of not 
provoking Italy advocated by the Foreign office and approved 
by the War Cabinet, banned discussions with the Turks 
concerning operations for the capture of the strategically 
important Dodecanese Islands in case news of them 'reached the 
ears of the Italians'. 2 Similarly, planning with the French 
for action to be taken in the event of war with Italy to 
encourage rebellion amongst the natives in Italian East Africa 
was halted, 3 though this decision was subsequently revised by 
the order that the British should take no action whatever 
inside Italian territory at present , with planning in British 
and French territory being allowed to continue provided it was 
'unobtrusive,. ' 
Just as military contact between Britain and its allies was 
restricted in the interests of policy towards Italy, that 
between the British and the Italians was maintained. In the 
middle of September, the Army Council suggested that the 
annual exchange of military information with Italy as agreed 
under the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938 be ceased as 
it, quite sensibly, considered it unwise that Britain should 
furnish such information to a country that was still formally 
'Kennedy, J., The Business of War: The war narrative-of 
Major-General Sir John Kennedy (London, 1957), p. 15. 
2 PRO CAB 79/1,51st Meeting, 18 October 1939,8th 
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an ally of Germany. The FO, however, argued that the exchange 
should be continued on purely political grounds, as to 
, discontinue this practice might arouse unjustified 
suspicions'. Indeed, Halifax even wondered whether it might 
not be developed to include precise numbers of troops rather 
than just units. ' The COS considered the question on 21 
September and, presumably under a certain amount of pressure 
from above, decided in favour of the Foreign Office, though 
2 they did at least rule out any expansion of the arrangement . 
There was thus tension from the start of the war between the 
armed forces and the diplomats over the issue of British 
military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The 
Foreign Office had clearly gained an early advantage by 
blocking Churchill's plan to station a large force at 
Gibraltar, by ensuring that military commanders in the region 
avoided provocative action, and by keeping the exchange of 
military information with Italy alive, but those who favoured 
a vigorous policy of military deterrence could at least take 
some comfort from the fact that there was as yet no sign of 
any intention to weaken the forces currently deployed in the 
theatre. It was not long, however, before even this was 
challenged. 
The Balkan Question 
During the first four months of the war, the area which 
dominated Allied strategic discussion was the Balkans, or 
perhaps more accurately, South-East Europe, 3 and Italy was one 
of the key factors in the debate. Indeed, an examination of 
this subject provides an interesting perspective on how the 
efforts of the British and French governments to handle the 
difficult situation of Italian non-belligerence affected 
Allied policy and strategy in general. 
'PRO CAB 80/3, Paper 41,20 September 1939. 
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In the months immediately preceding the outbreak of war, 
British and French policy in South-East Europe had been geared 
toward establishing a Balkan bloc of Romania, Greece and 
Turkey, reinforced militarily by and allied to Britain, France 
and the Soviet Union. ' The Allies' failure to secure the 
support of the USSR and, even more importantly, Italy's non- 
belligerence and the Allies' desire to maintain it led to a 
rethink in London, however. 
A key factor in this was a telegram from Loraine of 5 
September in which he reported the belief of his French 
counterpart that there was an arrangement that Italy would 
come into the war if the Allies adopted a vigorous policy of 
intervention in the Balkans. He also detailed a conversation 
he had had with the Yugoslav Minister in Rome. M. Cristitch 
had stressed the need to keep Italy neutral and argued that 
this meant keeping the war out of the Balkans as Italy would 
not be able to stand by and run the risk of Germany taking all 
the prizes in the region. The Yugoslav had further commented 
that the Balkan peoples would not be able to resist a German 
onslaught, and Sir Percy expressed his agreement in the 
2 telegram with all Cristitch's views . 
Loraine's telegram struck a chord in London. The failure to 
secure Russian assistance signalled by the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
had crushed British faith that anything could be done to 
prevent Germany overrunning the states of South-East Europe, 
with the exception of Turkey, in the early stages of a 
3 
conflict, and this recommended that efforts should be made to 
keep war out of the Balkans at least until the Allies had 
built up sufficient strength to defend the states of the 
region adequately. Added to this, the British Government was 
now being warned that Italy might well abandon its non- 
belligerence if the Allies intervened too vigorously in Balkan 
affairs or if war erupted in the area, a concern which is 
'Barker, pp. 3-5. 
PRO CAB 80/1, Paper 15,7 September 1939. 
3Stafford, Italy, pp. 166-7. 
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given some validation by a comment Ciano made in his diary on 
16 September that war in the Balkans at that time would 
'probably make our neutrality untenable'. ' It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the COS recommended in a memorandum of 7 
September that British policy should now aim to keep the 
Balkans neutral, primarily for the reasons laid out in 
Loraine's telegram, but also because it is desirable to 
restrict the actual area of military operations at least until 
such time as the resources of our Empire have been more fully 
mobilised'. 2 
The effects of this nascent change in policy began to be felt 
almost immediately. On 6 September, the JPC had supported the 
suggestion of Sir Michael Palairet, the British ambassador in 
Athens, that Britain, France and Turkey should initiate staff 
conversations with the Greeks to cover military action in the 
event of an Italian invasion of Greece. 3 The very next day, 
however, in the wake of their decision to advocate a change in 
Balkan policy, the coS ruled that, as Italian non-belligerence 
seemed more likely to be maintained if the neutrality of the 
states of South-East Europe was not threatened by an active 
Allied policy in the region, staff conversations with Athens, 
which would clearly impinge upon Greek neutrality, should be 
avoided. All they would authorise, and that only with the 
concurrence of the Foreign Office, was that the local Service 
commanders might work with General Weygand, the recently 
appointed French Commander-in-Chief in the Levant, in 
considering problems connected with possible operations in 
support of Greece, provided that no firm commitments were made 
to deploy British forces. 4 
Fortunately for the COS, the War Cabinet supported their 
advocacy of a policy of maintaining strict Balkan neutrality 
'Ciano, Diary, 16 September 1939, p. 153. 
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on 7 September, when its attention was drawn to the fact that 
the French were still preparing to deploy forces in South-East 
Europe in accordance with plans drawn up at a time when it had 
been envisaged that Italy would join Germany in fighting the 
Allies from the start of the war. ' In the light of Italy's 
non-belligerent stance, the War Cabinet decided that Paris 
should be informed that London no longer supported such action 
for fear that it would provoke Rome. 2 The British ambassador 
in Paris therefore informed the French Government on 9 
September that London considered it essential that, 'At the 
present time, all action in South-East Europe that would risk 
making Italian intervention in the war against us more likely 
must be carefully avoided'. ' 
The French, though, remained wedded to the idea of a vigorous 
policy of intervention in the Balkans. With the Allies agreed 
that it would be some time before a major military offensive 
against Germany could be launched in the West, the French felt 
the need, unlike the British who were content to concentrate 
on economic warfare while building up their own resources, to 
take some kind of direct military action elsewhere in order to 
keep up morale and ensure political stability at home. ' In 
addition to this, given the numerical superiority of the Axis 
over the Allies in army divisions and the perceived importance 
of denying the resources of South-East Europe to the Germans, 
the inclusion in the war on the Allied side of as many of the 
Balkan states as possible, or, in other words, the creation 
'Indeed, they were busily building up their force in 
Syria to a strength of around 15-20,000 men for just such a 
purpose (PRO WO 169/3, Vol. I, 7th Meeting MEJPS, 31 August 
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and maintenance of a front in the east, was viewed in Paris as 
fundamental to strategy. ' The illustrious General Weygand had 
therefore been recalled to service in late August to 
coordinate the French military missions in the Balkan 
countries and to organise plans to assist in the defence of 
the region by means of the despatch of an expeditionary force, 
drawn from the forces under his command in the Levant, to 
Salonika. in northern Greece. 2 It was by no means certain, of 
course, that the Germans would invade the Balkans and create 
the f ront in the east that the French wanted them to, but 
General Gamelin, France's top military man, hoped that an 
active Allied policy in the area, including obvious 
preparations for the despatch of a force to Salonika, would 
compel the Germans to attack into South-East Europe, thereby 
bringing new forces in on the Allied side, possibly creating 
friction between Germany and Italy and Russia, and, most 
importantly, keeping the war away from France itself. 3 
The British and French were thus set at odds over policy and 
strategy in South-East Europe. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that the Balkan question came up at the first meeting of the 
Supreme War Council on 12 September. Chamberlain and 
Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, expressed 
concern at the recent high profile visit of General Weygand to 
Ankara, the Turkish capital, fearing that this might create 
the impression that a Balkan bloc was being constructed 
against Italy. General Gamelin replied that precautions had 
to be made to meet the possibility of Italian intervention, to 
which the Prime Minister responded, winning the agreement of 
his French counterpart, Daladier, that these plans should be 
kept 'well in the background'. The fundamental question of 
what Allied policy in the Balkans should be, however, was not 
4 yet tackled in any depth. 
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Meanwhile, Halifax, who feared that 
there was a possibility that if war were to spread to the 
Balkans, this would enable Signor Mussolini to make the 
idea of war on the side of Germany more acceptable to 
Italian opinion, by explaining that it had been rendered 
necessary on a purely Balkan issue, ' 
had decided to act to strengthen support for the new British 
policy for South-East Europe. He argued in a memorandum dated 
12 September that the key to maintaining Italian neutrality 
was to avoid allowing Germany to improve its military 
position, and, as the COS had stated that, in their opinion, 
the entry of Balkan states into the war would allow it to do 
so, the only sensible course was to aim to maintain the 
neutrality of those countries. The Foreign Secretary admitted 
that this would allow Germany to draw important supplies from 
the region, such as Romanian oil, but pointed out that the 
level of Balkan supplies reaching the Reich would probably be 
greater if the German Army were given an excuse by the Allies 
to annex the countries of origin. He therefore advocated that 
Britain should seek to encourage the formation of a neutral 
Balkan bloc as the best means of keeping war out of the area. 2 
He subsequently defended this position in Cabinet, stressing 
that Italian neutrality was far more valuable that Balkan 
alliances, and his colleagues approved his plan. 3 
On 16 September, Halifax met with the French ambassador, 
Charles Corbin, who had been asked by his government to raise 
the issue of Allied policy in the Balkans with the Foreign 
Secretary. The French still advocated sending a force to 
Salonika, but at least now agreed with the British that before 
any such scheme were put into operation, the likely Italian 
response to it would have to be known. In the event of a 
demarche being made in Rome to ascertain this, Paris felt that 
it should be made clear to the Italian Government that the 
proposed Allied action was directed against German 
'PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 135, Halifax to Phipps, 14 
September 1939. 
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imperialism, which the French argued the Italians had as much 
reason to oppose as the Allies. Such an approach, moreover, 
would help to elucidate Italian intentions, whereas 
The present uncertainty exposed us to the risk of giving 
the initiative to the enemy. If Italian neutrality were 
sincere, she could not oppose this plan unless she were 
really favourable to the idea of German expansion in the 
Balkans. 
Corbin continued, 
The basis of Italian policy was prudence, prudence which 
dictated that Italy should always be ready to join the 
stronger state at any moment. It was therefore necessary 
to give Italy an impression of strength and determination 
even to the extent of bluffing, or rather of appearing to 
undertake more than we really intended. ' 
Corbin Is comments do much to clarify French views in regard to 
the possible repercussions for Italian foreign policy of the 
adoption of a vigorous Balkan strategy by the Allies. The 
French desire for such a strategy did not denote any weakening 
of Paris, willingness or desire to keep Italy out of the war, 
but rather its refusal to accept that an Allied intervention 
in the Balkans clearly aimed at opposing German expansion in 
the region would probably drag Italy in on Hitler's side. 
Indeed, as the French ambassador argued, it was hoped that a 
vigorous approach by the Allies to the Balkan question might 
fortify Italian neutrality by giving an impression of Anglo- 
French strength. This certainly sits somewhat uneasily with 
a French policy towards Italy that in almost all other 
respects was every bit as conciliatory in character as that of 
the British Government, but this merely highlights how vital 
the existence of a second f ront was perceived to be by the 
French. 
Despite this latest plea, the British COS remained opposed to 
French plans. In addition to the political consideration of 
Italian neutrality which had been stressed thus far, they now 
attacked the Salonika scheme on specific military grounds. 
Not only would Salonika be especially difficult to supply in 
the event of Italy joining the war, but it also suffered from 
'PRO CAB 80/2, Paper 34,16 September 1939. 
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poor topographical and climatic conditions, which had been at 
least partly responsible for the problems the Allies had 
experienced there in the Great War. Instead, the COS only 
envisaged countering a German drive into South-East Europe in 
the early stages of the war by defending Turkey. ' They 
therefore determined on 19 September that it was 'essential to 
counteract attempts by the French to dictate the Allied 
strategy' in the Balkans. 2 
Thus within just two weeks of the outbreak of war with 
Germany, the Allies found themselves at loggerheads over 
strategy for South-East Europe, with the question of Italian 
non-belligerence placed at the centre of the dispute by the 
British. So important was the concept of a second front to 
the French, however, especially af ter the fall of Poland in 
late September, that they were to continue to push London for 
the adoption of a more vigorous Balkan strategy for many 
months yet. 
Propaganda and the Press 
At the centre of British policy towards Italy was the desire 
to increase pro-Allied sentiment and belief in the growing 
strength of the Allies amongst the Italian people and 
government, and one way in which this could be achieved was 
through the organised dissemination or suppression of 
information. The British were fully aware of the importance 
of propaganda and the press in this context, but they eschewed 
the kind of vigorous propaganda offensive with which their 
Nazi enemies are commonly associated, preferring instead to 
adopt a more tentative approach. 
The influence of the Foreign Office was naturally paramount in 
deciding propaganda policy towards Italy and its chief 
objective was to prevent the dissemination, both at home and 
'PRO CAB 80/2, Paper 35,18 September 1939, pp. 11-12 
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abroad, of information likely to damage Anglo-Italian 
relations. This put the FO at loggerheads with the military 
establishment in the Middle East, for whom anti-Italian 
propaganda was an important part of their strategic plans. A 
request from the Middle East Intelligence Centre for its role 
to be expanded to incorporate the dissemination of propaganda 
material was therefore refused by the JIC, on which the FO had 
a representation, at the end of October 1939,1 but General 
Wavell returned to the issue in February 1940. In a 
memorandum for the JIC, he bemoaned the ban on the 
dissemination of anti-Italian propaganda to the tribes of 
Abyssinia and Libya who, it was hoped, could be encouraged to 
rise up against their Italian masters if war broke out between 
the Allies and Italy. Wavell ominously warned that the longer 
'our present inactive policy continues, the smaller the 
prospects become of causing embarrassment to the Italians 
through tribal action', and pointed out that both the French 
and the Italians themselves were conducting propaganda 
offensives aimed at discrediting their potential enemies 
amongst the peoples of northern and eastern Africa. 2 The JIC 
discussed Wavell's paper in mid February, but, led by the FO 
representative in the chair, French propaganda was dismissed 
as 'not serving any very useful purpose,, and it was agreed 
that 'it was undesirable to make active preparations for 
British propaganda among the tribes in Abyssinia and Libya at 
present-. 3 Fear of of f ending Rome thus won out over the 
interests of military strategy, and it was not until just a 
few days before Italy entered the war that the Foreign Office 
finally agreed to measures to counter Italian propaganda in 
Africa. ' 
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The FO was just as keen to block the leakage of anti-Italian 
information at home as it was overseas. It was therefore 
alarmed at a less than flattering account of Italian military 
prowess written by David Lloyd George, the former Prime 
Minister, for the Sunday Express early in the war, going so 
far as to bring it to the attention of the War Cabinet. ' 
Mussolini was known to be highly sensitive to the foreign 
press, summaries of which he read twice a day, and especially 
2 to slurs on Italy's military prowess, so the reaction from 
Whitehall to the Lloyd George article was swif t, Loraine being 
instructed to apologise to the Italians and to disassociate 
His Majesty's Government from it entirely. Press control was 
not imposed, but newspaper editors were asked I to exercise 
particular discretion in their references to Italy'. 3 
Nevertheless, pieces derogative of Italy continued to appear 
spasmodically in the British press, but, in the absence of 
tight press censorship, which those at the Southern Department 
of the FO occasionally lamented, ' there was little that could 
be done other than to apologise every time such an article 
appeared. 
The embarrassment caused by the Lloyd George article led to 
guidelines being drawn up for the treatment of Italy in the 
British press and covering the broader issue of propaganda in 
Italy. These were fairly predictable, ranging from avoiding 
negative comments about the Italian people or government, 
through praising the achievements of the Fascist regime, to 
playing up Germanic perfidy and Allied strength. ' A 
favourable reaction could certainly be expected to at least 
'PRO CAB 65/1,12th Meeting, 11 September 1939,2nd 
minute. 
2 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 6. 
3 PRO FO 371/23819, R7349/399/22, telegram to Loraine, 
10 September 1939. 
4For example, see PRO FO 371/23788, R10346/1/22, minute 
by Noble, 18 November 1939. 
5PRO FO 371/23804, R7836/41/22, memo by Martelli, 17 
September 1939. 
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some of this in Rome, but in making the prime objective of 
British propaganda to show 'Britain as the champion of smaller 
and weaker peoples who wish only the right to lead their 
lives', London ensured that its propaganda spoke convincingly 
mainly to the already converted,, ' and severely jaundiced its 
case in Mussolini's eyes in particular, given the Duce's view 
that the weak must inevitably bow to the will of the strong. 
Furthermore, at the heart of British propaganda policy, as the 
Minister for Information stated in a report to the War Cabinet 
in late September, was the belief that truth will be found to 
be the best policy'. This inexorably meant that the success 
of British publicity will largely depend on our achievements 
in the various f ields of war-like activity, both military, 
political and economic', 2 and so effectively denied British 
propagandists much scope to have any real impact upon Italian 
foreign policy in their own right. 
In any case, it was swiftly decided that the organised 
dissemination of information in Italy by the British was to be 
kept within fairly limited bounds for fear that excessive 
distribution would cause a backlash. Loraine's influence was 
naturally very important in deciding this, and in a letter 
dated 9 October he told Sir Campbell Stuart, the man in London 
directly responsible for propaganda policy towards Italy, 
that, 'on balance, for the moment, I would prefer nothing much 
to be done in any form'. This was because the situation in 
Italy was delicate and the sort of propaganda which might "go 
down" in Milan would at the moment be tactless in Genoa, fatal 
in Rome, or a joke in Naples I. 3 This essentially passive 
approach was not to the liking of many, and the Foreign office 
files contain a number of letters and telegrams suggesting 
that a more active policy be adopted to counter German 
propaganda in Italy. It was far from easy to give effect to 
'Cole, R., 'The Other 'Phoney War': British propaganda 
in neutral Europe, September-December 19391 in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 22 (1987), pp. 459,476. 
PRO CAB 68/1, Paper 15,21 September 1939, p. 6. 
3 PRO FO 1011/205, Loraine to Stuart, 9 October 1939, 
p. 2. 
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these calls, however, as the following three examples 
illustrate. 
In early October, Loraine himself raised the idea of providing 
Rome with statistical information on British resources to 
counteract recent German propaganda belittling Allied military 
strength. Noble of the Southern Department thought this had 
potential, and, the following day, Loraine went into more 
detail about exactly what he had in mind. He urged that the 
Italians be given such detailed information as the exact 
number of British divisions deployed in France and the number 
of aircraft available for the protection of merchant vessels 
at sea. Philip Nichols, the Head of the Southern Department 
at the Foreign Office, was somewhat taken aback and minuted 
that the type of information Sir Percy wanted to provide 
'would hardly be supplied to an active ally of His Majesty's 
Government', let alone to a country which was still officially 
allied to the enemy. ' Unsurprisingly, therefore, the War 
Cabinet decided that the kind of information Loraine had in 
mind could not be released to the Italians, and that Rome 
should only receive 'particulars of a general nature regarding 
our naval and military strength .2 
A second idea for adopting a more active propaganda policy 
towards Italy was that of increasing the circulation of the 
Osserva tore Romano, the Vatican Is newspaper, which was opposed 
to intervention and more independent than the rest of the 
Italian press, by secretly funding distribution of it to 
parish priests. This scheme was generally well received 
within the Southern Department, but D'Arcy Osborne, the 
British representative to the Holy See, effectively ensured 
its rejection by warning that it would be resented by the 
Vatican as dangerously compromising and would increase Fascist 
'PRO FO 371/23820, R8577/399/22, telegram from Loraine 
minute by Noble, 8&9 October 1939 & FO 371/23821, 
R8643/399/22, telegram from Loraine & minute by Nichols, 9 
11 October 1939. 
2 PRO CAB 65/1,44th Meeting, 11 October 1939,7th 
minute. 
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hostility towards and suspicion of both the paper and Britain 
should the secrecy which was to surround the operation ever be 
compromised. ' 
Finally, in February 1940, Loraine, who was clearly now 
beginning to query his own advice of early October 1939 that 
the dissemination of information in Italy was to be kept 
within tight limits, twice appealed for the implementation as 
soon as possible of certain improvements in the distribution 
of British propaganda in Italy. Firstly, the ambassador 
wanted British newspapers to be widely and freely distributed 
throughout Italy to counter the German and Fascist press. 
Official British publications were already being disseminated, 
but these were treated with some suspicion by the Italians, a 
response which Sir Percy was confident the famously free 
British press would not elicit. Secondly, he urged that the 
British begin medium-wave radio broadcasts to Italy as, at 
present, British broadcasts, unlike German, were made on a 
short-wave frequency which could only be picked up by 
expensive wireless sets. 2 Lord Perth, British ambassador to 
Italy in the 1930s and now working at the Ministry of 
Information, wrote to Loraine on 4 March informing him that 
the newspaper scheme would go ahead but that the radio scheme 
would not be so easy to put into practice due to the need to 
utilise a French station to relay medium-wave broadcasts to 
Italy. 3 The decision was duly taken to approach the French 
for use of one of their stations, but it was not until 19 
April that they agreed to British proposals, and just four 
days later, the Italians began to interfere with the new 
'PRO FO 371/23788, R10620/1/22, Nichols to Perth, 5 
December 1939 &: R12093/1/22, Osborne to Nichols, 21 December 
1939. 
2 PRO FO 371/24960, R1805/980/22, Loraine to Reith, 2 
February 1940 & R2664/980/22, Loraine to Perth, 21 February 
1940. 
3 PRO FO 371/24960, R2900/980/22, Perth to Loraine, 4 
March 1940. 
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British medium-wave transmissions so as to render them 
inaudible. ' 
Thus Britain pursued a largely straightforward, unimaginative 
propaganda policy in Italy during that country's period of 
non-belligerence, the mainstay of the effort being daily 
newscasts in Italian. ' British propaganda, at least in its 
own right, therefore did little to influence Italian views in 
a manner beneficial to the Allied cause, though before this is 
criticised too severely, two crucial points should be borne in 
mind. First, it was clear that German propaganda in Italy was 
in a far stronger position than British because of the 
existence of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Italo-German 
Cultural Treaty of 1938, and because the Italians who oversaw 
the dissemination of information within Italy, most 
particularly Mussolini himself, were better disposed towards 
the Nazis than the Allies. 3 Second, and most important, Ciano 
informed the French ambassador early in the war that for the 
Allies to direct a propaganda campaign towards Italy would be 
a waste of time, as the only propaganda that mattered was 
military victory. ' In the absence of this, or at least 
without the convincing prospect of such, British propaganda 
towards Italy was probably inevitably doomed to impotence. 
'PRO FO 371/24960, R5049/980/22, telegram from Campbell 
&: Charles to Halifax, 19 & 30 April 1940. 
PRO CAB 68/1, Paper 15,21 September 1939, p. 4. 
3 PRO FO 371/24937, R6387/57/22, memo by press attach6 
at Rome Embassy, 6 May 1940, p. 3. 
4 Reynaud, P., In the Thick of the Fight 1930-1945 
(London, 1955), p. 398. 
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CHAPTER THREE - SEPTEMBER TO OCTOBER 1939 
Britain and Italian Foreign Policy 
Having decided to accept Italy's declaration of non- 
belligerence, the British Government had effectively chosen to 
adopt an essentially reactive approach to its relations with 
Rome, in that its own policy towards Italy would henceforth 
inevitably depend to a large extent upon the foreign policy 
which was being pursued, or at least which seemed to London to 
be being pursued, by the Italian Government. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that a very close watch was kept on 
Italian activities, and that Rome's position in relation to 
the Allies and to Germany was constantly being assessed from 
September onwards. 
In the war's opening weeks, indications from Italy were 
generally encouraging. The British could take comfort, for 
example, f rom the f act that correspondence between senior 
British and Italian f igures in the early weeks of war was 
cordial or even friendly. Halifax wrote Ciano an official 
goodwill message on 8 September, for example, thanking Italy 
for its last ditch efforts to save the peace and expressing 
the hope that the British and Italian governments could work 
together for common ends in the coming months, 1 and the reply 
was both congenial and encouraging. ' Similarly, Chamberlain 
corresponded personally with Count Grandi, the former Italian 
ambassador to Britain and now Minister of Justice in Rome, in 
the warmest terms in the war's early weeks. ' 
Early British reports from Italy were positive also. Loraine 
reported on 5 September, for example, that, I Signor Mussolini, 
as a Fascist and a realist, will sit on the fence as long as 
'DDI, 9th Series, Vol. I; No. 110, Halifax to Ciano, 8 
September 1939, p. 70. 
2 Ciano, Papers, Ciano to Halifax, 14 September 1939, 
pp. 305-6. 
3 BUL NC 7/11/32, correspondence between Chamberlain 
Grandi, 1& 13 September, 10 & 24 October 1939. 
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he can'. He surmised that the King, Count Ciano, and Marshal 
Badoglio, Italy's Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces 
and top military professional, all opposed entering the war, 
though other individuals of lesser, though still significant, 
importance, such as Dino Alfieri, the Minister for Press and 
Propaganda, and Achille Starace, the Chairman of the Fascist 
Party, f avoured j oining the Germans. 1 As for the Italian 
people, the Consul in Florence produced a memo on 15 September 
on public opinion in Italy in which he commented that 'people 
are saying quite openly - and with ever increasing emphasis - 
that the order to march (especially on the side of Germany) 
will be the signal for revolt'. 2 This may have been slightly 
melodramatic, but its general thrust was supported by a report 
from Loraine a few days later. Thanks to its opposition to 
intervention and disassociation with Italy's pro-German 
foreign policy, the House of Savoy appeared to be on the rise 
with the Italian public at the expense of the Fascist regime. 
There was bad feeling between the two, and there had even been 
clashes between the Army and the Fascist militia. 3 On top of 
this, material factors continued, of course, to militate 
powerfully against Italian involvement in the war at this 
stage, Loraine pointing out that 'the Army and Air Forces were 
unprepared; that no unusual activities had been observed in 
the factories; that the economic and financial position was in 
4 a bad state and that stocks of raw material were short'. 
All this led Sir Percy to adopt a generally optimistic line in 
regard to future Italian policy. As early as 13 September, 
for example, he informed Halifax that recent conversations 
with Ciano had convinced him that there was a hope, 'however 
slender' at this stage, of Italy returning to the side of the 
'PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 30, telegram from Loraine, 
5 September 1939. 
2 PRO FO 371/23798, R7731/9/22, memo by Consul in 
Florence, 11 September 1939. 
3 PRO FO 371/23798, R7743/9/22, telegram from Loraine, 
15 September 1939. 
4 PRO FO 371/23820, R8181/399/22, Loraine to Nichols, 25 
September 1939. 
89 
Allies as in 1915, and -a fortnight later he wrote that, so 
long as Britain avoided I making mistakes with Italy ... and 
provided that we do not look like losing the war, I have an 
idea that Italy will veer insensibly towards us and away from 
the Germans'. ' 
Those in government circles in London, however, generally 
remained rather more cautious at this early stage. Although 
Halifax informed the Greek Minister in mid September that our 
information all went to show that the Italians were genuinely 
concerned to keep out of the war at any rate for the 
2 present I, he told the War Cabinet on the 19th that he was 
concerned that the Italian Government might be deceiving 
3 Britain as to its real attitude. Cadogan felt that 'Italy is 
merely waiting to see which side wins I, and was concerned that 
events in Poland were making it look like Germany would be 
victorious, 4 while John Colville, then working in the Eastern 
Department of the Foreign office, noted on 11 September that, 
In general the impression to be gained at the F. O. is not 
as encouraging as that which the newspapers give. it 
seems likely that Mussolini's neutrality is very much of 
a put-up job and that he is still on the best and most 
intimate terms with Hitler. ' 
Despite these suspicions of Italy, though, the great majority 
in London shared Loraine's belief that Italian intervention 
was not imminent. Too much confidence was placed in the 
factors restraining Mussolini to believe that he could or 
'PRO FO 1011166, Loraine to Halifax, 13 September 1939, 
p. 7 & 27 September 1939, p. 2. 
2 PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 100, Halifax to Palairet, 
15 September 1939. 
3 PRO CAB 65/1,20th Meeting, 19 September 1939,13th 
minute. 
4 Cadogan, A., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadocran 
1938-1945, ed. D. Dilks (London, 1971), 6 September 1939, 
p. 214. 
5Colville, J., The Fringes of Power: Downing Street 
diaries - Vol. 1: 1939-October 1941 (London, 1985), 11 
September 1939, pp. 21-2. 
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would bring Italy in without a fundamental change of some kind 
in the war situation, even at this early stage. ' 
It is interesting to compare these initial British views with 
the reality of the situation in Italy in the opening weeks of 
the war. As regarded the stance on intervention of the key 
Italian individuals, Loraine's surmisals were broadly correct, 
though he seriously underestimated Mussolini's desire to 
fight. Filippo Anfuso, Ciano's PPS, later recorded in his 
memoirs, for example, - that, 'In those ten months, up to May, 
1940,1 always found Mussolini in-the state of mind of a man, 
who having decided not to enter the game, is nevertheless 
determined to get into it as soon as he has gathered his 
strength'. 2 This lust to intervene militarily was conditioned 
by several factors, presented here in no particular order. 
First, there was a fear of being considered a traitor by his 
German ally, a concern that was great-enough to lead him to 
entreat Hitler on 1 September to release Italy from its 
3 
obligation to fight under the terms of the Pact of Steel . 
Second, the Duce was desperate to wipe away what he saw as the 
indignity of non-belligerence. As one historian has put it, 
after having assumed a warlike attitude for years, after 
having glorified war as the supreme act in the life of a 
people, what humiliation in front of the world, in front 
of Hitler especially, to have to declare that Italy was 
4 not ready to face the test'. 
Finally, Mussolini was convinced that for Fascist Italy to 
prove its status as a Great Power, it must intervene in a war 
'For example, see BLO MSS Simon 11, diary entry for 10 
September 1939, f. 21 & BUL NC 18/1/1121, Neville to Hilda 
Chamberlain, 17 September 1939, f. 2. 
2 As cited in Kirkpatrick, I., Mussolini: Studv of a 
demacTocrue (London, 1964), p. 420. 
3 Shirer, W. L., The Rise and Fall-of the Third Reich, 
(London, 1959), pp. 603-4. Hitler duly complied. 
4F dopo aver assunto per anni attegiamenti bellicosi, 
dopo aver glorificato la guerra come liatto supremo nella 
vita di un popolo, quale umiliazione di, fronte al mondo, di 
fronte a Hitler soprattutto, dover dichiarare che 111talia 
non e pronta ad affrontare la prova! '; Andr6, ILa Politica 
Esteral, p. 117. 
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between Germany and the Allies which promised to decide the 
fate of Europe. ' 
Unsurprisingly, Mussolini's burning desire to lead his country 
in war and boost Italian power and prestige was exploited by 
the Fuehrer. Although Hitler doubted from the start of the 
war that Mussolini would intervene before Germany had attacked 
in the West, 2 he was keen to get the Italians into the war at 
some point, valuing their navy and the psychological impact of 
their intervention. He sought to pave the way for this by, at 
almost every opportunity, emphasising his confidence in a 
German victory, dangling the possibility of spoils in the 
Balkans and Mediterranean before Mussolini's eyes, and 
stressing his conviction that the fate of Italy and the 
Fascist regime was inextricably linked to that of Germany and 
the Nazi regime. ' 
In the early months of the war, however, practical factors 
were, as the British appreciated, sufficient to restrain 
Mussolini's war-like urges, forcing him to admit to Ciano on 
16 October that there was no possibility of entering the war 
before June or July 1940, and that, even then, intervention 
would be highly doubtful due to lack of supplies. 4A major 
problem for the Duce was that the Italian public was 
vehemently opposed to intervention and anti-German. Marshal 
Badoglio comments in his memoirs that the Italian people would 
have preferred a frank declaration of neutrality that would 
have been more difficult to go back on than the ill-defined 
state of non-belligerence, s and Ciano wrote on 13 September 
that 'the country is and remains fundamentally anti-German. 
'Ciano, Diary, 24 September 1939, p. 157. 
2Schreiber, G., Stegemann, B. & Vogel, D., Germany and 
the Second World War - Vol. 3: The Mediterranean, South-Ea 
Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford, 1995), p. 41. 
Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, pp. 420-1. 
Ciano, Diar , 16 October 1939, p. 167. 
5 Badoglio, P., Italy in the Second World War:. Memories 
and documents (London, 1948), p. 10. 
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Germanophiles can be counted on the fingers of one hand' .1 
Militarily, the prospects for intervention were even worse. 
For example, the defences on the border with France were poor 
and believed to be unlikely to be able to withstand a French 
assault, and the Army had just ten divisions up to first line 
strength, the other 35 being under-strength and ill-equipped. 2 
Even the Italian Navy, the best prepared of the three 
Services, had a string of serious weaknesses, from a shortage 
of destroyers to inadequate stocks. 3 Indeed, an Italian 
report produced early in the war confirmed that the armed 
forces were inferior to those with which the country had gone 
to war in 1915! 4 There were, as Marshal Rodolfo Graziani 
pointed out in his memoirs, 'Deficiencies in every field: in 
raw materials, in production, in armaments'. 5 Moreover, it 
was extremely unlikely that these shortfalls would be able to 
be made up with any speed thanks to Italy's weak industrial 
base, poor supply of skilled labour, and virtual bankruptcy 
thanks to the wars in Spain and Abyssinia which had all but 
obliterated the reserves of foreign currency so crucial to the 
purchase of strategic raw materials. 6 
Crucially, though, every effort was being made to rectify 
Italy's military deficiencies from the very start of the war. 
One of the few advantages that Mussolini saw in Italian 
neutrality was the opportunity 'to gather economic and 
military strength, so that we could intervene effectively at 
the proper moment', 7 and he therefore ordered an increase in 
'Ciano, Diar , 13 September 1939, p. 151. 
2 Ciano, Dia , 10 & 18 September 1939, pp. 149-50,155. 
3 Mallett, Italian Navy, pp. 169-73. 
4 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empirg, pp. 198-9. 
5 'Deficienze in ogni Campo: nelle materie prime, nella 
produzione, negli armamentil; Graziani, R., Ho Difeso la . 
Patria (Milan, 1951), p. 179. 
6 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 30-1. 
Ciano, Diar ,4 September 1939, p-145. 
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all armaments production shortly after the outbreak of war. ' 
As a consequence, during the first six months of the conflict, 
the Italians imported from the USA alone nearly five-sixths 
the total value of their imports for the whole of 1938, 
completely reversing the former policy of husbanding dwindling 
reserves of foreign exchange by restricting imports. ' 
In mid September, two new developments were well received by 
the British Foreign Secretary. On the 15th, Halifax was 
pleased to learn that Rome had suggested to Athens a mutual 
withdrawal from the Albanian border, agreement upon which was 
swiftly reached, and seemed keen to improve Italo-Greek 
relations in general. 3 Then, on 16 September, the Foreign 
Secretary informed the War Cabinet that the Anglophile 
Giuseppe Bastianini was shortly to arrive in London as Count 
Grandi's successor as the Italian ambassador, an appointment 
which he described as a compliment to this country'. 4 
More worrying for the British were reports of certain Italian 
military preparations around this time, such as the 
reinforcement of Libya, but these were considered by the COS 
to be purely defensive, 5 and, in any event, when news came 
through that Italian soldiers would be granted leave for the 
harvest, Noble minuted, 'This is significant; the Italians 
would hardly be releasing men from the colours if they were 
contemplating an immediate attack'. 6 
I Mallett, Italian Navy, p. 166. 
2 Toynbee, A. &: V. M. (eds. ), The Initial Triumph of the 
Axis (London, 1958), p. 217. 
3 PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, Nos. 100 111, Halifax to 
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4 PRO CAB 65/1,17th Meeting, 16 September 1939,12th 
minute. 
5 PRO CAB 6611, Paper 30,15 September 1939, pp. 11-12. 
6 PRO FO 371/23811, R7776/86/22, telegram from Loraine & 
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The Soviet invasion of Poland and the subsequent rapid 
collapse of the eastern front caused a considerable amount of 
alarm in London in regard to Italian policy. On 21 September, 
Loraine reported that, 'The general tone of the press 
yesterday and to-day clearly indicates the possibility that 
Signor Mussolini is about to launch a peace campaign, and that 
the blame for its failure is to be thrown on Great Britain'. 1 
Anxiety can only have mounted when it was discovered that 
Ciano had been sent to Berlin on 1 October, though the British 
Government's greatest concern was not that an Allied rejection 
of any peace moves would result in Italian intervention, but 
that it would enable Berlin to make London and Paris appear in 
Italian eyes to be the real warmongerers. ' 
It was no doubt fortunate for the British, therefore, that 
Mussolini decided to remain aloof from Hitler's peace 
offensive. That this was the case had more to do with the 
Germans and Russians than the Italians, however. Prevented by 
practical factors from entering the fray militarily, Mussolini 
had soon latched onto the idea of arbitrating a negotiated 
peace. This did not spring from any yearning for peace per 
se, but rather from the desire to escape from the humiliation 
of having to remain aloof from the war for the foreseeable 
future, 3 and perhaps to regain some of the prestige he had 
forfeited by not fighting by taking the lead in arranging a 
settlement of European affairs as he had done at Munich. ' As 
early as 6 September, therefore, the Duce had been looking 
-forward to the possibility of mediating between the Nazis and 
'PRO FO 434/6, Part XIX, No. 34, telegram from Loraine, 
21 September 1939. 
2 PRO CAB 65/1,35th Meeting, 3 October 1939,7th 
minute. 
Ciano, Diar , 24 September 1939, p. 157. 
4 For the fact that Mussolini considered it important 
that any peace that were reached should reflect glory upon 
himself, see The Times, 9 November 1939, p-7, col. 5, 
highlighting Italy's swiftly evident lack of support for the 
peace offensive launched by the rulers of Holland and 
Belgium at that time. 
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the Allies once Poland had fallen, ' and Rome had consequently 
begun to put pressure on Berlin to put forward a generous 
peace offer, the core of which should be the reconstitution of 
some form of Polish national state, something which the 
Italians considered essential if the Allies were ever going to 
be induced to make peace. 2 It had soon become clear, however, 
that this was the one thing the Germans could not easily offer 
thanks to the pre-war agreements made with the Soviet Union 
which resulted in the formal division of Poland between the 
USSR and Germany at the end of September. 
The Duce's hopes of playing the mediator had taken a severe 
knock, 3 and they can not have rallied when he was appraised of 
the course of the impromptu meeting between Hitler and Ciano 
in Berlin on 1 October. Italy's Foreign Minister had been 
invited to the German capital just the day before, and the 
Fuehrer primarily used the meeting not to enlist Rome's 
support for a peace offensive, but to try to convince the 
Italians of the desirability of intervening militarily at some 
point. Hitler showed little interest in the possibility of a 
peace settlement, unless it were on his terms, and bluntly 
informed Ciano that his forthcoming Reichstag speech would be 
the last chance he gave the Allies to end to the war without 
4 a major clash of arms . On 6 October, Hitler 
duly made his 
speech offering peace on his terms, which, aware of the 
Allies' probable response, the Italian Government chose not to 
support, and the British and French promptly rejected it. 
Mussolini was depressed that an opportunity for him to recover 
some prestige had passed and that the ignominy of neutrality 
would continue. ' 
'Ciano, Diary, 6 September 1939, p. 146. 
2 DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 127, memorandum by 
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Ciano, Diary, 29 September 1939, pp. 160-1. 
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The collapse of Polish resistance led Loraine to muse further 
upon Mussolini's views. This was no easy task, however, for, 
throughout the entire period of Italian non-belligerence, 
Mussolini did not consent to a single meeting with the British 
ambassador, or, for that matter, with his French counterpart. 
It was further complicated, moreover, by the fact that the 
Duce operated in the early months of the war very much in the 
background, leaving centre stage to Ciano. 1 On 30 September, 
Loraine, perhaps depressed by the Polish collapse, rather 
forebodingly reported that, 'Musso is said to be in a state of 
great depression realising that he has dropped into a position 
by no means calculated to preserve the respect of the world 
and he may be thinking that he had better come in on the 
winning side while there is time,. 2 By 5 October, however, he 
was opining that Mussolini was wary of an Allied or a Nazi 
3 victory, and, shortly afterwards, doubtless reassured by 
Rome's aloofness from any German peace offensive, stated his 
conviction that Ciano's consistent anti-German and pro-Allied 
hints in conversation with him indicated that Mussolini 
approved of them, though Noble and Nichols back at the 
Southern Department in London were far from convinced that 
this was necessarily the case. 4 
Loraine thus picked up on Mussolini's extreme discomfort with 
neutrality, though he still failed to appreciate the Duce'S 
desire to enter the war as soon as possible. He was right to 
sense tension in the Duce's relations with the Germans in the 
opening weeks of the war, however. Mussolini was angry with 
Hitler for having broken the agreement not to provoke a 
general war before 1942 and for having made the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact behind his back, and had therefore explained to his 
'Fran(; ois-Poncet, pp. 141-2. 
2 PRO FO 371/23798, R8271/9/22, Loraine to Halifax, 30 
September 1939. 
3 PRO FO 371/23821, R8681/399/22, telegram from Loraine, 
5 October 1939. 
4 PRO FO 371/23821, R8668/399/22, telegram from Loraine 
& minutes by Noble & Nichols, 10 & 11 October 1939. 
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ministers on 1 September that 'we are the "betrayed", not the 
"betrayers" I. ' This did not prevent Ciano from noting just 
three days later that 'The Duce expresses full solidarity with 
2 Germany, and this is what, he really feels though this in 
turn did not preclude the occasional fit of pique at the 
Germans' expense, such as in early October, when Ciano 
recorded that Mussolini 'is somewhat bitter about Hitler's 
sudden rise to fame. He would be greatly pleased if Hitler 
were slowed down'. 3 On the basis that actions speak louder 
than words, however, it would appear that the Duce remained 
essentially committed to the Axis in the opening weeks of the 
war. In early September, for example, he promised to forward 
to Berlin all the intelligence he could gather about the 
Allies, 4 and, at the end of the same month, he had, with some 
difficulty, to be dissuaded from taking the drastic step of 
acceding to a German request to use Italian submarine bases in 
the Mediterranean and to help in locating Allied convoys. ' 
Mussolini did promise, though, to do all he could to 
facilitate the passage via Italy of German imports and 
exports, though the value of this in practice was fairly small 
as it was explained that, in order to avoid the possibility of 
war with the Allies, only such deliveries could be considered 
as could be camouflaged and passed through the British 
control. In particular, it would be necessary to keep at 
"noi siamo dei lltraditiý', non dei "traditorif''; 
Bottai, G., Diario 1935-1944, ed. G. B. Guerri (Milan, 1982), 
1 September 1939, p. 157. 
2 Ciano, Diar ,4 September 1939, p. 144. Giuseppe Bottai, Italy's Minister of Education and a senior Fascist, 
reached a similar conclusion at around the same time, noting 
in his diary that 'Mussolini is still in the position of the 
Axis, PMussolini 6 ancora sulle posizioni dell'Assel; 
Bottai, Diario, 5 September 1939, p. 160). 
Ciano, Diary, 3 October 1939, p. 163. 
Mack Smith, D., Mussolini, (London, 1981), p. 279. 
5Ciano, Dia , 27 September 1939, p. 160. 
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least approximately within the limits of the past import 
statistics'. ' 
Throughout October, the general trend of information reaching 
London regarding the Italians continued to be reassuring. At 
the start of the month, it was learnt that Mussolini had 
declared to a group of Fascists in a private meeting on 23 
September that, 'Our policy was fixed in the declarations of 
September 1st and there is no reason to change it. It answers 
our national interests'. 2 Then, on 17 October, Halifax, 
reporting on his first meeting with the new Italian 
ambassador, Giuseppe Bastianini, remarked that, 'All his 
comments upon German policy and Herr Hitler seemed to be made 
from a standpoint of complete detachment, which would have 
been impossible for a representative of one of the Axis Powers 
a few months ago'. 3 Even the Italian press, which was tightly 
controlled by Mussolini, 4 had become less pro-German and anti- 
Allied. 5 Impressed by all this, and doubtless seeking to 
encourage further such developments, the British decided to 
grant de facto recognition of Albania's new status under 
direct Italian rule .6 Anglo-Italian relations clearly 
appeared to be improving, and this led Halifax to comment on 
20 October that 'It really looks, from a great variety of 
indications which all point the same way, as if we could, 
without feeling that we were victims of wishful thinking, rest 
pretty well assured that Italy was not coming in against us I. 7 
1 DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 277, telegram-from 
Mackensen & Clodius, 19 October 1939, pp. 317-18. 
2 PRO FO 371/23798, R8280/9/22, minute by Noble, 2 
October 1939. 
3 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 2, Halifax to Loraine, 17 
October 1939. 
4Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 212. 
5 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 3, Loraine to Halifax 
enclosure, 24 October 1939. 
6 Barker, p. 47. 
7 PRO FO 800/328, Hal/39/44, Halifax to Gort, 20 October 
1939. 
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Also on 20 October, Francis Rodd of the MEW, who had recently 
been in Italy assisting Loraine with trade and blockade 
negotiations, produced a memorandum detailing his impressions 
of the situation in Italy which impressed the Foreign 
Secretary sufficiently to have it circulated to the War 
Cabinet on the 24th. Rodd's main impression had been one of 
fear; fear that Germany would win the war and then launch a 
punitive expedition against Italy for not joining the Reich. 
He thought that Italy wanted to remain neutral but considered 
that 
the policy of keeping out of the war, whatever the 
economic advantages which are apparent to all, is no 
easier. A neutrality benevolent to Germany exposes Italy 
to economic pressure by the Allies without providing the 
money which is so necessary to keep the existing fabric 
going. Neutrality benevolent to the Allies exposes Italy 
to German reprisals and perhaps a military expedition to 
Trieste to secure a Mediterranean naval base. ' 
Italy's position was thus very precarious and the most obvious 
conclusion to be drawn from Roddls paper was that a 
fundamental shift in Italian policy either in favour of or 
against the Allies was unlikely unless the military situation 
developed to the marked advantage of one side or the other. 
A fundamental shift in Italian policy, then, could effectively 
be ruled out for the moment, but events in Rome at the end of 
October seemed to indicate that the Italian position was not 
entirely static either. Without warning, at least to foreign 
observers, Mussolini suddenly shuffled his government, the 
most notable victims being the long-serving, pro-German 
Starace, who was replaced as Chairman of the Fascist Party by 
Ettore Muti, and Dino Alfieri, a fellow pro-German who was 
moved from the important Ministry of Press and Propaganda to 
the ambassadorship to the Vatican. Indeed, as Sir Noel 
Charles, the British charg6 dI af f aires in Rome (Loraine was in 
London at the time), reported to Halifax on 1 November, 'Most, 
if not all, Ministers who have "resigned" ... were 
known to have 
pro-German sympathies'. 2 
'PRO CAB 67/2, Paper 56,24 October 1939. 
2 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 7, telegram from Charles, 1 
November 1939. 
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The initial British response to events in Rome was 
surprisingly muted. Charles, perhaps influenced by the fact 
that Ciano had told the French ambassador that the ministerial 
changes would not affect Italian foreign policy, ' argued 
against too much being read into them, commenting that 'while 
it is all a step in the right direction we should not let 
ourselves run away with the idea that we have won the battle. 
Italy will only be guided by her material interest'. 2 
Cadogan, while clearly pleased with the changes, also chose 
not to place too great an emphasis upon them just yet, simply 
noting in his diary that they were 'All to the good'. 3 Noble 
was even more sanguine, noting unenthusiastically on 1 
November that 'The "change of the guard" is a regular part of 
Signor Mussolini's technique'. ' 
It is not entirely clear what the Cabinet reshuffle of late 
October actually signified, though it would appear that its 
origins lie in Mussolini's desire to remove Generals Pariani 
and Valle, the under-secretaries at the ministries of war and 
air respectively, as punishment for the deficiencies of the 
Army and Air Force. 5 This does not explain the dismissal of 
the pro-German ministers, however, but the fact that the 
Italian Cabinet as it was reconstituted had so many friends 
and proteges of the Foreign Minister in it that it came to be 
called the 'Ciano Cabinet' 6 indicates that Mussolini's son-in- 
law successfully managed to exploit the Duce's desire for 
change f or his own ends. Given Ciano Is own sympathies and 
'PRO CAB 65/2,71st Meeting, 5 November 1939,5th 
minute. 
2 PRO FO 371/23798, R9855/9/22, Charles to Nichols, 1 
November 1939. 
Cadogan, Diaries, 31 October 1939, p. 228. 
4 PRO FO 371/23798, R9573/9/22, minute by Noble, 1 
November 1939. 
5De Felice, R., Mussolini il Duce - Vol- 2: Lo stato 
totalitario 1936-1940 (Turin, 1981), pp. 701-2. 
6Guerri, G. B., Galeazzo Ciano: Una vita 1903-1944 
(Milan, 1979), pp. 445-6. 
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objectives at this time, the reshuffle of the Italian 
Government can only, therefore, be seen as an attempt to 
distance Rome from Berlin somewhat, though it is perhaps 
unlikely that the Duce himself saw this as an aim of the 
I change of the guard I. Certainly, the Italian press was 
careful to try to quash the idea that the reshuffle signified 
a move towards the Allies, arguing that Fascism remained 
, obstinately anti-democratic'. ' 
The British thus had cause to be very satisfied with the trend 
of Italian policy in the opening weeks of the war. The 
prospects of Italian non-belligerence lasting seemed very 
good, Italy had remained aloof from Hitler's peace offensive 
of early October, and the ministerial changes in Rome and the 
arrival of Bastianini in London seemed to augur well for the 
future. There had not even been a hostile reaction to the 
conclusion of an Anglo- Franco -Turkish alliance on 19 October, 
a fact which amazed and worried some Germans 'given that the 
pact would have above all a Mediterranean significance and 
would constitute therefore a sword of Damocles suspended over 
possible Italian aims'. 2 In coming months, however, the 
opening weeks of the war would be looked back on as the high 
point of Anglo-Italian relations during Italy's period of non- 
belligerence as things were soon to begin to take a downward 
turn that would ultimately lead to conflict. 
'The Times, 2 November 1939, p. 7, col. 2. 
2j dato che il patto avrebbe soprattutto unlimportanza 
mediterranea e costuirebbe quindi una spada di Damocle 
sospesa su eventuali mire italiane'; DDI, 9th Series, Vol. 
I, No. 864, telegram from Attolico, 23 October 1939, p. 553- 
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Anglo-Italian Economic Relations 
Although the British had decided in the early days of the war 
that they would aim for formal agreements with the Italian 
Government on both the blockade and trade, during the opening 
months of the war, they decided to adopt a cautious approach, 
dealing with matters on a largely ad hoc basis, seeking to get 
a feel for the climate in Rome in regard to the prospects for 
formal agreements on economic issues, and holding back 
suggestions for comprehensive deals until such time as it was 
felt they would have the best chance of being accepted. The 
story of Anglo-Italian economic relations during the f irst 
four months of war is therefore rather fragmentary. 
To begin with the blockade, the order was finally given on 25 
September for full contraband control procedure to be put into 
operation throughout the world. ' This was followed, in early 
October, by the War Cabinet agreeing that, in spite of the 
adverse effect it might have in Italy, the interception and 
examination of mails on neutral vessels should be introduced 
in the interests of blockade poliCy. 2 Loraine had commented 
on 20 September that the Italians 'have shown no disposition 
to resent our control', 3 and, perhaps surprisingly, this 
initially appeared not to change after the introduction of 
these measures. This was possibly largely due to special 
assurances given to the Italian Government in early October 
that vessels outward bound from the Mediterranean would not 
normally be examined within the inland sea, and that vessels 
proceeding to the East or across the Atlantic would normally 
only be boarded to establish identity and destination, 4 
sensible concessions which reduced the number of times Italian 
'PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
Section II, pp. 6-7. 
2 PRO CAB 65/1,36th Meeting, 4 October 1939,10th 
minute. 
PRO CAB 66/1, Paper 49,25 September 1939, Annex III, 
p. 8. 
4 PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
Section II, P. 16. 
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ships were stopped for inspection without seriously 
undermining the exercise of contraband control in any way, as 
vessels outward bound from the Mediterranean destined for 
Germany or an adjacent neutral state would be stopped in 
British home waters, whilst ships heading across the Atlantic 
or into the Indian Ocean would be examined upon their return 
to Europe. 
Attempts to discuss contraband control with Rome in the early 
weeks of the war were made tentatively, but they had 
nonetheless resulted by mid October in the Italians stating 
that they were willing, as part of an agreement, to give a 
guarantee not to re-export to Germany goods of French or 
British origin. For the moment, Rome was not willing to 
undertake any definite commitments regarding the limitation of 
Italo-German trade in general, Britain's ideal goal, though 
the Italian Government had pointed out that Italy's own 
shortage of raw materials and the Reich's considerable deficit 
in Italo-German trade mitigated against large scale Italian 
sales to Germany anyway. ' To encourage further progress in 
these negotiations, it was decided that the prestigious 
inward-bound transatlantic Italian liners should temporarily 
be treated with special leniency. 2 
Contrary to the promising nature of these early developments 
in regard to the blockade, opening discussions in Rome about 
trade did not go well. The main problem at this stage was the 
form payment for increased British purchases in Italy should 
take. The Italian authorities initially asked for it in US 
dollars, but the Treasury was set against this, preferring 
instead to pay through the Anglo-Italian clearing 
arrangementl 3 so as to arrest the trend of this account 
'PRO FO 837/493, memo by Rodd, 12 October 1939, p. 4 
CAB 67/1, Paper 47,20 October 1939, pp. 3-4. 
2 PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
Section II, p. 10. 
3 This was an arrangement whereby Britain and Italy 
could purchase goods from each other at a predetermined 
exchange rate between the lira and the pound by building up 
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falling into arrears and to retain valuable and scarce foreign 
currency for purchases from countries with which Britain did 
not have a clearing agreement. ' Also at stake on this issue 
was the fact that payments in free currency would allow Italy 
access to goods from all over the world, a potentially 
dangerous situation in regard to the blockade and Italian 
military preparedness, whereas payments into a clearing 
account would restrict Italian purchases made using the 
profits of trade with Britain to British and Empire sources, 
thereby giving London a greater degree of control over Italian 
imports. Faced with a British rejection of their initial 
demand, the Italians soon softened their position, stating 
that they were prepared to accept half of the payment for 
their goods through clearing, but now insisting that the other 
half be paid for in free sterling at a guaranteed exchange 
rate, allegedly so that Italian manufacturers could buy the 
raw materials from non-British sources that they needed in 
order to produce the goods the British wanted to buy. 2 
At the end of September, Francis Rodd of the MEW and Edward 
Playfair of the Treasury arrived in Rome as special advisors 
to Loraine on economic issues, and their arrival coincided 
with something of an upturn in Anglo-Italian discussions. On 
6 October, for example, Loraine was able to report that the 
Italians had agreed, against expectations, that payment for 
increased British purchases should go through clearing, 3 and, 
the next day, he sent a telegram informing London that the 
Italian authorities had suggested the establishment of an 
Anglo-Italian Joint Standing Committee, along similar lines to 
one established between Italy and France some years ago, to 
credit in a clearing account which one country could then 
use to pay for goods from the other. 
'PRO T 160/936, F13456/02/1, telegram to Loraine, 20 
September 1939 & FO 371/23827, R7957/7058/22, telegram to 
Loraine, 22 September 1939. 
2 PRO T 160/936, F13456/02/1, telegram from Loraine, 26 
September 1939. 
3 PRO FO 371/23804, R8542/41/22, telegram from Loraine, 
6 October 1939. 
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deal with economic issues. ' This progress is perhaps largely 
explained by the fact that Italo-German trade talks had by 
this time reached a deadlock owing to German insistence on 
the Italians continuing to export against payment to the 
credit of Italy in clearing', 2 but little of concrete value 
had yet been achieved in Anglo-Italian trade, and Loraine 
urged that I It would, I think, now be advisable to get'through 
some large scale purchase as soon as possible, both for its 
political effect and to prevent clearing breaking down'. 3 
The French, meanwhile, following the advice of their 
ambassador in Rome, who shared with Loraine the belief that 
the best way to cement Italian neutrality was to show Rome 
that it was profitable, ' had adopted a much more vigorous 
approach to the issue of increasing trade with Italy than the 
British. This was partly because Paris had considerable 
economic, as well as political, reasons for wishing to boost 
its trade with Rome, as the French had as great a need of 
certain armaments which Italian industry could provide as 
Italy had of raw materials from French sources for its own 
5 rearmament programme. Following a French note on 6 September 
suggesting secret talks on commercial issues, Italian and 
French ministers had met at San Remo on 14-15 September and 
agreed a programme of economic exchanges worth no less than 
5,000 million francs, and encompassing the provision by Italy 
to France of important war materiel and by France to Italy of 
vital raw materials. Such rapid progress makes British policy 
look lacklustre, but it had only come at the price of giving 
way to an Italian demand that a large proportion of the French 
'PRO FO 371/23804, R8684/41/22, telegrams from Loraine, 
6,7 October 1939. 
2 PRO T 160/936, F13456/02/2, telegram from Loraine, 11 
October 1939. 
3 PRO ADM 116/4173, M. 013284/39, telegram from Loraine, 
8 October 1939. 
4 Frangois-Poncet, p. 140 & PRO FO 371/23820, 
R7686/399/22, telegram from Loraine, 17 September 1939. 
5 Guariglia, R., La Diplomatie Difficile: M6moires. 
1922-1946 (Paris, 1955), p. 135. 
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purchases should be paid for in precious dollars, a concession 
which so concerned London that Paris felt compelled to promise 
not to agree to any further dollar expenditures without 
British agreement. ' 
The progress of talks on Anglo-Italian trade thus far was 
reviewed at an interdepartmental meeting held at the MEW on 17 
October. Playfair, who had returned with Rodd from Rome to 
debrief, explained that all payments would be through clearing 
for purchases in the whole sterling area of the Empire, except 
for certain special cases in which payment would be in raw 
materials. As things stood, it appeared that Britain wanted 
to buy goods to the value of E15,000,000 per annum from Italy, 
but that the Italians wanted E40,000,000 worth of goods every 
2 year from Britain and the Empire . Given Treasury guidelines 
established at the start of the war that clearing arrangements 
'should not be used as a channel for lending to neutrals by 
the creation of a balance in our favourl, especially if 'the 
resources so acquired enabled the neutral to lend openly or 
disguisedly to the enemy', this meant that the bulk of the 
purchases the Italians wished to make would have to be payed 
for in free currency. In the light of the fact that Italian 
foreign exchange reserves were little more than half what they 
had been at the end of 1938, the probability was clearly that 
Italian purchases from British and Empire sources would only 
amount to around the level of British purchases from Italy. 
This might lead to a certain degree of frustration, perhaps 
even bitterness, on the part of the Italians, unless Britain 
was prepared greatly to increase the amount it wished to buy 
from Italy. However, as Playfair informed the meeting, 
departments were not at the moment being asked to buy from 
Italy what they did not need in order to increase the level of 
'Shorrock, pp. 273-4 & dlHoop, 'La Coop6ration Franco- 
Britanniquel, pp. 295-6. 
2 By way of comparison, pre-war commercial exchanges 
conducted through the Anglo-Italian clearing, which 
admittedly did not encompass all the trade between the two 
countries, had more or less balanced at around E4,000,000 
per year (PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 94). 
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British purchases. Rather, they were only being asked to buy 
I things that might otherwise be bought elsewhere in dollars or 
other currencies, and to buy as much of them as possible 
within the limits of the Clearing'. Even this might prove 
tricky, though, as it was noted that the Italians had shown 
little desire to market manufactured goods, with a few 
exceptions, such as gloves, but were instead keen to sell 
large quantities of agricultural produce. ' 
Shortly after this interdepartmental meeting, the MEW produced 
a report for the War Cabinet on Anglo-Italian economic 
relations. It affirmed that discussions had taken place in 
a completely friendly atmosphere', and strongly advocated the 
purchase of additional Italian goods f or war purposes, as 
'such purchases are of political importance as enabling the 
Italian Government to realise some of the benefits of 
neutrality' . Furthermore, as such purchases would 
be paid for 
by increasing sterling proceeds in the Anglo-Italian clearing 
fund, Britain would not only increase its control over what 
Italy could buy, but such purchases as the Italians made would 
be covered against re-export to Germany if the proposed 
Italian guarantee not to sell British or Empire imports on to 
the Reich could be incorporated into an agreement. 
The main point with which the MEW report dealt, though, was 
the Italian suggestion for a permanent Anglo-Italian committee 
at Rome. The Ministry had provisionally agreed to the 
suggestion, and the Italians had consequently submitted a 
draft agreement for the establishment of the body. This did 
not specify in any detail the precise functions of the 
proposed committee, but was sufficiently general to allow 
interpretation to cover most areas of Anglo-Italian economic 
relations. As it had no clauses which would inhibit the 
exercise of contraband control, the War Cabinet was urged to 
'PRO FO 837/493, 'War Trade Arrangements with Italy', 
17 October 1939, T 160/936, F13456/02/1, Hawtrey to Gwatkin, 
6 September 1939 & FO 371/23815, R8730/336/22, telegram from 
Loraine, 11 October 1939. 
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accept the Italian draft, with a slight modification to ensure 
that it was not established as an executive organ. ' 
The agreement to establish an Anglo-Italian Joint Standing 
Committee was subsequently signed in Rome on 27 October, and 
the body was rapidly set up. Rodd, who was made temporary 
head of the British delegation, soon realised the limited 
value of the committee, however, commenting in a report of 7 
November that, 
It had soon become apparent that Senator Giannini's (the 
head of the Italian delegation] personality and capacity 
for irrelevant argument would make formal meetings 
otiose. It was therefore decided as far as possible to 
proceed by informal sub-committees. 2 
On the same day that the arrangement to establish the Joint 
Standing Committee was signed, an interesting suggestion for 
strengthening Italy's neutrality by economic means was put 
before the War Cabinet. An unidentified 'secret but reliable 
source in Italy' urged the Allies to offer direct economic 
assistance to Rome, as this would bring about Ia marked swing- 
over of public sentiment, to their side. 3 Halifax had toyed 
with the idea of a loan to alleviate some of Italy's economic 
difficulties, most notably shortage of foreign exchange, in 
late July, as a means of weakening the Axis, and so had asked 
Loraine for his opinion. Sir Percy Is reply had been negative, 
pointing out that Guarneri, the Italian Minister of Currency 
and Exchange, had said repeatedly that he did not want a 
foreign loan, as it would undermine his policy of cutting 
inflation. ' This naturally killed any prospect of a loan 
being offered at that time, but new circumstances had been 
brought about in the wake of the outbreak of war. As we have 
seen, Guarneri's careful programme of husbanding resources to 
'PRO CAB 67/1, Paper 47,20 October 1939. 
2 PRO FO 371/23806, R10175/41/22, report by Rodd, 7 
November 1939, Part III, para. 20. 
3 PRO CAB 65/3,62nd Meeting, 27 October 1939,8th 
minute. 
4 PRO FO 1011/66, Halifax to Loraine & reply, 25 July & 
1 August 1939. 
109 
fight inflation had been abruptly dropped and a massive 
importation of goods begun. In such conditions, a foreign 
loan would certainly have been economically attractive to the 
Italian Government, but, in the light of Rome's continued 
alliance with Germany, it would surely have been politically 
impossible to accept, especially as it would presumably only 
have come with a substantial quid pro quo, such as guarantees 
of continued neutrality, given that the British would have 
effectively been offering Italy a good means of improving its 
military position. Any debate over the political potential of 
a British loan to Italy, or indeed whether one would have been 
accepted, must remain academic, however, as one was not 
seriously considered, let alone offered. 
Meanwhile, back in Rome, it had been agreed that, due to the 
potentially large increases in the level of Anglo-Italian 
trade in the near future, efforts should be made to negotiate 
a new clearing agreement. It soon became apparent, however, 
that consensus on the distribution of funds among the various 
sub-accounts, such as coal and arrears, within the proposed 
new arrangement was going to be extremely difficult to reach. 
The Italians wanted to be able to spend their proceeds in the 
clearing as freely as possible, but the British were keen to 
channel the manner in which Rome could dispose of the credit 
to be generated by the proposed increase in British purchases 
in the interests of wiping out the present substantial arrears 
in payment for British coal exports to Italy, creating the 
facilities for the Italians to increase their imports of 
British coal in the future, and limiting Italy's access to 
strategic raw materials which would either aid the German war 
effort if forwarded to the Reich or allow Italy markedly to 
improve its own military preparedness. Both sides adopted a 
firm position on this issue, with the result that, although 
trade between the two countries continued on the basis of the 
existing clearing arrangements satisfactorily enough, little 
progress was made towards drawing up a new agreement better 
suited to the changed circumstances before negotiations were 
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temporarily suspended following the breakdown in Anglo-Italian 
economic talks in February 1940.1 
Although there had initially been no problems with the Italian 
Government over contraband control, it was becoming clear by 
the middle of October that this was changing. A particularly 
tricky difficulty was that shipping coming into the 
Mediterranean from the Black Sea was having to be diverted all 
the way to Haifa in Palestine for inspection, and this was 
leading to increasing complaints, particularly from the 
Italians. Approval had already been given for the 
establishment of a contraband control base at Malta, but, this 
would still require a considerable diversion for shipping 
bound for Adriatic ports. The idea was therefore mooted in 
London of approaching Athens with a view to resolving the 
problem and, even more important, tightening control of 
traffic through the Aegean by establishing a base near the 
Dardanelles on Greek soil, but this was swiftly dropped, 
paradoxically largely due to concern over how neutrals, 
especially Italy, would react to such an infringement of Greek 
neutrality. Instead, it was decided that a patrol would be 
established off the Dardanelles, a move which tightened the 
2 blockade but did little to reduce delays to Italian shipping . 
By the end of October, Rome's increasing irritation at the 
imposition of contraband control was clear, as almost every 
case in which an Italian ship was detained was producing an 
informal protest, even though Italian ships were receiving 
preferential treatment to which other neutrals were beginning 
'PRO T 160/936, F13456/02/2-5, October-November 1939, T 
160/937, F13456/02/6-9, November-December 1939 &T 160/938, 
F13456/02/10-12, January-February 1940. In any case, a new 
clearing agreement was always going to be held up until it 
had been agreed at least roughly how much each country was 
going to purchase from the other over a set period of time, 
something which was not really resolved until the British 
forwarded proposals to spend E25 million in Italy in 1940 in 
mid December 1939. 
2 PRO CAB 80/4, Paper 103 JP, 27 October 1939*& CAB 
79/1,62nd Meeting, 29 October 1939,4th minute. 
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to object. ' It seemed to Loraine that things here are 
brewing up for an explosion, over the blockade, a warning 
which prompted Halifax to write to the MEW asking that it help 
'to reduce to the absolute minimum compatible with the 
efficient administration of our contraband control the 
inconvenience caused thereby to Italian shipping'. 2 
Af ter two months of war, London was thus beginning to get 
caught on the horns of a dilemma in regard to the blockade in 
the Mediterranean. To loosen contraband control in the inland 
sea significantly would make it less effective and further 
antagonise neutral states whose ships were already being 
treated less leniently than those of Italy, while to leave it 
as it was promised to bring yet greater complaints from the 
Italian Government. Anglo-Italian trade relations were also 
far from satisfactory. Provisional agreement had certainly 
been reached on some questions, particularly the form of 
payment for British purchases in Italy, but little had yet 
been achieved in concrete terms. There remained much to be 
done if economic issues were to play an important part in the 
hoped for rapprochement between London and Rome. 
British Military Policy in-the Mediterranean and Middle East 
From late September, efforts were made to put the handling of 
the question of the appropriate level of British forces in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East on a more formal basis. A 
vitally important factor in this was the Balkan question, for 
although the British hoped that they would not have to fight 
in this region, they nonetheless felt the need to prepare to 
assist at least in Turkey's defence should the Germans launch 
a drive towards the Straits, and that aid would have to be 
drawn from forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East due to 
the need not to weaken the Allied position in north-west 
Europe. 
'PRO CAB 68/2, Paper 59,31 October 1939, p. 6. 
2 PRO FO 371/23828, R9370/7174/22, telegram from Loraine 
& Halifax to Findlay, 26 October &2 November 1939. 
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When the Anglo-French Permanent Military Representatives 
(PMRs) held a meeting on 26 September to discuss the Balkan 
question, therefore, it also had significant implications for 
military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East. A 
Frenchman, General Lelong, dominated the discussion. He 
argued that 'it was important to convince [Italy) that we were 
strong and that retribution could fall upon her,, and 
therefore advocated that strong forces capable of acting 
against Libya and Abyssinia be maintained in the theatre, 
views with which Admiral Chalmers, the senior British 
representative, agreed. In regard to the Balkan question, the 
PMRs urged that preparations be made to help defend the states 
of South-East Europe, particularly Turkey, against possible 
German attack, ' and their report consequently advocated that 
the Allies should give 'the utmost possible support to Turkey, 
and organise in the Levant and Egypt an ample supply base and 
a well-equipped Franco-British force,. 2 
Concern about a possible German drive towards the Straits was 
thus giving those who favoured reinforcing the Middle East the 
upper hand by the end of the first month of the war. It was 
at this point, however, that the suggestion was put forward in 
London for a radical swing in policy in the opposite 
direction. On 6 October, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, 
Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, 
urged that Rome be approached with a view to the mutual 
withdrawal of forces from North Africa and the establishment 
of a detente in the Mediterranean, the aim being to free 
British forces for deployment in more active theatres. 
Halifax then raised an idea of Churchill's that Italy be 
invited to cooperate with the Allies in keeping the 
Mediterranean Sea free from war. 3 
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The COS report produced in response to these ideas was 
unreserved in its recommendation that neither should be taken 
any f urther. It argued that an attempt to get Italy to 
cooperate in keeping the Mediterranean free from war, which, 
as envisaged by Churchill, would involve Rome joining with the 
Allies in declaring a ban on German submarines operating 
within the inland sea, would be very unlikely to win Italian 
support, as it would strain Rome's relations with Berlin and 
would be on shaky ground under international law. To have any 
chance of being accepted, the COS considered that Churchill's 
proposal would almost certainly have to be expanded to 
encompass a more general neutralisation of the Mediterranean 
which would include the removal of contraband control in that 
sea, giving Germany greater access to goods within the region 
and probably leading to calls for the blockade to be dropped 
elsewhere. This was not a price worth paying, as the COS 
argued that even if Rome did agree to cooperate in suppressing 
submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, that would not 
sensibly allow the Allies to abandon their own anti-submarine 
precautions in the area, and so the extent to which the 
western European powers would be able exploit the situation by 
withdrawing scarce destroyers to more active theatres would be 
limited. 
The COS's rejection of the idea of a mutual withdrawal of land 
and air forces was even more forceful. They opposed it on the 
following grounds: 
(a) Italy would be able to move forces back far more 
quickly than Britain. 
(b) It would undermine the idea of building up a reserve 
of manpower in the Middle East as recently advocated by 
the PMRs. 
(c) It would encourage unrest in the Middle East. 
(d) It would lessen British influence in South-East 
Europe. 
(e) It might prevent Dominion forces gathering in the 
Middle East either as part of the reserve of manpower or 
en route to other locations. 
The COS also considered a redistribution of British forces 
within the Middle East in the form of a withdrawal from Egypt 
to Palestine, but this raised the following points: 
(a) It would strain relations with the Egyptians, who 
were fearful of an Italian attack. 
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(b) Indian troops, which made up a sizeable portion of 
the Egyptian garrison, had been assured they would not be 
stationed in Palestine where they might become involved 
in internal disturbances. 
(c) It would be far easier for Italy to move troops from 
western Libya to the border of Egypt than for Britain to 
move forces from Palestine to the Egyptian-Libyan border. 
The COS therefore concluded that they could not advise any 
withdrawal or redistribution of forces; indeed they advocated 
the build up of additional forces in the Middle East as 
proposed by the PMRs. ' 
The idea of maintaining a fairly strong British position in 
the Middle East and Mediterranean had thus essentially been 
reaffirmed, yet those who favoured improving it still faced 
serious difficulties. By far the greatest of these was that 
other theatres, most notably France and Britain, had priority 
over the Middle East for reinforcement. For example, when the 
Air Officer Commanding in the region asked London in October 
whether there were any plans to increase his forces, he 
received the reply that the main problem for the moment was 
the attempt to expand the RAF into a force capable of gaining 
and maintaining air superiority above the Western Front, and 
that consequently there was no possibility of reinforcement in 
2 the near future . 
Similarly, the Deputy CIGS felt compelled 
at the end of the same month to advise that ten AA guns 
earmarked for despatch to Aden in November should be diverted 
3 to the air defence of the United Kingdom . 
The absolute primacy of north-west Europe for the deployment 
of resources was not universally accepted, however. At a COS 
meeting held on 25 October, the CIGS commented that 'There was 
a tendency for the French to regard British assistance solely 
in terms of the number of men we could send to the Western 
Front and for constant pressure to be put on us to send every 
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available man to France'. Ironside considered that this ran 
the danger of starving other important areas of resources and 
argued that a limit should be placed on the number of 
divisions Britain proposed to send to France. Concerned 
particularly about the German and Russian threat to Turkey and 
the Allied position in the Middle East, he urged that Britain 
should aim to build up in that theatre af orce of twelve 
divisions, the maximum he believed could be maintained there. 
Ironside's fellow chiefs were obviously impressed with his 
argument, for they agreed that full consideration should be 
given to the extent to which Britain should build up its 
forces in the Middle East with regard to the various possible 
future courses of the war. ' 
Despite the demands of other theatres, there was thus at least 
some prospect of land forces in the Middle East being 
reinforced in the near future, even if attempts to improve the 
air situation seemed doomed to failure. Britain's naval 
position in the Mediterranean, however, had begun to 
deteriorate by this time, -, Cunningham's main fleet having been 
reduced to just two battleships. This was no result of 
diplomatic meddling in naval affairs aimed at appeasing Italy, 
though, but rather a reflection of the growing confidence in 
Italian neutrality and, most importantly, the greater than 
expected menace of the German Navy. The carrier, Glorious, 
and the battleship, Malaya, the latter being replaced by the 
slower Ramillies, had been despatched to the Indian Ocean to 
hunt for raiders in early October, and , 
the flagship, HMS 
Warspite, had been recalled to join the Home Fleet and 
increase the strategic advantage over the German Fleet in the 
North Sea at the end of the same month. 2 
Thus, by the end of the second month of the war, there were 
strong indications as to the probable future of Britain's 
'PRO CAB 79/1,58th Meeting, 25 October 1939,2nd 
minute. 
2 PRO ADM 199/389, Mediterranean Station War Diary, 9 
28 October 1939, pp. 48,69. 
116 
military position in the Mediterranean and Middle East, with 
the naval presence having been reduced, the air position 
remaining unchanged, and the situation on land showing signs 
of likely improvement. Military policy as regarded the level 
of forces stationed in the region therefore remained overall 
as much in tune with the idea of maintaining at least some 
form of credible deterrent to Italian intervention as it did 
with that of appeasing Rome by reducing, or at least not 
increasing, Britain's military presence in the theatre. 
The Balkan Ouestion 
With the French showing little sign of giving up on their push 
for a more vigorous Balkan policy and with the matter due to 
be discussed by the Supreme War Council on 22 September, the 
War Cabinet addressed-the issue on the 21st. For the first 
time, there was an open challenge to the current trend of 
British policy. Churchill had already written to Chamberlain 
on 15 September, arguing that a combination of the Balkan 
states would be 'very powerful, and that, if such a 
combination were to be brought about in response to external 
aggression, Italy would not necessarily be estranged by it., 
The French clearly had a powerful ally at the heart of the 
British Government who shared their outlook, and at the War 
Cabinet meeting the First Lord took things further, stating 
that 'he would like to see all the Balkan countries and Turkey 
also brought into the war, especially if this could be secured 
with Italy's acquiescence'. He believed that 'it was not at 
all to our interest that the Balkans should be kept in a state 
of quiet, whilst France and ourselves were left to bear the 
full brunt of the German assault on the Western Front'. The 
First Lord failed to win his colleagues over, however, Halifax 
maintaining that a vigorous Balkan policy would only encourage 
the Germans to overrun the region country by country, and the 
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) and CIGS arguing against 
'Churchill, W. S., The Churchill War Pavers - Vol. 1: At 
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extending the war to the area at this stage, primarily for 
fear of an adverse Italian reaction. ' 
The meeting of the Supreme War Council the next day was 
dominated by the dispute over the Balkans. Daladier argued 
that it was essential to prepare at least a token Allied force 
to deploy to Salonika or, if the Italians opposed this, 
Constantinople to combat a German drive towards the Straits 
which the French, incorrectly, suspected was imminent. Such 
a force would I act as a cement for the Balkan nations I, in the 
absence of which their collapse would be-inevitable and would 
result in Italy entering the war to gain a share of the spoils 
in the region. Chamberlain countered by expressing the COS's 
opinion that the Allies could do little to prevent the 
collapse of the Balkan states should the Germans attack in 
strength and pointing out that it would perhaps be unwise to 
divide Allied forces and create an extended and vulnerable 
line of communications through the Mediterranean by sending 
troops to South-East Europe. He also raised doubts as to the 
suitability of Salonika and Constantinople as bases, but most 
important was the effect an Allied deployment in the Balkans 
might have in Italy. Chamberlain's words did little to 
persuade Daladier to drop the idea of a Balkan front entirely, 
but. the Frenchman did at least reaffirm the necessity of 
seeking Rome's opinion on the whole affair before major action 
was taken. The British Prime Minister now commented that 
overt plans to send an Allied force to the Balkans were hardly 
compatible with efforts to encourage the formation of a 
neutral bloc in the region. Daladier agreed, and even stated 
that, if such a bloc could be formed, no Allied force would 
need to be deployed in the theatre. However, the Frenchman 
continued that if such a bloc could not be formed, he would 
consider the Allies duty-bound to offer assistance to such 
states in the region as wished to resist German aggression. 
At the end of the meeting, it was clear that the Allies were 
no nearer to a definite consensus over Balkan policy than they 
had been at the start, and all the SWC could do to try to 
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achieve progress was authorise an examination by the PMRs of 
the possibility of establishing and maintaining an Allied 
force in South-East Europe. ' 
The PMR committee met on 26 September to discuss the drafting 
of a paper on this subject. The meeting was a great success 
for the British as it saw the French representatives give way 
in two crucial areas. First, the French PMRs accepted that a 
Balkan intervention was not advisable at the moment, though 
they urged that such an intervention should be prepared 
diplomatically and militarily from the present time, the core 
of this being a build up of forces in the Middle East. 
Second, and equally important, they agreed that, should Italy 
become hostile, no large scale Balkan intervention should be 
risked, as forces which would be used for such an operation 
would instead be needed to defend British and French interests 
in the Middle East and Africa. 2 
In their report, the PMRs crucially argued against any Allied 
deployment in the Balkans ahead of a German invasion of the 
region. Should such an attack materialise, moreover, they 
advised that, due to the many logistical difficulties involved 
in a Balkan intervention, including the provision and 
protection of shipping, the low capacity and weak defences of 
ports in the Levant, and the poor state of land communications 
in the region, the Allies should at first form a front based 
on Turkey. Then, assuming Italy remained neutral, no 
measures, particularly those related to a landing at Salonika, 
should be taken which might offend its susceptibilities before 
Rome could be consulted so as to ascertain its probable 
reaction. So long as the Germans did not attack into the 
Balkans, the PMRs urged that the Allies should work towards 
improving the prospects of resisting such an assault should 
one develop in the future, which should involve; 
(i) Giving the utmost possible support to Turkey. 
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(ii) organizing in the Levant and Egypt an ample supply 
base and a well-equipped Franco-British force. 
(iii) Encouraging the establishment of a durable Balkan 
bloc, benevolently disposed towards the Allies. ' 
The essence of the PMRs' deliberations on Balkan policy was 
thus considerably closer to British than French designs, and 
this served to dampen, at least temporarily, the ardour with 
which the French had hitherto pressed for the adoption of a 
more vigorous policy. The dispute had not yet been resolved 
once and for all, however, as the PMR report was merely 
advisory. There remained much wrangling ahead. 
Despite its general opposition to any action in the Balkans 
which might offend Italian susceptibilities and increase the 
risk of Italy entering the war, London took a slightly 
different attitude as far as relations with Turkey were 
concerned. Turkey was the one state in the region that the 
British valued militarily, and its strategic position was such 
(control of the Straits, buffer between Europe and Allied 
possessions in the middle East) that it was crucial to the 
Allies that it should not align itself against them. Britain, 
and to a lesser extent France, had therefore been vigorously 
courting Turkish friendship since the mid Thirties, 2 and 
seeking af irm military alliance with Ankara to balance a 
possible Italian intervention on Germany's side since spring 
1939. By the outbreak of war, however, this had still to be 
achieved. 
Given the f act that Italy and Turkey were on f ar f rom f riendly 
terms in 1939 following thirty years of dispute, and even war, 
between the two over territorial issues such as Libya and the 
Dodecanese, a policy of affiliation with Ankara was hardly 
calculated to improve the Allies, standing in Rome. However, 
rather than responding to Italian non-belligerence by cooling 
relations with the Turks as they did with the other states of 
South-East Europe, the British intensified their efforts to 
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wring a formal military alliance from the Turkish Government. 
Indeed, the significance attached to the Turkish alliance was 
great enough to prompt even Halifax to comment in early 
September that the I importance of meeting the Turkish point of 
view was such as to outweigh the possible bad effect on 
Italy', when the Cabinet was discussing the form of words for 
article one of the proposed Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty. ' 
The extent to which London was prepared to ignore the Italian 
factor in its relations with Turkey should not be exaggerated, 
however. Allied involvement in Turkey was unlikely to be as 
provocative to the Italians as interference in Greek or 
Yugoslav affairs, largely because Turkey's status as a former 
Great Power and its greater distance from Italy meant that 
Italian pride and prestige would not be so challenged by an 
active Anglo-French policy. Moreover, evidence of appeasement 
of Italy can certainly be found in Anglo-Turkish relations in 
the early stages of the war. It will be remembered, for 
example, that the British refused to enter into discussions 
with the Turks for the recapture of the Dodecanese, even 
though this was a matter of national pride in Ankara, for fear 
of the damage that would be done to relations with Rome should 
the Italians somehow gain knowledge of them. 2 
Despite Britain's stance on this crucial issue, however, the 
Turks did eventually sign the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty on 
19 October. 3 Aware of the damage that announcement of the 
pact might do to relations with Italy, assurances were given 
to Rome by the Allies that it was not directed against Italian 
interests, ' and the passivity with which the Italian 
Government received news of the alliance suggests that these 
were not unsuccessful. The Treaty promised the unspecified 
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mutual assistance in the event of war in the Mediterranean 
caused by the aggression of a European power that the Allies 
had sought, but the Turks had demanded a high price for their 
signature, including E40 million for rearmament and a secret, 
though unspecific, promise to assist in the recapture of the 
Dodecanese. ' 
In contrast to the apparent success of Allied policy towards 
Turkey, efforts to form a neutral bloc of all the Balkan 
states were proving futile by the end of October. All Britain 
could do within the limits imposed by the desire not to risk 
offending the Italians was encourage the states of South-East 
Europe to forget their differences and unite in a grouping 
pledged to avoiding becoming embroiled in the war, a process 
which had been initiated in the first week of the war. 2 At 
the end of October, Halifax stressed the importance of 
including Italy in efforts to build a neutral Balkan bloc and 
reported that Loraine had been instructed to sound Ciano out 
on the subject. 3 Had Britain tried to include Italy at an 
earlier date, this might have succeeded, for the Italians had 
toyed with the idea of forming a neutral bloc in the Balkans 
themselves in September and early October in order to keep 
other powers out of an area which they liked to see as their 
own sphere of influence, but, by this stage, Mussolini had 
decided to torpedo the scheme so as to maintain a greater 
degree of f reedom to enter the war at a later date by avoiding 
any overly strong suggestion of definite Italian neutrality. ' 
At the same time as London tried to bring Rome into its plan 
f or a Balkan bloc, the Romanians launched their own initiative 
on lines very similar to those envisaged by the British. The 
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bloc was to include Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and, most significantly, as it would have 
cemented its neutrality, Italy. It would not be a military 
alliance with each state pledged to come to the defence of the 
other in event of an attack by an external power, but it did 
provide that should such an attack materialise, each member of 
the bloc would observe towards the victim at least benevolent 
neutrality. ' 
A meeting of Foreign Office officials was held in Halifax's 
room on 3 November to- discuss 'the idea of a neutral Balkan 
bloc, but although all agreed that such a body would be ideal, 
Loraine, who was present, urged that London should follow an 
observatory course only, allowing Rome to pursue the policy 
with regard to South-East Europe that it chose and not seeking 
to influence the Italian Government's decision. 2 Thus the 
possibility of Italy joining or leading a bloc of neutral 
states, and thereby cementing its own neutrality, was to pass 
beyond the scope of British Government policy. 
The Foreign Office was by this stage holding out little hope 
for the successful formation of a neutral Balkan bloc anyway. 
The main problem seemed to be the dispute between Bucharest 
and Sofia over the Southern Dobrudja, an area inhabited by 
3 Bulgars but forming part of the Romanian state . In reality, 
this was just one of a number of such disputes, and one 
historian of the region has sagely commented that, 'The 
British plan for a "Balkan bloc" was undermined from the start 
by the territorial disputes of the area,. 4 Indeed, even had 
the Balkan states been able to overcome their deep-rooted 
differences, and attempts were made, 5 it is still unlikely 
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that a Balkan bloc would have been formed due to opposition to 
it from Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. ' These powers 
were in a far stronger position to influence Balkan 
governments than were Britain and France, principally because 
of the greater proximity of their armed forces, but also, at 
least in the case of the Germans, thanks to their economic 
preponderance in the region. ' 
By early November, therefore, the issue of Balkan policy was 
in reality little nearer to being definitively resolved than 
it had been in mid September. Despite being prepared to risk 
of fending Italy by making an alliance with Turkey, London 
remained firmly opposed to the vigorous Allied involvement in 
the Balkans that Paris had not yet dropped as an idea. French 
ardour for such a strategy had certainly died down in the wake 
of the PMR report, but the increasing obviousness of the 
impracticability of a neutral Balkan bloc being formed 
threatened to resurrect the French Government's interest in 
adopting a more active policy in South-East Europe to 
compensate. The dispute had not yet run its course. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER 1939 
Britain and Italian Foreicrn Policv 
Despite the sanguine response initially given to them, the 
changes in the Italian Government at the end of October 
clearly had an impact upon how the British viewed news from 
Italy in the following weeks. Rumours in early November of a 
forthcoming visit to Italy by Goering, for example, were 
received with calm, Halifax informing the War Cabinet that it 
was doubted whether any change would occur in Italian foreign 
policy in the near future. ' Then, when Charles reported from 
Rome on 16 November that in addressing Fascist students in the 
Piazza Venezia the day before, the Duce had belligerently 
said, 'Prepare yourselves to study with all calm and 
discipline but as always ... keep your rifle alongside your book 
and well under your eye. Peace of Fascist Italy is not an 
unwarlike peace, it is an armed peace', Noble found it amusing 
rather than worrying, and drily minuted, 'Doubtful whether the 
student will be able to concentrate under such conditions'. 2 
Noble had decided by this time that 'the Axis is indeed a dim 
relic of past necessities', 3 and doubted 'whether Signor 
Mussolini is pro-German: it is probably more that he has not 
yet decided to cut the line to Berlin', a view with which 
Nichols was in sympathy. ' Indeed, confidence over Italy at 
the FO was such at this point that a handful of reports that 
came in suggesting that Mussolini intended to enter the war in 
spring 1940, information which would have caused considerable 
5 
anxiety just a few weeks earlier, were given scant credence. 
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The ministerial changes in Rome were not the only reason for 
this confidence, however. From late October, the British 
became aware of a crisis in Italo-German relations over the 
status of the German minority in the Alto Adige region of 
northern Italy, many of whom wanted to be incorporated within 
the Reich, and some of whom agitated f or this. ' Then, in the 
middle of November, D'Arcy Osborne, Britain's representative 
at the Vatican, reported that Mussolini had recently been told 
that the Army and Air Force would not be ready for war on a 
large scale for two yearsf 2 and, even more encouraging, a 
fortnight later, Britain's military attache in Rome reported 
that 
the whole tone of the new regime at the Ministry of War 
leads me to think that the present trend of Italian 
military policy is to prepare for defensive operations in 
the North East of Italy or co-operation with the Balkan 
powers in defence of their and Italian interests in the 
Balkans rather than offensive operations against France 
and Great Britain. 
Noble minuted that, if correct, 'this is a development of 
considerable importance'. 3 Finally, on 29 November, Loraine 
reported that Bastianini had recently told him that efforts by 
him and his friends to cure Mussolini of his complex that he 
was so personally bound up in the alliance with Germany that 
he could in no circumstances escape from it were making 
considerable progress. ' 
The British were not wrong in discerning a shift in Italian 
views and policy in late October and November, though that 
shift was not as fundamental as they hoped. Italo-German 
relations were undoubtedly deteriorating at this point, 
primarily due to Berlin's growing links with Moscow and, even 
more important, the dispute over the Alto Adige. This latter 
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issue was, in many ways, the supreme test of the validity of 
the Axis as a partnership. Hitler had reassured Mussolini of 
the inviolability of the Brenner frontier in the wake of the 
Anschluss, and it had even been included in the terms of the 
Pact of Steel. The presence of a sizeable German-speaking 
community, a hard-core minority of whom continually clamoured 
for incorporation within the Reich, remained a source of some 
concern to Rome, however. An understanding had therefore been 
reached in June 1939 covering the forcible eviction of hard- 
core irredentists and the voluntary transfer of the remainder 
of the German community, but a formal agreement had not been 
reached by the outbreak of war. The opening of hostilities 
had resulted in a surge of irredentist feeling both in the 
Alto Adige and in Germany itself, to which Rome had responded 
by increasing pressure for action on the June understanding. 
Berlin had been worryingly reticent, though, and it had not 
been until October that negotiations had been resumed. On the 
21st, a formal agreement had finally been signed, providing 
for the obligatory repatriation of hard-core irredentists 
within three months and an option to stay or leave with very 
favourable compensation for the remaining German- speakers. 
Far from resolving the problem, however, this had served to 
intensify it, for Berlin had now launched a propaganda 
campaign to encourage as many Alto Adige Germans as possible 
to transfer. This had infuriated Rome, which only wanted the 
troublemaking, irredentist minority to leave, as a mass exodus 
from the region threatened to ruin the local economy, place a 
great strain upon Italian finances, and damage Italian 
prestige. ' 
The result of all this was that Italo-German relations in 
November 1939 were placed under enormous strain, especially as 
80,000 Germans had been evacuated from the Baltic States in a 
few hours in early October under Soviet pressure. 2 Ciano 
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noted in his diary on the 9th, the day after the Fuehrer had 
survived an assassination attempt in Munich, that 'no Italian 
feels any great joy over the fact that Hitler has escaped 
death - least of all the Ducel, and two days later commented, 
'The Duce in these last few days, probably because of the 
situation in Alto Adige, expresses himself as more and more 
definitely anti-German'. ' By 21 November, fearing that the 
Germans were preparing to hold a plebiscite in the Alto Adige 
on the question of incorporation of the region within the 
Reich, Ciano wrote that the chasm which separates us from 
Germany is becoming wider from day to day, even in the Duce's 
mind'. 2 
Indeed, it was primarily fear that the Nazis might be planning 
to incorporate the Alto Adige within Germany that explains the 
shift in the trend of Italian military policy in the last two 
months of 1939, detected by the British, towards defensive 
preparations in the north-east. The extensive work done on 
the border fortifications with the Reich in late 1939 was 
continued into the spring and summer of 1940, when Italy was 
on the verge of intervening and even after it had entered the 
war, and was only slowed down, though not halted entirely, 
when Hitler raised the issue. It should therefore be seen as 
'defensive reinsurance to avoid vassalage, not preparation for 
a change of sides', but the fact that the Duce considered it 
necessary to devote a great amount of resources to improving 
Italy's ability to resist possible German military action 
highlights a definite mistrust and uncertainty at the heart of 
the Axi S. 3 
Perhaps the Allies should have made greater efforts to exploit 
the Alto Adige dispute. Ciano certainly thought so. He noted 
in his diary on 9 November that, 'If the French and British 
were clever, this would be a fine moment to create a major 
incident between us and the Germans', and, on 21 November, 
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that, 'If an incident were to break out in the Alto Adige our 
relations with Berlin would become extremely precarious' .1 
Any Allied attempt to increase friction between Germany and 
Italy, however, would quite possibly have been viewed in Rome 
as unwarranted meddling and thus have served instead to worsen 
Italo-Allied relations. A policy of interference would have 
been a risk, and the Chamberlain administration was seldom 
inclined to gamble. 
Alongside the damage done to Italo-German relations by the 
Alto Adige dispute, Hitler's links with Soviet Russia created 
further problems. There was certainly a strong anti-Bolshevik 
element to this due to the strength of Fascism and Catholicism 
2 in Italy, but another powerful issue, particularly as far as 
Mussolini was concerned, was that he and Italy seemed to be 
3 being relegated to a secondary position . This resulted in an 
anti-Soviet backlash in Italy which caused sufficient damage 
to the Axis for the Germans to launch a propaganda campaign in 
Rome to encourage better relations with Moscow. ' When the 
Russo-Finnish War broke out-at the end of November, however, 
Italo-Soviet relations reached their nadir. There was real 
concern in Rome, not helped by German press support for the 
Soviet invasion, that Berlin and Moscow were planning to 
divide Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and, most disturbingly, 
the Balkans between them., 5 The Italian response to the 
Russian aggression was therefore unequivocally hostile, anti- 
Soviet demonstrations erupting throughout the country, and 
moral and material aid being given by Rome to the Finns. 6 It 
even got to the stage of ambassadors being withdrawn. Hitler 
was so worried by the situation that he took the unusual step 
for him of letting the Duce in on his future plans by 
'Ciano, Dia ,9&: 21 November 1939, pp. 174,176-7. 
2 Ciano, Diary, 26 September 1939, p. 159. 
3 Lowe & Marzari, pp. 349-53. 
4 Toynbee & Toynbee (eds. ), p. 227. 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 17-18. 
"Ciano, Dia ,4&8 December 1939, pp. 180,182. 
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despatching Dr. Robert Ley, the Nazi Minister of Labour, to 
Rome to inform Mussolini that Germany's current cooperation 
with Moscow was purely tactical and that an assault upon the 
Soviet Union remained at the heart of the Fuehrer's plans. ' 
Awareness of the strain being thrown upon Italo-German 
relations by Berlin's links with Moscow can only have 
encouraged the Allies to react to the outbreak of the Russo- 
Finnish War as they did. The Soviet aggression was denounced 
by the western European powers, both in public and in a 
private note to Rome, 2 and the USSR was expelled f rom the 
League of Nations in December, but Allied policy ultimately 
went much further. Much material aid, so desperately needed 
by the Allies themselves, was sent to help the Finns, and an 
Allied task force was even prepared to go to their aid early 
in 1940, albeit with the ulterior motive of occupying Narvik 
and the iron orefields in northern Sweden so as to restrict 
the supply of a vital commodity to Germany. Thankfully, the 
Soviets defeated the Finns before the Allies had got around to 
despatching the force and embroiling themselves in war with 
the USSR, though the task force did deploy to Scandinavia 
nevertheless, though to be beaten by the Germans in Norway 
rather than by the Russians in Finland. This anti-Soviet 
approach must certainly have been appreciated in Italy, where 
3 everyone was indignant about Russian aggression" but there 
is no evidence that it had any lasting beneficial impact upon 
Italo-Allied relations. 
Britain's relations with Italy began to turn sour in late 
November when the decision to announce the introduction of 
enemy export control provoked a crisis over the blockade. 
Aware that the British announcement was likely to upset Rome, 
Halifax had written a goodwill letter to Ciano on 25 November, 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 19-21. 
2 DDI, 9th Series, Vol. II, No. 460, Loraine to Ciano, 
(early) December 1939, p. 360. 
'Ciano, Diary, 2 December 1939, p. 179. 
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along very similar lines to that of early September, ' but the 
Italian Foreign Minister considered this communication 'very 
courteous but not of particular importance', 2 and it soon 
became apparent that the expected Italian ire was not to be 
easily assuaged. At a War Cabinet meeting on 6 December, the 
Foreign Secretary related that he had received Ciano's reply. 
Though not a formal protest at British action, the Italian 
letter, which Loraine correctly opined Mussolini had directed 
his son-in-law to send, complained at some length about the 
blockade. The unfortunate message seemed to be that the Duce, 
, though possibly disillusioned about the Germans, was still 
nurturing his grudges against the democracies, and had not yet 
moved closer to us in personal sympathy'. 3 
The thorny issue of the blockade continued to cause anxiety 
throughout December, but the general trend of Italian opinion 
and policy in that month nevertheless remained favourable in 
Foreign Office eyes. The Fascist Grand Council met for the 
f irst time since the start of the war on 7 December. it 
reaffirmed Italian non-belligerence, but also the Pact of 
Steel, and stated Italy's direct interest in the affairs of 
South-East Europe and its intention to protect Italian sea 
traffic. ' Loraine's interpretation of these decisions was 
optimistic. He commented that 
Italy's dangerous proximity to Germany and her 
unpreparedness for war, combined with her desire to use 
her present position to her best advantage as a 
bargaining lever against the Allies on the one hand and 
Germany on the other hand precludes her from making any 
formal declaration of neutrality, although it is possible 
she has, in fact, decided to be a neutral. 
Sir Percy further considered that the Italians would be 
prepared to fight on the Allied side should the Germans or 
'DDI., 9th Series, Vol. II, No. 338, Halifax to Ciano, 
25 November 1939, pp. 278-9. 
Ciano, Diary, 30 November 1939, p. 178. 
3 PRO CAB 65/2,105th Meeting, 6 December 1939,8th 
minute. 
4 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 20, telegram from Loraine, 
8 December 1939. 
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Russians disrupt the status quo in the Mediterranean or South- 
East Europe, and even went so far as to dismiss the 
reaffirmation of the Pact of Steel as 'a sop to Germany'. I 
The Fascist Grand Council meeting was followed just over a 
week later by a speech on foreign affairs given to the Italian 
Chamber by Count Ciano. Under close instruction from 
Mussolini, Ciano accused the Allies of trying to encircle and 
suppress Germany, and claimed that this had precipitated the 
current conflict. The guarantee to Poland was heralded as 
responsible for the Poles unwillingness to negotiate over 
Danzig, and the Allies' slowness in responding to Mussolini's 
peace initiative of late August and insistence that the 
Germans withdraw their forces from Poland before talks could 
begin were blamed for the failure to avert war. Conversely, 
there was no bitterness towards Germany, which 'had had no 
desire to enter into hostilities with the Western Powers', 
though Ciano did reveal by implication that Berlin had broken 
its word to Rome by provoking a general war in 1939, and that 
Hitler had gone behind Mussolini's back in signing the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact. 2 
In his report on Ciano Is speech, Loraine confidently predicted 
that, in Italo-German relations, 'The way is being prepared 
for breaking away'. 3 This view must surely, however, have had 
more to do with Sir Percy's conversations with Ciano and the 
frosty reception of some Germans to the speech than with the 
4 text of the speech itself. Loraine's French counterpart was 
upset by the emphasis given in the speech to the German 
'PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 19, telegram from Loraine, 
8 December 1939. 
2 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 21, Loraine to Halifax (by 
telephone), 17 December 1939. 
3 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 22, Loraine to Halifax, 18 
December 1939. 
'Ciano, Diar , 16 December 1939, pp-184-5 
Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, p. 417. 
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alliance, ' Rodd felt that it 'shows quite clearly how far 
apart we still are and how rash it would be to count upon the 
2 Italians as friendly neutrals for an indefinite period" and, 
in Egypt, it was interpreted, 'as indicating the continuance 
of Italo-German co-operation and even the ultimate emergence 
of Italy into the conflict against us'. By the end of the 
year, therefore, the FO had decided that the speech had 
3 effectively left things pretty much as they had been before . 
If Ciano's speech thus gave no clear sign as to the future of 
Italian policy, other indications continued to be encouraging 
for the Allies. On 18 December, for example, Osborne reported 
from the Vatican that he had recently learnt that Mussolini's 
4 sentiments were now anti-German. Two days later, Halifax 
informed the War Cabinet that Ciano had told Loraine that the 
blockade was the only cloud on the Anglo-Italian horizonl, 5 
and, on 22 December, Osborne reported that the Vatican had 
used the occasion of a visit by the Italian King, Victor 
Emmanuel III, 'for the purpose of publicly emphasising the 
desire of the Italian people for peace'. 6 
The reality of the situation in Italy in December, however, 
was somewhat less favourable to the Allies than some British 
believed, at least in regard to Mussolini. The Duce was even 
more infuriated by the blockade than London thought he was. 
The Germans had been working on Mussolini's feelings of 
irritation, anger and insecurity caused by Allied economic 
control, so that, by 10 December, he was 'becoming more and 
'Ciano, Diary, 19 December 1939, p. 185. 
PRO FO 837/494, Rodd to Ingram, 18 December 1939, p-8. 
3 PRO FO 371/23822, R12215/399/22, telegrams from &: to 
Lampson, 22 December 1939 &3 January 1940. 
4 PRO FO 371/23799, R11866/9/22, Osborne to Halifax, 18 
December 1939. 
'5PRO CAB 65/2,120th Meeting, 20 December 1939,10th 
minute. 
6 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 24, Osborne to Halifax, 22 
December 1939. 
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more exasperated by - the - British blockade. He threatens 
counter-measures and revenge,. 1 
Mussolini's attitude towards Germany at this time changed 
almost daily. It was he who insisted upon the inclusion of an 
explicit reaffirmation of the German alliance at the meeting 
of the Fascist Grand Council, 2 but, once at the meeting, he 
took a more detached view; 
If England wins, we will not be allowed the sea to bathe 
in. If Germany wins, not even the air to breathe. We 
can only wish that the two lions tear each other to 
pieces, until their tails drop to the ground. And we, if 
this happens, will go and pick them UP ... 
3 
After the meeting, Mussolini's mood shifted again, Ciano 
noting on 9 December that 'fundamentally he is still in favour 
of Germany'. 4 The Christmas period, however, saw perhaps the 
nadir of the Duce's opinion of the Germans, despite the visit 
of Himmler to Rome to try to reassure Mussolini as to German 
intentions. 5 A German propaganda campaign was increasing the 
number of residents of the Alto Adige choosing to resettle in 
the Reich, and, given Italy's rash pledge to compensate anyone 
who left for their abandoned property, this was threatening to 
place a severe strain on Rome's already weak finances. ' Even 
more disquieting, it was learnt that a lecture had been given 
by Dr. Josef Pfitzner, the vice-mayor of Prague and a leading 
Sudeten German intellectual, referring to intentions to annex 
not just the Alto Adige, but Trieste and the whole plain of 
'Ciano, Diary, 1& 10 December 1939, pp. 178-9,183. 
ft Ciano, Dia ,3 December 1939, pp. 179-80. 
3 'Se vincesse ll-Tnghilterra, non ci lascerebbe il mare 
per fare i bagni. Se vincesse la Germania, neppure llaria 
per respirare. Si pub desiderare che i due leoni si 
sbranino, fino a lasciare a terra le code. E noi, caso mai, 
andremo a raccatarle... 1; as cited in Quartararo, R., Roma 
tra Londra e Berlino: La nol tica estera fascista dal 1930 
al 1940 (Roma, 1980), p. 546. 
Ciano, Diary, 9 December 1939, p. 183. 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, p. 21. 
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Lombardy. Mussolini was so infuriated by this that, as Ciano 
noted, 'Now, for the first time, he wants the Germans 
defeated'. The Duce even acted on his words for once, and 
arranged for the Dutch and Belgians to be informed of German 
plans, subsequently abandoned, to invade their countries early 
in the new year. The anger did not last long, however, and, 
as the year ended, Ciano disapprovingly noted that 'Mussolini 
is still suffering from one of his usual recurrent waves of 
pro-Germanism'. ' 
If Mussolini's fluctuating moods were one main feature of the 
situation in Italy at this time, the other was the continued 
lack of preparedness for war. This was hammered home by two 
reports by General Favagrossa, the Minister of War Production. 
The first of these, in mid December, calculated from figures 
provided by the Services, which may well have been slightly 
optimistic, that the Army and Navy would not be ready until 
1943-4, and the Air Force not before mid 1941.2 The second, 
at the end of the month, stated that even if Italian factories 
were to work a double shift, a sufficiently complete level of 
production could still not be reached before October 1942. ' 
This was hardly encouraging for those in the Italian 
Government who dreamt of intervention, and even before these 
reports came out, Mussolini, restless with his forced 
aloofness from the war, was beginning once again to consider 
the possibilities of an Italian- sponsored negotiated peace. 
He would suggest the idea to Hitler, and, if it came to 
nothing, all the Duce would then be able to do would be to 
bring Italy into the war in 1942, as he had originally agreed 
4 with the Germans. 
As the year drew to a close, then, the British had good reason 
to feel confident about the prospect of Italy remaining non- 
'Ciano, Diary, 23,26 &: 31 December 1939, pp. 187-8, 
191. 
'Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 75. 
Ciano, Diary, 31 December 1939, p. 192. 
Ciano, Diary, 3 December 1939, p. 180. 
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belligerent in 1940. Practical factors against intervention 
remained overwhelming, and London could take comfort from the 
fact that, although the Duce was angry with the Allied 
blockade, Italo-German relations were under strain as well. 
The new year, however, would see the situation develop 
markedly to the Allies' detriment. 
Ancrlo-Italian Economic Relations 
The story of Anglo-Italian economic relations in the final two 
months of 1939 is not dissimilar to that of the first two 
months of the war. Minor concessions continued to be made 
over the blockade in the Mediterranean, but not at too great 
a cost to the effectiveness of the exercise of contraband 
control in the inland sea, whilst trade issues proceeded to 
develop in a generally positive direction, but at a painfully 
slow rate. The key event during the period was the 
introduction by the Allies of enemy export control in late 
November. Not only did this spark something of a crisis in 
Anglo-Italian relations over the blockade, but, by threatening 
Italy's supply of seaborne German coal, it created the 
circumstances in which the British could at last put forward 
a comprehensive trade deal that might appeal to the Italians 
without undermining the policy of preventing Italy from 
increasing its overall importation of strategically important 
goods too significantly. 
To begin with trade, the MEW had reported at the end of 
October that arrangements for buying hemp, sulphur, mercury, 
silk, and motor torpedo-boat engines in Italy were well 
advanced, but Loraine had pushed for a greater sense of 
urgency lest Britain lose out to foreign competition. ' Within 
days, Sir Percy's fears about British tardiness in negotiating 
contracts began to be realised, for Germany successfully 
concluded a deal for 40,000 tons of Italian hemp, leaving only 
2 6,000 tons available to the British. This was a bitter blow 
to the men involved in trying to increase Anglo-Italian trade, 
'PRO CAB 68/2, Paper 59,31 October 1939, P-5. 
PRO CAB 68/2, Paper 73,7 November 1939, p. 5. 
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Rodd commenting on 7 November, for example, that 'our present 
policy isn't a policy at all. It's a mess and I'm surprised 
we've got as faras we have'. He advocated a much more 
vigorous approach, buying and selling as wide a range of goods 
as possible with a view to becoming Italy's principal economic 
partner so that any break with Britain would have to be 
considered doubly seriously in Rome. ' 
Despite the lack of concrete progress in expanding Anglo- 
Italian trade by this time, however, consideration was at 
least being given to the placing of, large orders in Italy. 
The total value of British orders by mid November was only 
E2,270,000, but orders under active consideration amounted to 
E13,500,000, while it was calculated that it might be possible 
to increase expenditure in Italy by a further E10,000,000 or 
more, the bulk of orders in the latter two categories being of 
2 a military nature. Urgency was clearly desirable in 
converting orders under consideration into actual purchases, 
though, for Halifax referred in Cabinet to the feeling of 
irritation and disappointment in Italian official circles ... at 
our slowness in making purchases in Italy'. 3 It is perhaps 
surprising, therefore, that by the end of 1939, the only new 
British purchasing transactions which had been concluded with 
the Italians since the start of the war were the Admiralty's 
purchase of sulphur and Isotta engines, and the Ministry of 
4 Supply's contract for mercury. 
This failure to conclude transactions with the Italians was 
far from entirely down to simple tardiness, however. The fact 
was, f or example, that many of the goods that the various 
departments were being asked to consider buying from Italy 
'PRO FO 371/23806, R10175/41/22, Rodd to Ingram, 7 
November 1939, pp. 2-3. 
2 PRO FO 371/23806, R10475/41/22, minute by Noble, 18 
November 1939. 
3 PRO CAB 65/2,81st Meeting, 13 November 1939,8th 
minute. 
Medlicott, p. 289. 
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were not greatly needed or desired. For instance, the Air 
ministry was asked to consider purchasing Italian aircraft 
worth E10 million, but these were not of a particularly high 
standard, and the Air Ministry could buy better planes in the 
United States at no greater cost. It therefore, not 
unreasonably, refused to purchase from Italy unless it were 
allotted an extra E10 million so to do. ' 
Perhaps the key factor behind the British slowness in 
concluding trade deals with the Italians at this stage, 
though, was the desire to avoid allowing Italy to build up too 
great a sterling credit in the Anglo-Italian clearing until 
such a time as the great majority of that credit was to be 
spent on increased supplies of British coal, a situation which 
was unlikely to arise until enemy export control had been 
introduced. At the moment, Rome wished to buy large amounts 
of other strategic raw materials and goods from Britain and 
the Empire, most of which, if supplied on a considerable 
scale, would allow Italy to improve its military preparedness 
markedly and to provide Germany with contraband goods. London 
had no intention of allowing this to happen, its policy for 
providing Italy with goods from sources under its control 
being to dole out raw materials in the smallest possible 
quantities'. 2 It was surely wiser before the introduction of 
enemy export control, therefore, to risk irritating the 
Italians by being tardy in trade negotiations than to 
infuriate them by letting them build up a hefty credit which 
the British would then have to prevent being spent as Rome 
wished. 
Alongside trade difficulties, problems began to increase over 
the blockade f rom November, signalled by a marked rise in 
Italian complaints about contraband control. Indeed, by the 
middle of the month, Rome was warning that unless a definite 
'PRO T 160/936, F13456/02/5, Street to Gilbert, 5 
November 1939 &: FO 371/23805, R9946/41/22, minute by Noble, 
10 November 1939. 
PRO FO 800/320, H/XIX/94, minute by Noble, 31 January 
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understanding could be reached, it 'would be obliged to adopt 
other methods' , which was interpreted as the escorting of 
Italian merchant ships by warships. This greatly concerned 
London and led to the introduction of certain further 
concessions aimed at appeasing Rome without significantly 
undermining the effectiveness of the exercise of contraband 
control. First, the problem of homebound Italian ships being 
stopped both at Gibraltar and in the western Mediterranean was 
resolved by granting such vessels either exemption from 
calling at Gibraltar, in return for a promise to call at 
Marseille or Malta before reaching home, or clearance through 
the western Mediterranean, provided a guarantee was given at 
Gibraltar not to take on cargo, passengers or mail between 
there and Italy. Second, it was decided that shipping plying 
between Italy and its colonies, which Rome regarded as 
internal trade, and therefore exempt from economic control 
under international law, was not normally to be interfered 
with, as Italy's colonies produced very little of any 
strategic significance and the Allies could prevent them being 
used as an entrepot for trade in contraband goods by 
continuing to intercept ships that plied between them and 
everywhere but Italy. Finally, the British promised to 
establish a contraband control base at Aden in December so as 
to reduce the delay to Italian shipping entering the 
Mediterranean via the Red Sea caused by it being diverted for 
inspection in the Suez Canal Zone, where neutral ships could 
not compulsorily be searched under the terms of the Canal 
Convention, to either Haifa or Malta. ' 
In spite of these concessions, complaints about the Allied 
blockade continued. Bastianini informed Halifax on 23 
November, for example, that 'The Italian Government Must 
insist on the general principle of the inviolability of postal 
matter carried on Italian vessels', 2 but, at this stage, the 
problem was more the application of economic control than the 
'Medlicott, pp. 292-4,75. 
2 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 14, Halifax to Loraine, 23 
November 1939. 
139 
principle. What was causing particular resentment in Italy 
was the fact that many ships were experiencing delays of over 
a week, yet were being found to have no contraband on board. 
Some of this delay was due at this point to lack of staff and 
experience at the MEW, yet some kind of delay was inherent in 
any exercise of contraband control where the blockading power 
was keen not to offend neutrals by seizing cargo over hastily 
and therefore insisted upon rigorous, and thus sometimes 
lengthy, checks of suspected contraband. ' 
In an ef fort to reduce delays to neutral shipping, the British 
Government tried various different tactics. In November, the 
hold-back system, (a system under which a ship could be 
allowed to proceed to a neutral destination after giving a 
guarantee to return to an Allied port any items of cargo which 
it might later be decided should be seized) , was introduced in 
the Mediterranean. 2 This was initially successful, but it 
soon became apparent that the system merely transferred the 
delay to the transit of goods from the contraband control base 
to the quay of destination. 3 
Also in November, the decision was taken to introduce 
Navicerts (certificates issued by Allied officials at the dock 
of loading certifying thaý none of the goods on board the ship 
were contraband, and thus allowing much speedier passage 
through the blockade) to cover cargoes loaded in the Americas 
and bound for European neutral ports. The system was 
introduced in the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay 
on 1 December, ' but it was some time before much use was made 
of it by Italian shipping, presumably for the political reason 
of not wishing to offend Germany by appearing to collaborate 
too closely with the Allied exercise of economic control. 
'Medlicott, pp. 294,86-7. 
2 Medlicott, p. 89. 
3 PRO CAB 67/4, Paper 21,27 January 1940, p. 2. 
4 Medlicott, P. 43. 
140 
Anglo-Italian negotiations in regard to the blockade in 
November and December focused upon the conclusion of a 
protocol between the two countries, putting in writing the 
terms and methods of the exercise of economic control by the 
British over Italian shipping. This was an Italian 
suggestion, and a draft protocol was produced in early 
November and followed a few days later by further draft 
annexures. The British were not keen on the Italian 
initiative, rightly fearing that a great deal of flexibility 
would be lost to them by committing details of their exercise 
of economic control to paper. However, as their part of the 
deal, the Italians were offering a guarantee against the re- 
export in any form of goods imported from British sources or 
the use of such imports to free existing stocks for export. 
With this in mind, and in order to avoid of fending the 
Italians, the British considered their draft documents and 
tightened up the language used in them. Even so, problems 
remained. In trying to agree on the terms of a protocol, the 
British priority was to avoid making any major concessions and 
to insert a clause whereby either contracting party could 
terminate the agreement at a month's notice. The Italians, 
however, sought to get the British to commit such concessions 
as had already been made in regard to economic control to 
paper and to win yet further concessions. ' An impasse 
naturally resulted and the protocol was never signed as, in 
the new year, the idea was replaced by ef forts to reach a more 
comprehensive Anglo-Italian agreement covering trade as well 
as the blockade. 
Alongside blockade negotiations with Rome, the British began 
in late 1939 to seek agreements with individual Italian firms 
whereby they would undertake to comply fully with Allied 
contraband control (by, for example, refraining from selling 
to Germany and obtaining guarantees of neutral consumption 
from purchasers) in return for swift passage for their goods 
through the blockade. There was some hope that if enough 
agreements could be made, it would amount to 'something in the 
'PRO ADM 116/4173, M., 0433/40, memo by MEW, 30 December 
1939, pp. 11-13, Annexes XII & XIII. 
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nature of a rationing agreement with Italy', ' but success was 
severely limited, deals being concluded with only a handful of 
companies by the time Italy entered the war. 2 
In late November, the British Government finally announced its 
intention to introduce enemy export control in retaliation for 
Germany's laying of magnetic mines without warning in sea 
lanes frequently used by merchant shipping. The British had 
been hoping since the start of the war for an excuse to seize 
German seaborne exports, so as to limit the Reich's ability to 
earn foreign currency with which to pay for imports of 
strategically valuable raw materials, but, as the right to 
exercise enemy export control was far from universally 
accepted by the international community, it could not be 
3 introduced lightly . When discussing the 
issue on 20 
November, therefore, the War Cabinet's attention was brought 
to the probable adverse response it would elicit from 
neutrals, ' and this worry was confirmed with regard to Italy 
over the next few days by the receipt of several telegrams 
expressing the concern of the Italian Government at the 
proposed change in blockade poliCY. 5 Nevertheless, the 
seizure of enemy exports was considered a sufficiently 
important measure economically to override political 
objections to it, so the announcement that it was to be 
introduced was duly made, though it was initially to be 
'gradual and light', and not put fully into effect until 
January. Moreover, it was decided in early December that, in 
order to avoid trouble with Italy over its fuel supplies until 
Rome could be persuaded to increase its importation of British 
'PRO FO 371/23828, R11829/7174/22, Nichols to Loraine, 
6 January 1940, para. 3. 
Medlicott, pp. 676-92. 
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coal, neutral ships carrying German coal to Italy were not, 
for the moment, to be diverted or detained at all. ' 
The Italian Government, however, like the great majority of 
neutral governments, 2 was not to be placated by softening 
measures, and responded to the British move by increasing its 
complaints against the blockade. Halifax's initial reaction 
to this appears to have been irritation, for he commented to 
Loraine on 2 December that 
the Italians will no doubt realise quickly enough that, 
if they want to build up a profitable Anglo-Italian 
trade, they must exercise at least a reasonable degree of 
patience over our contraband control, which contrasts 
very favourably with Germany's reckless sinking of 
neutral ships 
by magnetic mines, 3 but irritation swiftly turned to concern, 
and Halifax informed the Cabinet just two days later that 
recent telegrams from Loraine on the subject of the blockade 
were causing him considerable anxiety. 4 The Foreign Secretary 
had even received an informal written complaint direct from 
Count Ciano which prompted him to recommend on 6 December that 
contraband control measures against the Italians be eased 
further. ' Complaints continued to pour in from Italy over the 
next two weeks, 6 but the general feeling in London was, as 
Churchill noted on 15 December, that Italy was already being 
treated 'with exceptional consideration' as far as the 
7 blockade was concerned , (for example, Italian ships and 
cargoes were surreptitiously being given priority in all 
'PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
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3 PRO FO 434/6, Part XX, No. 17, telegram to Loraine, 2 
December 1939. 
4 PRO CAB 65/2,103rd Meeting, 4 December 1939,11th 
minute. 
5PRO CAB 65/2,105th Meeting, 6 December 1939,8th 
minute. 
6PRO CAB 66/4, Paper 163,16 December 1939, p. 5. 
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proceedings before the MEW and the Contraband Committee, the 
body in London which decided whether suspect cargoes should be 
released or not), ' and so, at a meeting held in the Foreign 
Office on 18 December, it was decided that 'Italian shipping 
interests have not any great cause for complaint', and that, 
therefore, the system as currently established in the 
Mediterranean did not require much alteration. Halifax 
accepted this, but commented that if the situation did not 
ease, 'he would consider further measures most desirable even 
at the cost of some reduction in efficiency in our contraband 
control system'. 2 
To return to the issue of trade, Britain's slowness in 
concluding agreements with Italian firms had led by mid 
November to a deterioration in negotiations which mirrored the 
worsening of relations over the blockade. ' Somewhat 
perversely, however, it was the introduction of enemy export 
control that created the circumstances in which the British 
felt able to give fresh impetus to trade talks. 
on 4 December, Halifax produced a memorandum for the War 
Cabinet on the issue of trade with Italy. He reported that 
tardiness in concluding contracts was holding up agreement on 
a new clearing arrangement, the conclusion of which he 
considered of great importance, as it would facilitate 
increased Italian purchases within the Empire, giving Britain 
greater control over Italian sources of supply. He continued 
by pointing out- that, as a result of the decision to introduce 
enemy export control, Italian coal supplies were ultimately 
threatened, creating a situation in which the Italian economy 
might undergo a strain and perhaps suffer a breakdown which 
would reflect itself in resentment and hostility to us'. The 
Foreign Secretary therefore recommended that Rome should now 
'PRO FO 371/23828, R11829/7174/22, Nichols to Loraine, 
6 January 1940, para. 8. 
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be formally assured that Britain proposed to increase its 
provision of coal to Italy in 1940, so-as to replace fully the 
deficit which would be created by the stoppage of seaborne 
German coal, and to use the proceeds thereby gained to pay for 
the bulk of E25 million worth of purchases that Halifax urged 
the British should promise to make in Italy in the following 
year. ' 
The War Cabinet discussed Halifax's memorandum on 6 December. 
Although the Chancellor asked for the figure of E25 million to 
be examined further before being presented to the Italians, 
the general response to the paper was very positive, Churchill 
even offering to explore if any additional increases could be 
made in Admiralty purchases from Italy in the interests of 
facilitating an agreement and maintaining Italian neutrality. 
The War Cabinet therefore agreed to proceed with negotiations 
on the basis laid out in the Foreign Secretary's paper, 
subject only to a further examination of the sum of E25 
million proving satisfactory. Just two days later, Halifax 
reported that this further examination had proven 
satisfactory, and that he had instructed Loraine to inform the 
Italian authorities accordingly. 2 
The reception given to Britain's trade plan in some quarters 
in Italy was not favourable. Giannini, the head of the 
Italian delegation to the Joint Standing Committee, was 
unimpressed by the British proposals, viewing them as a crude 
attempt to lever Italy away from Germany. The biggest 
problem, as he saw it, was that if the Germans responded to an 
Italian acceptance of the proposals by demanding that Rome pay 
for its consequently reduced requirement of German coal in 
scarce foreign currency, the British would be unable to make 
up the inevitable shortfall in Italian needs. In any case, 
the Italians had recently demonstrated their preference for 
coal from Germany by negotiating a new agreement with their 
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ally to increase the supply of coal by rail to half a million 
tons per month, half Italy's requirement, in response to the 
threat to seaborne German supplies caused by the introduction 
of enemy export control. ' Nevertheless, Loraine was able to 
report on 17 December that Mussolini had approved Britain's 
plans on trade as a basis for negotiations for an agreement, 
a development which Noble felt was a considerable step in the 
right direction'. 2 Crucially, however, Loraine did not report 
that in forwarding the British proposals he had failed to make 
clear that, as the great majority of orders Britain wished to 
place in Italy were for war material, the sale of Italian 
armaments to Britain was indispensable to the scheme's 
success. 3 This was to have profound significance in the new 
year. 
Meanwhile, the blockade continued to be a source of 
considerable friction in Anglo-Italian relations, Ciano 
informing Loraine just before Christmas that, unlike before, 
I it was no longer a question of concrete 'cases, but of the 
general and unfortunate impression created that Italy was 
4 being controlled, by Britain . This warning did not fall on 
deaf ears, for Sir Percy was already doing all he could to 
ease tension in regard to economic control. For example, it 
was after a special plea from Loraine, who had himself been 
pressed by the Italians, 5 that, at the end of December, 
certain cargoes detained under the hold-back guarantee system 
but formally consigned to Italian consignees for Italian 
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consumption were released upon receipt of guarantees that they 
would not end up in Germany. ' 
Loraine was also keen to find ways of modifying the blockade 
which might ease tension more permanently. On 17 December, 
therefore, he asked for Jlatitude to release, without prior 
reference to London, ships and the part or the whole of 
cargoes for which guarantees have been obtained which satisfy 
us here" (i. e. the devolution of the work of the Contraband 
Committee upon the embassy in Rome), the aim being to reduce 
yet further delays to Italian shipping. At around the same 
time, Sir Percy, on his own initiative, also raised the idea 
with Ciano that the Italian Government might take over a 
certain amount of responsibility for the exercise of 
contraband control, insofar as it directly involved Italian 
interests, along lines similar to those recently arranged with 
Sweden. 3 Ciano discussed the idea with Mussolini, who 
apparently thought it interesting and worthy of further 
examination, ' but this information did little to appease the 
MEW, which reacted angrily to the ambassador's action. The 
Southern Department at the FO, on the other hand, was pleased 
with Loraine and hoped that his initiative would bring 
5 results. 
Partly as a result of Loraine's initiatives, a meeting was 
held on 28 December between representatives from the MEW and 
the FO to discuss the problem of Italy and the blockade. 
Cadogan considered that there were only two ways of resolving 
the present problem; either the conclusion of some kind of war 
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trade agreement with Italy, whereby Britain would agree to 
relax its physical control of Italian shipping in return for 
a promise not to assist Germany to break the blockade and 
limitation of the importation of certain materials and 
products, or the devolution of part of the contraband control 
procedure upon the Anglo-Italian Joint Standing Committee in 
Rome. Either of these would mean handing over a certain 
degree of responsibility for the exercise of economic control 
to the Italian Government, at which some concern was 
expressed, but Francis Rodd commented that, as far as the MEW 
could tell, 'comparatively little had gone through Italy to 
Germany since the war started', and that there were no great 
problems, in regard to Italy exporting German goods on behalf 
of the Germans. This implied that Rome could probably be 
trusted to keep to anyýpromises it made, and Rodd added that 
'if we had any definite evidence that the Italians were not 
keeping their side of the bargain, we should then break our 
agreement'. The conclusion of some kind of war trade 
agreement thus seemed the most desirable option, and the MEW 
representatives reported that was what the Ministry was now 
working towards. ' 
By the end of 1939, therefore, the British were at last 
beginning to try to reach the definitive agreements with Italy 
over trade and the blockade that they had considered desirable 
since the start of the war. In the light of the deterioration 
of Anglo-Italian relations in November and December due to the 
Allied exercise of economic control in the Mediterranean and 
British tardiness in concluding contracts for purchases in 
Italy, the successful realisation of these formal agreements 
was now more important than ever in order to prevent nascent 
problems from getting worse and to put relations between 
London and Rome on a firmer, more propitious basis for the 
future. The opening weeks of the new year were clearly going 
to be critical. 
'PRO FO 371/23828, R12214/7174/22, memo by FO, 28 
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British Military-Policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East 
Just as Anglo-Italian relations began to take a turn for the 
worse in late November, two important issues regarding British 
military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East came up. 
First, the Colonial Office asked the DCOS to consider whether, 
given Rome's continuing non-belligerence, it was possible to 
authorise the relaxation -of local defence precautions against 
Italy in order to alleviate the strain some colonial 
governments were experiencing in maintaining them. The 
Foreign office had already raised this issue back in 
September, when it had been decided that it would be premature 
to authorise any relaxation, so it was no surprise that the CO 
initiative won backing from the FO, which commented that, 'The 
object of our efforts... should be to encourage (Italy] to be 
friendly and to make the first move towards collaboration and 
relaxation of military precautions'. This time, with 
confidence in Italy remaining aloof from the war having grown, 
the DCOS gave general consent to the idea, provided that the 
French authorities concurred and that a sufficient degree of 
readiness be maintained so that, should Italian policy change, 
there would be no long delay in restoring full precautionary 
measures in the colonies. ' 
The issue was then passed on to the Oversea Defence Committee 
(ODC) f or consideration. -It too agreed that 
local authorities 
should be able to relax def ence measures against Italy but 
added the following, more specific provisos to those put 
forward by the DCOS; 
(i) No precautions should be relaxed which could not be 
restored in 21 days (the length of time it was calculated 
it would take the Royal Navy to reach full strength in 
the Mediterranean from its current depleted state). 
(ii) No local defence units, air raid precaution squads, 
etc., should be demobilised unless they were judged 
efficient and could be remobilised within 21 days. 
(iii) The continuance of long term projects (such as 
underground shelters at Malta) should be considered in 
Britain with regard to how far they had progressed and 
whether to abandon them would result in a saving worth 
the consequent lack of defensive preparedness in the 
appropriate colony. 
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The ODC did agree, however, that certain African units, such 
as the Kenya Defence Force, could be disbanded forthwith if 
there were no local objection to such a course of action. ' 
It was not until just before Christmas that the Military Co- 
Ordination Committee got around to discussing the question. 
At this meeting, the view was generally expressed that it 
would be a mistake to permit a general relaxation of military 
activities, such as manning AA guns, as it was felt that this 
would almost certainly result in a loss of morale, but that 
there was no reason why there should not be some easing of 
passive defence measures, such as air raid precautions. 2 At 
the end of the month, the French gave notice of their 
concurrence with British plans, but were keen to add that the 
Allies should avoid going 'too far in the direction of 
weakening a system which is already everywhere purely 
defensive in character'. 3 
Consideration of the issue continued into the new year in 
consultation with colonial governors and it was found that 
there were few measures that could safely be taken. Hardly 
any African units could be wisely disbanded or demobilised as 
they were needed for internal security as much as against the 
threat of Italian attack. It was also judged unwise to 
abandon long-term projects, such as the construction of 
underground air raid shelters in Malta, as they were all 
designed to increase' the security of places of first class 
importance, though it was decided that the rate of progress of 
the work could be adjusted so that provision of labour and 
materials did not interfere with the war effort in Britain. 
only such minor administrative measures as the relaxation of 
the precautionary stage (which was little m6re than an open 
declaration, as opposed to a tacit awareness, of a possible 
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attack from a named country) were considered advisable. ' Once 
again, therefore, the FO's hopes of improving relations with 
Italy by relaxing military preparedness in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East were effectively frustrated. 
The second important military development in late 1939 was the 
production by the COS on 5 December of the review of military 
policy in the Middle East initiated by Ironside at the end of 
October. Although this report stressed that, 'Steps to 
increase our forces in the Middle East must ... not be at the 
expense of our essential requirements in the West', it also 
commented that 
We must at all times maintain in Egypt, Palestine, the 
Sudan, Kenya and Aden the minimum forces necessary for 
the internal security of these territories. over and 
above these, we must retain in these countries sufficient 
forces to defend our essential interests against Italian 
land attack. 
Although the air situation remained unsatisfactory, it was 
reaffirmed that land forces currently stationed in the Middle 
East were considered broadly adequate for these tasks, though 
the formation of an African division in Kenya and of an 
additional battalion of the Sudan Defence Force were 
recommended to improve things further. The main 
recommendation of the report, however, was the ultimate 
establishment in the Middle East of a force of twelve 
divisions and over thirty squadrons (mainly bombers and 
fighters). Rather than being aimed primarily at deterring 
Italy from entering the war or improving preparedness to fight 
the Italians should they intervene, this plan reflects the 
advice of the PMRs at the end of September that the Allies 
should increase their military presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean so as to render themselves capable of lending 
greater assistance to the states of South-East Europe, most 
particularly Turkey, in the event of a German or Soviet attack 
upon them. 2 
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Despite the primary aim of the scheme, its acceptance and 
implementation would, of course, have serious repercussions 
for policy towards Italy, and it might have been expected that 
it would encounter severe opposition from the Foreign Office 
as a result. However, the report did not propose the despatch 
to the Middle East of large numbers of reinforcements in the 
near future, merely the development of facilities in the 
region to enable a force of 12 divisions and the suggested 
number of squadrons to be accommodated when such forces could 
be spared. Given the overriding commitments in north-west 
Europe, this was unlikely to be for a little while, by which 
time the expected improvement in the Allies' military position 
vis-&-vis Germany and the further deterioration of Italo- 
German relations hoped for by the FO might have, at best, 
broken the Axis, or, at worst, rendered an adverse Italian 
reaction to the large-scale reinforcement of the Middle East 
both less likely and less worrying for the British. 
Responsibility for detailed analysis of the COS paper was 
handed to the Military Co-Ordination Committee, but it was not 
until the new year that Chatfield produced its report, which 
concurred with practically all the COS's detailed 
recommendations. ' On 15 January, therefore, the War Cabinet 
formally approved the COS paper and instructed the departments 
concerned to proceed immediately with detailed plans and 
preparations. ' 
Although these preparations did not at this stage involve an 
attempt to build up land forces in the Middle East to twelve 
divisions, the opening months of 1940 nevertheless witnessed 
the arrival in the region of a considerable number of troops. 
The 1st Cavalry- Division arrived in Palestine in three 
echelons between the start of January and the middle of 
February, and the Durham Light Infantry was sent from Tientsin 
in China to Port Said in Egypt. Moreover, plans to withdraw 
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seven battalions of the existing garrison of Palestine once 
the Cavalry Division arrived were withdrawn at the request of 
the French, These forces were augmented in early February by 
the arrival of the first echelons of the Australian and New 
Zealand Divisions in Palestine and Egypt respectively, whose 
presence in the Middle East, though formally only for training 
purposes, provided some insurance against the sudden 
development of hostilities in the region. ' These arrivals 
meant that by the start of March 1940, the number of British 
troops deployed in the Middle East had risen to 52,000 from a 
figure of 37,400 at the start of the year; and this excludes 
the 13,500 antipodean troops. 2 However, just as the Anzacs 
and other troops were arriving in the Middle East, the French, 
in the light of continued Italian neutrality, were in the 
process of reorganising the bulk of their land forces in North 
Africa for transfer to France, 3 mirroring an earlier 
withdrawal in the last months of 1939 of most of the French 
bomber force in Tunisia, ' and this can only have diminished 
any deterrent effect the new British arrivals had in Rome. 
The COS review of early December, though specific about the 
level of land and air forces to be aimed for in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, said practically nothing on the 
subject of naval forces, the stationing of which in the 
Mediterranean and its environs was clearly primarily aimed at 
the Italians. This issue was addressed, though, on 18 
December, in a major JIC report which stated that, I So long as 
Great Britain and France remain unsure of Italian intentions, 
they must maintain large naval forces to safeguard their 
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position in the Mediterranean'. ' In reality, however, the 
British Mediterranean Fleet had been reduced by this time to 
just four small cruisers, an Australian flotilla leader, four 
Australian destroyers, and two submarines, the bulk of 
Cunningham's pre-war fleet now being employed in other waters 
either to combat German raiders and U-boats, to increase the 
Royal Navy's strategic advantage over Germany, or to train new 
crews. 2 It is true that most of the withdrawn naval forces 
could be returned within a month, yet there can be no denying 
that by relaxing naval precautions in the Mediterranean to the 
extent they had been by the end of 1939, Britain had left its 
position there vulnerable to a surprise Italian naval assault, 
something which could quite conceivably have influenced 
consideration in Rome as to whether to enter the war or not. 
Despite Churchill minuting Pound three times in early 1940 to 
make administrative preparations for the return of a 
battlefleet to the Eastern Mediterranean, 3 however, it would 
not be until late April that the British corrected their 
potentially dangerous reduction of the Mediterranean Fleet to 
a skeleton force. 
Thus British military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East continued to develop from November 1939 onwards as it had 
begun to in September and October. Important military factors 
yet again managed to stave off challenges from the Foreign 
Office to lessen British preparedness for war with Italy in 
the hope that such moves would make conflict with Rome less 
likely. Air forces in the theatre remained more or less at 
the level they had been at since the start of the war, while 
further reductions in the size of the Mediterranean Fleet were 
balanced, at least to some extent, by increases in the number 
of troops stationed in the Middle Eastl even if these were 
brought about more by the desire to improve Britain's ability 
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to support Turkey against a possible German or Russian assault 
than as a result of a specific attempt to deter Italy 
militarily from entering the war. A pattern had clearly been 
set for military policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 
and it would only be as the prospect of hostilities with Italy 
in the region became very real from April 1940 that it was to 
be seriously reconsidered. 
The Balkan Ouestion 
The Balkan question went into abeyance f rom the end of October 
until almost- the end of November, as the Allies grew 
increasingly concerned about a possible German attack on 
Holland. It was briefly discussed at the third meeting of the 
SWC in London on 17 November, where Daladier's passion for a 
Balkan front seemed to have cooled, the Frenchman commenting 
that, 'It would now be too ambitious to think in terms of a 
Salonika front', though he still advocated the establishment 
of Allied military facilities in Turkey. ' Toward the end of 
November, however, the French requested a high level meeting 
of military personnel in Paris as soon as possible to discuss 
policy in South-East Europe. 2 The initial British response 
was one of suspicion and reluctance, but tentative agreement 
was given and 'an expression of the views in general terms of 
the French High Command on the problems involved, was 
requested to facilitate discussion. 3 
The COS briefly considered the Balkan question in their review 
of military policy in the Middle East of 5 December. This 
paper advised that preparations should be made for the Balkans 
becoming a theatre of war in the spring (as a result of enemy 
rather than Allied action, it must be stressed), but the COS 
only envisaged Allied forces helping to defend Turkey and 
possibly the Pelopponese at -this early stage in the war. 
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Moreover, in the event of Italy entering the war, Allied 
forces would be unavailable to meet even these tasks. ' 
The COS Is main statement on the Balkan question in early 
December, however, came in the form of a list of replies to 
the views of the French High Command requested in late 
November. These views seemed to indicate that Paris still 
hankered after a front in South-East Europe. In the light of 
forceful British opposition to Salonika as a base, the French 
now wanted investigation into the despatch of a Franco- 
British Expeditionary Force to Thrace or Anatolia, in such a 
manner that this force can be installed there before any 
German or Russian threat arises in the Balkans'. They hoped 
to have studies and negotiations with the Turks cleared up by 
early 1940 and to proceed to the active stage [presumably 
meaning initial deployment] in January'. The French also 
still favoured supporting the Yugoslavs and Romanians 
militarily, and at one point even mooted the idea that the 
Allies might take action in the region 'notwithstanding the 
attitude of Italy'. The COS were appalled. To install a 
force in Thrace or Anatolia before any threat to the Balkans 
arose seemed to them to be precipitating conflict in the 
region, something which the British were, of course, set 
against. The COS reiterated their serious reluctance to go to 
the direct military aid of Romania or Yugoslavia in the near 
future, and the French suggestion that Italian attitudes might 
be ignored in formulating Balkan policy brought the horrified 
response that this was entirely contrary to our ideas'. 2 
In discussion on 7 December, the War Cabinet agreed 
wholeheartedly with the COS, particularly over their concerns 
about the impact an adventurous Allied policy in the Balkans 
would have in Italy, an issue which was termed a very 
uncertain factor,, and their reluctance to deploy British 
forces north of Turkey's frontiers in these early stages of 
the war. The COS were therefore authorised to make their 
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replies to the views of the French High Command the basis for 
the high level military talks on Balkan policy scheduled for 
11 December in Paris. ' 
The meeting which took place in the French capital on 11 
December was attended not only by all three Service chiefs of 
Britain and France, but by Generals Weygand and Wavell as 
well. Gamelin opened the discussion by reporting that recent 
approaches had been made to France by Yugoslavia, Romania and 
Greece, outlining their determination to oppose aggression and 
requesting Allied help, moves which the French were keen to 
respond to positively. Replying for the British, Sir Cyril 
Newall, the CAS, stated that he had been instructed by the War 
Cabinet to emphasise that body's apprehension as to Italian 
reactions to an adventurous Balkan policy, and added that the 
British High Command felt that, for the moment at- least, 
Allied activities should be confined to unostentatious 
preparations to lend such assistance as was deemed advisable 
as and when it was required. The CAS then went on to 
reiterate the problem of lack of resources for a campaign in 
the Balkans and pointed out that, with Italian neutrality not 
assured, anything that could be sent would have to come from 
the Western Front, a point which was surely intended to 
dissuade the French from adventures in, South-East Europe by 
raising the spectre of a denuded front in France. Admiral 
Pound and his French counterpart, Admiral Darlan, followed 
Newall's comments up by arguing that it would not be possible 
to transport and maintain a force in South-East Europe by sea 
if Italy were hostile, and pointed out. that a Balkan 
expedition would probably require the use of bases in Turkey 
which were poorly defended and would therefore create further 
claims for AA resources that were already sparse. 
With the discussion following a negative trend, Gamelin tried 
to talk up a Balkan campaign by emphasising the number of 
divisions certain Balkan states could deploy (Romania - 31, 
Greece - 17, Yugoslavia - 26, Turkey - 37), but Ironside 
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considered his figures somewhat optimistic and pointed to the 
problems of coordinating such forces. Weygand then advocated 
immediate preparations f or the despatch of an expeditionary 
force to South-East Europe, including the establishment of 
supply depots in the area, and urged that armaments be sent to 
all Balkan countries requesting them. Doubtless to the 
disquiet of the COS, General Wavell voiced total agreement 
with Weygand, and, equally worrying, the Frenchman then urged 
that preparations for an Allied front should be initiated 
before Rome was consulted on the subject, so as to present the 
Italians with a fait accompli that they would then have to 
accept, whether they liked it or not. Newall immediately 
replied that this was impossible as the Allied governments had 
promised to keep Italy informed of any projected action in the 
Balkans, a fact that had slipped the memory of General 
Gamelin. The meeting broke up without definitive agreement 
being reached, but the British delegation took away with them 
for consideration a set of draft resolutions on the Balkan 
question drawn up by Gamelin. 1 
Once they had digested them fully, the COS were surprised by 
Gamelin's draft resolutions, even going so far as to comment 
that 'we found ourselves in complete agreement on all 
essentials I. Certainly, some of the resolutions were unlikely 
to appeal to the British. For example, neither the use of 
Salonika as a base nor Allied military intervention in 
northern Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania were expressly ruled 
out. However, far more important than these, Gamelin 
explicitly stated that, 'In the existing political and 
military circumstances, we can do no more than initiate 
preparations for Allied intervention, . Moreover, he added 
that, if it is decided to undertake operations in the 
Balkans, the forces to be employed there can only be 
transported and, thereafter maintained, if the attitude of 
Italy is at least the one of benevolent neutrality', and that, 
'Italy's attitude also governs the question of the size of the 
'PRO CAB 66/3, Paper 159,13 December 1939. 
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f orces the Allies can use f or operations in the Balkans I. 1 
France's most senior military commander was thus effectively 
of f ering to abandon any thought of despatching af orce to 
South-East Europe in the near future ahead of any enemy attack 
into the region and to bind the whole idea of a Balkan 
expedition firmly to the attitude of Italy, the very situation 
the British had been aiming for all along. The War Cabinet 
therefore decided to accept Gamelin's draft resolutions on 14 
December. 2 
When the Supreme War Council met for the fourth time on 19 
December in Paris, the Allies attempted to build upon recent 
progress to reach definitive agreement on the Balkan question. 
Daladier confirmed that the French Government now had no 
intention of despatching a force to South-East Europe in the 
immediate future, as this 'would be premature and might arouse 
keen opposition in Italy', but Paris did propose 'to take 
advantage of the remaining two or three months of relative 
quiet to prepare to help the Balkan countries should they 
decide to resist any aggression upon them'. After some 
discussion, it was agreed that such a policy should be pursued 
by means of continued diplomatic action aimed at encouraging 
the Balkan states to unite in the face of possible aggression, 
as generous a supply as possible of war material, and 
'Preparatory measures on a limited scale to make possible in 
case of necessity ultimate intervention by Franco-British 
armed forces; for example, the conduct of conversations 
between the military staffs, the organisation of bases, &c. 1. 
However, it was explicitly confirmed that 'There can be no 
question of the despatch of any Franco-British armed forces 
even on a limited scale, unless Italy is at least a definitely 
benevolent neutral., Moreover, the SWC agreed that the 
attitude of Italy was 'an overriding consideration and it is 
essential to avoid offending her susceptibilities'. With this 
in mind, it was decided that no preparatory measures were to 
'PRO CAB 66/4, Paper 160,13 December 1939. 
2 PRO CAB 65/2j 115th Meeting, 14 December 1939,2nd 
minute. 
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be initiated until the result was known of an informal 
approach in Rome to ascertain Italian views on possible Allied 
policy in South-East Europe. ' Ciano was therefore approached 
by both Frangois-Poncet and Loraine in late December 1939 and 
early January 1940 as to how Italy would react to an Allied 
intervention in response to German-aggression, but he rather 
sidestepped the issue. 2 This was a far from ideal response, 
of course, but the Foreign Office felt reassured enough by it 
to clear the way for the initiation of unprovocative 
preparations for possible military action in defence of the 
states of South-East Europe. 3 
The SWC meeting of 19 December thus effectively resolved the 
fundamental issues of the Balkan question; Allied strategy 
would be reactive rather than proactive, and everything was 
tied to the attitude of Rome. Given the firmness of London's 
resolve not to pursue a Balkan policy which it considered 
would jeopardise Italian neutrality, the French had little 
choice in the end but to accept Britain's fundamental 
objections to their plans, though this was doubtless made 
easier by the fact that the Allies began in December to 
contemplate the possibility of despatching a force to 
Scandinavia in response to the Soviet invasion of Finland. ' 
Such a move would not only meet Paris I desire for some kind of 
action, but was also expected to divert German attention from 
the west by threatening the Reich's supplies of Swedish iron 
ore and thereby to create in the north the much longed-for 
second front. 
Discussion of Balkan strategy did not stop after 19 December, 
of course, as there remained many issues to resolve (notably 
'PRO CAB 99/3,4th Meeting, 19 December 1939, pp. 3-7. 
2 PRO CAB 65/2,123rd Meeting, 27 December 1939,8th 
minute, CAB 65/5,9th Meeting, 11 January 1940,4th minute & 
Woodward, 1, p. 30. 
3 PRO CAB 21/1180, Halifax to Chatfield, 16 February 
1940, pp. 2-3. 
'See, for example, PRO FO 1011166, Halifax to Loraine, 
26 December 1939. 
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whether Salonika was to be used as a base) , but these were of 
a lesser importance than those settled by the SWC and do not 
fall within the remit of this particular study. The focus of 
Allied strategic discussion from late December shifted to the 
possibility of operations in Scandinavia, which the British 
were far more happy to engage in in the early stages of the 
war than a campaign in South-East Europe. It was not until 
April 1940, in much changed circumstances, that fundamental 
questions of Allied Balkan policy were to re-emerge. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - JANUARY TO APRIL 1940 
Britain and Italian Foreign Policy: January to Februaj: y 
On 2 January, Loraine took the opening of the new year as an 
opportunity to report his considerations on the trend of 
Italian policy to London. He stated that, 'Italy means to 
keep out of this war and that she will only take military 
action if she feels that vital interests of hers are 
threatened'. The Southern Department, though very satisfied 
with the overall situation, were not quite so optimistic as 
the ambassador, Noble minuting that 'We have good reason to 
believe that Signor Mussolini himself would still rather like 
to bring Italy in on Germany's side', though, as things stood, 
he considered that if the Duce did try I to rush Italy into war 
on Germany's side, he would be driven from power by the 
moderates, backed by the King'. I 
The overthrow of Mussolini, or at least his withdrawal into 
the background, was the great hope of the Southern Department, 
for he was considered the only man capable of dragging an 
unwilling Italian King, Army and people into the war on 
Hitler's side, 2 and there was some hope early in 1940 that the 
Duce would indeed be forced to take a back seat permanently, 
either for political reasons or because of bad health. 
Loraine warned Halifax in an otherwise upbeat letter of 22 
January, however, that 'Mussolini's hand has never left the 
tiller', and that, although Ciano, Grandi, and Marshal Italo 
Balbo, Governor-General and C-in-C Armed Forces, Libya, were 
all anti-German, if pushed, they would all remain loyal to the 
Duce, whatever course he set. 3 At the start of February, 
therefore, Noble felt compelled to minute that 'it would be a 
'PRO FO 371/24937, R306/58/22, telegram from Loraine & 
minutes by Noble & Nichols, 2,6 &8 January 1940. 
'Indeed, Noble minuted early in 1940 that, 'With Signor 
Mussolini out of the way, the odds are, in my opinion, that 
Italy would come into the war on our side' (PRO FO 
371/24937, R306/58/22, minute by Noble, 6 January 1940). 
3 PRO FO 1011/67, Loraine to Halifax, 22 January 1940, 
pp. 1-2. 
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great mistake to assume that Signor Mussolini has already let 
the reins of government slip from his hand; such a development 
may come, and sooner than we expect, but it has not come 
yet'. ' 
It was perhaps this realisation that the. Duce's removal from 
power was probably not imminent that led, at the end of 
January, to the idea being mooted in the Southern Department 
of making efforts to encourage and accelerate the hoped for 
change. The concept was put f orward by Max Salvadori, an 
anti-Fascist exile, who argued that 
there is a large and increasing number of people of the 
upper classes, particularly in the Court, the Army and 
the Church and among the industrialists, who are tired of 
Mussolini's aggressive foreign policy and of Fascism's 
constant interference with the life of the individual 
citizen, and who would be only too glad to combine to 
push Mussolini (who has already lost a great deal of his 
prestige) into the background, but do not dare to do so, 
less from fear of internal trouble, than from fear of 
leaving Italy defenceless against Germany. If these 
circles could be assured privately by someone with 
authority to speak for the British and French Governments 
that in such an event Allied help would be immediately 
forthcoming, they might pluck up enough courage to take 
some decisive action. 
Noble, with whom Nichols wholeheartedly agreed, responded to 
this suggestion on 2 February. He commented, 
I entirely agree ... that it would be to our advantage 
if 
Signor Mussolini were to disappear; there is no one else 
in Italy who would have a hope of bringing the country in 
on the same side as Germany and very few people who would 
want to. But I think it would be dangerous f or us to try 
any intrigues designed to that end. We should do better 
to leave it to the moderates and German tactlessness to 
do our work for us; and there is at least a possibility 
that Signor Mussolini Is health will break down or that 
the moderates, led by Count Ciano, will gradually edge 
him into the background. The moderates know quite well 
that if Germany attacked Italy she could count on allied 
support and any back-door approach by us might play 
straight into the hands of the extremists. 2 
'PRO FO 371/24949, R1595/60/22, minute by Noble, 3 
February 1940. 
2 PRO FO 371/24938, R1497/58/22, minutes by Collier, 
Noble & Nichols, 30 January &2 February 1940. 
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Thus any idea of intriguing to remove the Duce from power was 
ruled out on the grounds that it was too risky and was 
possibly unnecessary. 
Britain's generally positive interpretation of Italian policy 
continued throughout the opening weeks of 1940. A factor in 
this was the suggestion from the Anglophile Signor Bastianini, 
made in private conversation with British officials on 8 
January, that London might replace Berlin in a new Anti- 
Comintern Pact. Loraine felt that such a development might 
very probably provide us with a cooperative link with Italy, 
of which the Duce would find it extremely awkward to 
disapprove,, and Nichols was also keen to follow it up, even 
though he was aware that it was 'quite likely that nothing 
will come of it'. Cadogan, however, was concerned that such 
an eventuality would mean Britain aligning itself with Japan, 
which would strain relations with the United States, and 
therefore advised that we had better leave it alone,. This 
view prevailed, and the reply given to the Italian ambassador, 
although polite and expressing an interest in the idea, was 
not overly enthusiastic, and the matter was not raised again 
by Bastianini. 1 In any event, there is no evidence that the 
Italian ambassador had acted upon instructions from Rome in 
making his suggestion, which was, as we shall see, contrary to 
the general trend of Italian policy at this time. Rather, it 
seems that he had been acting on his own initiative to try to 
encourage London to exploit the difficulties in Italo-German 
relations caused by Nazi-Soviet collaboration by picking up 
the mantle of opposition to communism which Hitler seemed to 
have discarded. 
There were other reasons for continued British optimism in 
regard to Italy. George Martelli of the Political 
Intelligence Department of the FO reported on 17 January, for 
example, that the Italian press had become yet more balanced 
'PRO FO 1011/67, Loraine to Halifax, 22 January 1940, 
p. 3, FO 371/24949, R1103/60/22, minutes by Noble & Cadogan, 
23 & 29 January 1940 & Woodward, 1, p. 30. 
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in its presentation of news, 1 and, as part of his report, 
dated 22 January, on his recent visit to Rome to discuss 
economic relations, Sir Wilfred Greene, the Master of the 
Rolls and recently appointed head of the British delegation of 
the Anglo-Italian Joint Standing Committee, stated that there 
was a growing anti-German and pro-Allied feeling amongst the 
people and, more importantly, government, though he added that 
this was fragile. 2 Loraine remained most optimistic of all, 
going so f ar as to comment at one point that I the risk of 
Italy's joining up with Germany has pretty well reached the 
vanishing point .3 Halif ax was clearly 
impressed by such 
reports, for he noted in his diary at the start of February 
that 'I think one may rest assured that, subject to nothing 
unforeseen, Italian policy is going to remain as it is at 
present'. 4 
Even at this early stage in the new year, however, there were 
also signs of trouble for the British. On 11 January, for 
example, Loraine reported that considerable-progress was at 
5 last being made in the settlement of the Alto Adige problem, 
the successful resolution of which would, as Halifax had been 
warned in 1939, 'remove the greatest bone of contention 
between the Axis Powers'. 6 On the previous day, the annual 
exchange of military information with Italy, provided for 
under the terms of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938, 
had revealed that the budget of the Italian Ministry of War 
for 1939-40 had been increased to the equivalent of around 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 17, 'Memorandum respecting 
the Italian press, by Martellif 17 January 1940. 
2 PRO CAB 67/4, Paper 21,27 January 1940, Annex, pp. 1- 
2. 
3 PRO FO 371/24949, R1507/60/22, Loraine to Halifax, 22 
January 1940, p. 4. 
BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 1 February 1940, 
p. 6. 
5PRO FO 434/. 7, Part XXI, No. 16, Loraine to Halifax, 11 
January 1940. 
6PRO FO 800/319, H/XIX/48, Henderson to Halifax, 4 July 
1939. 
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E50 million, almost twice the normal sum. 1 Then, on 16 
January, Ettore Muti, the Chairman of the Fascist Party, made 
a speech in which the audience were told that Fascism did not 
approve of sympathy for the Allies amongst Italians, that 
disciplinary measures would be taken if it were persisted in, 
and that the Italian people should not assume that they would 
not have to fight. 2 
The British should have taken greater heed of these 
developments than they did, for the opening weeks of 1940 saw 
a def inite swing in Mussolini Is thoughts in f avour of Germany. 
On 3 January, the Duce wrote to Hitler. In this letter, 
although the Fuehrer was warned that 'a further step in your 
relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in 
Italy', the general tone was that of one ally to another. 
Mussolini's main purpose in writing the letter was to urge 
Hitler not to launch the offensive in the West in the near 
future as Italy was not ready to participate in the struggle 
at this juncture. Instead, a compromise peace was advocated, 
the first step towards which the Duce suggested should be the 
reconstitution of some form of Polish state. Rather than 
fighting the Allies, Hitler was encouraged to take on the 
Bolsheviks, a suggestion which was motivated by the desire to 
safeguard Italy's position as Germany's main ally. Mussolini 
concluded the letter by telling Hitler that Italy was a 
reserve for Germany; diplomatically, if the Reich wanted a 
negotiated settlement, economically, in helping Germany resist 
the blockade, and militarily, in that Italy was building up 
its armed forces for intervention at a future stage when such 
action would not impose a strain on German resources. 3 
'PRO CAB 66/4, Paper 17,12 January 1940, p. 5. 
2 PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Rome, by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 117. 
3, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 504, Mussolini to 
Hitler, 3 January 1940, pp. 604-9, Cliadakis, H., 'Neutrality 
and War in Italian Policy, 1939-401 in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 9 (1974), pp. 177-8 & Knox, 
Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 67-9. 
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Nor were these words just to please Hitler, for on 6 January, 
the Duce explained to Ciano that Italy's course remained tied 
to that of Germany, as to change over to the Allied side would 
mean 'the confirmation of the [Allied) military and colonial 
hegemony at Italy's expense'. ' To be sure, Mussolini was 
still prone to the occasional fit of pique at the Germans, 2 
and Hitler's tardiness in replying to his letter of 3 January 
was a continuous annoyance to him, 3 but the general trend of 
his thoughts in the first month of 1940 was definitely away 
4 from the Allies. 
Hitler's failure to respond positively to his renewed appeal 
for an I tal ian- sponsored negotiated peace swiftly led the Duce 
to return to consideration of possible dates for Italy's entry 
into the war. Reminded of Italy's woeful lack of preparedness 
for a major conflict on 10 January, Mussolini suggested to 
Ciano on the lith the second half of 1941, though, on 23 
January, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, at which he 
warned his subordinates that Italy could not remain neutral 
without falling to the second rank of European powers, the 
Duce argued that they should join Germany in the second half 
of 1940 or early in 1941. This change of date was due to 
Mussolini beginning to give less weight in his musings to 
practical factors militating against intervention. For 
example, despite revelations on 20 January that Italy's 
financial predicament was shocking, the Duce showed no concern 
over the possibility of inflation on a huge scale, crassly 
retorting that states are never shaken by financial problems. 
In any event, the particular date that Mussolini happened to 
settle on is not the most important thing. What is, is that, 
1 As cited in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 67. He 
reaffirmed this on 22 January by telling his son-in-law, 
'One thing is certain: we shall never join with them (the 
AlliesP (Ciano, Diary, 22 January 1940, p. 201). 
Ciano, Nary, 17 & 28 January 1940, pp. 198,202. 
Shirer, p. 687. 
'Ciano, Diary, 1,19,23 & 28 January 1940, pp. 192, 
199,202-3. 
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as Ciano noted in his diary on 1 February, 'His mind is set 
and decided on war'. ' 
It was not long before London was given a firm indication of 
Mussolini's new found adherence to the German alliance, for, 
on 8 February, the Duce, abruptly and without warning, 
torpedoed efforts to reach a comprehensive Anglo-Italian 
economic agreement by blocking the sale of Italian armaments 
to Britain. The official explanation for this decision was 
that Italy needed many of the types of war material Britain 
wished to purchase for its own rearmament and that it would be 
dishonourable for Mussolini to allow the sale of weapons to 
his ally's enemies. ' Other reasons mooted by the Foreign 
Office were German pressure, an attempt to win greater 
concessions, an effort to work up a feeling of grievance 
against Britain to facilitate entry into the war subsequent to 
a German offensive, or just a fit of pique. only the first of 
these was given much credence, though, and the FO was broadly 
prepared to accept the official explanation. ' 
This was a partially accurate reading of the situation. Italy 
certainly did need the bulk of the armaments that it produced 
for its own rearmament programme, though its need of foreign 
currency was even more severe, so sizeable quantities of goods 
of a military nature were sold abroad all the same, 4 much to 
the discomfort of Italy's military chiefs. 5 Indeed, one of 
the major recipients of such goods was France, and it was as 
late as 24 May, a fortnight into the German assault on the 
West, that Mussolini finally ordered a halt to armaments 
'Ciano, Diary, 10,11,20,23 January &1 February 
1940, pp. 195-6,200-1,204. 
PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 56,13? February 1940, p. 3. 
3 PRO FO 371/24929, R2934/48/22, report by Rodd, 25 
February 1940, Part II, paras. 6-7 & Woodward, 1, p. 148. 
'Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 199. 
5Badoglio, p. 11. 
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exports to the French. ' What enabled this trade to flourish 
while the Duce refused to sell arms to the British was the 
fact that contracts were concluded with a dummy Portuguese 
purchasing company, so that the Italians could deny the 
existence of an arms trade with France to the Germans. Had 
this trade been out in the open, it would not have survived. 
Berlin had complained to Rome about the sale of certain types 
of material of a vaguely military nature to the Allies in mid 
January, and Mussolini had only narrowly been dissuaded from 
banning this trade then by the revelation of how desperately 
the foreign currency gained from such transactions was needed 
2 for Italian rearmament . When the Germans renewed their 
complaints in early February with regard to the British 
attempts to purchase arms from Italy, 3 the Duce was left in no 
doubt as to the damage that would be done to the Axis by 
agreeing to such sales, and so banned them. 
Thus Mussolini's decision of 8 February had everything to do 
with German pressure and shortages of military material in 
Italy (partly, of course, caused by the sale of arms on a 
considerable scale to France) , and very little to do with 
honour. Perhaps even more important than the reasons for the 
decision, however, was what it signified for the future 
direction of Italian policy. For the French ambassador in 
Rome, Mussolini's embargo on open arms sales to the Allies 
signified that he had decided to 'come down on the German side 
of the fence,, but Loraine was clearly little shaken by the 
collapse of the economic agreement, arguing that it only meant 
that 'he refuses to come down on our side, anyway as yet'. 4 
In London also, optimism continued to prevail throughout 
February. Halifax for one gave little credence to rumours of 
'Shorrock, pp. 273-4. 
Ciano, Marv, 14 January 1940, pp. 196-7. 
3 DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 593, telegram to Rome 
Embassy, 3 February 1940, pp. 738-9. 
4 PRO FO 371/24929, R2383/48/22, telegram from Loraine, 
16 February 1940. 
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I. 1 a change in Italian policy, and the bulk of information he 
2 
reported to the War Cabinet reflected this view. The general 
Foreign Office view of the Italian situation at this time can 
be found neatly summarised, bizarrely enough, in a report from 
the Yugoslav press bureau correspondent at Geneva which Noble 
called 'sensible,, Nichols referred to as 'not ... far from the 
truth', and Sir Orme Sargent, the Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State at the FO, labelled a very accurate picture'. The key 
point made was that Italy would very probably remain neutral 
until the end of the war. Although Mussolini most likely 
still favoured intervening on Hitler's side, as 'the victory 
of Germany would give Italy the possibility of obtaining 
something while the victory of France and England would leave 
Italy in the same situation in which she found herself today' , 
strong opposition to intervention within Italy and lack of 
preparedness for a major war would prevent the Duce from 
getting his way. Mussolini's personal bond of loyalty to 
Hitler, however, meant that he was very unlikely to make an 
agreement with the Allies, though, if he were removed from the 
equation, it might be possible to persuade the Italians to 
repeat the events of 1915 and intervene on the side of the 
western European powers. 3 
British optimism might not have remained so strong had they 
been more fully aware of the Duce's thoughts and actions. At 
the start of the war, Mussolini had had doubts over who would 
win, but was now becoming ever more convinced that Germany 
would emerge victorious, and so was more determined than ever 
that Italy should intervene on the Nazi's side. ' over the 
four days of the meeting of the Supreme Commission of Defence 
in mid February, therefore, he consistently tried to play down 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 37, Halifax to Campbell, 
16 February 1940. 
2 See, for example, PRO CAB 65/11,42nd Meeting, 15 
February 1940,9th minute. 
3 PRO FO 371/24938, R2825/58/22, report from Yugoslav 
Press Bureau correspondent at Geneva & minutes by Noble, 
Nichols & Sargent, 7,21,22 & 28 February 1940. 
De Felice, Mussolini, p. 680. 
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the lengthy catalogue of industrial, financial and military 
deficiencies revealed to him, ' arguing simply that 'We cannot 
remain absent from this drama, which will reshape the history 
of continents', 2 and, by the end of the month, was ominously 
talking once again of Italy's claims against France and the 
need to secure free access to the oceans. 3 
More important than words, though, were actions. Calls-up 
around this time meant that Italy was expected to have one and 
a half million men under arms by spring, a significant 
increase on earlier figures. ' Mussolini also began to direct 
a press campaign against the French from the middle of 
February, 5 which, to the mind of the Italian ambassador in 
Paris, denoted a grave shift in Rome's attitude to France. 6 
Then, having effectively rejected Britain's economic package, 
the Duce decided to intervene personally in Italo-German trade 
talks. The Germans had been endeavouring to pursue a more 
active economic policy towards Italy since the start of the 
year, the aim being to meet Italian requirements as well as 
their own, thereby strengthening the Axis. Little progress 
had been made, however, before Mussolini's intervention. The 
Duce ordered that sacrifices be made to supply the Reich with 
raw materials, and the result was a renegotiated Italo-German 
economic agreement of 24 February that promised maximum 
efforts from Germany to supply Italy with its full annual 
requirement of 12 million tons of coal and under which 
Mussolini was prepared to scour Italy, including the churches, 
for copper the Germans required for their war effort. 
Moreover, the agreement contained a secret protocol 
'Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 203-5. 
2 IlVdi non possiamo rimanere assenti da questo dramma, 
che rifar-i la storia dei continentil; as cited in Bottai, 
Diario, 14 February 1940, p. 176. 
3 Ciano, Dia 25 February 1940, p. 212. 
4 The Times, 4 March 1940, p. 5, col. 3. 
Ciano, Diarv, 16 February 1940, p. 209. 
Guariglia, p. 148. 
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encouraging total economic cooperation between the two 
countries. ' Italy was now bound more closely than ever to 
Germany, and tentative Italian efforts to enter into military 
discussions with the Germans from the end of February 
threatened to make the bond tighter Still. 2 Nothing much came 
of the subsequent Italo-German staff talks, but the fact that 
the Italians sought them strongly indicates the direction of 
Rome's policy at this time. 
The opening two months of 1940 had thus seen Mussolini take a 
more active role in determining Italian foreign policy and set 
a definitely more pro-German course. The signs were there, 
some obvious like the scuppering of the Anglo-Italian economic 
agreement, others more subtle, such as the smoothing out of 
the Alto Adige problem, yet, for the moment, the British 
continued to believe that there was little to worry about in 
regard to Italian policy in the near future. This optimism 
was not entirely unjustified, given the enduring strength of 
opposition to intervention within Italy and the country's 
continued lack of preparedness for a major war, but, at least 
with hindsight, one has to conclude that the British should 
have been considerably more anxious about developments in Rome 
in January and February 1940 than they were. Events in March, 
however, would open their eyes. 
Ancrlo-Italian Economic Relations: January to February 
The opening weeks of 1940 were crucial to Anglo-Italian 
economic relations. Having decided at the end of 1939 that 
the time was right to push for formal agreements with Rome 
over trade and the blockade, the British now endeavoured to 
conclude the deals that they hoped would improve relations 
with Italy and strengthen Italian neutrality. Unfortunately, 
however, this coincided with the adoption by Mussolini of a 
'Mallett, 'Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations', 
pp. 155-6, Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp-38-9, Knox, 
Mussolini Unleashed, p. 75 & Ciano, Diary, 21 February 1940, 
p. 211. 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 42-3. 
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more pro-German course, with the result that British policy in 
the economic sphere encountered frustration and failure. 
At the start of January, Sir Wilfred Greene, the Master of the 
Rolls and the man recently chosen to head the British 
delegation to the Anglo-Italian Joint Standing Committee, left 
for Rome, taking with him proposals for an agreement over the 
exercise of contraband control, in effect the counterpart of 
the scheme already put to the Italians for a trade agreement. 
Under these proposals, the Italian Government would undertake 
to recommend to the state monopolies and other parastatal 
importing bodies that they should enter into individual 
negotiations with the MEW for agreements whereby, subject to 
satisfactory standing guarantees as to destination, agreed 
quantities of goods should be passed automatically through the 
blockade in a given period. This, as Noble minuted, amounted 
to 'a rationing system on Italy, though it will not of course 
be so called,, ' yet Ronald Cross, the Minister of Economic 
Warfare, nevertheless felt that the scheme had a fair chance 
of being accepted. ' He was swiftly disabused, however, for 
the Italians described the British proposals as an attack upon 
their sovereignty. 3 
Negotiations over blockade issues thus began to f ounder badly 
in mid January, though the British could at least take comfort 
from the fact that there had been a falling off in the number 
of Italian complaints against economic control by this time, 
and this in spite of the rendering effective of enemy export 
control in the Mediterranean, with the exception of German 
coal, from 10 January. A formal agreement over the blockade 
nonetheless remained highly desirable, so Loraine was 
instructed to inform Rome of Britain's inability to maintain 
for much longer the exemption of seaborne German coal from 
enemy export control in the hope of resurrecting 
'PRO FO 371/24927, R112/48/22, minute by Noble, 4 
January 1940. 
PRO CAB 68/4, Paper 3,2? January 1940, p. 6. 
PRO CAB 68/4, Paper 22,16? January 1940, p. 6. 
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negotiations. ' In response, the Italians put forward the 
simple scheme of a blanket state guarantee against both the 
re-export to Germany of goods allowed through the blockade and 
the export through Italy of German goods, essentially a 
refinement and expansion of earlier Italian offers. This 
proposal had certain obvious disadvantages for the British, 
most notably the lack of formally agreed quantitative 
restrictions on Italian imports and the inherent dependence 
upon Italian good faith, yet could not be ruled out 
immediately. Greene therefore returned to London for 
consultations. 2 
By the time he arrived, the Italians had given the British 
another difficult economic issue to address. Rome was now 
insisting, as indeed Loraine had warned in mid December it 
probably would, ' that, as part of any comprehensive economic 
deal, the British purchase additional large quantities of 
agricultural produce to compensate for the inevitable loss of 
trade in such consequent upon the interruption of seaborne 
imports of German coal, for which Italian fruit and vegetables 
were used to pay. ' 
Both Loraine and Greene felt that Britain should respond 
positively on both counts. Sir Percy warned that, 
If we reject these propositions we are heading almost 
certainly for a first class row, a revival of "sanctions" 
mentality, quite possibly accompanied by a press campaign 
of a type with which we are familiar, and a refrigeration 
of our rather painfully restored relations, all of which 
would be jam for Germany. 5 
Sir Wilfred advised the purchase of horticultural produce 
currently being used to pay for German coal as payment for 
'PRO CAB 68/4, Paper 22,16? January 1940, pp. 6-7. 
PRO CAB 68/4, Paper 32,23? January 1940, p. S. 
PRO FO 837/494, Stirling to Hutton, 18 December 1939, 
p. 1. 
PRO CAB 68/4, Paper 39,30? January 1940, p. 5. 
5 PRO T 160/938, F13456/02/11, telegram from Loraine, 16 
January 1940. 
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British coal to replace it, arguing in a letter to Halifax 
that, 'We can't buy the Italian Government: but we can buy 75%ý 
of the population and prevent agitations against us being 
raised amongst them. And the cost, as you see, is not very 
big'. He also came down strongly in favour of accepting the 
Italian scheme for a state guarantee, provided it only covered 
goods consigned to Italian consignees, not those in transit to 
neighbouring neutrals, and the Italians worked their export 
control effectively to make the guarantee stick. Acceptance 
of the scheme would show the Italians that the British trusted 
them (whereas to reject it would show that they did not), the 
issue of trust being one upon which Greene placed particular 
importance in the effort to win the Italians over. Logic 
seemed to dictate, moreover, that the Italians could be 
trusted, as the British and French embassies in Rome believed 
that the leakage to Germany of goods consigned to Italians was 
comparatively small in importance and the Italian Government's 
priorities were to build up its own stocks and to increase its 
export trade (for which German marks were a poor reward). ' To 
be sure, acceptance of a blanket state guarantee with no 
provision for restricting imports to Italy of goods of 
strategic value by means of the blockade would do little to 
hinder Rome's ability to improve its military position, but 
Italian imports were not being restricted in such a way at 
present anyway, and, as Noble pointed out at the end of 
January, 
we cannot entirely prevent Italy from accumulating 
reserves of raw materials unless we are prepared , 
to 
impose a rationing system on her, which clearly is not 
practical politics at the moment. All we can do is to 
ensure that she does not draw dangerously large amounts 
of raw materials from sources under our control; this is 
in fact already being done, the practice being to dole 
out raw materials in the smallest possible quantities. 2 
'PRO CAB 67/4, Paper 21,27 January 1940, Annex, pp. 4-6 
&: FO 371/24927, R883/48/22, Greene to Halifax, 11 January 
1940. 
2 PRO FO 800/320, H/XIX/94, minute by Noble, 31 January 
1940. 
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The issues of increasing horticultural purchases f rom Italy 
and the Italian offer of a blanket state guarantee were put in 
the framework of a comprehensive scheme to resolve Anglo- 
Italian economic problems in a joint memorandum for the War 
Cabinet by Halifax and Cross, the Minister of Economic 
Warf are, on 27 January. The memorandum agreed with Greene 
that the state guarantee should be accepted (subject to a 
provision enabling either party to terminate the arrangement 
if desired and to agreement being reached on one or two 
administrative points, such as definition of the goods covered 
by the guarantee), as, despite the scheme's weaknesses, it was 
considered that, 'The risk of widespread evasion would only be 
serious if the Italian Government were to embark upon a 
deliberate policy of forwarding contraband to Germany'. The 
paper then noted that seaborne German exports of coal to Italy 
could not be allowed to continue for long lest their exemption 
from enemy export control anger other neutrals. To stop the 
supply with as little damage being done to Anglo-Italian 
relations as possible, Britain would not only have to offer to 
make up the shortfall in the coal itself, but also in the 
purchase of agricultural produce currently being used to pay 
for it. Halifax and Cross felt that there should be no 
problem supplying the coal, but there was simply no viable 
market at the moment for the additional E5 million worth of 
agricultural produce the Italians were insisting Britain buy. 
The memorandum stated that E2.5-3.5 million worth could be 
justifiably purchased, though such purchases should be made 
conditional upon the supply of certain war materials, which 
Britain needed and the Italian Government was currently 
refusing to sell, and upon the Italians providing the 
transport for the produce. Thus, in effect, what was being 
proposed was 'buying goods which we do not need in order to 
enable Italy to buy coal which we could without difficulty 
sell elsewhere'. This transaction may seem ridiculous and 
illogical on its own merits, but some kind of agreement with 
the Italians on economic issues was considered essential in 
order to secure military supplies and shipping, and, above 




The memorandum drew up a list of proposals for a comprehensive 
economic agreement with Italy which was to be accepted or 
rejected as a whole to avoid further lengthy wrangling over 
minor issues. These were: 
(1) Acceptance in principle of an Italian state 
guarantee. 
(2) Cessation of seaborne German coal exports to Italy. 
(3) British purchase of an additional E2.5-3.5 million 
worth of agricultural produce from Italy, conditional 
upon certain measures being met by the Italian Government 
as mentioned above. 
(4) Britain to make available in 1940 not less than 8.3 
million tons of coal for sale to Italy. 
(5) Clearing negotiations allowing for these and other 
purchases to be made to be completed. 
(6) Two shipping agreements already provisionally made 
with Italian shipowners to be signed and brought into 
force at once. 
Halifax and Cross doubted that these proposals would prove 
quite adequate to meet Italian demands, so they suggested 
that, although Greene should try to secure agreement on them, 
he should be authorised, if necessary to obtain a general 
settlement, to increase the proposed additional agricultural 
purchases to the level of E5 million for which the Italians 
were asking. ' 
The war Cabinet considered the Halifax-Cross memorandum on 29 
January. The main point discussed was the proposed increase 
in agricultural purchases f rom Italy, as it had created a 
certain amount of unease, especially within the Treasury, 
where it was viewed, quite legitimately, as largely 
unnecessary expenditure which would impact negatively upon 
both domestic production and imports of similar goods from 
elsewhere. 2 The Chancellor of the Exchequer was therefore 
keen to comment at the War Cabinet meeting that, 'The war 
threw a great strain upon us, and expenditure on non- 
essentials should be avoided as far as possible. Moreover, a 
transaction of this kind created a most undesirable precedent 
for negotiations with other neutrals, . Halifax suggested that 
the problem might be resolved by permanently exempting German 
'PRO CAD 67/4, Paper 21,27 January 1940. 
PRO T 160/938, F13456/02/11-12, January-February 1940. 
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coal from enemy export control, thereby allowing Britain to 
avoid purchasing the produce it did not want without damaging 
Anglo-Italian relations. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the 
Director-General of the MEW, swiftly quashed this idea, 
however, as it would invite protests from many neutrals. In 
any case, the permanent exclusion of German coal from enemy 
export control would have drastically undermined the trade 
deal proposed by the British in which the increased supply of 
coal from Britain to Italy was fundamental. The problem thus 
remained, but the Chancellor, concerned by the fact that the 
United States was already protesting at the tenderness which 
we had shown for Italian susceptibilities', argued that Italy 
did not need to sell fruit and vegetables in order to pay for 
increased supplies of British coal. This was a fair point, 
but Chamberlain noted that, 'We must consider whether, if 
Italy were forced to find the sterling required, she would 
remain friendly to us', adding that he was 'disposed to think 
that at this stage of the war, the goodwill of Italy was so 
important to us that we should do whatever might be necessary 
to secure it I. once that goodwill had been secured, the 
protests of other neutrals arising from it could be dealt 
with. Simon was apparently won over by this argument, for 
later in the discussion he commented that he was now also 
disposed to think that it would be worth spending up to E5 
million on agricultural produce to gain a comprehensive 
economic agreement, provided Britain secured the Italian anti- 
tank and AA guns that Oliver Stanley, the new Secretary of 
State for War, had said were greatly needed, and as long as 
Italian ships were authorised to carry ore from Morocco to 
Britain, something which Rome had thus far blocked on the 
grounds that the Germans viewed it as contraband trade. 
The War Cabinet finally agreed that Greene should be 
authorised to negotiate a settlement in Rome as proposed in 
the Halifax-Cross memorandum, though with certain additional 
points. First, the supply of Italian guns should be 
unconditional as to the manner of their use, so as to counter 
a possible proviso that they should not be deployed on the 
Western Front against Germany, where they were most needed. 
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Second, agreements for the chartering of Italian shipping 
should be reached, though the insistence on the carriage of 
Moroccan ore was dropped. Finally, no extra imports of 
Italian apples were to be agreed to, so as to appease American 
apple exporters, and thereby, with luck, Washington. ' 
This last point might seem rather trivial at first sight, but 
it in fact highlights an important issue. Two memoranda had 
been produced before the War Cabinet meeting, one by the 
President of the Board of Trade, the other by the Secretary of 
State for the Dominions, both urging that any further 
agricultural purchases in Italy should not be at the expense 
of trade in such goods with other countries, particularly the 
USA, France, Spain, and the Dominions, lest an agricultural 
lobby hostile to Britain form in those nations. 2 The fact 
that the War Cabinet chose to place a block on further imports 
only of Italian apples shows the extent to which it considered 
the interests of policy towards Italy should receive priority. 
The response of many in the Italian Government to the 
agreement proposed by Greene on his return to Rome was 
favourable. Riccardi, the Minister of Currency and Exchange, 
for example, was keen that the British plan should be accepted 
in order to ease Italy's economic situation. 3 However, on 8 
February, Mussolini abruptly placed an embargo on the sale of 
armaments by Italian firms to Britain for at least six months. 
Ciano told Loraine that the Duce's decision did not preclude 
the purchase by Britain of materials used in the manufacture 
of armaments, such as sulphur and mercury, and that his 
intention was not to stifle all Anglo-Italian trade, 4 but, 
even so, the embargo on arms sales effectively meant the 
breakdown of the British scheme, for the bulk of the f-25 
'PRO CAB 65/5,26th Meeting, 29 January 1940, lst 
minute. 
PRO CAB 67/4, Papers 26 & 27,27 & 28 January 1940. 
3Ciano, Diary, 3 February 1940, p. 205. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 30, telegram from Loraine, 
8 February 1940. 
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million that Britain had offered to spend in Italy in 1940 was 
to have been used to purchase armaments. ' 
Mussolini's decision came as a great surprise, not only to the 
British, but to many Italians as well, particularly those who 
had been negotiating in earnest with the British for the past 
weeks and months, 2 yet there had been indications that 
something of this kind might happen. Admittedly, at the start 
of the year, the RAF had, with Mussolini's personal assent, 
placed an order for 400 Caproni training aircraft at a total 
cost of f-9,000,000,3 but there had been a host of signs 
throughout January that the Italians would not be able to 
4 provide all the war material the British wanted. Indeed, 
contrary to the situation in the first months of war, it was 
the British who were now beginning to complain about Italian 
tardiness in concluding trade deals of all kinds, 5 and 'the 
process of attempting to place orders in Italy' had become 'a 
very painful one'. 6 Then, on 3 February, when Loraine had 
confirmed to Ciano upon handing him details of the proposed 
scheme that unless Britain could buy aircraft and guns the 
whole thing would fall through, the Italian Foreign Minister 
'PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 56,13? February 1940, p. 3. 
2 Sir Wilfred Greene commented in a report dated 14 
February that, 'the inconsistency between Signor Mussolini's 
decision and the earlier behaviour of various Departments of 
Government and other authorities in assisting and even 
encouraging negotiations for the purchase of war material 
may be ascribed to a defect in the governmental system of 
the country, under which there is insufficient liaison 
between the Departments and the head of Government' (PRO FO 
837/495, 'Negotiations with Italy (January-February 1940)1 
by Greene, 14 February 1940, p. 9). 
3 Mallett, 'Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations', 
p. 154. 
PRO T 160/938, F13456/02/10-12, January-February 1940. 
5Mallett, 'Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations', 
pp. 154-5. 
6 PRO T 160/938, F13456/02/10, Turner to Noble, 5 
January 1940. 
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had said that I there might be dif f iculty about it I due to 
Italy's own rearmament needs. ' 
The fact that Mussolini's embargo resulted in the collapse of 
the British plan for an economic agreement with Italy led to 
some criticism of London's tactics. Francis Rodd, for 
example, criticised the significance given to the purchase of 
2 
armaments, though only with the benef it of hindsight , and, on 
the face of , it, the British do seem to have been somewhat 
naive in expecting to reach a deal with Rome that included the 
open sale of arms to the enemy of Italy's ally. However, 
until the Duce issued his ban, the Italians, notwithstanding 
the alliance with Berlin, had entered into negotiations for 
the sale of arms to Britain in genuine sincerity and there had 
been no firm indication that armaments sales would be ruled 
out on principle, one or two deals even actually being struck, 
as we have seen, and so the charge of naivety is perhaps less 
valid. Moreover, as the British believed that Italy would 
only be able to make up the shortfall in its coal supplies 
once the Allies began seizing seaborne German coal exports by 
buying from Britain, 3 there was good reason to expect that-the 
economic necessity of securing one's requirements of a vital 
raw material would outweigh any political objection to the 
sales of arms needed in order to obtain British coal. 
Finally, and most important, the purchase of large quantities 
of arms was crucial to the effort to buy enough from Italy in 
1940 to allow the Italians to purchase the additional British 
coal which London believed Italy would have to buy and which 
the British were most keen to sell, both to prevent a 
deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations and, as Rodd 
explained in a letter to Lord Hankey, the Minister without 
4 Portfolio, to gain 'an economic hold, on Italy . Britain 
'PRO FO 371/24928, R1641/48/22, telegram from Loraine, 
4 February 1940. 
2 PRO FO 371/24929, R2934/48/22, report by Rodd, 25 
February 1940, Part II, para. 12. 
PRO FO 837/495, minute by Nicholls, 13 February 1940. 
PRO FO 837/494, Rodd to Hankey, 18 December 1939. 
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quite simply did not need or want anything that Italy could 
provide in sufficient quantities to achieve a balanced trade 
agreement other than armaments. 
Rodd, again only after the event, also criticised the decision 
that Rome had to accept or reject British proposals as a 
whole, 1 and, on the face of it, there seems no reason why the 
development of a serious difficulty in attempts to establish 
a sure footing for Anglo-Italian trade should have scuppered 
measures under consideration in regard to the blockade. 
However, London's decision was more rational than it would 
initially appear because, in accepting the idea of an Italian 
state guarantee, the British were effectively offering to give 
up substantial rights in the exercise of economic control, and 
to have offered to do so without some form of quid pro quo, in 
this case, in the form of a comprehensive trade agreement, 
would have caused considerable difficulties with other 
neutrals. 
If the British had not been shortsighted in combining trade 
and blockade questions in a single package, however, they 
certainly seem to have failed to appreciate the overall 
weakness of their position vis-a-vis Germany in economic 
relations with Italy. As we have seen, German pressure played 
a major part in the Duce's decision of 8 February, and the 
reason for this goes beyond the political factor of the 
existence of the Axis and the psychological factor of Italian 
fear of German military retribution. Acceptance of the 
British plan against German wishes might have put in jeopardy 
not only German exports of coal by land, the continuation of 
which was essential to meet Italian requirements given that 
the British were'only offering to make up the shortfall in 
seaborne supplies from Germany, but also the supply by the 
Reich to Italy of 67 per cent of its imports of machinery and 
apparatus, 48 per cent of its imports of wood, 38 per cent of 
its iron and steel imports, and 22 per cent of its chemical 
'PRO FO 371/24929, R2934/48/22, report by Rodd, 25 
February 1940, Part II, para. 13. 
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and wood pulp imports, none of which the Allies could 
conveniently replace. In 1939, Italy had received 27%; of its 
imports f rom and sent 19*-. of its exports to Germany, whilst 
the Allies together had provided just 14% in each category. 
Rome was simply more reliant economically upon the Germans 
than the Allies, with obvious implications for a situation in 
which it was effectively forced to choose between the two. ' 
Although the period for dealing with the recall of goods 
released under guarantee under the hold-back system and 
subsequently classed as contraband was increased in the 
Mediterranean in mid February from ten days to a month in 
order to appease the Italian Government in the wake of the 
failure to conclude an agreement on the blockade, 2 the general 
response in London to the failure of the British economic plan 
was fairly calm. When he revealed Mussolini Is decision to the 
War Cabinet, Halifax observed that it at least freed Britain 
from any position of obligation to Italy, and the CIGS said 
that although the failure to secure guns from Italy was 
serious, Britain could manage without them. 3 The major reason 
for this muted reaction was that the British were by no means 
sure that the Duce's decision would stand, given the belief 
that Italy could only make good the loss in seaborne German 
coal by buying from Britain and the news that certain Italian 
ministers were trying to persuade Mussolini to drop his 
4 embargo. Bearing in mind advice from Loraine not to rush 
into taking any steps which might prejudice a reversal of the 
Duce's decision, the War Cabinet therefore decided on 14 
February to defer discussion of the interception of seaborne 
'Medlicott, p. 283. 
Medlicott, pp. 90-1. 
3 PRO CAB 65/5,38th Meeting, 10 February 1940,5th 
minute. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 35, telegram from Loraine, 
14 February 1940. 
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German coal until Greene returned f rom Rome in af ew days 
time. ' 
On 16 February, however, the War Cabinet was informed of two 
telegrams from Loraine which made it clear that there was very 
little prospect of Mussolini withdrawing the embargo in the 
near f uture. The following day, Halifax read to his War 
Cabinet colleagues a letter he had received from Rome 
concerning the breakdown of negotiations. Loraine considered 
that there was no need to be. unduly depressed about it. The 
Duce had taken the line that, if he had agreed to the British 
proposals, he would tacitly have taken a decision of the first 
importance to render help to Britain against his German ally, 
not that the Italian Government considered that Britain had 
attempted to force a political issue with the proposals. Had 
Mussolini accepted the British scheme, 'we should have secured 
a political success of a kind which could hardly be expected 
within nine months of the signature of the Italo-German 
military alliance, and after only six months of indecisive 
warfare, (it is surprising that nothing was made of the 
political implications of the British scheme and their likely 
impact upon its prospects of success before it was put 
forward). Loraine felt that Britain had not lost too much 
from the failure of the negotiations, including Italian 
goodwill. Italy, on the other hand, might be damaged more by 
the failure, as it would struggle to obtain elsewhere raw 
materials it was to have paid for by arms sales to Britain, 
something which would reduce its ability to wage war. Having 
read the letter, Halifax agreed with Simon that the time had 
come to give orders for the interception of seaborne German 
coal, though he still wanted to speak with Greene first. 2 
The Foreign Secretary duly consulted with Greene on 19 
February, when Sir Wilfred, echoing Loraine, expressed tlýe 
opinion that Italy would run into difficulties securing raw 
'PRO CAB 65/5,39th Meeting, 12 February 1940,11th 
minute & 41st Meeting, 14 February 1940,6th minute. 
2 PRO CAB 65/5,43rd Meeting, 16 February 1940,7th 
minute & 44th Meeting, 17 February 1940,6th minute. 
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materials and selling its agricultural produce once the 
seaborne coal exports from Germany were stopped. This gave 
him some hope that Italian industrialists might yet be able to 
exert pressure in time to get Mussolini to reverse his 
decision, and- he accordingly considered that Britain's 
response to the embargo on arms sales should be neither 
vindictive nor weak, but polite and firm. The War Cabinet 
therefore agreed the same day to instruct Loraine to inform 
the Italians that any ship which left port after 1 March 1940 
carrying German coal for Italy would be stopped, and its cargo 
subjected to enemy export control. This the British 
ambassador duly did, and, in a telegram dated 20 February, he 
reported, wildly over-optimistically, as events in March were 
to show, that 'he was now fairly persuaded that there was 
going to be no drama over the stoppage of German coal 
shipments'. ' 
British policy towards Italy in the economic sphere had thus 
received a very serious check in February 1940 with the 
f ailure of the comprehensive scheme covering both trade and 
blockade issues. Some hope lingered, however, that all 
prospects for a formal agreement with Rome on economic matters 
had not disappeared, and, indeed, would be resuscitated once 
the Italians realised what an awkward position they had put 
themselves in, particularly over the question of coal 
supplies. Unfortunately for London, though, the Germans, who 
had already played a major part in bringing about the embargo 
on arms sales that had ruined the British plan, were aware of 
the economic problems that would confront Italy in the near 
future too, and were to make every effort to ensure that Rome 
did not need to reconsider its position. 
Britain and Italy's Political and Territorial Claims 
It is interesting to note that as Mussolini began to tighten 
his links with Nazi Germany in early 1940, the question of 
Italy's political and territorial claims was reawakened in 
London. This issue was not brought, -back into focus by the 
'PRO CAB 65/5,46th Meeting, 19 February 1940,6th 
minute & 50th Meeting, 23 February 1940,4th minute. 
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British, however, for, as we have seen, they continued to take 
a favourable view of Italian policy during the opening months 
of the second year of the war. Rather it was Italians posted 
to London who raised the matter and made the British think 
about it once more. 
In fact, the British had been prompted to reconsider the 
question of Italy's claims in late 1939, when Anglo-Italian 
relations had begun to show the first signs of real strain 
since the start of the war. George Martelli of the Political 
Intelligence Department of the FO had had a conversation in 
mid November with two Italian journalists who had suggested to 
him that Britain should seek to open talks on political 
questions with Rome. Given that the suggestion had not been 
put forward by officials connected to the Italian Government, 
Martelli had seen no reason to act upon this at the time of 
the conversation, but, with the announcement of the 
introduction of enemy export control causing friction with 
Rome by the end of the month, he had decided to inform Noble 
of the conversation. Both men had swiftly agreed, however, 
that there was no reason for Britain to change its stance on 
the question of Italy's claims reached at the start of the war 
and that the time was not propitious for an attempt to 
initiate political talks. ' Loraine had also reaffirmed his 
opposition to such a move, unless the Italian Government took 
the first step, in early December, and official discussion of 
the idea had subsequently lapsed as it had in mid September. ' 
It was not long before the issue was revived, however. The 
Marchese Bernardo Patrizi, an Anglophile who was shortly to be 
sent to London to act as liaison between the Italian embassy 
and the MEW, used the opportunity presented by an encounter 
with Sir Noel Charles in mid January to suggest that some 
consideration might be given to Italy's political and 
territorial claims as a means of overcoming Rome's 
'PRO FO 371/23788, R11031/1/22, Martelli to Noble, 1 
December 1939. 
2 PRO FO 1011/66, Loraine to Halifax, 4 December 1939, 
pp. 4-5. 
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, fundamental suspicions' about the Allies. This, Patrizi was 
keen to point out, would strengthen the hand of those in Italy 
who sought to break with Germany. ' 
By the time news of Patrizi Is suggestion reached London at the 
start of February, the Southern Department was considering a 
paper entitled 'Italy and the European War' written by 
Bastianini and handed to the British Government by the anti- 
Fascist exile, Max Salvadori. This document emphasised the 
independence of Italian policy and urged the Allies to loosen 
the blockade and, more importantly, address Italy's political 
and territorial claims. Bastianini commented at one point 
that I It is most unlikely that Italy would make a war in order 
to enforce her claims, if the prospect exists of reaching a 
reasonable settlement with [sic) peaceful means', and at 
another that, if Italian desires, which included a free hand 
to establish a dominant political, economic and cultural 
position in the Balkans, were met by the Allies, Italy 'will 
not find herself necessarily on the side of Germany'. The 
British were thus effectively being offered the prospect of 
cementing Italian neutrality, possibly even of turning it into 
alliance, by Italy's senior representative in London. 2 
Despite the elevated status of the author of the paper, 
reaction to it within the Southern Department was less than 
enthusiastic, no doubt largely as the fact that it had arrived 
via Max Salvadori strongly suggested that its production had 
not been inspired by the Fascist leadership in Rome. Noble 
also complained that Bastianini had been I rather vague I on 
exactly what Italy Is claims were, and suspected that they were 
such that the Allies could not fulfil them. He considered 
that to sate the Italians would require either the cession of 
the Suez Canal, 'which we could never allow', or a territorial 
route between Libya and Abyssinia, which would mean ceding 
'PRO FO 371/24938, R1513/58/22, report by Charles, 21 
January 1940, pp. 3-4. 
2 PRO FO 371/24938, R1497/58/22, 'Italy and the European 
War, by Bastianini, 30 January 1940. 
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almost all of the Sudan. As far as the Southern Department 
clerk was concerned, the likely price for assured Italian 
neutrality or support was too high, and he concluded that 
'Italy must resign herself to the hard fact that the 
establishment of the "Mare Nostrum" and a new North African 
Empire can only be achieved by defeating France and Great 
Britain'. Although he emphasised the importance of winning 
Italy over to the Allied cause, Nichols agreed with his 
subordinate that it should not be necessary to make major 
political and territorial concessions to do so, commenting 
that, 
While it is true that Italy will always be actuated by 
self-interest and is in some ways the least reliable of 
the Great Powers, nevertheless it should not be beyond 
our diplomacy to ensure that it was in Italy's interest 
generally to side with us. ' 
Thus the British rejected the idea of initiating talks with 
Rome on political and territorial issues for the third time 
since the start of the war. In the wake of Mussolini's 
fateful decision of 8 February, however, the Southern 
Department found itself forced to consider the question once 
more. On 12 February, George Martelli reported recent 
conversations he had had with the Marchese Patrizi and Count 
Capponi, the new naval attache at the Italian embassy in 
London. Patrizi had stated that intervention on the side of 
Germany was impossible and expected Italy to come in with 
Britain and France in eight or nine months time, provided the 
Allies could prove that they could defeat the Reich. This 
pro-Allied intervention was not certain, however, and to 
facilitate it, the two Italians had advocated meeting Italy's 
claims in the Mediterranean. To encourage British willingness 
to follow this new path in their relations with his country, 
Patrizi warned that Italian neutrality could not be secured 
merely by promoting Italy's ability to profit economically 
from non-belligerence, pointing out that 
estimates of the extent to which (Italy] could "cash in" 
by keeping out of the war were greatly exaggerated. For 
one reason or another, including lack of raw materials 
'PRO FO 371/24938, R1497/58/22, minutes by Noble 
Nichols, 2 February 1940. 
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and plant, her productive capacity was strictly limited 
and she could never hope to replace the belligerents in 
the world's markets. 
Clearly stirred by what he had been told, Martelli minuted 
that he had 
gained the impression, perhaps erroneously, that feelers 
are being put out in the hope that we will come forward 
with the offer of a bribe, which Italy herself is either 
too proud to ask for, or prevented from asking for for 
fear of cheapening herself. 
Noble was unimpressed, however, seriously doubting that the 
views of Patrizi and Capponi represented those of the men in 
power in Rome, and commenting on the idea of approaching Italy 
to meet its claims, 'I think it would be the greatest mistake 
for us to do so now or later unless our need of Italian 
military support is really extreme (and the value of Italy as 
an ally is doubtful, except strategically)'. Nichols once 
again agreed with Noble, minuting that there was 'Nothing here 
to suggest that we should do well to modify our policy, . Both 
Sargent and Cadogan subsequently signed the minute sheet upon 
which the two Southern Department men had made their comments 
and their decision to add no observations of their own 
indicates that they agreed with the position adopted by their 
subordinates. ' 
Thus, despite the blow to Anglo-Italian relations caused by 
Mussolini's decision of 8 February, the Foreign Office 
maintained its refusal to seek to initiate discussions on 
political and territorial issues with the Italian Government. 
Given the fact that three senior figures from the Italian 
embassy in London, including the ambassador himself, had urged 
such a course, and in the light of Patrizils comment about the 
probable ineffectiveness of attempting to strengthen Italian 
neutrality merely through efforts to increase trade, the FO 
might perhaps be criticised for failing to respond more 
positively to the string of Italian approaches. Such 
criticism would be largely unfair, however. To be sure, 
Patrizils warning was given less attention that it probably 
'PRO FO 371/24938, R2054/58/22, minutes by Martelli, 
Noble & Nichols, 12 & 15 February 1940. 
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merited, but, more importantly, it seems extremely likely that 
the Southern. Department was right to doubt that the approaches 
had been encouraged by the Italian Government. it is 
impossible to prove why the three demarches were made, and at 
least one historian, Rosaria Quartararo, has argued that they 
were indeed inspired by Rome in an attempt to move towards the 
Allied camp, but she provides no solid evidence for this 
assertion. ' It is certainly conceivable that an anti-German 
figure in the Italian Government, perhaps even Ciano himself, 
was behind the approaches, but again there is no hard evidence 
to support such a claim. There is, however, strong evidence 
to contend that none of the demarches was made with even the 
slightest official encouragement from Mussolini, the man 
ultimately, indeed almost solely, responsible for major 
Italian foreign policy initiatives. This evidence comes from 
the memoirs of Bastianini, which state that when he and 
Raffaele Guariglia, the ambassador in Paris, were recalled to 
Rome in February 1940 and supported the idea of seeking 
political agreements with the Allies, they were 'received like 
dogs in church' by the Duce. 2 Perhaps the most likely 
explanation, then, for the three Italian approaches of early 
1940 is that the Anglophile Bastianini, Patrizi and Capponi, 
disturbed by the developing trend of Mussolini's policy, of 
which they were presumably more aware than the British, were 
acting on their own initiative in an attempt to get London to 
take action which they hoped might change the pro-German 
course of the Duce's thoughts and actions. 
Whatever the inspiration behind the demarches, however, the 
arguments that were put forward against opening them by the 
Southern Department were powerful. After all, why should 
Britain and France have made the major concessions it was 
believed would be required to achieve concrete results when 
there was doubt over the military value of an Italian alliance 
'Quartararo, Roma, pp. 575-86. 
"accolti come cani in chiesal; Bastianini, G., Uomini, 
Cose. Fatti: Memorie di un ambasciatore (Milan, 1959), 
p. 181. 
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and when there still seemed in London to be reason to believe, 
as indeed Patrizi asserted, that the Italians would not join 
the Germans and would gradually move towards the Allies 
anyway? It was perhaps for these reasons, even more than 
doubt as to who was really behind the approaches, that, 
although Italian officials had made the first move, the 
British elected not to explore the possibility of talks on 
political and territorial issues at this time. 
Britain and Italian Foreign Policy: March to April 
British optimism in regard to Italian policy received a 
serious blow in March. On the 3rd, Loraine sent a 
communication from the Italian Government responding furiously 
to the stoppage from 1 March of seaborne German coal imports 
and raging at the illegality, as Rome saw it, of the exercise 
of enemy export control and the seizure of mail bags. ' This 
was Italy's first formal protest against the blockade, and 
came at the end of a two month period during which there had 
been little complaint on the subject in the Italian press and 
even a general acceptance in Rome that many of the earlier 
2 grievances had been mitigated . 
The change of tone heralded 
by the Italian note was clear, however, and, on 4 March, 
Osborne telegraphed the Vatican's belief that Mussolini had 
now 'issued orders for setting a definitely more pro-German 
3 course,, an opinion with which Vansittart firmly agreed . 
Unsurprisingly, Berlin sought to exploit this latest crisis in 
Anglo-Italian relations, despatching Ribbentrop at short 
notice to Italy. Loraine's response to the visit was one of 
equanimity, however. On 10 March, the day Ribbentrop arrived, 
he reported that the German Foreign Minister and his suite had 
received a cold welcome at the station from Count Ciano and 
that the opinion generally being formed by foreign observers 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 40, telegram from Loraine, 
3 March 1940. 
The Times, 4 March 1940, p. 6, col. 5. 
3 PRO FO 371/24929, R3215/48/22, telegram from Osborne & 
minute by Vansittart, 4&6 March 1940. 
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was that Mussolini was annoyed by the visit. ' This was 
followed three days later by a telegram stating that Ciano had 
informed Sir Percy that Italian policy had not been changed as 
2 a result of the two meetings held with Ribbentrop. Loraine 
even commented on 14 March that the whole episode had been 
'due probably to uneasiness in Berlin over the Italian 
attitude'. 3 Back in London, Noble was prepared to accept Sir 
Percy's reassurances, and considered-that the situation in 
Italy was no more dangerous than before Ribbentrop's visit, 
but both Sargent and Cadogan were less confident. ' 
Chamberlain, meanwhile, doubted that German efforts would come 
to much, though he was concerned by the fact that 'Mussolini 
is an incalculable factor,. 5 
Overall, Ribbentrop's visit to Rome did not, as Ciano told 
Loraine, substantially alter Italian policy, but it was not 
without significance. At the first of two-meetings, the Reich 
Foreign Minister handed over Hitler's long awaited reply to 
the Duce's letter of 3 January and then proceeded to expound 
upon the key points contained in it. The Fuehrer was said to 
be furious at the stoppage of seaborne German coal, calling it 
, an unheard of attempt by the pluto-democratic States, aimed 
at strangling Italy economically'. This was skilfully 
followed up with an offer to supply all Italyls coal 
requirements by land. Ribbentrop then told the Duce and Ciano 
that Germany would attack France this year, and added his 
conviction that the Allies would be crushed by the autumn. 
The commonality of the fate of Nazism and Fascism was stressed 
at this point, the obvious message being that Italy stood to 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 50, telegram from Loraine, 
10 March 1940. 
2 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 56, telegram from Loraine, 
13 March 1940. 
3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 60, Loraine to Halifax, 14 
March 1940. 
4 PRO FO 371/24936, R3419/57/22, minutes by Noble, 
Sargent & Cadogan, 16 & 18 March 1940. 
5 BUL NC 18/1/1147, Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 March 
1940, f. 2. 
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benefit by joining Germany and to lose by remaining aloof - 
Hitler's diplomat next moved on to the issue of Soviet Russia, 
with whom Italy's relations were still far from good, 
reassuring his audience that the Soviets would not attack in 
the Balkans, had given up on the idea of world revolution, 
were really more nationalist than communist, and had been 
forced into the war with Finland. In short, the present 
regime was little different to those of the Tsar's day. 
Ribbentrop rounded off his performance with a liberal dose of 
flattery for the Duce and his government, including thanks for 
such economic assistance as Italy had thus far rendered the 
Reich. ' 
At the second meeting the next day, Ribbentrop was told that 
the Duce was far f rom convinced about the Soviets, though 
Mussolini added that he was not averse all the same to efforts 
to improve Russo-Italian relations. The Duce did agree about 
the commonality of the fate of Nazism and Fascism, however, 
and, most importantly, affirmed that Italy would enter the war 
against the Allies to address the problem of its land and 
maritime frontiers. Crucially, though, the significance of 
this declaration was greatly diminished by Mussolini giving no 
indication as to when intervention might occur and stating 
that Italy could not stand a long war financially. ' 
Ciano noted in his diary that night that 'If he [Ribbentrop) 
wanted to reinforce the Axis, he has succeeded. If, on the 
other hand, he wanted to accelerate our intervention, he has 
not achieved his aim,. on the face of it, this comment is 
accurate, but it misses the key point that any strengthening 
of the Axis was likely to increase yet further Mussolini's 
desire to intervene as soon as possible. For the moment, 
however, it seemed that Ciano had cause for relief, for 
Ribbentrop's departure was followed by several days of concern 
on the Duce Is part that he might have given too strong an 
'Ciano, Papers, record of conversation between 
Mussolini & Ribbentrop, 10 March 1940, pp. 339-49. 
2 Ciano, Papers, record of conversation between 
Mussolini & Ribbentrop, 11 March 1940, pp. 349-59. 
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impression that Italian intervention was imminent, whereas, if 
the Germans went ahead with their plans to launch an offensive 
against the Allies in the coming weeks, Italy would be 
compelled by practical factors to remain non-belligerent. 
This led Mussolini to resolve to try to dissuade Hitler from 
attacking in the West and to inform Ciano that, if Germany 
attacked anyway, Italian forces 'will constitute the left wing 
which will tie up an equal number of enemy troops without 
fighting, but ready, none the less, to go into action at a 
convenient moment I; in other words, Italy would only intervene 
if the Allies appeared to be on the verge of defeat. ' 
The most important repercussion of Ribbentrop's visit was the 
arrangement of a meeting between the Duce and the Fuehrer at 
the Brenner on 18 March. To some in London, this was a 
worrying development. Chamberlain, for example, chose the day 
of the meeting to enquire if it would be possible to 
concentrate a fleet in the Mediterranean if developments made 
this desirable, 2 and Cadogan, clearly in a fit of pique, 
referred to the Italians in his diary as double-crossing 
monkeys'. 3 others were more sanguine, however, Halifax 
confiding to his diary on 18 March that he suspected the 
meeting would not lead to any great changes, and drawing 
considerable reassurance the next day from the simple fact 
that Ciano had been at the Brenner, even though there was no 
news yet as to exactly what Mussolini and Hitler had talked 
about. ' 
ý Loraine tried to reassure the worriers in London. Initiallyl 
A telegram of 19 March reported that Ciano had informed him 
that, as with the Ribbentrop visit, the Brenner meeting would 
'Ciano, Diar , 11-17 March 1940, pp. 220-3. 
PRO CAB 65/6,71st Meeting, 18 March 1940,2nd minute. 
Cadogan, Diaries, 18 March 1940, p. 264. 
4BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entries for 18 & 19 March 
1940, pp. 56-7. 
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not lead to any change in Italian policy, ' and a report dated 
the 21st noted that the Italian press had referred to the 
incident merely as 'a normal and natural consultation within 
the framework of the Italo-German alliance and agreements'. 2 
That same day, however, Loraine telegraphed that when the 
French ambassador had 'reminded Ciano that Anglo-French horse 
although a slow starter usually came through with a winning 
run in the straight, Ciano replied that Signor Mussolini had 
backed the German horse and had now doubled his bet'. 3 The 
view that arrived on 22 March from the Vatican was even more 
disturbing. Osborne reported that his information was that 
Mussolini had returned from the Brenner 'certain of Herr 
Hitler's military success', and opined that early German 
victories in a campaign in the West would bring Italy into the 
war. 4 
The anxious tone of these latter reports was justified, for, 
although the Brenner meeting followed a similar course to the 
two meetings between the Duce and Ribbentrop in Rome, Hitler 
dominated the encounter and exercised a powerful influence 
over Mussolini, persuading the Italian to agree that Ia danger 
of Bolshevik contagion does not exist, and that the Germans 
had been quite right to deal with the Poles as they had. 
Moreover, not only did the Fuehrer's talk of imminent German 
success against the Allies dissuade Mussolini from trying to 
deter Hitler from launching his offensive in the West, but it 
encouraged the Duce to promise that Italy would intervene 'as 
soon as Germany has by her military operations created what 
the Fuehrer describes as a favourable situation', or, 'Should 
the German advance develop with a slower tempo, the Duce would 
'PRO CAB 65/6,74th Meeting, 21 March 1940,4th minute. 
2 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 67, Loraine to Halifax, 21 
March 1940. 
3 PRO FO 371/24936, R3650/57/22, telegram from Loraine, 
21 March 1940. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 65, telegram from Osborne, 
22 March 1940. 
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wait until the moment when his intervention at the decisive 
hour could be of real use to Germany'. ' 
Interestingly, and explaining the reassurances he gave Loraine 
on 19 March, Ciano recorded in his diary on the evening of the 
Brenner encounter that 'The meeting has not substantially 
altered our position'. 2 In that Mussolini had been yearning 
to enter the war since its beginning, practical factors 
continued to militate against intervention, and no specific 
date had yet been set for entry, Rome's position had indeed 
not been substantially altered, but the Duce had nevertheless 
moved Italy one step further towards intervention. Before the 
Brenner meeting, Mussolini had promised Ciano that he would 
reserve for himself the choice of timing of Italian entry, 3 
and, by avoiding specific dates, he had essentially done this. 
The Duce had, however, given Hitler, albeit rather vague, 
assurances as to when Italy would intervene, and this surely 
denoted a development in Italy's position towards entering the 
war. 
Ciano was swiftly shaken from his initial self-delusion. On 
23 March, he noted in his diary that Mussolini now speaks 
openly of entering the war at the side of Germany and even 
defines our course of action: defensive in the Alps, defensive 
in Libya, offensive in Ethiopia against Jibuti (sic) and 
4 Kenya, aero-naval offensive in the Mediterranean'. He added 
that the Duce Is attitude was I beginning to inf luence many 
Fascist leaders', though 'the people of all social levels' 
still opposed intervention. On 26 March, Mussolini informed 
the Hungarian Prime Minister that Italy would enter the war on 
'Ciano, Papers, record of conversation between 
Mussolini & Hitler, 18 March 1940, pp. 361-5. 
Ciano, Diary, 18 March 1940, p. 224. 
Ciano, Diary, 16 March 1940, p. 222. 
4 This strategy was subsequently committed to paper by 
the Duce on 31 March and circulated amongst the Fascist and 
military elite. It was to be the nearest thing Italy had to 
a coherent strategic plan when it entered the war in June 
(Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 88-9). 
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Germany's side, 1 and, the same day, orders were given to the 
press not to attack Russia. ' It soon became clear who the new 
target was when the propaganda ministry began to put out pro- 
war and anti-British messages daily from the start of April. 3 
On 2 April, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, 
Mussolini spoke of the necessity of engaging in the conflict 
to prove Italy's status as a Great Power, to win an empire in 
4 the Mediterranean, and to gain free access to the oceans . 
The. date for Italian intervention was still not yet set, 
however, the Duce considering it a matter of delaying it as 
long as possible, consistent with honour and dignity, so as 
further to improve Italian preparedness. 5 
By the end of March, the Brenner meeting had clearly gone some 
way towards a reassessment of the Italian situation in London, 
for, on the 31st, Halifax felt compelled to write to the 
Service ministers to inform them 'that we, in the Foreign 
Office, after due reflection, cannot guarantee that Italy will 
not at once join the Reich as a belligerent, should the 
Germans launch their Blitzkrieg and obtain what might be 
interpreted as an initial success I. 6 The military needed 
little warning, however, for the COS were already 
contemplating steps that might be taken in response to the 
change of mood in Italy, and, on 27 March, had produced an 
aide memoire, in consultation with the MEW, on economic and 
military measures to deter Italy from entering the war. ' More 
explicitly, in an assessment of 'Certain Aspects of the 
'Ciano, Diary, 23 & 26 March 1940, pp. 225-7. 
2 Bottai, Diario, 26 March 1940, p. 181. 
3 Mack Smith, Mussolini, p. 289. 
4Ciano, Diary, 2 April 1940, p. 231. 
5 PRO CAB 146/1, 'Axis Plans and operations in the 
Mediterranean: September 1939 - February 19411, March 1950, 
Part I, pp. 7-8. 
6 PRO FO 371/24936, R3661/57/22, Halifax to Churchill, 
31 March 1940. 
PRO CAB 80/9, Paper 275,27 March 1940. 
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Present Situation', produced on 26 March, the COS had 
commented, 
If, as we think may be the case, Italy is at the cross 
roads, all possible steps should be taken to ensure that 
she moves in the right direction. It might, f or example, 
be thought that our best course was to arrange a show of 
force in the Middle East with the object of impressing 
her with the dangers of ranging herself against us. On 
the other hand, it might be thought that this would be 
provocative, and that the better policy was to maintain 
our present conciliatory attitude. 
The COS had stopped short of offering their own opinion, as it 
was a political question, but they had urged discussion of the 
basis of policy towards Italy as soon as possible. ' 
It should come as no surprise that the COS made this plea, or 
that sections of the British Government had begun to consider 
tougher policies for handling Italian non-belligerence, as the 
basis of policy hitherto, namely that increasing Allied 
strength vis-&-vis Germany, German insensitivity towards the 
Italians, and widespread dislike of the German alliance in 
Italy would lead to the Italian Government gravitating 
increasingly towards the Allies provided London and Paris 
adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Rome, had clearly been 
called into question by developments since the start of the 
year. Reports of heightened Italian military preparations 
around this time, moreover, emphasised the urgency of the need 
to reconsider general policy towards Italy. The Italian Air 
Force was being increased by a third in its squadron 
establishments and three new groups were being formed, one of 
which was to be based in Sicily. Italian naval activity 
remained fairly muted, but 400,000 recruits had been called up 
to the Italian Army in March, and there were reports of 
suspension of leave from 1 April. ' 
Interestingly, concern as to Italian intentions had died down 
somewhat in the Foreign Of f ice by the end of the f irst week of 
April. Loraine, in London for consultations, told Halifax on 
'PRO CAB 66/6, Paper 111,26 March 1940, p-4. 
2 PRO CAB 6616, Paper 114,29 March 1940, p. 9 & CAB 
66/7, Paper 123,5 April 1940. pp. 6-7. 
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the Ath that he was still of the opinion that Mussolini would 
not come in unless and until Britain was already practically 
beaten, and the Foreign Secretary noted in his diary two days 
later that 
I still adhere to my view that he [Mussolini] is going to 
bark more than bite. It is all part of dictator 
technique to keep poor timid democracies jittering. What 
they cannot as yet succeed in understanding is that we 
are much less frightened of them jumping out on us now 
than we were at the time of Munich. ' 
Nonetheless, the War Cabinet broached the crucial question of 
policy towards Italy on 4 April. Churchill took the lead in 
wondering whether the time had come to force Italy to define 
its attitude. Chamberlain stated that he was thinking along 
similar lines, but wanted to wait until the position in 
France, presumably meaning the new government under Paul 
Reynaud, had been consolidated. He added that he felt that 
'Signor Mussolini was rather presuming on our goodwill'. 
Halifax was not so sure of the wisdom of the change in policy 
being mooted, and thought that Loraine should be consulted as 
to whether his opinion given at the start of the war that 
Italy should not be forced to declare its position had 
altered. The suggestion was subsequently made that the Duce 
might not be genuinely intending to enter the war, but was 
bluffing by creating anxiety as to his intentions, so as to 
raise his value. This seemed to be supported by the fact that 
some of the Italian military preparations currently under way 
did not appear to be of the kind that would suggest that Italy 
was planning an early entry into the war (for example, men 
being called up for the Army were raw recruits rather than 
reservists). Nevertheless, the War Cabinet decided that a 
proper examination of Britain's whole policy towards Italy 
should be conducted, with particular emphasis being placed 
upon a joint study by Halifax and Cross into the issue of the 
blockade. ' 
'BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entries for 4&6 April 1940, 
pp. 66,68. 
PRO CAB 65/6,81st Meeting, 4 April 1940,2nd minute. 
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One of the most interesting things about this War Cabinet 
meeting was Chamberlain's apparently hardening attitude to 
Italy. This was presumably only a show to conciliate his more 
hawkish colleagues, however, for other evidence makes it clear 
that the Prime Minister was still keen to pursue a 
conciliatory policy towards Rome. The coal crisis of early 
March and the disturbing trend of events throughout that month 
had decided Chamberlain to utilise a secret channel he had to 
Mussolini. Established in 1937 with the help of Count Grandi, 
the then Italian ambassador in London, to enable Chamberlain 
to circumvent Eden, this secret channel operated through an 
envoy, Adrian Dingli, the solicitor to the Italian embassy in 
Britain, who carried messages back and forth at infrequent 
intervals between the Prime Minister and the Duce. Since 
Halifax had succeeded Eden as Foreign Secretary, there had 
been less use for the secret channel, but Chamberlain now 
considered it might have a use once more. Presumably with at 
least the knowledge of Halifax and R. A. Butler, the 
Parliamentary under Secretary of State at the FO, who had both 
been informed of the existence of the secret channel in 
January, Dingli was despatched to Rome in early April with a 
personal message of goodwill for Mussolini. ' 
Chamberlain's message was duly passed on via Ciano on 5 April, 
but it had little effect, the Italian Foreign Minister 
referring to it in his diary as luseless'. Dingli's latest 
visit to Rome was not without consequence, however, for the 
Duce exploited the opportunity to launch a peace offensive. 
Ciano urged Chamberlain's envoy on 5 April to persuade his 
master to seek a negotiated settlement with Hitler, but was 
bluntly told that British public opinion would not stand for 
such talks. Nevertheless, at a second meeting two days later, 
Ciano, acting on instructions from the Duce, informed Dingli 
that 'in the event of Chamberlain being ready to offer 
Possible conditions [i. e. those that Hitler would be prepared 
to accept] we could become intermediaries for his proposals 
'Quartararo, R., II1 'Canale Segretow di Chamberlain, 
in Storia ContCmvoranea, Vol. 7 (1976), pp-701-5- 
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and facilitate a compromise' to end the war. ' Mussolini's 
plan was revealed to Chamberlain upon Dingli's return to 
London in mid April, and, in spite of the unpropitious course 
of the Norwegian campaign, the Prime Minister determined that 
, there could be nothing doing on the lines proposed'. 2 
The Duce's offer to mediate a compromise peace clearly shows 
that he was not irrevocably committed to military intervention 
at this stage. Indeed, before the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on 2 April at which he spoke of the necessity of 
entering the war, Mussolini had decided to write to Hitler in 
3 
an attempt to dissuade him from initiating a land offensive . 
Keen as he was to lead his country into war, the Italian 
dictator could not escape for long from the practical factors 
militating against such a policy, much as he tried to ignore 
them. ' Desperate to avoid having to choose in the near future 
between the ignominy of remaining aloof while Germany and the 
Allies decided the fate of Europe on the battlefield and the 
enormous risks that a premature military intervention would 
entail, the Duce tried to avert, or at least postpone, the 
titanic clash of arms that Hitler was planning. 
Mussolini clearly lacked faith in his prospects of success, 
however, for he wrote to Franco, the Spanish dictator, on 8 
April, explaining that Italy would have to enter the war on 
Hitler's side due to Allied determination to strangle with 
their blockade the neutrals who bordered Germany. The date of 
intervention could not be foreseen, and Mussolini would try to 
Postpone it as long as possible, but he doubted whether 
Britain and France would allow him to succeed in this. He was 
'Quartararo, II1 "Canale Segreto", pp. 706-9 & ciano, 
P-jary, 5,6 &7 April 1940, pp. 231-3. 
2 PRO T 273/410, note by Sir Horace wilson, 20 April 
1940. 
3Ciano, Diary, 1 April 1940, p. 230. 
'See, for example, Balbols commients in Fermi, 
MllssS21ji3j (Chicago, 1961), p. 405. 
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therefore going to mobilise the Italian Fleet and take other 
measures to improve the readiness of the Army and Air Force. ' 
Within 24 hours of the penning of this letter, the Germans had 
invaded Scandinavia, a development which had important 
repercussions not only for the course of the war with Germany, 
but also for Anglo-Italian relations. However, as we have 
seen, one may already see the beginnings of a reassessment 
both of British views of Italian policy and of British policy 
towards Italy before this event, largely occasioned by fears 
as to exactly what had transpired at the Brenner. It came not 
before time. 
Anqlo-Italian Econonic Relations: March to April 
March and early April 1940 was a period of reflection for the 
British Government as to how to handle economic relations with 
Italy, particularly in regard to the blockade, in the wake of 
the failure of its comprehensive scheme for an agreement on 
economic issues. We have seen how, in mid to late February, 
London had essentially adopted a holding position, in the hope 
that Mussolini might reconsider his attitude over the sale of 
armaments to Britain, but the increasing improbability of this 
happening by March, as well as the obvious strengthening of 
the bond between Italy and Germany, now encouraged the British 
to contemplate a change of tack. 
On 1 March, the Foreign office produced a report, drawn up in 
consultation with other departments, on the present state of 
Anglo-Italian economic relations. Mussolini Is embargo on arms 
sales meant that the proceeds of British purchases from Italy 
in 1940 would now only be in the region of E7-9 million, 
though an additional two million in sterling from trade with 
France and a further E2 million from shipping agreements with 
Britain, should they go through, would increase Italy's 
sterling credit to Ell-13 million. The report pointed out 
that although this was theoretically sufficient to allow Italy 
to buy the eight million tons of British coal it was believed 
'1=, 9th Series, Vol. III, No. 726, Mussolini to 
Franco, 8 April 1940, pp. 623-4. 
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it would now need to buy in the wake of the stoppage of 
seaborne German coal imports, this would leave little or no 
margin for purchases of other raw materials from Britain and 
the Empire that Italy required. Moreover, the devotion of 
nearly all Italy's sterling credit to the purchase of coal was 
also undesirable from the British perspective, as the 
reduction of other Italian purchases below the level of E2.25 
million would have a serious effect on various lines of 
British export trade. By maintaining its present level of 
non-coal purchases, however, Italy would only be able to buy 
around four million tons of British coal in 1940. Rome was 
thus expected to be faced with a coal supply crisis. To ease 
the dislocation caused by the stoppage of seaborne German 
imports, and thereby hopefully limit the damage to Anglo- 
Italian relations, the Italians would be allowed to run up as 
much credit as they could on purchases of British coal in 
March. Thereafter, however, the report advised that, 'in the 
absence of any change of heart on the Italian side', the 
British should terminate this facility, with the result that 
Italy would have either to 
find means of financing her essential imports whether by 
sales of armaments or payments in free exchange, or else 
resign herself to a restriction of imports of a severity 
which may not inconceivably bring Italian industry almost 
to a standstill. 
As far as trade with Italy in general was concerned, the FO 
report noted that it had been agreed at an interdepartmental 
meeting to continue outstanding negotiations for purchases in 
Italy and in future to buy from Italy whenever convenient. 
The additional purchases of agricultural produce, however, 
would not be made, though negotiations to charter Italian 
ships to bring goods to Britain were still in progress. With 
regard to the blockade, the state guarantee scheme would be 
taken no further in present circumstances. Overall, the 
report advised that, 
in dealing with economic and contraband questions our 
attitude should continue to be as friendly and helpful as 
possible short of now giving the impression that we are 
203 
prepared to make any f urther concessions without some 
substantial "quid pro quo,,. ' 
The War Cabinet briefly discussed and approved this report on 
4 March. The previous day, Rome had sent a note furiously 
complaining about the decision to seize seaborne German coal, 
but, rather than encouraging a more conciliatory attitude as 
Italian ire had tended to do in the past, this only led the 
War Cabinet to decide that it was doubly undesirable that we 
should do anything to make matters easier for the Italian 
2 Government' . 
There was clearly thus a certain hardening of Britain's 
attitude towards Italy in regard to economic issues in early 
March. British policy in this sphere did not suddenly become 
unflinchingly uncompromising, however, as the episode of the 
Italian colliers at Rotterdam demonstrated. The Italian Coal 
Monopoly asked in early March that ships loading at this port 
be granted an extended respite from enemy export control, on 
the grounds that they would have sailed before the 1 March 
deadline but for adverse weather. This was turned down by the 
War Cabinet, but the representatives of the Coal Monopoly in 
the Netherlands, allegedly as a result of a genuine 
misunderstanding, publicly announced that a further exemption 
had been granted. Consequently, despite a prompt denial by 
the British, thirteen colliers left Rotterdam between 3-5 
March and were detained, their cargoes being put in prize. 
This outraged the Italians, but the crisis was swiftly defused 
when, on 8 March, the War Cabinet decided to release these 
ships and their cargo in return for a promise from Rome that 
the colliers remaining in Dutch and Belgian ports should not 
attempt to sail with German coal, and that no further ships 
should be sent to fetch German coal from those ports in the 
future .3 The British were cock-a-hoop about the resolution of 
'PRO CAB 67/5, Paper 68,1 March 1940. 
PRO CAB 65/6,59th Meeting, 4 March 1940,7th minute. 
3 PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 82,5? March 1940, p. 2 & Paper 90, 
12? March 1940, p. 3. 
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this potentially disastrous dispute, Halifax noting 
triumphantly in his diary, 'One up, I think, to us', ' and 
Cadogan rejoicing in 'A smack in the eye for Rib[bentrop] on 
his arrival in Rome, when I expect he hoped to rope the 
Italians into the war. There may be something in 
'appeasement' yet!! '. 2 The Prime Minister was equally 
pleased, noting that the quantity of coal contained in the 13 
ships detained was a small price to pay for Italian promises 
not to try to run the gauntlet of the blockade in such a way 
3 again. 
The deal struck as a result of the Rotterdam colliers dispute 
was clearly seen in London as a success for a policy of 
firmness allied with a willingness to compromise, then, but 
the issue of Italian coal supplies in general remained 
unresolved. The British were still keen to meet the expected 
shortfall in Italian coal supplies consequent upon the 
stoppage of seaborne German coal so as to avoid friction with 
Rome and increase Italian dependence upon British sources of 
supply, but the problem remained that the only goods Britain 
wanted from Italy in sufficient quantities to pay for 
increased supplies of British coal were of a military nature. 
A scheme was being mooted in early March to get round this, 
however, whereby Italian armaments would be paid for with 
British coal but delivered to Britain's ally, Turkey, in 
fulfilment of the terms of the Anglo- Franco -Turkish Pact of 
October 1939.4 
The prospects for this plan, and London's belief that Italy 
depended upon Britain to obtain sufficient quantities of coal 
in the wake of the stoppage of seaborne German supplies, were 
called into question on 13 March, therefore, when Loraine 
lBIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 9 March 1940, p. 45. 
2 Cadogan, Diaries, 9 March 1940, p. 260. 
3 BUL NC 18/1/1146, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 10 
March 1940, f. 1. 
4 PRO FO 371/24929, R2967/48/22, minute by Cadogan, 6 
March 1940. 
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reported a press communique announcing that Germany had 
undertaken to supply Italy with all its coal requirements by 
land. ' Three days later, though, Sir Percy reassuringly 
reported that trading circles considered this uttermost 
phantasy (sic) and that the Italians still seemed to want to 
2 purchase four million tons of British coal per annum. This 
latter point suggests that the Italians also had some doubts 
as to their ally's ability to supply all their coal 
requirements by land, and this is confirmed by the fact that 
Mussolini set aside a billion lire in gold at the Bank of 
Italy in early March for future imports from Britain. 3 
Indeed, even the Germans themselves were far from convinced 
that they would be able to fulfil their promises, as they had 
initially forecast that they would be able to guarantee supply 
by rail of only half of Italy's coal requirements each month. ' 
Events soon showed, however, that this was an underestimate, 
as the Reich proved able to supply Italy by land with an 
average of 900,000 tons of coal a month, not the million tons 
a month promised, admittedly, but close enough for the 
Italians to have no great need for British coal any more. ' 
Doing so certainly increased the strain on the German railway 
6 system, an advantage that was not lost on Lord Halifax, but 
this was small compensation for the trumping of Britain's best 
card in Anglo-Italian economic relations. 
More hopefully for the British, reports in the middle of March 
indicated that many Italians were keen to respond positively 
to Chamberlain's comment in parliament on the 11th, in the 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 55, telegram from Loraine, 
13 March 1940. 
2 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 57, telegram from Loraine, 
16 March 1940. 
Ciano, Diary, 1 March 1940, p. 214. 
'DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 589, memorandum by 
Wiehl, 1 February 1940, pp. 726-8. 
-'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 34-5. 
BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 15 March 1940, p. 53. 
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wake of the resolution of the dispute over the Rotterdam coal 
ships, that, I It may be hoped that the way has now been opened 
for a resumption of negotiations between our two countries for 
the furtherance of trade to our mutual advantage'. ' Edward 
Playfair was consequently despatched to Rome again to resume 
2 talks on the revision of the clearing agreement, though there 
was no clear idea of what kind of arrangement should be aimed 
for, as the nature and level of Anglo-Italian trade, even in 
3 the near future, was extremely uncertain. Thus, the value of 
the resumption of trade negotiations was doubtful, and there 
was certainly not the great hope that there had been in 1939 
and early 1940 that they might achieve very much in the 
political sphere by way of markedly improving Anglo-Italian 
relations or strengthening Italian neutrality. As Playfair 
himself later commented, 
These conversations, covering the whole scope of Italian 
trade with the sterling area, went on at intervals until 
May 1940. We were never ready to do more than talk about 
much in the Italian list of demands, for several reasons: 
some of the materials cost dollars, some were extremely 
scarce, and most were obviously wanted in order to build 
up stocks against a possible war. As the months went by 
and the political situation worsened, the general trade 
discussions became less and less real, and though the 
facade was kept up to the end, both sides paid more 
attention to particular deals which could be closed 
quickly, before worse befell. ' 
As soon as they resumed, Anglo-Italian commercial negotiations 
ran into serious difficulties. A key issue for the Italians 
was that the British should increase the level of their 
'normal, (i. e. pre-war) purchases from Italy which had fallen 
at the start of the war due to the British policy of 
restricting non-essential imports as far as possible in the 
interests of sound war finance. They were especially keen 
that Britain should greatly increase its importation of 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, Nos. 56a & 57, telegrams to & 
from Loraine, 14 & 16 March 1940 & Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 358, cols. 809-10. 
2 PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 98,19? March 1940, p. 2. 
PRO FO 837/497, minute by Stirling, 14 March 1940. 
As cited in Medlicott, p. 287, n. l. 
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Italian agricultural produce, but, although the British were 
prepared to make small increases in the purchase of such 
goods, they were not prepared to make any major changes in the 
level of their 'normal, trade with Italy. ' 
The dispute from earlier negotiations over the method of 
payment for British purchases in Italy also resurfaced. As 
Waley of the Treasury pointed out in a letter to Nichols of 
the FO, 
What the Italians want is to have a considerable amount 
of sterling at their free disposal for sale in New York, 
as large an amount as possible for sterling raw 
materials, and as little as possible for U. K. 
manufactured goods and British financial claims. 
The British remained most keen, however, to channel everything 
through clearing and to restrict as far as possible the manner 
in which Italy could dispose of the proceeds of its trade with 
Britain, not just in the interests of limiting Italy's access 
to strategic raw materials, but also because every pound we 
give to the Italians which they can turn into dollars, and 
every pound which we give them which they can spend on raw 
materials for which we should otherwise get dollars, is a 
direct crippling of our own war effort,. ' 
With Anglo- Italian trade thus experiencing severe dif f iculties 
and declining in political importance anyway, the blockade 
returned to the forefront of economic relations with Rome. In 
the wake of the collapse of Finnish resistance against Russia 
in early March, there was intense pressure in France for the 
war to be conducted more vigorously than hitherto, and this 
was reflected on 19 March, when the French embassy in London 
forwarded a memo from Monnet, the new French Minister of 
Blockade, urging that consideration should be given to 
measures for tightening the blockade and for rationing 
neutrals in the importation of commodities essential for 
military purposes, especially if the neutrals had already 
'PRO T 160/939, F13456/02/16-17, March-April 1940. 
2 PRO T 160/939, F13456/02/18, Waley to Nichols, 13 
April 1940. 
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stocked these in excessive, quantities. ' The British 
Government was also being urged by sections of the press and 
parliament by this time to tighten the blockade, 2 so, when 
Paul Reynaud, who had recently replaced Daladier as Prime 
Minister, brought up the issue of rationing neutrals at the 
sixth meeting of the Supreme War Council on 28 March, the 
British agreed that the subject should be investigated 
further. 3 
The question of tightening the blockade was becoming 
particularly apposite in regard to Italy for, despite the 
declarations made at the end of January that there was no 
great leakage of contraband goods to Germany via Italy, it was 
becoming clear by early spring that this was no longer the 
case. Indeed, Italy was now believed to be the 'next 
leakiest, country after the Soviet Union, ' a change which can 
perhaps be largely explained by German pressure. ' The fact 
that 'Italian imports and exports are still not satisfactorily 
under control I led the COS to urge in late March that I we 
should do our utmost to close the gaps in our contraband 
control,, ' and, in a huge draft appreciation of the major 
strategy of the war produced on 8 April, the JPC argued, with 
reference to Italy and the blockade, that 'some risk should be 
taken to stop the leakage, and it is perhaps relevant that 
steps taken to effect this would show the Italians the great 
economic difficulties in which war would involve theml. 
'PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 109,3 April 1940, pp. 1-2. 
2 Medlicott, p. 46. 
3 PRO CAB 99/3,6th Meeting, 28 March 1940, pp. 13,24. 
4 PRO CAB 65/6,81st Meeting, 4 April 1940,1st minute. 
5 See, for example, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, No. 593, 
telegram to embassy in Italy, 3 February 1940, pp. 738-9, in 
which the German ambassador in Rome was instructed to inform 
the Italians that Berlin considered that they should 'be 
unremitting in offering resistance [to the blockade] and 
more forceful than in the past' so as to give the Reich 
'effective assistance in the transit trade'. 
PRO CAB 66/6, Paper 111,26 March 1940, p. 2. 
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Specific measures suggested to tighten economic control in the 
Mediterranean were, in order of severity; 
(1) a firm exercise of belligerent rights towards Italy, 
including introducing a "Black List" procedure to deal 
with Italian firms known to be dealing with the enemy. 
(2) the rationing of Italian imports by agreement, or 
failing that, by unilateral Allied action. 
(3) specific economic action based upon Italy's status as 
a non-belligerent ally of Germany rather than a true 
neutral, such as denial of Allied goods, services and 
facilities. ' 
This JPC memorandum was never formally approved, invalidated 
or needed to be changed as many parts of it were by the German 
assault on Scandinavia, but it nevertheless highlights an 
important strain of opinion in London at this time. 
Opinions were also hardening in the MEW, as Rodd noted on 1 
April. 'Quite apart from the representations made by the 
French.... there is a growing feeling in this Ministry, as 
well as probably elsewhere, that Italy, in common with other 
neutrals, should be subjected to more rigorous control'. Rodd 
himself was sympathetic to this view with regard to the need 
to prevent goods from reaching Germany, but he was less sure 
about tightening the blockade to restrict Italy's ability to 
accumulate stocks, as there was no precedent in international 
law for preventing the strengthening of neutral states. 
Overall, though, he favoured tightening economic control, but 
suggested that the introduction of measures to effect this 
should coincide with 'a combination of economic and financial 
advantages, for the Italians in regard to trade, so as to make 
the pill easier to swallow. If such sweeteners proved 
unacceptable to the Treasury, however, Rodd felt that a tough 
policy should be adopted regardless. ' 
Although Rodd was thus now prepared, if necessary, to risk 
enraging Rome in the interests of more effective economic 
warfare, others, even in the MEW, were not. Suspecting that 
'PRO CAB 84/11, Paper 88,8 April 1940, Section XI, 
p. 3. 
PRO FO 837/498, 'Italian Policy, by Rodd, 1 April 
1940. 
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the blockade might soon be tightened, the Italian press was 
making it plain that too severe a move in this direction would 
be I likely to extend the area of the conflict I-1 This must 
have been a factor in the line taken by Nicholls of the MEW in 
responding to Rodd1s paper on 3 April. He noted that due to 
the overriding desire not to drive Italy into Germany's arms, 
I The regrettable conclusion seems to be that we cannot with 
safety embark on any tightening up of control on a large scale 
in regard to Italy'. Nevertheless, he considered that it 
should be possible to tighten up to some extent by means of 
improving intelligence and taking firmer action against 
companies and organisations which broke the blockade. 2 
Cross met his French counterpart, Monnet, on 5-6 April to 
discuss the blockade. During these encounters, the exercise 
of contraband control in the Mediterranean was considered, the 
two men agreeing that every effort should be made to improve 
its efficiency, but the main reason for the meetings was to 
discuss the more general issue of the rationing of neutrals. 
Both ministers felt that it had become highly desirable to 
ration the imports of adjacent neutrals, that such rationing 
should be applied to selected commodities, and that it should, 
if possible, be arranged by agreement. Cross and Monnet also 
agreed, however, that no discrimination should be made between 
neutral states in regard to the introduction of rationing, and 
this meant that the crux of this problem was the treatment of 
Italy'. Cross explained that the question of general policy 
towards Rome was being urgently considered by the British 
Government, and argued that, until decision had been reached 
on this, it was undesirable to start the forcible rationing of 
smaller neutrals. 3 
Thus the key policy question in regard to the blockade was 
left to await the decision of the War Cabinet, but the trend 
of the past month suggested that this body might well give way 
'The Times, 1 April 1940, p. 7, col. 2. 
PRO FO 837/498, minute by Nicholls, 3 April 1940. 
PRO CAB 68/5, Paper 116,11 April 1940, pp. 1-3. 
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to the pressure from the French and from within the British 
Government to adopt the principle of rationing, in spite of 
the inevitable damage this would do to Anglo-Italian 
relations. Before the decision was made, however, a new and 
important factor was introduced into the equation in the form 
of the eruption of war in Scandinavia. 
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CHAPTER SIX - APRIL TO MAY 1940 
Britain and Italian Foreiqn Policv 
The invasion of Scandinavia and the f irst serious 
, 
military 
clashes between the Wehrmacht and Allied armed forces 
unsurprisingly had a significant impact upon Italian policy, 
Ciano informing the French ambassador on 11 April, for 
example, that the German campaign was making an immense 
impression, on the Duce. 1 From the very start of the German 
assault, Mussolini ordered the Italian press and people to 
'applaud without reservations Germany's action' in attacking 
Denmark and Norway, 2 and Charles (Loraine was in London for 
consultations) reported this bias as early as 10 April. 3 In 
fact, so vicious towards the Allies was the Italian press that 
Halifax instructed Charles to raise the matter in Rome 
forthwith, but Sir Noel was bluntly told by Ciano's right-hand 
man, Filippo Anfuso, that 'Italy was in sympathy with 
Germany'. 4 
More disturbing than the activity of the Italian press was a 
flurry of rumours of imminent Italian attacks throughout the 
Mediterranean and/or into the Balkans-5 The British did not 
yet view Italian intervention as inevitable, though. For 
example, Charles telegraphed on 11 April that 'the impression 
gained in conversations with Italians in influential 
positions-confirm the view that this country-is dreading 
the possibility of being dragged in at the heels of Germany' .6 
'PRO FO 371/24939, R4548/58/22, telegram from Campbell, 
11 April 1940. 
Ciano, Diary, 9 April 1940, p. 234. 
3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 3, telegram from Charles, 
10 April 1940. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 6&7, telegrams to 
from Charles, 12 & 13 April 1940. 
5For example, see PRO CAB 65/6,88th Meeting, 11 April 
1940,8th minute & 89th Meeting, 12 April 1940,6th minute. 
6 PRO FO 371/24939, R4591/58/22, telegram from Charles, 
11 April 1940. 
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Moreover, annual reports on the situation in Italy despatched 
by the British embassy in Rome on the same day generally 
indicated that Italy was still in no position to fight a major 
war. The bulk of the Italian people remained opposed to 
entering the struggle, and this led Charles to surmise that, 
if Mussolini did drag Italy into the war at this point, 'the 
spirit of revolt would be likely to have a devastating effect 
on her power of continued resistance, . Sir Noel sombrely 
added, however, that the development of present events in 
Scandinavia might quell opposition to entering the war, and 
the annual report on the political situation in Italy noted 
that repression and propaganda were valuable tools with which 
Mussolini could win over, or at least impose his will upon, 
the Italian people. This was worrying, but more encouraging 
were Italy's continued economic and military deficiencies. 
'Apart from a certain accumulation of petroleum supplies, 
Italy is not to any serious extent better equipped for war 
economically than she was six months ago, and the position of 
the gold reserve is very much worse'. Of the armed services, 
only the Navy was ready f or war, though its of f icers were 
inexperienced. The Army was so poorly equipped that it was 
judged at the present moment not in a fit state to take part 
in a European war I, and it was opposed to intervention anyway. 
As for the Air Force, its planes were in need of 
modernisation, only around a third of its pilots were believed 
to be of RAF standard, and Italy's AA organisation was poor. ' 
Overall, therefore, logic still seemed to dictate that Italy 
would not yet intervene, so the prevalent view in London in 
the week following the German invasion of Scandinavia was that 
the upsurge in Italian bile against the Allies did not signal 
imminent intervention, but was in lieu of such action, its aim 
being to confuse the British and French and thus hinder their 
effort in the north. 2 As Halifax put it, a vicious press 
campaign is the easiest way for them to show Germany 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 8, Charles to Halifax 
enclosures, 11 April 1940. 
2 See, for example, BUL NC 18/1/1150, Neville to Ida 
Chamberlain, 13 April 1940, ff. 2-3. 
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sympathy. Rather like the old lady who always bowed when the 
Devil's name was mentioned in Church: "Politeness costs 
nothing, and you never know"'. ' Unfortunately, the Foreign 
Secretary seems to have missed the key point: Mussolini was 
not just paying lip-service to the Devil, he was in league 
with him. 
By mid April, however, with little sign of the tension easing, 
the British Government was becoming more concerned about 
possible Italian intervention. 2 In a memo dated 16 April, the 
JIC did not rule out an attempt by Mussolini to drag Italy 
into the war or to gain a cheap success in the wake of a 
possible German attack in the West, even despite Italy's lack 
of military preparedness, 3 and Charles reported two days later 
that press attacks were getting yet worse; 
The weight of the Italian propaganda machine is devoted 
to securing the greatest possible publication of all 
anti-British and anti-Allied material. It is equally 
devoted to presenting Berlin news, Berlin versions and 
Berlin lies under huge head-lines ... In short, the Italian press has become completely Goebbelised. ' 
Even more disquieting, as the Director of Military 
Intelligence put it, with typical British understatement, 'The 
maintenance of Italian armed forces in a high state of 
preparedness for immediate action ... gives grounds for 
considerable suspicion as to (Italy's] attitude in the early 
future' .5 The French had 
become very pessimistic about Italy, 6 
and Halifax's faith was clearly wavering by 17 April, when he 
noted in his diary that 'The guess work about Italy continues 
and no one is bold enough to bet with any confidence,. ' 
1BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 13 April 1940, p. 76- 
PRO CAB 65/6,94th Meeting, 16 April 1940,5th minute. 
PRO CAB 82/5, Paper 54 JIC, 16 April 1940. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 11, Charles to Halifax, 
18 April 1940. 
5 PRO CAB 81/135, Paper 21 (S), 18 April 1940, p. 2. 
6 Cadogan, Diaries, 18 April 1940, pp. 271-2. 
BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 17 April 1940, p. 82. 
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Perhaps most worrying of all, at least for those few 
individuals, including Chamberlain, Halifax and Butler, privy 
to the existence of the secret channel to the Duce, was 
information Dingli brought back with him from Rome in mid 
April. At the first meeting between Chamberlain's secret 
envoy and Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister had not only 
stressed that Mussolini considered himself totally bound by 
his alliance with Germany, but, presumably in the hope of 
encouraging London to seek a negotiated peace before the Nazis 
attacked in the West and Italy got dragged in, had even gone 
so far as to reveal that the Duce had promised Hitler that, if 
the conflict between Germany and the Allies were to enter a 
more active phase, Italy would intervene militarily at some 
point on the side of the Reich. Mussolini, perhaps fearing 
that the Allies would respond to this information by adopting 
a tougher line towards Rome which would force him to act 
before he was ready, had tried to soften the impact of his 
Foreign Minister's words by instructing him to inform Dingli 
at their second meeting that any decision to intervene would 
be judged on Italian interests alone and that the Duce saw no 
reason why relations between his country and Britain should 
not be correct so long as Italy remained non-belligerent, but 
Dingli's news nevertheless remained most alarming. ' 
The British thus had more reason in mid April than at any time 
hitherto to expect that Italian intervention might be 
imminent. There remained one very important reassuring fact, 
however, which Halifax and Cross brought attention to in a 
joint report on relations with Italy. Italian military 
unpreparedness and the weakness of Italy's strategic position 
vis-a-vis the Allies should logically mean that Italian entry 
into the war would be delayed until the western European 
'Quartararo, 'Il "Canale Segretol'', pp. 710,706-8. 
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powers seemed to be on the verge of collapse. 2 That, at 
least, was clearly not yet. 
The possibility that Italy might intervene regardless of its 
weak strategic position could certainly not be ruled out, 
however, and concern about the Italians had a highly 
significant impact upon the Scandinavian campaign. It figured 
prominently, for example, in the Admiralty's reluctance to 
commit the Royal Navy fully to the attack on Trondheim in mid 
to late April, a key moment in the failure of the Norwegian 
campaign, for fear that heavy losses would imperil Britain's 
ability to defend its interests in the Mediterranean. 2 In 
similar vein, concern as to Italy's intentions in the near 
future, Churchill informed Lord Camrose in early May, 
influenced the War Cabinet in deciding at the end of April to 
withdraw from central and southern Norway, thereby freeing up 
3 
resources, especially ships, for the Eastern Mediterranean . 
Apprehension about Italy thus clearly acted as an impediment 
to Allied commitment to, and perhaps even success in, the 
struggle in Scandinavia. 
On 24 April, Halifax informed the War Cabinet that the trend 
of British and French telegrams from Rome over the past few 
days had been more encouraging in regard to future Italian 
policy. ' In one of these telegrams, Charles returned to the 
idea that Italian policy in recent weeks had been intended 
'PRO CAB 67/6, Paper 109,18 April 1940, p. 3. Halifax 
had commented in his diary the night before thatt 'To every 
judgment of common sense it seems insane for Musso to risk 
everything on coming in until he is quite sure of the 
result' (BIY Hick. A7.8.3, diary entry for 17 April 1940, 
p. 82). 
2 Feiling, K., The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 
1946), P. 438. 
3 Churchill, War Papers - Vol. 1, extract from Lord 
Camrose's diary, 3 May 1940, p. 1191. 
4 PRO CAB 65/6,102nd Meeting, 24 April 1940,8th 
minute. One French source reported Mussolini saying in mid 
April, 'The Germans are trying to drag me into the war by 
the hair: luckily I am bald' (as cited in Woodward, 1, 
p. 151, n. 1). 
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merely to divert Allied f orces away from the active theatre of 
operations against Germany, and he even went so far as to 
opine that each time the Germans launched a fresh atta'ck, 
Italian policy would be the same. Nichols, however, with whom 
Sargent was in agreement, considered this view far too 
optimistic, and had become convinced that Mussolini had 
genuinely wanted to enter the war but had been dissuaded by 
Italy's internal problems. If the Germans attacked in the 
West and were initially successful, moreover, Nichols fully 
expected the Duce to reassess the prospects of Italian 
intervention. ' 
There can be little doubt that the thinking of Nichols and 
Sargent was more accurate than that of Charles, for it seems 
that the Duce had been on the verge of ordering military 
action in mid April, most probably against Yugoslavia 
initially. He had commanded the Italian Fleet to mobilise 
fully and increased the pace of the preparations of the other 
Services on 12 April. Then, on 14 April, Giovanni Ansaldo, 
editor of the newspaper, 11 Telegrafo, had delivered a radio 
address to the armed forces which was 'the first public and 
authoritative statement' that Italy's entry into the war in 
the near future was inevitable. The speech, which must have 
been authorised by Mussolini, was not reported in the press 
and the state broadcasting network and Ministry of Popular 
Culture subsequently proved reticent when asked for a 
transcript. This was presumably because the Duce had in the 
meantime stepped back from the brink under pressure from the 
Italian military chiefs, who only advised military action if 
the Allies were on the verge of defeat. 2 Mussolini clearly, 
though one suspects unwillingly, took their advice to heart, 
for, although Ciano found him on 20 April more warlike and 
more pro-German than ever', he was now not contemplating 
intervening before the end of August to allow time for further 
preparations. Just two days later, Mussolini put back the 
'PRO FO 371/24941, R5243/58/22, telegram from Charles 
minutes by Nichols & Sargent, 23 & 24 April 1940. 
Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 92-3,95. 
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date for intervention to spring 1941, and, on 25 April, Ciano 
noted in his diary that 'he will enter ... only when he has a 
quasi-mathematical certainty of winning'. ' 
Thus the prospect of Italy imminently entering the war was far 
from certain in late April, but it is important to note that 
at least some of the factors restricting Italian intervention 
were beginning to loosen as a result of German success in the 
north. The boldness of the Nazi assault on Scandinavia 
impressed the Italian people and softened their anti-German 
bias, and the King, though still opposed to war, could, at 
least in Ciano's opinion, do no more to guard against it'. 
Indeed, by the end of the month, Mussolini had decided that he 
could afford to ignore Victor Emmanuel's objections altogether 
in the belief that the Italian people would follow him, and, 
in any case, by the end of the first week of May, the King's 
opposition to war had apparently weakened. 2 
On 27 April, the British mood took a turn for the worse yet 
again, when Halifax reported that Osborne had telegraphed the 
previous day that he had received information that Mussolini 
had imposed upon his subordinates the decision to enter the 
war on or about 1-2 May. The idea that Italian military 
action was imminent was supported by Churchill, who reported 
that the Italian naval attache in London had said that he 
hoped the British Government would not regard an attack by 
Italy on Yugoslavia as a casus belli. 3 The War Cabinet took 
these warnings very seriously, and even a more accurate 
telegraph from Osborne reporting that Mussolini's military 
advisers had persuaded the Duce to postpone Italy's 
intervention until events developed further still did little 
'Ciano, Diar , 20,22 & 25 April 1940, pp. 236-7,239. 
2 Ciano, Diary, 10,22,29 April &6 May 1940, pp. 234-5, 
237,241,244. 
3 PRO CAB 65/6,105th Meeting, 27 April 1940,5th & 6th 
minutes. 
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to ease the fear that war was about to erupt in the Balkans 
and/or Mediterranean. ' 
The perseverance of this heightened anxiety in London as to 
Italy's intentions in the near future was no doubt largely due 
to the fact that it was clear by this time that the Allies had 
had the worse of the fighting in the north, but it must also 
have been conditioned by the belligerent nature of comments 
being made by senior Italian figures at this time. Mussolini 
himself talked of the need to 'prepare to face events of which 
we shall not be able always to remain only spectators', and 
the favourite theme of orators and writers at this time was 
that of Italy's imprisonment in the Mediterranean and its 
resolve to break free. 2 Bastianini complained to Halifax 
3 along these lines on 26 April, and even the Anglophile Count 
Grandi stated in a speech that Italy could no longer stay out 
of the war and that the Italian people must give blind 
obedience to the Duce. 4 Just as disturbing as the oratory 
emanating from Italy in late April was the sudden removal of 
Bernardo Attolico from the Berlin embassy and his replacement 
5 
as ambassador by the notoriously pro-German Dino Alfieri . 
Indeed, fear that Italy was about to come into the war was 
such that the War Cabinet decided on 28 April that current 
diversions of shipping , from the Mediterranean, first 
introduced on 19 April and added to on the 27th, had to 
'PRO CAB 65/6,106th Meeting, 28 April 1940, Ist 
minute. 
2 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 16 & 17, Charles to 
Halifax, 30 April &3 May 1940. 
3 DDI, 9th Series, Vol. IV, No. 217, Bastianini to 
Ciano, 26 April 1940, p. 181. 
4 PRO CAB 65/6,106th Meeting, 28 April 1940, ist 
Meeting. 
5Wi skemann, E., The Rome-Berlin Axis: A history of the 
relations between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1949), 
p. 206. 
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continue, even though doing so would cause a month's delay in 
Britain's import programme. ' 
With the failure of new initiatives by both the British and 
French governments towards Italy (see below) and the 
commencement of the Allied withdrawal from most of Norway in 
early May, it came as something of a surprise that Italy did 
not take any action at the start of that month, and the very 
f act that it did not seems to have contributed to the adoption 
once again of a rather more optimistic line by the British. 
Butler, for example, in replying to a letter enquiring about 
the situation in Italy, commented on 2 May that 'I am myself 
hopeful', 2 and Charles reported a day later that he believed 
that I Italy will try to avoid becoming involved for as long as 
possible,. 3 Indeed, Italy's failure to take military action 
gave the War Cabinet renewed confidence, for it decided on 2 
May that Chamberlain should make a particular point in a 
speech he was due to give to the Commons that afternoon of 
mentioning naval reinforcements in the Mediterranean, 4 an 
announcement which Churchill opined 'will give the gentlemen 
5 (in Rome] something to think about'. This sudden burst of 
optimism was augmented on 5 May with news from a reliable 
neutral source that the German military command had little 
expectation of Italy entering the war, 6 and the feeling was 
such by the end of the first week of the month that a partial 
relaxation of the diversion of shipping in the Mediterranean 
imposed during the past few weeks was authorised. 7 
'PRO CAB 65/6,106th Meeting, 28 April 1940,2nd minute 
CAB 67/6, Papers 110 & 114,22 & 27 April 1940. 
2 TCLC RAB E3/8, Horner to Butler & reply, 30 April &2 
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3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 17, Charles to Halifax, 3 
May 1940. 
4 PRO CAB 65/7,110th Meeting, 2 May 1940,4th minute. 
5 Churchill, War Papers - Vol. 1, extract from memoirs 
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This new found hopefulness received a rude shock on 8 May, 
however. Loraine had returned to Rome after a period of 
illness, and, in his first meeting with Ciano, the Italian 
Foreign Minister informed him, 
and he repeated it more than once, that Signor Mussolini 
stood by his pact with Germany, that he would fulfil his 
obligations to Germany 100-1;, that he had taken complete 
and sole control of Italian policy, and would take his 
decisions at his own time and in his own way. 
Ciano added that, for the moment, Italy remained non- 
belligerent, but he was not prepared to say how long this 
might last. Moreover, 'there was no means of lessening the 
uncertainty about Italy's eventual attitude, or of having some 
kind of rapprochement'. The best advice Ciano could give Sir 
Percy was to 'leave us alone'. ' 
The Foreign Minister's statements to Loraine had been dictated 
by Mussolini, who was more sure than ever of a German victory 
in the wake of the Allies, decision to withdraw from the bulk 
of Norway in early May. 2 The Duce's innate desire for war had 
been fuelled throughout April by Hitler, who repeatedly sent 
him letters detailing German military successes in Norway. 
Ciano noted in his diary on 28 April that 'Hitler is a good 
psychologist and he knows that these messages go straight to 
Mussolini's heartl. 3 Indeed, any desire the Duce had for a 
negotiated settlement of the war or to avert the impending 
German assault on the West appears to have vanished in the 
light of Hitler's stunning Scandinavian victories. ' Thus, on 
the eve of the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries and France, 
Mussolini was more psychologically primed to order Italian 
intervention than ever before. The key now was whether the 
Wehrmacht would be successful enough to create a military 
situation in which such intervention no longer seemed an 
enormous gamble. 
'PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 124. 
Ciano, Diary, 8&3 May 1940, pp. 245,243. 
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The Balkan Question 
In the wake of the German drive into Scandinavia, the Balkan 
question, as it had been perceived by the Allies since the 
start of the war, radically changed. Hitherto, the concern 
had been that a war in South-East Europe triggered by the 
Germans or the Allies would result in Italy getting dragged 
in, but now, there emerged a real danger that the Italians 
would take the initiative in deciding the future of the region 
by invading-either Yugoslavia or Greece. 
Mussolini had, in fact, been toying with the idea of 
exploiting the conflict between Germany and the Allies to 
attack Yugoslavia or Greece since August 1939.1 The Duce had 
ordered his military planners that month to examine the 
possibility of offensive action against these countries, only 
to have them report back advising against such a move due to 
the inability of the Italian armed forces to assault the 
Balkans and defend Italian interests against the Allies at the 
same time. 2 Nevertheless, by late January, a sketchy plan to 
take over Croatia in the wake of a nationalist uprising had 
been formulated, though the Duce still dared not act at that 
3 time. once the Germans had invaded Scandinavia, however, 
Mussolini's first thought seems to have been to take advantage 
of Allied preoccupation with events in the north by moving 
against Yugoslavia. ' 
The War Cabinet discussed the issue of how to respond to an 
Italian act of aggression in the Balkans for the first time on 
14 April. Allied policy in the event of an attack upon Greece 
had effectively been prescribed by the guarantees given to 
Athens in April 1939, and the fact that it received little 
'Indeed, even the anti-interventionist Ciano looked 
forward to annexing Croatia and the Dalmatian coast, 
provided that such action did not embroil Italy with the 
western democracies (Ciano, Diar , 12 October 1939 & 22 January 1940, pp. 166,201). 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 53-4. 
Ciano, Diar , 21 January 1940, p. 201. 
Ciano, Diary, 9 APril 1940, p. 234. 
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formal consideration over the ' next two months strongly 
suggests that London and Paris would have stood by their 
pledges and declared war on Italy had it invaded Greek 
territory. ' However, an attack upon Yugoslavia 'was considered 
more likely, and it was the question of how to respond to this 
eventuality that was the focus of Allied discussion over the 
following weeks. 
Such an assault would be a clear case of aggression akin to 
Hitler's invasion of Poland, so, although no guarantee had 
been given to Yugoslavia, there would inevitably be a general 
expectation that the Allies would respond forcefully 
nonetheless, probably by declaring war. A failure to do so 
would therefore run the risk, though not so great as ignoring 
an Italian attack upon Greece, of Allied influence in the 
Balkans collapsing. This would be a strategic disaster, as it 
might encourage the states of South-East Europe, most 
disturbingly Turkey, to align themselves in some way with the 
Nazis for their own security, thus potentially giving Germany 
control of the Straits and exposing the Allied position in the 
Middle East to attack from the north. 
Nevertheless, at the War Cabinet meeting on 14 April, 
Churchill, of all people, suggested that if Italy invaded 
Yugoslavia in present circumstances, 'we should take no 
immediate counter-action', though he added that 'we should 
reserve our liberty to take such action as we might think 
proper at a later date I. The main reason for delaying a 
possible forceful response was that the Royal Navy was at 
present, thanks to commitments in the North Sea, incapable of 
operating at sufficient strength in the Mediterranean. 
Halifax was prepared to accept this for the moment, though he 
had serious concerns that if Britain remained inactive in the 
'Indeed, even at the end of May, with the situation in 
north-west Europe truly critical, the FO reconfirmed to the 
British ambassador in Ankara that if Italy were to invade 
Greece, the Allies would be bound to come to the Greeks, 
assistance in accord with the guarantee given in 1939 (PRO 
WO 106/5706b, 36A, telegram to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 28 May 
1940). 
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face of Italian aggression, a deep and unfavourable effect 
would be created in the Balkans'. ' 
On 16 April, the French War Committee met and decided that an 
Italian attack upon Yugoslavia would call for an immediate 
reaction on the part of the Allies. This forced the War 
Cabinet to return to the Balkan question the next day, when 
Halifax, though concerned that Britain should endeavour to 
avoid war with Italy if possible, urged that, in the event of 
the Italians invading Yugoslavia, the British should I mark our 
displeasure in some manner which should not be futile or 
reminiscent of sanctions'. 2 
The British position hardened further still on 18 April in the 
light of the views of Sir Michael Palairet, the British 
ambassador in Athens. He was convinced that Allied influence 
in the Balkans would collapse if nothing was done in response 
to Italian aggression in the region and that, given the 
present poor state of Italo-Allied relations, a policy of not 
reacting would only serve to postpone war with Italy for a 
short time anyway. Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State 
for Air, supported these views and argued that a firm British 
response might exacerbate internal opposition to Mussolini. 
Urged thus to contemplate drastic action, the War Cabinet 
instructed the COS to consider the implications of becoming 
involved in a war with Italy at the present time. 3 
The resulting COS paper listed the three possible courses of 
action open to Italy as direct intervention on the side of 
Germany, aggression against a neutral country, and continued 
non-belligerence, though the first and third of these options 
were given only cursory consideration in the paper, for 
obvious reasons. The COS began by making the fundamental 
point that, if Rome took military action, Britain should 
'PRO CAB 65/6,92nd Meeting, 14 April 1940,10th 
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drastically reduce its commitment in the north in order to 
free naval forces for the Mediterranean. They then went on to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of war with Italy at 
the present juncture. The benefits were the tightening of the 
blockade, the probable entry of Turkey into the war (depending 
on the attitude of the Soviet Union), and the fact that Italy 
might become a liability to Germany due to the unpreparedness 
of its forces and the vulnerability of its industrial 
heartland and maritime communications. The drawbacks were the 
further dispersion of Allied strength, the interruption of the 
route through the Mediterranean, and the prevention of forces 
deployed in the Mediterranean and Middle East from giving 
effective assistance if needed to those countries with whom 
Britain had contractual obligations. On balance, the COS 
decided that 
there is no doubt that the intervention of Italy on the 
side of Germany at the present juncture would, at any 
rate on a short-term view, add greatly to our 
difficulties. It is to our interest, -therefore, to keep 
Italy out of war, and all the resources of diplomacy and 
propaganda should be exerted to this end. 
A 
Thus far into the report, it seemed as if the COS were likely 
to advocate a policy of effectively ignoring any Italian 
aggression against Yugoslavia. Instead, however, they 
advocated that the Allies should respond to any such attack by 
declaring war, as they agreed wholeheartedly with the views of 
the Foreign Office as formulated by this time. The FO felt 
that, if the Allies declared war, the Yugoslavs would be far 
more inclined to resist aggression forcefully themselves and 
that Greece and Turkey would be more likely to commit 
themselves to Yugoslavia's defence. Although Allied 
intervention would probably provoke German intervention, which 
might well lead to Belgrade's capitulation, this was deemed 
preferable to doing nothing in response to Italian aggression 
as, 'If Mussolini is allowed to achieve a quick and 
spectacular success there is every prospect that the whole of 
our political influence in South East Europe will collapse'. 
Moreover, it was believed that an Italian attack upon 
Yugoslavia would be the first step to a confrontation with the 
Allies which, if delayed by Anglo-French inaction, would 
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commence in even worse circumstances than at present due to 
the destruction of Allied influence in the Balkans. On the 
other hand, a prompt reaction on the part of the Allies might 
usefully encourage the anti-war elements in Italy... to oppose 
the Government before Mussolini had been able to consolidate 
opinion behind him'. ' 
Given the opposition hitherto put up by the FO and the COS to 
the adoption of a strong policy in the Balkans, it is perhaps 
surprising to find them supporting one now. Several factors 
explain it, however. Firstly, this was a new scenario being 
considered. Italy was now envisaged as the aggressor, and 
this in itself undermined one of the main previous objections 
to a strong policy, as the preservation of Italian neutrality 
would become a far less realistic goal upon which to base 
Balkan policy if Rome itself started a conflict in South-East 
Europe, especially as it was believed that such action would 
indicate that an Italian declaration of war on the Allies was 
inevitable anyway. Secondly, with Germany as the potential 
aggressor in the Balkans, the only positive form of action 
open to the Allies in response to an attack was to deploy 
forces in the region. With Italy as the aggressor, however, 
the Allies had the option of restricting their action to 
declaring war. Indeed, the COS explicitly stated in the paper 
that 'there is nothing we can do to afford direct assistance 
to Yugoslavia or Greece until the Italian threat to our 
communications has been eliminated'. They envisaged helping 
these countries in the early stages of a war with Italy 
indirectly, by forcing the Italians to divert forces from the 
Balkans to the French frontier and the colonies to combat the 
2 Allies. Finally, there is the matter of psychology. Germany 
was viewed, even before the fall of France, as a formidable 
enemy. Italy, on the other hand, had no such reputation, and 
this meant that an Allied failure to respond forcefully to an 
Italian attack in the Balkans would be far more difficult to 
justify to the states of the region than failure to oppose a 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 134,21 April 1940. 
2 PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 134,21 April 1940, p. 5. 
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German assault, and would therefore be much more likely to 
lead to the collapse of Allied influence in the area than 
would, say, allowing Germany to swallow Romania. 
By mid April, support was thus being given by the COS and FO, 
as well as by the French High Command, ' to a forceful response 
to an Italian attack upon Yugoslavia, but the Allied 
governments had yet to adopt such a policy formally. The 
issue was therefore discussed at the eighth meeting of the 
Supreme War Council on 23 April, when the French Prime 
Minister, Paul Reynaud, pushed for a commitment to the landing 
of Allied forces at Salonika, where they could establish a 
base for the assistance of Yugoslavia and any other Balkan 
state that was attacked. In reply, Chamberlain, who clearly 
still viewed the avoidance of conflict with Italy as the prime 
objective, bent the truth, to put it charitably, by stating 
that the British Government, having examined the situation, 
did not consider declaring war on Italy a wise response to an 
invasion of Yugoslavia in view of-commitments elsewhere. The 
British Prime Minister was clearly swimming against the tide 
of opinion at the meeting, however, for, although the SWC 
failed to reach definitive agreement as to whether the Allies 
would declare war in response to an Italian attack upon 
Yugoslavia, -it resolved to address a joint enquiry to Athens 
to ascertain the attitude it would adopt in the event of such 
an attack and whether it would consent to the landing of an 
Allied force at Salonika in response. In the light of the 
reply, the. Allies would determine whether the Salonika 
operation was feasible and/or desirable. ' 
The threat of an Italian invasion of Yugoslavia had thus 
apparently got Britain nearer to agreeing to the French plan 
for a landing in northern Greece than any danger of a German 
drive to the Straits. It did not take long, however, for the 
British military establishment to make it clear that its view 
'PRO CAB 85/7, Paper 53 PMR, 21 April 1940. 
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of the Salonika operation had not in fact changed. Sir John 
Dill, the Vice CIGS, reported to the War Cabinet on 27 April 
a conclusion reached by the COS that Athens should not be 
approached until the full military implications of the 
despatch of forces to Salonika had been examined by a joint 
Allied military body. Experience in Scandinavia had 
strengthened their view that the establishment and maintenance 
of a force at Salonika with the resources at present available 
would be impracticable with Italy involved in the war. If the 
French could find the 200 AA guns and considerable numbers of 
fighters required, the project was feasible, but if they could 
not, as was a near certainty, the British should rule the 
scheme out. Faced with renewed opposition to the French plan, 
Chamberlain, one suspects with pleasure, agreed to bring up 
these points at a meeting of the SWC scheduled for that 
afternoon. 
The discussion then moved on to the issue of policy in the 
event of an Italian attack upon Yugoslavia in a broader sense. 
Peirse, the Vice CAS, stated that he would only favour a 
declaration of war if Britain were prepared to deliver a 
determined aerial attack upon Italy's industrial heartland in 
the north-west of the country, for which consent to use French 
aerodromes was essential. The importance of clarifying 
Turkey's attitude to an Italian attack was then raised, the 
War Cabinet agreeing that this was vital, as the key objective 
of Balkan policy was to keep the Turks on side. The issue of 
Britain's response to Italian aggression was thus thrown into 
some confusion at this meeting and the War Cabinet reacted by 
determining that every effort should be made to resolve the 
outstanding issues as soon as possible to allow a clear policy 
to be adopted. In the meantime, it was agreed that if Italy 
were to invade Yugoslavia within, say, the next 24 hours, 
Britain should not declare war immediately. ' 
The outstanding issues were duly raised by the Prime Minister 
at the tenth meeting of the SWC that afternoon. The French 
'PRO CAB 65/6,105th Meeting, 27 April 1940,7th 
minute. 
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agreed that efforts should be made to clarify the Turkish 
position, that the Allied air staffs should examine the 
question of bombing Italy in detail, and, more surprisingly, 
that the approach to Athens should be delayed. ' The question 
of how the Allies should react to an Italian invasion of 
Yugoslavia thus remained unresolved at the very time when the 
British believed Mussolini might be on the verge of acting. 
This was a far from ideal situation, and Halifax attempted to 
improve it by producing a new paper on the subject on 29 
April. This provided an extensive list of benefits and 
drawbacks to war with Italy at the present time, the most 
important of which had already been mentioned by the COS in 
their memo of 21 April. After weighing up the pros and cons, 
the Foreign Secretary also concluded that a strong response 
should be given to Italian aggression. Indeed, he felt that 
Britain should declare war on Italy even if the Yugoslavs did 
not resist or if they collapsed at the first onslaught. 
Furthermore, he ruled out any action short of a full 
declaration of war as unsatisfactory and impractical. For 
example, breaking off diplomatic relations and closing the 
eastern and western entrances to the Mediterranean to Italian 
commerce would render war practically inevitable anyway, would 
allow Mussolini to rally the Italian people in the face of the 
reimposition o, f sanctions, and would surrender the initiative 
2 to the enemy . 
The War Cabinet discussed Halifax's paper the next day. The 
discussion mirrored the memo itself, with a string of 
advantages and disadvantages being brought up in succession, 
but, rather than reaching a conclusion, the War Cabinet 
decided that the matter should be discussed further with the 
French, Turkish and Balkan governments and that the Allied 
staffs should prepare an up-to-date statement on the military 
action it would be possible to take in the event of war with 
'PRO CAB 99/3,10th Meeting, 27 April 1940, p. 13. 
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Italy. 1 Evidence of a retreat from the strong position 
advocated by the COS on 21 April and repeated by Halifax eight 
days later was thus surfacing before the month was out, and it 
is interesting to note that Cadogan felt that the general 
sense in the War Cabinet on 30 April had been against 
declaring war. 2 Churchill, generally the most hawkish member 
of the War Cabinet, certainly opposed it, as he hoped that an 
Italo-Yugoslav war might cement Italian neutrality in the 
Allied struggle with Germany, opining that 'If the Yugos fight 
[Italy] seriously she will come crawling to us not to 
intervene against her - she will then only want us to leave 
her alone'. 3 
The indecision of the War Cabinet at the end of April as to 
how to respond to an Italian attack on Yugoslavia presumably 
reflected a dip in confidence consequent upon Allied defeat in 
central and southern Norway by this time. When Italy did not 
enter the war at the start of May as the British had expected, 
however, the War Cabinet's confidence was somewhat restored, 
and it became bold enough to decide that it should be made 
clear semi-officially that an Italian act of aggression in the 
4 Balkans would lead to war. This boldness was short-lived, 
though, and any thought of declaring war on Italy if it should 
attack Yugoslavia was effectively killed by the launch and 
early success of the German assault in the West. It was not 
long before the situation became critical, and, in such 
circumstances, to think of voluntarily adding to one's enemies 
seemed disingenuous. As early as 14 May, Halifax was 
expressing doubts as to the wisdom of declaring war on Italy 
if it attacked Yugoslavia and was investigating the 
intermediate steps he had initially ruled out on 29 April. 5 
'PRO CAB 65/6,108th Meeting, 30 April 1940,13th 
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The Foreign Secretary subsequently produced a second memo on 
the subject of policy in response to Italian aggression. Now 
he advocated merely issuing a joint Allied statement 
denouncing the attack, a course of action he was not happy 
with, but which he considered unavoidable in present 
circumstances. ' The War Cabinet approved this policy on 17 
May and invited Halifax to attempt to secure the agreement of 
the French and Turkish governments to it, ' but, by the time 
Paris replied to Halifax's approach four days later, the 
situation on the Western Front was already so bad that the 
French Government, desperate to avoid Italy entering the war, 
considered even the mild rebuke suggested by Halifax 
inopportune. ' As for the Turks, their Foreign Minister's 
public declaration in the wake of Belgium's capitulation on 28 
May that the alliance with Britain and France had been a 
mistake showed that little support for British policy could be 
expected from Ankara. 4 
Thus, by the middle of May, the question of how London should 
react to possible Italian aggression against Yugoslavia had at 
last effectively been resolved. By now, however, this had 
become almost irrelevant. The situation in France was so bad 
that it appeared that Mussolini would no longer bother 
attacking in the Balkans at all, but would go directly for the 
5 Allies themselves . 
Reconsidering Tactics for Averting Italian Intervention 
It will be remembered that the War Cabinet had re-opened the 
question of general policy towards Italy on 4 April in the 
light of concern as to Italian intentions in the wake of the 
Brenner meeting. Almost all aspects of policy towards Italy 
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therefore underwent serious reconsideration in April and early 
May, and several new ideas were raised and tried out. 
New Tactics 
Impressed by the apparent success of German personal diplomacy 
in Rome and at the Brenner, the British decided in mid April 
to try to get the Pope to use his inf luence to aid their cause 
by personally appealing to Mussolini to keep Italy out of the 
war. The American representative to the Holy See, Myron 
Taylor, was enlisted as an intermediary in this, and suggested 
on his own initiative that Roosevelt might be approached with 
a view to emulating His Holiness. ' Although both the Pope and 
the President proved willing to comply with the British 
request, neither approach achieved anything. Ciano described 
Mussolini's reply to the Pope as 'sceptical, cold, and 
sarcastic' and that to Roosevelt as 'cutting and hostile,. 2 
Another new way in which London tried to influence the 
Italians against intervention in April was to try to remove 
any ideological tension between Italy and the western European 
democracies by stressing that the Allies were not opposed to 
fascist, totalitarian regimes per se, but only to those which 
threatened European stability. Halifax stated this publicly 
in a speech on 10 April, and Butler reconfirmed it in private 
conversation with Bastianini two days later. ' There is, 
unsurprisingly, no evidence that this had any impact upon 
Italian policymaking. 
'PRO CAB 65/6,99th Meeting, 21 April 1940,7th minute. 
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With concern about Italian intentions heightening in the 
aftermath of the German invasion of Scandinavia, the COS 
formally submitted a memorandum on 16 April for consideration 
by the War Cabinet on military measures to deter Italy from 
entering the war. Unfortunately, few reinforcements were 
available for the Mediterranean and Middle East without a 
change in current priorities of some kind, so the measures put 
forward were largely based on the shuffling of forces already 
deployed in the region or on bluff. Navally, the 
reconstitution of strong forces in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Red Sea was most desirable, but the units required for 
this were at present unavailable due to recently increased 
commitments in the North Sea. In Europe, the French might be 
asked 'to create the impression that active operations on the 
Franco-Italian frontier are under consideration', and Italian 
sensitivity about the vulnerability of their north-western 
industrial heartland could be played upon by activity at 
aerodromes in the south of France. In North Africa, the 
French had withdrawn the bulk of their forces from Tunisia and 
air reinforcements for Egypt were restricted to two Indian 
bomber squadrons from Singapore, a Rhodesian squadron in 
Kenya, and/or an Australian army co-operation squadron from 
the Antipodes, so little could be made of a threat to Libya 
unless the remaining French forces took up advanced positions 
at the same time as the British concentrated troops in the 
Western Desert. To threaten Italy's position in East Africa, 
one or both of the infantry brigades held in reserve in 
Palestine could be moved to Sudan and British Somaliland could 
be reinforced by a battalion from Kenya. The French might 
also be persuaded to send a brigade of Madagascan troops to 
Djibouti. Finally, the Turks might be asked to concentrate 
troops in south-western Anatolia to give the impression that 
an assault was being planned on the Dodecanese. Overall, the 
COS advised that, 'Our aim would best be achieved by the 
cumulative effect of a number of unobtrusive measures to 
improve our strength in the Mediterranean, rather than by any 
more striking gesture I, and that any action taken should 
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follow a carefully coordinated plan in collaboration with 
France and Turkey. ' 
This paper was not fully considered by the War Cabinet for a 
fortnight, principally to give the Foreign Office time to 
examine its implications, but action nevertheless began almost 
at once to give effect to one of the measures suggested, and 
too swiftly dismissed, by the COS; the reinforcement of Allied 
naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. 2 The First Sea 
Lord had in fact begun to make administrative preparations for 
the return of a battlefleet to Alexandria in the wake of the 
Brenner meeting, 3 and the British and French admiralties had 
decided in early April that, in the event of hostilities 
breaking out or becoming imminent with Italy, there should be 
a major reconcentration of Allied naval power in both halves 
of the inland'sea. 4' With the eruption of war in the north, 
however, it became clear that the Royal Navy could only 
reinforce the Mediterranean to the detriment of operations 
against the Germans, so Pound put the problem before the War 
Cabinet on 20 April. The French had agreed to help the 
British by sending three old battleships to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, but only if a French admiral should then take 
over command in the theatre. Cunningham, unsurprisingly, was 
opposed to relinquishing command and had pointed out that the 
handing over of control to a Frenchman would have serious 
political repercussions in Egypt and Turkey. Pound therefore 
proposed establishing a 4olding force at Alexandria, centred 
upon an old battleship, to be reinforced when possible by two 
further capital ships and some older cruisers. ' Whilst 
incapable of acting offensively, this holding force could 
cover the line of communications between Egypt and Turkey and 
support Allied land operations, so, although it would have 
limited value as a deterrent, it would be of some use 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 130,16 April 1940. 
PRO CAB 65/6,96th Meeting, 18 April 1940,2nd minute. 
3 BL Cunn. Add. MSS 52560, Pound to Cunningham, 30 March 
1940, p. 2. 
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defensively should Italy come into the war. Pound's plan was 
therefore approved by the war Cabinet. ' 
At a meeting of the SWC on 23 April, Reynaud was pleased to 
hear of British plans to send capital ships back to the 
Eastern Mediterranean and urged that further reinforcements 
should be sent. Chamberlain, however, felt it wiser that the 
Allies should watch the situation and add to their present 
measures as might be considered necessary'. This more 
cautious view won out, for although the SWC acknowledged the 
desirability of building up as large a British battlefleet as 
possible in the Mediterranean to act as a deterrent to Italian 
aggression, it also decided that the Scandinavian campaign 
must receive priority for the moment. ' 
Meanwhile, certain figures in the Air Ministry had began to 
push forcefully for the idea of an aerial deterrent to Italian 
aggression. One such was Squadron Leader R. E. Vintras, one of 
the British PMRs, who strongly advocated the establishment of 
the explicit threat of air attack on Italy's industrial 
heartland in the north-west on the grounds that 
Mussolini is afraid of Hitler - the only effective 
counter is to make him afraid of us ... It has been said that Italy does not react favourably to threats. I 
submit that this is only true when she is tolerably sure 
they will not be carried out ... The best counter to 
Italians is swift and violent reaction, or the knowled e I g3 
that it will result from any false move on their part. 
Of all the forms of military deterrence open to the Allies, 
the threat of aerial bombardment of Italy's industrial 
heartland was perhaps the most promising. Italian air defence 
was very weak in both fighters and AA guns, 4 and this left the 
'PRO CAB 65/6,98th Meeting, 20 April 1940,7th minute. 
2 PRO CAB 99/3,8th Meeting - 2nd session, 23 April 
1940, pp. 6-7,15-16. 
3 PRO CAB 21/1304,18A, 'Measures to Deter Italy' by 
Vintras, 16 April 1940, pp. 1-2. 
Overy, R. J., The Air War 1939-1945, (London, 198o), 
16. 
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regions of Lombardy and Piedmont, wherein a massive three- 
quarters of Italy's industrial capacity was concentrated, ' 
exceptionally vulnerable to attacks from bombers operating 
from southern France. As we shall see, however, the Allies 
were to prove too tardy in establishing a credible threat for 
it to have much effect in determining Italian policy. 
With pressure building for the adoption of an Allied aerial 
deterrent, efforts to strengthen the naval one proceeded 
better than expected. By early May, German naval losses in 
northern waters and the reduction of the commitment in the 
theatre consequent upon the decision to withdraw from the bulk 
of Norway had allowed the British to reinforce the Eastern 
Mediterranean with two battleships, with a further two 
expected at Alexandria very shortly, as well as enabling a 
small fleet to gather at Aden to counter the limited Italian 
naval presence in the Red Sea. 2 This was a dramatic 
improvement in Britain's military position in the region, but 
its deterrent impact was clearly limited by the Allies' 
ignominious defeat in Scandinavia, as the Italian press, which 
had mocked the Royal Navy in April for its failure to prevent 
the German landings in Norway, reported that it left Italy 
'completely unconcerned and calm,. 3 
A revised copy of the COS paper on military measures to deter 
Italy from entering the war was finally produced on 28 April. 
The Foreign Office had examined the issue and made the 
following points: 
(a) there could be no objection to measures necessary in 
self-defence. 
(b) if Italy entered the war, Mussolini would be likely 
to seek an early spectacular success. Therefore, any 
increase in the strength of the defences of Malta and 
Gibraltar would be valuable. 
'Butler, Grand Strategy, p. 296. 
2 PRO CAB 65/6,107th Meeting, 29 April 1940,5th 
minute, CAB 65/7,112th Meeting, 4 May 1940,2nd minute & 
Playfair, pp. 83-4. 
3 The Times, 11 April 1940, p. 7, col. 3 &6 May 1940, 
p. 6, col. 7. 
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(c) the Duce was prepared to accept some reverses in the 
colonies, but feared threats to Italy itself. 
(d) Mussolini Is decision to enter the war would depend 
upon the progress of the conflict. Any measures 
recommended by the COS would only be used as a pretext. 
With views in the FO concerning policy towards Rome thus 
hardening, at least in regard to ensuring that Britain was as 
well prepared as possible to meet the seemingly increasingly 
likely Italian attack, the COS were now free formally to 
advocate a more active policy of military deterrence towards 
Italy. Efforts to re-establish a naval deterrent were already 
well in hand, so the paper concentrated on land and air 
forces. With the arrival expected in the near future of six 
battalions from West Africa and three from South Africa, no 
further army reinforcements were deemed necessary in East 
Africa, though the COS advised that a battalion be moved from 
Kenya to Somaliland, that Aden's garrison be similarly 
strengthened, and that ostentatious preparations be made for 
the despatch to the Sudan of one or both infantry brigades 
held in reserve in Palestine. The French should also be asked 
to reinforce Djibouti and three South African squadrons should 
be sent to Kenya as soon as modern aircraft became available. 
In North Africa, the French were to be asked to reconstitute 
the pre-war garrison of Tunisia and every effort was to be 
made to increase defences in the Western Desert. Two Indian 
bomber squadrons were to go from Singapore to Egypt, to be 
joined later by a Rhodesian squadron currently in Kenya, and 
an Australian army co-operation squadron was to proceed to 
Palestine as soon as aircraft were available. In the 
Mediterranean, the COS urged that Gibraltar's garrison be 
increased by a battalion to bring it up to the level it had 
been at in September 1939, but there was nothing practicable 
we can do to increase the power of resistance of Malta I. 
Further east, plans to ask the Turks to concentrate forces 
opposite the Dodecanese were dropped. Finally, and most 
importantly, plans and preparations, which 'should be 
unobtrusive though not sufficiently secret to escape the 
Italian intelligence', were to be concerted with the French to 
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enable bombers to operate against the industrial heartland of 
north-west Italy. ' 
The War Cabinet approved the COS paper on 29 April and, the 
next day, agreed to the despatch of orders for the manning of 
the defences at Alexandria, Haifa, Malta and Gibraltar, and 
for the movement of the Armoured Division into the Western 
2 Desert under the pretext of manoeuvres . The 
impact of such 
steps to deter Italy from entering the war as were approved 
would have been greatly augmented by the arrival of the whole 
of the second wave, 20,000 strong, of Anzac troops earmarked 
for deployment in the Middle East (ostensibly to train), but 
the danger of Italian attack in late April led Churchill to 
doubt the wisdom of sending convoys carrying these men through 
the Red Sea. 3 Italy's failure to enter the war in early May 
meant that the War Cabinet agreed on the 9th that the first 
convoy, carrying around 7,000 troops, should be instructed to 
proceed to Suez, but Rome's reaction to the German assault in 
the West meant that the subsequent convoy was diverted round 
4 the Cape to Britain . 
Thus, the diversion of the bulk of the second wave of Anzac 
troops to Britain notwithstanding, Britain's military position 
in the Mediterranean and Middle East was being greatly 
improved by the time Germany invaded the Low Countries and 
France, and military considerations were at last outweighing 
the political factor of not provoking Rome in determining how 
forces in the region should be deployed. The need to take 
steps to counter the increasing threat of war with Italy had 
finally allowed a more vigorous policy of military deterrence 
to be adopted. 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 138,28 April 1940. 
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Economic Issues 
Alongside the idea of military deterrence dealt with by the 
COS, the MEW raised the notion in April of taking economic 
measures to deter Italy from entering the war. The steps open 
to the British in this sphere were, U) to tighten contraband 
control in the Mediterranean, and (ii) to place financial and 
administrative obstacles in the way of Italian trade. In the 
first case, 
* 
increased delays to Italian shipping would impede 
the flow of trade to and from Italy, and this could be 
supplemented by a 'Black List' policy against Italian traders. 
More severely, Italian imports of essential commodities could 
be limited to the quantities necessary to meet domestic needs. 
In the second case, financial restrictions could be imposed, 
such as the denial of sterling and franc credit, the refusal 
of insurance in the London market, and the reduction of Allied 
purchases in Italy. Trade relations with Italy could even be 
severed entirely by refusing export licences and prohibiting 
imports, a move by which the British now seemingly stood to 
lose relatively little economically (though not, of course, 
politically) , given that, as Waley of the Treasury pointed out 
in mid April, the Italians had hitherto refused to sell us 
all the things that we really want' . It was for the War 
Cabinet to decide which, if any, of these measures to adopt, 
but it was warned that any action which might reawaken the 
ghost of sanctions would probably have the opposite effect to 
that hoped for. ' 
As well as possibly deterring Italy from entering the war, a 
tightening of the blockade would, of course, increase pressure 
upon Germany. That this was desirable was highlighted by an 
MEW report of early April which concluded that the situation 
, did not seem very promising for a rapid decision in favour of 
the Allies through economic pressure alone as at present 
exercised'. 2 This factor weighed particularly heavily with 
the French, who saw the German offensive in Scandinavia as the 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 130,16 April 1940, pp. 5-6 &T 
160/939, F13456/02/18, Waley to Nichols, 13 April 1940. 
2 As cited in Medlicott, p. 58. 
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f irst step in an attempt to reach a decision in the war in 
1940, and led their Ministry of Blockade to insist in mid 
April upon the necessity of applying forcible rationing to all 
neutral countries adjacent to Germany without delay, covering 
a wide range of goods, including oils, many metals, cotton, 
and rubber. ' 
There were thus good reasons to adopt a firmer line in Anglo- 
Italian economic relations by the time Halifax and Cross 
produced their joint memorandum on the subject, requested by 
the War Cabinet in early April, on the 18th. The paper was 
compiled after a series of meetings of an interdepartmental 
committee recently formed to discuss economic relations with 
Italy under the chairmanship of R. A. Butler, and it 
essentially reported the conclusions reached by that body. 
The key issue was the blockade. 'Our control of contraband 
and enemy exports, in practice as applied to Italy', the 
report noted, is becoming increasingly ineffective'. There 
was growing evidence of leakage of contraband to Germany, 
which looked set to get worse, as well as evidence of German 
exports passing through Italy, and increased imports were 
improving Italy's own war potential. Finally, taking in the 
broad picture, I In the absence of a decision to tighten up our 
contraband control as regards Italy, we lack the moral ground 
for tightening it elsewhere'. 
The strength of the argument for increasing economic pressure 
on Italy was clearly recognised, then, but there remained the 
political objection that it would antagonise Rome. There 
therefore appeared to be two options: (a) to make a renewed 
attempt to reach agreement with the Italians on economic 
issues, or (b) to abandon any idea of reaching agreement and 
instead tighten up the blockade in the Mediterranean to a 
level at least equal to that applied to minor neutrals. If 
option (a) were to be pursued, the aim should be to build up 
a body of opinion as favourable to the Allies as possible in 
Italy, so as to make Mussolini doubt his ability to drag his 
'PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 130,24 April 1940, p. j. 
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people with him into war, though, at the same time, such 
efforts as were consistent with this prime objective should be 
made to keep Italian war potential as low as possible. The 
aim of option (b) was to restrict the development of Italian 
war potential and increase economic pressure on Germany, 
subject always to avoiding, if possible, any action which 
could successfully be represented by Rome as an economic 
sanction at a moment when this would be politically unwise. 
The key objective of each alternative was thus to make Italian 
entry into the war as difficult as possible, though the 
methods by which this would be achieved were very different. 
option (a) carried with it little chance of provoking an 
immediate break with Italy at the expense of allowing Italian 
and German war potential to increase (though this would be 
offset by concurrently increasing Allied and Turkish war 
potential), whereas option (b) ran the risk of giving 
Mussolini the pretext and the means to drag a still largely 
unwilling population into the war in the hope that, if the 
Duce failed to exploit this opportunity, the prospect of Italy 
intervening in the future would be reduced due to its 
stagnating war potential. 
Af ter much debate, the Butler Committee had come down in 
favour of option (a) . This was only an interim decision, 
however, for, as Cross noted in a letter to Butler, it was 
very difficult to formulate a long-term policy towards Italy 
while the repercussions of the war in Scandinavia on Italian 
policy had yet to become clear. The Minister of Economic 
Warfare had therefore agreed that policy in the short-term 
'should clearly not be provocative and must not involve taking 
any action from which we might afterwards have to retreat'. 
This inevitably meant the adoption of option (a), because it 
could be shifted to option (b), if circumstances in the near 
future made this desirable, considerably more easily than the 
other way round. 
In his letter to Butler, Cross stressed that he f elt the 
blockade should not be tightened by the introduction of 
rationing only for the time being', and the hardening 
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attitude in the MEW which this, reflects was evident in certain 
considerations to which the Butler Committee's support of 
option (a) was made subject. These were: 
(i) that nothing should be conceded in negotiations with 
Rome that would unduly increase Italy's war potential. 
(ii) that every endeavour should be made to obtain a quid 
pro quo for any concessions made. 
(iii) that the Italians should be given no impression of 
British weakness. 
(iv) that the French should agree to the adoption of this 
approach. ' 
Given the trend of French opinion on blockade policy in recent 
weeks, there must have been serious doubts as to whether 
Paris' consent to the adoption of option (a) was attainable. 
However, this consent was effectively granted at the meeting 
of the SWC on 23 April. Reynaud raised the question of 
economic relations with the Italians by bringing up Italy's 
excessive importation of oil and asking Chamberlain whether he 
thought Rome should be approached about this. The British 
Prime Minister replied that he considered the present an 
inopportune moment for such an approach, and that it might 
even precipitate some form of hostile Italian action. Rather 
than trying to bring the British round to the way of thinking 
of the French Ministry of Blockade, Reynaud then let the 
matter drop, thereby effectively clearing the way for London 
to adopt whichever approach to economic relations with Italy 
it saw fit. 2 
The War Cabinet therefore approved the adoption of option (a) 
on 24 April without any real disagreement, the key point being 
made by Chamberlain that 'our present military resources, 
combined with our military obligations, did not permit the 
adoption of a strong diplomacy' . Cross accepted this, but 
stated that he hoped the blockade in the Mediterranean would 
be tightened as soon as the strategic situation allowed. As 
regarded the prospects for trade, the War Cabinet was, rather 
'PRO CAB 67/6, Paper 109,18 April 1940 & FO 837/499, 
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surprisingly, fairly 'optimistic, with the ordering of new 
merchant ships a priority and some hope being held out that 
Britain might even be able to procure armaments through a 
dummy Portuguese company the French had been using. ' 
Significantly, however, any belief that a trade agreement 
would markedly improve Anglo-Italian relations and cement 
Italian neutrality had all but crumbled by this time. As 
Sargent noted on 23 April, by itself the economic bait of a 
trade agreement is going to be quite inadequate for the 
purpose of keeping Italy out of the war, if for political and 
military reasons she has decided that the time has come for 
her to intervene'. 2 
Specific guidelines for effecting option (a) had been laid 
down by the Butler Committee. As regarded the blockade, there 
was to be no approach made on the subject of a state 
guarantee, but the British were to be receptive to any Italian 
proposals aimed at resolving the dispute. Meanwhile, some 
efforts were to be made to tighten up control by, for example, 
treating concerns ill-disposed towards the Allies with 
severity when valid evidence justified it. As for Anglo- 
Italian trade, the Butler Committee had urged that, provided 
that the arrears in payment were not considerably increased, 
the present guarantee facilities for the purchase by Italy of 
up to four million tons of British coal per annum should be 
continued for the time being. This proposal was only made, 
however, to avoid damaging relations with Rome by withdrawing 
the facilities, for, as Halifax pointed out to the War 
Cabinet, it was anticipated that Italy could only afford and 
would only order around a quarter of this amount. The Butler 
Committee had also advised that Britain should maintain or 
even increase its purchases of Italian horticultural produce, 
in so far as there was a legitimate market for it, on the 
grounds of the beneficial political effect this would have in 
Italy and the desirability of transferring some payments for 
'PRO CAB 6516,102nd Meeting, 24 April 1940,9th 
minute. 
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such goods from dollars to lire. Special reference had been 
made to the need to conclude negotiations for the ordering of 
merchant ships as well. Finally, instructions were to be sent 
to Playfair to endeavour to conclude a new clearing agreement 
on the basis of accepting the fundamental point on which the 
Italians were now insisting, namely that there should be a 
distinction between 'normal' and 'special' British purchases 
in Italy, with sterling credit generated by the latter being 
reserved solely to buy raw materials rather than service 
arrears in payment, provided that the distribution by Italy of 
the proceeds of 'normal' purchases (i. e. those which would be 
made in peacetime as opposed to those made to meet a 
requirement generated by the war) was not less favourable to 
Britain than under existing clearing arrangements. ' 
At first sight, the decision to accept that the proceeds of 
I special I purchases should be reserved to buy raw materials 
might seem like a major concession, given that, hitherto, the 
British had consistently tried in negotiations for a new 
clearing agreement to limit Italy's potential to acquire large 
quantities of such goods (other than coal) in the interests of 
economic warfare and restricting Italy's ability markedly to 
increase its military preparedness. However, it must be borne 
in mind that the prospective level of Anglo-Italian trade in 
the near future was considerably lower than it had been before 
the breakdown of negotiations in February, and so, although 
under the proposed new clearing arrangements Rome would be 
able to spend a higher percentage of the proceeds of British 
purchases in Italy on raw materials, the actual quantity of 
such materials would not be dangerously high. Moreover, in 
the telegram to Rome explaining this decision, Playfair was 
further instructed that the division of purchases into 
, normal' and 'special' should only be accepted provided there 
was a quid pro quo in the form of a satisfactory solution to 
'PRO CAB 67/6, Paper 109,18 April 1940 & CAB 65/6, 
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the issue of the appropriate rate of exchange to be used in 
establishing new clearing arrangements. ' 
Dispute over the rate of exchange between the lira and the 
pound to be adopted under new clearing arrangements had 
2 
surfaced in early April, and had soon begun to prove a 
serious impediment not only to negotiations for a new clearing 
agreement, but also to progress in reaching specific trade 
deals, such as those for the construction of merchant ships in 
Italy. The Italians wanted the rate of exchange to be based 
on the value of the pound on the New York black market, but 
the Treasury was equally insistent that it should be based 
upon the official sterling-dollar exchange rate because 
acceptance of a rate of exchange based on the black market in 
New York was considerably less favourable to the British and 
would, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained in a 
letter to Butler, 'completely destroy all our efforts to 
squeeze this market out or at any rate to reduce it to 
insignificance'. Despite the British attempt to break the 
deadlock over the exchange rate problem by offering to accept 
the division of purchases into normal' and 'special', 
however, Playfair had to inform the Butler Committee when he 
returned to London to report in early May that the Italians 
had shown little intention of budging on their demands in this 
area. The prospects of securing a new Anglo-Italian clearing 
agreement therefore seemed negligible and the Butler Committee 
agreed that, in such circumstances, trade negotiations would 
have to continue as best they could on the basis of the 
existing agreement, with any minor modifications as could be 
agreed upon being made to it. 3 
As expected, when Playfair met his Italian counterpart on his 
return to Rome, he was definitively told that, I in view of our 
'PRO T 160/939, F13456/02/19, telegram to Charles, 19 
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attitude on exchange rate question there'was no possibility of 
reaching agreement on terms of a new clearing' . Nevertheless, 
the meeting was friendly and the Italians at least agreed to 
continue trade on the basis of the existing clearing agreement 
and to engage in discussions to make minor modifications to 
it. ' 
Although Anglo-Italian trade relations thus remained amicable, 
if unproductive, into early May, there had been a sharp 
increase in tension surrounding the blockade in the 
Mediterranean in late April, ' and this had prompted Osborne to 
telegraph on the 30th that, as, in his opinion, 'the effects 
of the blockade are largely responsible for the slowly growing 
anti-British feeling in Italy', greater weight should be 
afforded to political considerations in calculating the 
appropriate level of control to be exercised in the 
3 Mediterranean . This sentiment was echoed 
in Cabinet by 
Oliver Stanley on 6 May, and the War Minister succeeded in 
getting his colleagues to instruct that the idea be examined 
further. ' 
Thus the balance that had been struck in regard to the 
blockade under option (a) between political and economic 
considerations was being challenged, with some success, within 
a fortnight of its acceptance by the War Cabinet on the 
grounds that a more accommodating approach to economic control 
might ease tension with Italy. Moreover, the primacy of 
political considerations was also beginning to become evident 
in practice, for, in early May, an Italian ship carrying 5,500 
tons of lubricating oil which had been detained at Gibraltar, 
and then Malta, for a month, and which, under normal 
circumstances, would have had its cargo seized, had been 
'PRO T 160/940, F13456/02/21, telegram from Loraine, 8 
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released. ' By the eve of the German offensive in the West, 
therefore, the prospect of Britain adopting a firmer approach 
in regard to the blockade in the Mediterranean, apparently so 
possible just a month earlier, seemed to have disappeared. 
Political issues 
Given that the mistaken belief in London during February 1940 
that Italian policy was not developing unfavourably for the 
Allies had played some part in the decision at that time not 
to explore the issue of political offers to Italy, it is no 
surprise that the question resurfaced once again in the wake 
of the Brenner meeting with the realisation that Mussolini had 
set a definitely more anti-Allied course in Italian foreign 
policy. It was not the Italians, however, nor indeed the 
British, that took the lead this time, but the French. 
The French were even more deeply concerned by the change in 
mood in Italy in late March than the British, and they 
responded by abandoning the decision made at the start of the 
war not to try to initiate political discussions with the 
Italians. By this stage, however, Italo-Allied relations had 
deteriorated to such an extent that it seemed unrealistic to 
make an effort to buy Italian support, so it was therefore 
only in an effort to bribe the Duce into remaining aloof from 
the conflict, rather than to join the Allies in it, that the 
idea of making political and/or territorial concessions to the 
Italians was mooted and tried in the spring of 1940. 
The first step taken by Paris in late March was to get 
Frangois-Poncet tentatively and secretly to try to reopen the 
door to talks on Italy's claims, but this met with no 
success. 2 Then, -under growing pressure 
from the French 
legislature and press, and to the alarm of the British Foreign 
office, Reynaud prepared to send a plenipotentiary to Rome to 
open negotiations on Franco-Italian points of dispute, only to 
'PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 140,7? May 1940, p. 7. 
2 Frangois-Poncet, pp. 158-9 & Ciano, Diar , 27 March 
1940, p. 227. 
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have to abandon the idea when Ciano summoned the French 
ambassador to inform him that any public effort to weaken the 
Axis would instead strengthen it, that Mussolini was not 
interested in such conversations, and that the Duce would not 
receive any French emissary. ' 
This forthright rejection of the idea of a French 
plenipotentiary being despatched to Rome discouraged any 
further attempt on Paris' part to initiate discussions on 
political issues until mid April. Then, an official at the 
Italian embassy in France suggested to Reynaud's military 
attache that the Duce would be amenable to an approach on the 
basis of guaranteed Italian access to key natural resources, 
aid to Italy to exploit Ethiopia, concessions over the Suez 
Canal, a new statute for the Italians in Tunisia, and 
guaranteed access to Ethiopia via Djibouti. Influenced by 
this demarche, and doubtless also by Italy's disturbing 
response to the German attack upon Scandinavia, Reynaud 
decided to make another attempt to initiate political talks by 
writing to Mussolini. ' In this letter, which the Duce 
received on 24 April, France's Premier stressed the damage 
that would be done to Italian interests should a German 
victory destroy the balance of power in Europe and issued a 
sort of invitation to a meeting before the two nations cross 
swords'. 3 This latest French effort failed miserably too, 
however, Mussolini's reply being described by Ciano as 'cold, 
cutting, and contemptuous'. 4 
'DDI, 9th Series, Vol. III, No. 636, telegram to 
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R3822/438/22,28 March 1940 & Frangois-Poncet, pp. 168-70. 
Shorrock, pp. 279-80. 
3 Ciano, Diary, 24 April 1940, p. 238. For the text of 
Reynaud's letter, see DDI, 9th Series, Vol. IV, No. 166, 
Reynaud to Mussolini, 22 April 1940, pp. 135-6. 
'Ciano, Diary, 26 April 1940, p. 239. For the text of 
Mussolini's reply, see DDI, 9th Series, Vol. IV, No. 219, 
Mussolini to Reynaud, 26 April 1940, p. 184. 
249 
Meanwhile, in the British Foreign Office, a considerable 
amount of thought was also being given by mid April to the 
possibility of attempting to bribe the Italians with offers of 
political concessions, Sargent minuting on' 23 April, for 
example, that 'if it was shown that we could not afford to 
risk a war with Italy in present circumstances, then we would 
have to face the question of whether we ought not to be 
prepared to buy Italy off by discussing with her her 
"claims"'. ' Despite growing concern that the policy of 
concentrating on economic issues in negotiations with Rome 
I may not be suf f icient to lure Italy away f rom the edge of the 
conflict', however, the FO soon concluded that to open 
discussions on Italian claims 'would be as infructuous as it 
2 would be undignif ied' . This was largely because, as Sir 
Pierson Dixon, who had recently replaced Noble as the clerk at 
the Southern Department responsible for Italy, explained in 
early May, it was felt that, 
So long as the Allies are not in such an overwhelmingly 
strong position as to make the defeat of Germany 
absolutely certain, I think we may take it Mussolini 
would refuse to make any declaration which would be 
regarded by the Germans as a betrayal of the Axis. 
Moreover, in the absence of the condition predicated 
above no undertaking given by him would be worth the 
3 paper it was written on . 
The abject failure of French efforts to open discussions on 
Italy's claims highlights the accuracy of the FO's reading of 
the situation. 
The War Cabinet discussed the issue of political talks with 
Italy on 28 April, when Chamberlain and Halifax, who were by 
this time aware that Ciano had told Dingli in early April that 
the Axis could not be broken and that any attempt to discuss 
Italy's political and territorial claims by bilateral 
'PRO FO 371/24942, R5438/58/22, minute by Sargent, 23 
April 1940. 
2 PRO FO 371/24951, R5919/60/22, minute by Butler, 27 
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3 PRO CAB 21/1304,40A, Dixon to Medhurst, 9 May 1940. 
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diplomatic means would not be taken into consideration, ' led 
opposition to them. The major objection raised was that 
attempts to initiate such talks would give an impression of 
Allied weakness, and so probably serve to make Italian 
intervention more rather than less likely. It was therefore 
decided to keep economic issues the mainstay of Anglo-Italian 
relations for the moment and to monitor how Mussolini reacted 
to Britain's latest efforts in this sphere. ' 
Unprepared as the British Government remained to enter into 
direct and immediate discussion of Italy's claims, however, 
some senior Foreign office figures nevertheless felt a need by 
April to offer Mussolini something by way of a political 
incentive to remain out of the war. The Italian press had 
been warning the Allies against a new Versailles, and of the 
need to consider Italian views and interests in any post-war 
settlement since the start of the conflict, 3 and Loraine had 
argued in early February that Rome should be consulted when 
the time for peace and European reconstruction came so that 
Italy would become a force for stability in the post-war 
world. ' Informal offers of active Italian participation in 
the reconstruction of Europe after the defeat of Germany were 
therefore made to Bastianini twice in April, first by Butler 
on the 12th, then by Halifax on the 26th, in the hope that 
Mussolini would be more inclined to remain aloof from the war 
if he believed that Italy did not have to fight in order to 
secure an important place at the peace table. 5 
Considering the informal nature of the offers, and 
particularly the fact that Germany appeared to be winning the 
'Quartararo, 'Il "Canale Segretol'', pp. 706-7. 
2 PRO CAB 65/6,106th Meeting, 28 April 1940,6th 
minute. 
The Times, 6 September 1939, p. 5, col. 4. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXI, No. 33, Loraine to Halifax, 8 
February 1940. 
5 DDI, 9th Series, Vol. IV, Nos. 61 & 217, Bastianini to 
Ciano, 12 & 26 April 1940, pp. 43-5,182. 
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war'at this time and was therefore in a better position to 
offer Italy participation in the reconstruction of Europe 
after the conflict than the Allies, it will come as no 
surprise to discover that they failed to elicit a noteworthy 
response. Nevertheless, Butler continued to believe that 
there might be something to gain from such offers, a view with 
which Nichols agreed, particularly ýas the Counsellor at the 
Italian embassy had told him that such an approach might bear 
fruit. ' Sargent, on the other hand, considered this idea to 
be impractical and unwise, opining that, 
If approached on this plane Mussolini would at once 
suspect a trap and react accordingly. The only aspect of 
reconstruction in which he is interested is ... the cession 
of territories which he covets, and if we are not going 
to discuss these claims he will view our approach with 
the utmost suspicion as being merely an attempt on our 
part by the use of f ine words to detach him from the Axis 
in foreign affairs and to undermine the Fascist regime in 
2 the domestic sphere . 
No firm decision was therefore reached at this stage on 
whether to make a more formal offer to Mussolini of 
participation in the reconstruction of Europe after the war. 
Thus, by the eve of the German offensive in the West, despite 
extending to the Italians vague and informal offers of 
participation in the framing of a future peace settlement, the 
British had once again eschewed the kind of appeasement based 
on political and territorial concessions which the French had 
now shown themselves keen to pursue. The extent to which 
London was able to maintain this position in the wake of 
Germany's dramatic military success in France will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
'PRO FO 371/24951, R5919/60/22, minute by Butler, 27 
April 1940. 
PRO FO 371/24951, R5920/60/22, memo by Sargent, 1 May 
1940. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - MAY TO JUNE 1940 
Britain and Italian Fore icrn-- Pol icv 
The day Germany launched its offensive in the West, 10 May, 
Ciano informed Loraine that this development did not alter 
Italy's status as a non-belligerent. Although this was 
technically true, at least for the moment, it soon became 
clear that the German action would have dramatic repercussions 
in ''Rome, for, within forty-eight hours, Sir Percy was 
reporting 'an outburst of Italian animosity ... even more bitter 
than the last' in April. There had been offensive posters put 
up on every street corner, anti-British propaganda from 
students and youth organisations, and the Osservatore Romano, 
the only newspaper widely available in Italy not controlled by 
the government, was scheduled to be banned from 13 May. ' Some 
Fascists had even gone so far as to assault a British official 
who had torn down an anti-British manifesto. ' 
With Italy's failure to intervene in April or early May in 
mind, the initial reception given in London to all this was 
fairly sanguine, Halifax informing the recently reconstituted 
War Cabinet on 13 May, for example, that he still felt, though 
admittedly with less conviction than before, that Mussolini 
was not about to enter the war. 3 This view seemed to be 
supported by a telegram from Loraine the same day which 
pointed out that anti-war feeling amongst the Italian people 
remained strong. ' Sir Percy at this point believed this 
latest anti-Allied outburst was part of a plot engineered by 
the Germans to get Britain and France to declare war on 
Italy, 5 and this doubt over the prime motivating factors 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 19 & 25, telegrams from 
Loraine, 10 & 12 May 1940. 
Ciano, Diary, 11 May 1940, p. 248'. 
PRO CAB 65/7,120th Meeting, 13 May 1940,4th minute. 
4 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 29, telegram from 
Loraine, 13 May 1940. 
, 5Waterfield, p. 265. Loraine was not alone in believing 
that the Germans were playing an important. role in 
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behind Italian policy led Sargent to minute on 14 May that I it 
is not certain yet whether the new policy of provocation 
should be considered as a direct preliminary to entry into the 
war' .1 
The reality, however, was that the Duce was desperate to 
commit Italy to the fray as soon as he felt it possible to do 
SO. He was thrilled by and approved wholeheartedly of the 
German assault in the West when it was announced to him in the 
early hours of 10 May, and his first thought was to exploit 
the Nazi attack by acting against Yugoslavia. By 13 May, he 
had forgotten about Yugoslavia and was relishing a direct 
fight with the Allies, telling Ciano, 'We Italians are already 
sufficiently dishonoured. Any delay is inconceivable. We have 
no time to lose. Within a month I shall declare war'. Ciano 
sadly noted in his diary that day, 'I can do nothing now to 
hold the Duce back... Only a new turn in military events can 
induce him to revise his decision, but for the time being 
things are going so badly for the Allies that there is no 
hope'. The next day, Mussolini told the German ambassador 
that Italy would intervene within weeks or even days. ' 
There remained, of course, the problem of Italy's lack of 
preparedness for a major war. However, as May wore on, 
Germany's spectacular military success made it look 
increasingly like the war would not have long to run, and an 
Italian report of 13 May made it clear that the country could 
3 cope with a short conflict. All Italy's military leaders 
could do in these circumstances before consenting to 
determining Italian policy at this time. The British 
Consul-General in Genoa, for example, was convinced that 
German fifth columnists were infiltrating Italy and trying 
to stir the Italian people and leaders into intervening (PRO 
CAB 21/975, HM Consul-General, Genoa to Charles, 7 May 
1940). 
'PRO FO 371/24944, R6067/58/22, minute by Sargent, 14 
May 1940. 
Ciano, Diar , 10,13 & 14 May 1940, pp. 246,248-50. 
Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 99. 
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intervention was seek a delay of a couple of weeks to monitor 
developments on the Western Front. ' 
This still left the Monarchy, the public, the Church and the 
remaining dissenting figures within the Fascist Party as 
obstacles to the Duce Is desire, but, in the event, none of 
these proved particularly difficult to deal with. The Church 
was effectively dealt with by the threat to ban the Vatican 
newspaper and by the application of pressure, including 
violence, to its vendors, all of which resulted in the Pope 
agreeing not to publish any political news in the paper from 
the middle of May. 2 The key factor working in Mussolini's 
favour, though, was the outstanding success of German arms. 
Suddenly, the Duce's policy of alliance with Hitler began to 
seem more wise than most Italians had hitherto believed, and 
the odds of Italy being able to f ight the Allies with some 
degree of success in spite of its weaknesses improved daily. 
From mid May,, street protests began to erupt demanding war, 
and, over the following days and weeks, many Italians came 
ever more round to the idea of intervention as the means to 
prove Italy was a Great Power and expand its influence. 3 
German success appears to have cast the same spell over many 
of those in the Fascist regime who had previously opposed 
Italy's involvement in the war, some of whom became 
'Ciano, Diary, 18 May 1940, p. 252. 
Wiskemann, pp. 209-10. 
3 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p-103,108-12. There has 
been some dispute as to the extent the Italian people were 
won over to intervention in May-June 1940. It certainly 
seems that when Mussolini announced Italy's intervention on 
10 June, the crowd assembled outside the Palazzo Venezia 
received the news with little enthusiasm (see, for example, 
Ciano, Diary, 10 June 1940, p. 264 & Badoglio, pp. 20-1), and 
this has led many subsequent commentators to state that, as 
one historian has put it, the Italian people entered the war 
'not with the faith of an army, but with the patient 
resignation of a herd' (Segre, C. G., Italo Balbo: A-Fascist 
life (California, 1987), p. 375). However, Knox's assertion 
tlý_a_t the bulk of the Italian people were won over to the 
idea that Italy should enter the war, at least at the end of 
May and beginning of June, when the chances of any conflict 
being cheap and easy appeared to be good, seems to me the 
most thoroughly researched and convincing thesis. 
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, exaggeratedly pro-German', and the King's opposition was 
eroded by his decision to tie the position of the Monarchy to 
that of the Italian people. ' 
Marshal Badoglio, Italy's top military man, finally gave his 
approval to Italian entry on 26 May, convinced by the Duce's 
insistence that the war would be over by September and his 
famous plea, 'I need a few thousand dead so as to be able to 
-attend the peace conference as a belligerent'. As a result, 
Mussolini faced no opposition from his chiefs of staff when he 
told them three days later that Italy would intervene some 
time shortly after 5 June. 2 Ciano, one of the few major 
figures in the Italian Government still opposed to 
intervention, realised that there was nothing he could now do, 
and echoing the words of the man the Duce was so desperate to 
emulate, unhappily noted in his diary on 30 May, 'The die is 
cast. To-day Mussolini gave me the communication he has sent 
to Hitler about our entry into the war'. 3 
The reality of the situation in Italy began to be more clearly 
appreciated in London from 15 May. This was the darkest day 
of the war so far for the Allies, for not only did the Dutch 
capitulate, but, even more disturbingly, Reynaud responded to 
the German breakthrough on the Meuse by telephoning Churchill, 
who had succeeded Chamberlain as Prime Minister on 10 May, to 
tell him, 'We are beaten. We have lost the battle. The way 
4 to Paris is open'. With the war starting to go disastrously 
wrong for the Allies, an MEW report of 8 May which had 
concluded that Italy, despite its material weaknesses, could 
5 
survive a short war, must have begun to cause severe 
'Ciano, Diar , 16,17 &: 20 May 1940, pp. 251,253. 
Badoglio, pp. 14-18. 
3 Ciano, Dia , 30 May 1940, p. 257. For the text of this communication, see DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, No.. 356, 
Mussolini to Hitler, 30 May 1940, p. 483. 
As cited in BUL NC 2/24A, diary entry for 15 May 1940. 
5PRO CAB 21/980, 'Italy - Economic Preparedness for 
War' by MEW, 8 May 1940. 
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consternation. This can hardly have been relieved by a 
telegram from Rome on 15 May reporting that Ciano had informed 
the Belgian ambassador that 'Italy had now passed from a 
position of non-belligerency to a position of near- 
belligerency', ' nor by information revealed to the War Cabinet 
the same day that the Italian Foreign Minister had told the 
American ambassador that the odds were now ten to one on Italy 
entering the war. With concern mounting, the War Cabinet 
ordered the thinning out of merchant shipping in the 
Mediterranean and the prevention of any more British ships 
from passing westwards of Aden on 16 May, and, the very next 
day, Halifax finally told his colleagues that 'on the latest 
evidence he was inclined to think that Signor Mussolini had 
very neatly reached the point of bringing Italy into the 
2 war' . 
Even now, though, a degree of uncertainty as to Italian 
intentions remained, largely caused by reports of Italian 
military activity, or rather lack of it. For example, Loraine 
reported on 15 May that, although numbers serving with the 
colours were double the normal peace establishment and the 
Navy was ready and up to war strength, neither the Army nor 
the Air Force had yet been put on a war footing. 3 The 
confusion this caused the British ambassador was mirrored by 
that of the COS. In a report dated 17 May, they noted that 
although there were large concentrations of Italian forces on 
the French and Yugoslavian borders, and there had been a 
movement of troops in Libya eastward towards Egypt, there was 
a surprising lack of military activity in centres such as 
Rome, Naples, and Bari, many of those currently serving in the 
Italian armed forces were untrained, and there was a seeming 
lack of any air raid precautions in Italy. This led them to 
'PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 34, telegram from 
Loraine, 15 May 1940. 
2 PRO CAB 65/7,123rd meeting, 15 May 1940,5th minute, 
124th Meeting, 16 May 1940,9th minute & 126th Meeting, 17 
May 1940,7th minute. 
3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, No. 37, telegram from 
Loraine, 15 May 1940. 
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conclude that, 'It is almost impossible to reach, on military 
grounds, any firm conclusion as to Italian intentions,. ' 
Uncertainty as to Italian intentions dissipated over the next 
week or so, however. On 22 May, Loraine, now free from his 
delusion that it was the Germans propelling Italy towards 
intervention, 2 telegraphed that the Duce was only waiting for 
the establishment of German forces in the Channel ports before 
declaring war ,3 and, shortly afterwards, the JIC -reported 
that, although there were indications both that Italy would 
and would not enter the war in the near future, 'The balance 
ofýevidence suggests ... that Signor Mussolini has reached the 
conclusion that it is possible and/or necessary for him to 
override the difficulties which stand in the way of Italy 
going to war with the Allies, .4 Perhaps the most eloquent 
surmisal of Italian intentions, though, was provided by 
Wavell, who commented in a letter to the CIGS, 
Italy still seems to be hesitating on the brink, but I 
think must take the plunge soon. Musso looks to me 
rather like a man who has climbed up to the top diving 
board at a swimming pool, taken off his dressing gown and 
thrown a chest to the people looking on. I think he must 
do something; if he cannot make a graceful dive, he will 
at least have to jump in somehow; he can hardly put on 
his dressing gown and walk down the stairs again. 
Any lingering doubts were dispelled on 28 May, the same day 
that Belgium capitulated as Loraine later emphasised, ' when 
Ciano informed Sir Percy that all negotiations between Italy 
and the Allies were to be broken off completely and at once, 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 158,17 May 1940, p. 10. 
2 In fact, by the end of May, most Nazis and German 
officers were strongly opposed to Italian intervention, as 
they felt that the victory should be Germany's alone 
(Wiskemann, p. 207). 
PRO CAB 65/7,135th Meeting, 23 May 1940,5th minute. 
PRO CAB 80/11, Paper 387 JIC, 24? May 1940. 
5PRO WO 201/2119,36A, Wavell to Dill, 22 May 1940, 
p. 2. 
6 PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 114. 
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and; that Italian entry into the war was now a certainty. 
There remained only doubt about the date, though it could not 
be reckoned in months. ' British policy had failed. 
Last Ditch Efforts to Avert War in the Mediterranean 
In., the light of the rapidly deteriorating military situation 
during the opening fortnight or so of the German offensive in 
theýWest, the maintenance of Italian non-belligerence became 
of-, ý even greater importance to Britain and France than 
hitherto. The best way to have forestalled Italian 
intervention would have been for the Allies to have matched or 
bettered the Germans on the battlefield, but the Anglo-French 
armed forces proved incapable of this. other means had 
therefore to be sought in the attempt to avert war in the 
Mediterranean. 
Personal Appeals 
Despite the failure of personal appeals to Mussolini by the 
Pope and the President of the United States in April to keep 
Italy out of the war, some faith in this form of diplomacy was 
clearly retained in London, for Churchill took the opportunity 
granted him by becoming Prime Minister to write a personal 
letter to the Duce. It was neither a particularly strong nor 
weak epistle, its intent being to warn Mussolini against 
intervening by informing him that Britain would fight on even 
if France were to fall and that it would be increasingly aided 
in its struggle by the United States. The Duce, however, 
despite being impressed by the letter's tone, replied promptly 
and forcefully, referring to the imposition of sanctions in 
1935 and to Italy's 'state of servitude, in the Mediterranean, 
and reaffirming his bond of honour to Germany. 2 More concrete 
action was clearly going to be required if the British were to 
avert Italian intervention. 
'PRO CAB 65/7,146th Meeting, 29 May 1940,10th minute 
& Waterfield, p. 269. 
2 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 39 & 41, telegrams to & 




Having adopted a more vigorous policy. of military deterrence 
in April, one might have expected the British Government to 
have markedly stepped it up in response to the ever more 
vehement anti-Allied outbursts from Rome after 10 May. 
However, the extent to which Britain's military position 
against Italy could be improved was seriously limited by 
increased demands for men and materiel for the Western and 
Home fronts brought about by the failure to halt the advance 
of the Wehrmacht, and it is to London's credit that it did not 
panic and rush into denuding the Mediterranean and Middle East 
of forces unnecessarily. 
Indeed, in the month between the commencement of Germany's 
assault on the West and Italy's entry into the war, Britain's 
military position in the region continued to be improved. The 
four battleships sent to Alexandria in late April-early May 
were joined by an aircraft carrier and another battleship was 
despatched to Gibraltar to help guard the western entrance to 
the Mediterranean. ' The increased aerial threat to Britain 
and the scarcity of aircraft and AA guns meant that little 
could be done to ameliorate the air situation in the region, 
2 
but there was considerable activity amongst land forces as 
efforts continued to be made to effect the recommendations put 
forward by the COS and approved by the War Cabinet at the end 
of April. Between 11-19 May, one battalion arrived at Aden, 
another reached British Somaliland, and an Australian brigade 
group disembarked in Palestine. 3 Later, in early June, an 
infantry brigade was moved from Palestine to Egypt4 and two 
West African brigade groups left Nigeria for Kenya. ' 
1 Playfair, p. 91. 
2 See, for example, PRO CAB 65/7,135th Meeting, 23 May 
1940,6th minute & CAB 80/12, Paper 425,4 June 1940. 
PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 167,24 May 1940, pp. 8-9. 
'Playfair, P. 98. 
PRO CAB 66/8, Paper 195,7 June 1940, p. 8. 
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At the same time as the earlier of these measures were being 
effected, however, serious consideration was being given in 
London to a step that would have severely undermined Britain's 
policy of military deterrence. On 18 May, Churchill, worried 
about the situation in France, instructed the COS to discuss 
the possibility of withdrawing eight Regular infantry 
battalions from Palestine. ' The COS addressed the issue on 24 
May, when General Percival, representing the CIGS, vehemently 
opposed the measure, arguing that it was important to defend 
the Empire as well as Britain and expressing concern that if 
the battalions were to be moved about in the next few crucial 
weeks, they might not be able to fight anywhere. He was also 
worried that their withdrawal would encourage Italy to 
intervene and would have a disastrous effect upon Britain's 
allies in the region. Pound supported Percival, pointing out 
that the transport of these troops through the Mediterranean 
at the moment would be a very difficult task for the Navy. 
They could always go round the Cape, of course, but this would 
only prolong the period in which they would be unable to play 
any active role in the war. 2 
The matter did not end there, though. It was raised at 
War 
Cabinet level on 29 May and vigorously supported by Churchill, 
who had not given up France as a lost cause and envisaged 
sending the Palestinian battalions across the Channel. 
3 The 
JPC therefore produced a paper on the subject the next day, 
in 
which it expressed its wholehearted support for the position 
adopted by Percival, adding convincingly that the shortage in 
north-west Europe was in tanks, guns and ammunition rather 
than manpower. 4 The COS, greatly relieved by the arrival in 
Britain of large numbers of seasoned British troops from 
'Churchill, W. S., The Churchill War Papers - vol. 2: 
Never Surrender, May 1940-Decemberý940, ed. M. Gilbert 
(London, 1994), Churchill to Ismay, 18 May 1940, pp. 76-7. 
PRO CAB 79/4,146th Meeting, 24 May 1940,4th minute. 
PRO CAB 65/7,146th Meeting, 29 May 1940,9th minute. 
PRO CAB 80/12, Paper 410 JPj 30 May 1940. 
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Dunkirk, approved the JPC paper on 31 May, ' and, faced with 
such solid opposition from the British military establishment, 
the Prime Minister had to settle instead for the withdrawal of 
eight Regular British battalions from India. 2 
Britain thus retained a viable military deterrent to Italy on 
land as well as at sea, but it will be remembered that the 
measure in which the greatest hope had been placed at the end 
of April was the establishment of an aerial threat to Italy's 
industrial heartland in the north-west. Unfortunately, 
however, very little had occurred by late May to render that 
threat effective. When informed of the British scheme, the 
French had, not unreasonably, insisted that they should take 
responsibility for it, but a fortnight into the campaign in 
north-west Europe, no bombers had been moved to south-eastern 
France and there seemed to be little prospect of this being 
rectified. The British therefore decided to press the French 
as to the importance of the plan and offered to take 
responsibility for its implementation. 3 
With the idea of an aerial deterrent thus being resurrected, 
Loraine telegraphed on 28 May to argue that the despatch of a 
British bomber force to the south of France 'would make a very 
deep impression on the Italian Government I and to suggest that 
he be permitted to inform Ciano that the Allies intended to 
bomb industrial targets if Italy entered the war. When the 
War Cabinet discussed the project on 1 June, there was general 
consensus as to its military worth, though doubts were clearly 
beginning to surface as to its deterrent value in the wake of 
Ciano's revelation to Loraine on 28 May that Italian 
intervention was certain and imminent. The CAS, for example, 
stated that he would prefer not to despatch bombers to the 
south of France until Italy had actually intervened, so that 
1PRO CAB 79/4,160th Meeting, 31 May 1940,2nd minute. 
2 Connell, J., Wavell, Scholar and Soldier: To-June 1941 
(London, 1964), P. 234. 
3 PRO CA13 21/1304,59A, 'Air Attack on Italian War 
Industry, by CAS, 24 May 1940. 
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the Germans could continue to be bombed as heavily as possible 
in the meantime, and Chamberlain, now the Lord President of 
the Council, agreed that only servicing units should be sent 
for the moment. Churchill, though, obviously retained at 
least a faint hope that deterrence might still work, for he 
argued that a much deeper impression would be made in Rome by 
the arrival of the aircraft themselves. In spite of the Prime 
Minister's plea, the War Cabinet resolved that the decision as 
to when to despatch aircraft to south-east France should be 
left to the Air Staff, though it also agreed that Loraine 
should approach Ciano as he had suggested on 28 May. ' This 
latter decision was swiftly reversed, however, the War Cabinet 
deciding on 2 June that a better way of proceeding was to 
arrange for news of preparations for bombers to operate from 
aerodromes near Italy to be allowed to leak out.. 2 
The British thus managed to maintain or create at least some 
form of deterrence in the Mediterranean and Middle East in 
each sphere of military activity during the last month of 
peace in the region. Had the steps which were taken in April 
and May 1940 to improve Britain's military position against 
Italy been taken earlier, they might have had a tangible 
effect in Rome. However, coming, as they did, during a period 
when German arms were crushing the Allies and seemingly 
winning the war, their impact was inevitably diminished. Not 
only did German success prevent the French from complementing 
British measures by taking similar deterrent action against 
Italy, such as reconstituting a powerful army in North 
Africa, 3 but the Italian fear of fighting the western European 
powers, which a policy of military deterrence was intended to 
exacerbate, naturally lessened as the Wehrmacht appeared to 
bring the Allies ever nearer to defeat. As one historian has 
neatly put it, 'Hitler's "real war,, was being far too 
'PRO CAB 65/7,151st Meeting, 1 June 1940,3rd minute. 
2 PRO CAB 65/7,152nd Meeting, 2 June 1940,3rd minute. 
3 Playfair, p. 92. French forces in North Africa in 
early June 1940 were only capable of limited operations. 
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successful for such threats to have any significance". if 
the British were to have any hope of maintaining Italian non- 
belligerence in the light of Germany's spectacular victories, 
other tactics would have to be tried. 
Economic Issues 
In the circumstances of massive Allied defeat at the hands of 
the Wehrmacht, it was far too late for the prospect of 
improved trade with Britain to have much influence upon 
Mussolini's decision to remain non-belligerent or enter the 
fray, so the fact that some progress was made in Anglo-Italian 
commercial negotiations in mid May, headway being made in 
attempts to conclude contracts for the construction of 
merchant shipping in Italy and some agreement being reached on 
minor modifications to the existing clearing arrangements, for 
example, was, to all intents and purposes, irrelevant. 
' 
The blockade, however, offered London a more immediate chance 
to ease tension with Rome. Almost since the war 
had started, 
seemingly the greatest bone of contention between the 
British 
and Italians had been the exercise of economic control 
in the 
Mediterranean, and, in the wake of the launch of the 
German 
attack in the West, its deleterious effect upon Anglo-Italian 
relations was highlighted. Not only did Rome produce a savage 
report labelling the blockade 'an instrument of commercial 
hegemony, and detailing the supposed damage done to Italy 
by 
it, but it was the major issue upon which the Italian press 
was attacking the British. ' 
As we have seen, the War Cabinet had decided on 6 May that the 
idea of affording greater weight to political considerations 
in calculating the appropriate level of economic control to be 
exercised in the Mediterranean should be given consideration, 
and the Butler committee had consequently met to discuss the 
'Waterfield, p. 269. 
2 PRO T 160/940, F13456/02/21-22, May 1940. 
3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 24 & 43, telegrams from 
Loraine, 10 & 14 May 1940. 
264 
issue two days later, on the 8th. Encouraged by Italy's 
continued non-belligerence even in the wake of the Allied 
withdrawal from the bulk of Norway, however, it had agreed 
that no further relaxation of economic control towards Italy 
was advisable. ' Nor had this been an arduous decision to 
reach, for key figures at the Foreign Office were by this 
stage as opposed to loosening the blockade as those in charge 
at the MEW. Sargent, for example, considered that if blockade 
policy in the Mediterranean were to be altered at all, it 
should be tightened, and- Cadogan commented of attempts to 
improve Anglo-Italian relations that 'the worst price to pay 
is relaxation of contraband control, which merely puts 
Mussolini in a position better to threaten us at a later date 
when his appetite needs assuaging again,. ' 
Following the drastic reduction of the Allied military 
commitment in Scandinavia and the reconstitution of a powerful 
battlefleet under Cunningham in the Eastern Mediterranean in 
early May, and with the MEW's desire to tighten the blockade 
and the FO's apparently hardening position on economic control 
towards Italy in mind, it is possible that efforts to 
introduce stricter control over contraband and enemy exports 
in the Mediterranean would soon have been resurrected in 
London in an attempt to increase pressure upon Germany and 
deter Italy from entering the war. The commencement and 
initial success of the German assault in the West, however, 
prevented British policy from developing in this direction. 
The key reason the British Government had decided against 
tightening the blockade in the Mediterranean in April was that 
it did not consider it wise to take steps which could quite 
conceivably give Mussolini the pretext and the means to drag 
a still largely unwilling population into the war at a time 
when the Allies had taken on a considerable military 
commitment in the north. With the eruption of fighting in 
north-west Europe, therefore, the need to maintain Italian 
1940. 
'PRO FO 371/24943, R5946/58/22, minute by Dixon, 8 May 
2 PRO FO 371/24951, R5920/60/22, memo by Sargent & 
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non-belligerence became greater than ever, and so effectively 
ruled out any measures which ran a considerable risk of 
provoking immediate Italian intervention. 
Indeed, the commencement and initial success of the German 
attack in the West served to resurrect the idea of trying to 
ease tension with Rome through the adoption of a more 
accommodating approach to economic control. As early as 13 
May, for example, Sargent wrote that 'the moment is coming 
when we will have to answer the question whether we ought not 
to call off our contraband control in the Mediterranean 
entirely in the hopes of thereby at any rate postponing 
Mussolini's entry into the war'. ' 
The very next evening, the Marchese Patrizi from the Italian 
embassy in London called upon Butler, apparently on his own 
initiative, to discuss the blockade. He pointed out that 
following recent events, nearly all northern European ports 
which were not currently in Allied hands were controlled by 
the Germans, or at any rate soon would be. He therefore felt 
that it made sense f or control of all seaborne goods to be 
imposed at the source of supply, principally in North and 
South America, by means of the Navicert system, rather than in 
the approaches to Europe. Patrizi also advised that it would 
be to the Allies I benef it should they release all cargoes 
detained in Italy under the hold-back system and warned that, 
should his suggestions be ignored by the British Government, 
he feared that war would result. ' 
The British response to Patrizils demarche was immediate. 
Halifax informed the War Cabinet on 15 May that he had 
instructed Loraine to notify Ciano that London was ready to 
enter into discussions with the object of minimising as far as 
possible the annoyances caused to Italy by the Allied exercise 
'PRO CAB 21/978, Sargent to Ismay, 13 May 1940. 
2 PRO FO 371/24943, R5946/58/22, minute by Butler, 15 
May 1940. 
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of economic control in the Mediterranean. ' The Italian 
Government replied constructively by letting it be known that 
they would be prepared to cooperate in the functioning of a 
Navicert system by refusing to ship goods not covered by a 
Navicert or for which an application for a Navicert had not 
been made, 2 and, on 17 May, Mussolini accepted that a British 
delegation should return to Rome to discuss the blockade. 3 In 
the light of this positive response, the Butler Committee 
approved the release of all goods currently detained in Italy 
under hold-back guarantees on 18 May, 4 and, the next day, the 
War Cabinet gave its approval to the introduction of a system 
of contraband control in the Mediterranean based upon control 
at the sources of SUpply. 5 On 20 May, Sir Wilfred Greene was 
despatched to Rome authorised to announce, in view of the 
cooperative attitude recently displayed by the Italian 
Government, the temporary suspension of all contraband control 
in the Mediterranean, pending the successful negotiation of an 
agreement covering the blockade. 6 Just three days later, the 
Admiralty instructed its forces that no Italian ships inward 
or outward bound to or from the Mediterranean were to be 
stopped for enemy export control, examination of mails, or 
removal of passengers either, though the Italians were not 
informed of these measures. 7 
It might have been expected that the MEW would have staunchly 
opposed these developments, but it appreciated that the need 
to keep Italy out of the war in the light of the desperate 
'PRO CAB 65/7,123rd Meeting, 15 May 1940, Sth minute. 
PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 152,21? May 1940, P-3. 
3 PRO FO 1011169, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 107. 
PRO FO 371/24943, R5946/58/22, minute by Dixon, 18 May 
1940. 
5PRO CAB 65/7,129th Meeting, 19 May 1940,6th minute. 
PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 152,21? May 1940, p. 3. 
7 PRO ADM 199/2124, Blockade History: Mediterranean, 
Section II, p-36. 
267 
situation in France was such that drastic measures were 
required. ' Indeed, exactly what the British were hoping to 
achieve with the radical changes to their blockade policy in 
the Mediterranean is explained in an MEW memorandum dated 18 
May. The changes were not expected to prevent Italy f rom 
entering the war in the face of political and military factors 
working in favour of intervention in the mid to long-term, but 
it was hoped that they might ease tension sufficiently at 
least to postpone Italian entry for a few weeks, during which 
time the Allies might rally on the Western Front and create a 
military situation which would render Italian intervention 
improbable once more. Indeed, should the Allies rally 
sufficiently, any concessions made to the Italians might then 
be withdrawn in the interests of establishing firmer control 
over German imports and exports. ' in this light, the British 
response to Patrizils approach to Butler seems more like 
skilful diplomacy than an act of desperation. 
Greene returned from Rome on 26 May, confident of having 
discovered the basis for a lasting agreement regarding 
contraband control in the form of an Italian state guarantee 
against the re-export of certain key commodities, provided a 
list could be agreed upon, and the maintenance of the Navicert 
system. 3 That same day, however, Badoglio had given his 
consent to Italian intervention, thereby at last clearing the 
way for Mussolini to make the definitive break with the 
Allies. With war in the near future now a certainty, the Duce 
no longer had any need for or interest in discussing economic 
issues with the British and all negotiations were consequently 
'See, for example, the comment of the new Minister of 
Economic Warfare, Hugh Dalton, that he 'was wholly in 
favour, given the present situation, of the Master of the 
Rolls undertaking his latest mission' in PRO FO 1011/211, 
Dalton to Loraine, 25 May 1940. 
2 PRO FO 371/24943, R5946/58/22, memo by Drogheda & 
Nicholls, 18 May 1940, p. 4. 
3 PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 158,28? May 1940, p. 1 & FO 
837/500, 'Note by the Master of the Rolls Regarding his 
Recent Mission to Rome', 27 May 1940, paras. 4-5. 
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severed on 28 May. The radical changes in Allied blockade 
policy had not achieved their aim. 
Political 
-Tssues 
The final way in which the Allies tried to avert war in the 
Mediterranean was to raise the possibility of political and 
territorial concessions. As we have seen, Paris had 
unsuccessfully endeavoured in late March and April to initiate 
political talks with Rome, but now, with the Wehrmacht pouring 
through northern France, efforts to avert, or at least delay, 
Italian intervention with offers to discuss Italy's political 
grievances came to the fore. 
The War Cabinet had, of course, decided to eschew approaching 
the Italians to discuss their claims as recently as 28 April, 
but the idea continued to be discussed in the Foreign Office 
even so. Up to the outbreak of war on the Western Front, such 
consideration almost unequivocally -supported the current 
position. Dixon of the Southern Department minuted on 6 May, 
for example, 
I cannot conceive that any approach to the Italians at 
the moment would have an effect other than making them 
open their mouths wider and encouraging the illusion that 
we are now in such desperate straits after the Norwegian 
reverse that we are ready to go to great lengths in order 
to keep Italy out of the war against us. 
Nichols agreed with his colleague and raised a point 
fundamental to the whole question by noting, 'there can be no 
question of buying Permanent Italian non-belligerency - at 
least I can think of no means of ensuring the permanency,. 
Cadogan picked up on this and minuted his agreement, though 
Halifax interestingly limited himself to opposing an approach 
only 'as things are at present'. ' 
opposition to efforts to introduce political questions into 
relations with Italy began to recede, however, as a result of 
the increased need to keep Italy out of the war in the light 
of the spectacular German success on the Western Front. As 
'PRO FO 371/24943, R5811/58/22, minutes by Dixon, 
Nichols, Cadogan & Halifax, 6&7 May 1940. 
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early as 14 May, a- minute by Sargent raised the possibility of 
opening discussions on Italian claims, though it warned that 
such a policy 
would at this juncture be interpreted by Mussolini as a 
sign that we were even weaker than he supposed, and the 
result might be the reverse of what we had hoped unless 
our approaches were accompanied by definite evidence of 
increased strength in the Mediterranean. ' 
By 17 May, the FO was consulting with the French on the 
desirability of making a public statement 'designed to reduce 
the propaganda value to Mussolini of the exploitation of 
Italian grievances real and imaginary'. This statement 
referred to the recent reinforcement of the Allied fleets in 
the Mediterranean, adding that this was purely defensive, 
before moving on to its key message. This was that the Allies 
would welcome Italy as an equal at the peace conference at the 
end of the war, at which Italian claims would be discussed as 
part of the general settlement. Bastianini had of course 
already been twice informed back in April that the British 
Government wished to invite Italy to the peace conference as 
an equal, but the proposed statement would not only make such 
an offer public, and therefore much more difficult to renege 
on, but added the specific promise to consider Italian claims. 
On 21 May, however, the British decided at the last minute 
that, in 
, view of 
the Duce's negative reply to Churchill's 
letter of 16 May, the statement should not be made. ' 
It swiftly became apparent that the French were not prepared 
to let the matter drop, though. On 21 May, Daladier, recently 
instarled as Foreign Minister in Reynaud's government, 
informed Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador in Paris, 
that he was considering opening negotiations with Italy with 
a view to making immediate concessions. Campbell tried to 
discourage him, surmising that Mussolini 'could not be bought 
off', but with little apparent effect. 3 
'PRO FO 371/24944, R6067/58/22, minute by Sargent, 14 
May 1940. 
Woodward, 1, pp. 232-3. 
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The reaction in the Foreign of f ice upon learning of Daladier Is 
proposed initiative is very interesting. Nichols, whose views 
were shared by Sargent and Cadogan, expressed his opposition 
to immediate concessions, though he balanced this by 
supporting the public statement that had so recently been 
rejected. This should only be made, however, when a planned 
Allied counter- offensive in France had succeeded, so as to 
avoid seeming to act from a position of weakness, a 
stipulation with which Cadogan strongly agreed. Nichols 
further stated that the aim of Allied policy at this time 
should be to delay Italian intervention and to fortify those 
in Italy opposed to entering the war. These were objectives 
which he believed could be met, and at a price worth paying, 
by a public statement offering to discuss Italy's claims at 
the peace conference (Sargent noted his agreement with this in 
the margin). ' 
Thus the British were not prepared at this point to take 
things any further than they had been before they were 
informed of Daladier's desire for immediate concessions. With 
the fighting going from bad to worse in France, however, it 
was only a matter of hours before they were being forced to 
reconsider their position yet again. On 23 May, a telegram 
arrived from Paris in which the British ambassador passed on 
a proposal from Daladier and Reynaud that Roosevelt should be 
asked to make a personal approach to Mussolini again, this 
time to inquire exactly what his political grievances were and 
to offer to communicate them to the Allied governments, the 
aim being thereby at least to delay Italian intervention. ' 
With the French clearly desperate to take some kind of joint 
Allied action in regard to Italy's claims, the Foreign Office 
seized upon the idea of involving Roosevelt, as an indirect 
approach to Rome, made ostensibly on the President's own 
initiative, would hopefully avoid the appearance of Allied 
'PRO FO 371/24958, R6198/438/22, minutes by Nichols, 
Sargent & Cadogan, 22 May 1940. 
'Woodward, 1, pp. 234-5. 
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weakness that so troubled British policymakers. Indeed, using 
Roosevelt as an intermediary was something which the FO had 
itself been mooting, and, presumably in the hope of dissuading 
Paris from taking any more drastic action, it now suggested 
that the President also be asked to inform the Duce 'that he 
had reason to believe' that the Allied governments would be 
willing to consider Italian claims at the peace conference at 
the end of the war, to which Italy would be invited as an 
equal, provided that Rome did not intervene on Germany's 
side. ' Given the dire situation on the Western Front and the 
need to prevent French policy from deviating too far from that 
of London, Halifax had little trouble convincing the War 
Cabinet of the merits of the plan on 24 May. 2 
The next day, this time without prompting from across the 
Channel, the British took things further still. An 
undisclosed member of the staff of the Italian embassy had 
suggested to Vansittart that a willingness to consider Italian 
political grievances on London's part might bear fruit, and 
this had convinced Britain's Chief Diplomatic Advisor that 
London should offer to discuss political issues with Mussolini 
forthwith .3 Cadogan also now favoured such a move, 'if it 
4 will stave off war with Italy for a few days" a comment 
which suggests that British offers to enter into political 
discussions with Rome were perhaps less a genuine attempt to 
address Italian grievances than a bid to delay Italy's 
intervention in the hope that the Anglo-French armed forces 
might yet be able to stabilise the front in France and 
drastically improve the Allies' predicament. 
The War Cabinet responded to Vansittart's news by agreeing on 
25 May that he should be instructed to inform his contact at 
the Italian embassy that London was 'willing to enter into 
'PRO FO 371/24958, R6198/438/22, 'Notes for S. of S. 1, 
24 May 1940. 
PRO CAB 65/7,137th Meeting, 24 May 1940,7th minute. 
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discussions with the Italian Government with a view to putting 
an end to the difficulties and misunderstandings which blocked 
the path of friendship, between Britain and Italy without 
delay. The British were thus effectively offering to enter 
into political discussions with Rome forthwith, though 
Churchill insisted that the approach must not be accompanied 
by any publicity, since that would amount to a confession of 
weakness'. ' 
It is important to appreciate fully the difference between the 
two approaches to Rome to open political talks authorised by 
the War Cabinet on 24 and 25 May. On the former day, the War 
Cabinet had agreed to let the Italians know that the Allies 
would be willing to discuss their claims only at the peace 
conf erence at the end of the war. This was certainly a 
noteworthy development from the offers made to invite Italy to 
participate as an equal at a peace conference in April, when 
no specific promise had been made to consider Italian claims, 
yet the new proposal was even less likely to entice the 
Italians than the earlier ones. Not only would the 
stipulation that their claims would only be discussed once the 
Allies had won the war, and were therefore in a predominant 
position, have awakened the suspicion in the Italians that the 
western European powers had little intention of making any 
serious concessions, but it would have seemed even more 
ridiculous in late May that the British and French, rather 
than the Germans, would be deciding the fate of Europe at a 
peace conference than it did in April. Moreover, though less 
importantly, the f act that the approach was to be made by 
Roosevelt rather than by the Allies themselves threatened to 
create concern in Rome as to the offer's genuineness. 
It was presumably reflection upon these points that led to the 
War Cabinet's decision of 25 May to inform the Italians 
directly that the British Government was willing to discuss 
their claims forthwith. After all, if an offer to enter into 
political talks was to avert, or at least delay, Italian 
'PRO CAB 65/7,138th Meeting, 25 May 1940,8th minute. 
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intervention, it had to be accepted by Rome, and a direct 
expression of willingness to enter into discussion now, while 
the Allies were in difficulties and therefore more likely to 
offer concessions, would clearly have more chance of appealing 
to the Italian Government than indirect suggestions that the 
Allies would consider its claims after the war. 
Interestingly, the French also concluded on 25 May that an 
of f er to discuss Italian claims only at the end of the war was 
pointless. That evening, therefore, Paris put forward the 
proposition that Roosevelt be asked to suggest to the Italians 
that the Allies were prepared to discuss their claims 
straightaway rather than, as originally planned, at the peace 
conference, and, having decided earlier that day to offer Rome 
immediate political talks directly, the British unsurprisingly 
accepted the French proposal to offer such talks indirectly. ' 
The very next day, 26 May, the issue of discussing Italy's 
claims with Rome took on a radical new direction. Reynaud 
made an unscheduled visit to London to meet Churchill, explain 
to him the direness of the situation in France, and put 
forward a plan which the French hoped would enable the Allies 
to get out of their current predicament. What the French 
Premier proposed was that Britain and France should make a 
direct joint approach to Mussolini warning against the dangers 
of allowing the Germans to establish their dominance in Europe 
and promising positive consideration of Italian political and 
territorial claims in return not only, as hitherto, for a 
pledge to keep out of the war, but, more importantly, for an 
undertaking by the Duce to act as mediator between the Nazis 
and the Allies in reaching a negotiated settlement of the war 
that safeguarded the independence and security of the western 
2 European powers . 
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Initially, British views of Reynaud's scheme were mixed. 
Loraine considered that 'any further approach would only be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness and would do no good', but 
Greene felt that the plan was at least worth trying. ' of the 
War Cabinet members, Halifax was the keenest to pursue the 
French policy, 2 though he felt that it would have 'only a very 
slender chance of success'. 3 Arthur Greenwood, the new 
Minister without Portfolio, at this stage broadly shared 
Halifax's view, but Chamberlain was only prepared to consider 
Reynaud's plan if Mussolini could show that he was capable of 
taking a line independent of Hitler and of acting as a genuine 
force for balance at the negotiating table, which the Lord 
President of the Council doubted he could. 4 Although 
Chamberlain in his diary records Churchill stating that if we 
could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and 
some African colonies he would jump at it', this was perhaps 
more a cry of exasperation than a serious statement of policy. 
In Cabinet, the Prime Minister certainly vigorously opposed 
efforts to seek peace terms. Attlee, the new Lord Privy Seal, 
made hardly any comment about Reynaud's proposals, though, 
according to Chamberlain, he 'seemed to be with Winston'. 5 
As the only member of the War Cabinet to take a firm position 
on the French scheme at this stage, Churchill had little 
trouble convincing his colleagues to defer a final decision 
until it was seen how much of the Army could be rescued from 
Dunkirk, the evacuation from which was just beginning. 6 
Reynaud was therefore informed that the British 'would try and 
'PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 170,26 May 1940, p. 3. 
2 PRO CAB 65/13,140th Meeting, 26 May 1940, Ist minute. 
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find some formula on which Musso could be approached but we 
must have time to think'. ' 
The War Cabinet discussed Reynaud's scheme again the next day, 
when it was revealed that Paris now wanted to be 
geographically specific in offering concessions to the 
Italians, but this was strongly opposed on the grounds that it 
would only encourage Mussolini to ask for more than the Allies 
were prepared to offer. Chamberlain then disclosed that since 
the matter had been discussed the previous day, Loraine had 
reported that the Germans were believed to have informed the 
Italians that they no longer wanted them to enter the war as 
they could deal with France satisfactorily alone and would 
prefer to keep Italy as an avenue for supply, and, in the 
light of this, the former Prime Minister argued that the 
French plan 'would serve no useful purpose'. Halifax, 
however, had decided since the previous day to back Reynaud's 
scheme more forcefully and now strongly urged that the British 
should go along with it, but Churchill fiercely opposed him, 
arguing that unless the British showed Germany that it could 
not defeat them, any peace terms offered by Hitler were bound 
to be unacceptable (i. e. they would fail to safeguard British 
independence and security) . With the Foreign Secretary unable 
to find any support for his position from the rest of the War 
Cabinet, the Prime Minister won the day and got his colleagues 
to agree to the drafting of a statement to be made to the 
French opposing Reynaud's plan on the grounds that, as 
Roosevelt had now agreed to make a demarche in Rome as 
recently requested by the Allies, an Anglo-French approach at 
the. same time would only annoy the Americans, confuse the 
Italians, and create an impression of Allied weakness. ' 
In the wake of Belgium's decision to capitulate the previous 
night, Reynaud's proposals were discussed by the War Cabinet 
for the third time in as many days on 28 May. It was revealed 
'BUL NC 2/24A, diary entry for 26 May 1940. 
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that Vansittart had concluded from a discussion with an 
undisclosed member of the Italian embassy in London that a 
clear indication that Britain would like to see mediation by 
Italy would be favourably received at the embassy, but this 
made little impression *- once again, Halifax was the only 
member of the War Cabinet to support the French plan, though 
he did so less vigorously than on the previous day. His main 
contention was that the Allies should at least try to find out 
what peace terms Mussolini could wring from Hitler in the 
knowledge that they could reject them if they were 
unacceptable, but, yet again, Churchill strongly opposed such 
a policy, as he was convinced that there was no chance of the 
Allies being offered acceptable terms in present circumstances 
and feared that, if Britain became embroiled in peace efforts, 
it would undermine resolve to f ight on and might lead to a 
situation in which London's refusal of certain points could 
lead to charges of bad faith from Paris. As on 27 May, the 
rest of the War Cabinet supported the Prime Minister and the 
decision to reject the French scheme, at least until there was 
a good prospect of an acceptable peace being negotiated, was 
therefore confirmed. ' 
Churchill duly wrote to Reynaud after the meeting to explain 
the British decision. He emphasised the belief that 
acceptable terms could not be wrought from Hitler at present 
and referred to the damage that might be caused to Allied 
morale by any attempt to engage in peace moves. He was also 
able to point out that Roosevelt, having now made his approach 
on behalf of the Allies, had received a wholly negative 
reply'. 'Therefore, without excluding the possibility of an 
approach to Signor Mussolini at some time, we cannot feel that 
this would be the right moment' .2 There would be no Italian- 
sponsored peace conference. 
'PRO CAB 65/7 &: 13,145th Meeting, 28 May 1940, lst 
minute. 
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Despite the rejection of Reynaud's scheme, however, the War 
Cabinet's offer of 25 May to enter into political talks in the 
hope of thereby forestalling Italian intervention still stood. 
Indeed, Halifax had informed Bastianini of the offer that same 
day, ' and had felt that his demarche had gone quite well, ' 
though the press attach6 at the Italian embassy had told 
Gladwyn Jebb, a senior figure at the Foreign office, that the 
approach had left a bad impression, as no concrete proposals 
had been made, and that what was required was immediate 
satisfaction of Italian claims. ' 
Nothing more was heard from the Italians on the subject of 
British willingness to discuss their claims by 28 May, when 
Ciano informed Loraine that all negotiations between the 
Allies and Italy were being severed. Later that day, with 
approval from Halifax, Loraine asked Ciano specifically 
whether there was any answer to the approach to Bastianini of 
25 May, only to be told that it fell under the general ban on 
4 negotiations. British efforts to avert, or at least delay, 
Italian intervention with the offer of political discussions 
had failed. 
In reality, however, the prospects of Mussolini agreeing to 
discuss Italian claims at the last minute had never been very 
good anyway. Representatives of the Italian Government in 
both London and Paris had certainly urged the Allies to make 
concrete proposals in regard to Italy's claims, but this had 
been done without instructions or indications from Rome. ' 
Indeed, Ciano had explicitly told Loraine in early May that 
'Mussolini would reject and resent anything that looked like 
an attempt to bribe him away from his obligations to Germany, 
'PRO FO 371/24958, R6198/438/22, telegram to Loraine, 
26 May 1940. 
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and was particularly sensitive on this point'. ' Moreover# 
although Mussolini Is aim was to increase Italian territory and 
influence, something which could have been achieved at less 
cost and risk through a deal than as a result of combat, a 
bilateral agreement with the Allies which secured gains for 
Italy in return for allowing Germany's enemies to devote all 
their attention to fighting the Wehrmacht was hardly likely to 
be well received in Berlin. As Cadogan pointed out, though 
interestingly only after the Duce had rejected Roosevelt's 
approach on behalf of the Allies at the end of May, 
of course Mussolini is not going to, and, in fact, dare 
not make any separate agreement with the Allies, even if 
he wanted to. He is simply wondering how much of the 
general 'share-out' he will be allowed by his 'Ally' to 
take, and whether he will ultimately get more, or less, 
by spilling Italian blood for it. ' 
Although, Rome's opposition to a separate agreement with the 
democracies in May 1940 is thus clear, it is less obvious how 
Mussolini would have reacted had he been approached by the 
Allies to mediate a peace settlement with Hitler in return for 
promises to meet Italian claims. The Duce had, of course, 
unsuccessfully offered Chamberlain his services as a go- 
between with Hitler back in early April, and Renzo De Felice 
has argued that Mussolini might well have been prepared, even 
perhaps was hoping, given Italy's military weaknesses, to 
mediate a general European settlement in return for political 
and territorial gains as late as 27 May. 3 
Doing a deal with the Allies to play the role of mediator 
would have precluded Italy from intervening militarily at the 
very time when the Wehrmacht's stunning success in north-west 
Europe had opened the way for Italian intervention, however, 
and this would almost certainly have ensured the Duce's 
rejection of any efforts to reach such an agreement. 
'PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
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De Felice, Mussolini, pp. 833-4. 
279 
Mussolini's burning desire to lead Italy in war has already 
been referred to several times, and it is important to note 
that on the day the Italian High Command was formed, with the 
Duce rather than the King at its head, Ciano wrote in his 
diary, 'Rarely have I seen Mussolini so happy. He has 
realized his dream: that of becoming the military leader of 
the country at war'. ' The Duce, moreover, considered it 
important that any political and territorial gains Italy made 
should come after a war, rather than as a result of a deal, 2 
and believed that a short, victorious conflict was the best 
means of undermining the last remaining internal checks on his 
3 power from the Monarchy and the Church. It thus seems clear 
that Mussolini's overriding aim in May 1940 was to intervene 
militarily. After all, one would have expected that if he had 
been hoping to mediate a general peace settlement, he would 
have taken steps before he committed Italy to military 
intervention at the end of May to make his willingness to do 
so known to both the Germans and the Allies, particularly as 
Guariglia, the Italian ambassador in Paris, reported in mid 
May, albeit rather exaggeratedly, that the French seemed to be 
prepared to cede almost all their empire forthwith if the Duce 
could help them to get out of their terrible predicament. ' 
Even had Mussolini been amenable to the idea of mediating a 
general European settlement in return for Allied political and 
territorial offers, though, it is extremely unlikely that he 
would have been happy with the type of concessions it appears 
the British would have been prepared to make. When Paris was 
considering offering concessions to Italy in late May 1940, it 
believed that major compromises would have to be made and was 
prepared to make them. A programme drawn up by Daladier on 27 
May incorporated huge territorial concessions to the south of 
Libya, cession of practically all of French Somaliland, and 
'Ciano, Diary, 29 May 1940, p. 256. 
2 Mack Smith, Mussolini, p. 290. 
3 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 102. 
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280 
even Franco-Italian condominium over Tunisia. ' The British, 
however, in the absence of a positive response to Halifax's 
demarche to Bastianini of 25 May or to Roosevelt's approach 
two days later, never drew up a programme of concessions they 
would be prepared to make, but seem to have been no more 
inclined in May 1940, in spite of the disastrous military 
situation, to make major political and territorial concessions 
to Rome than they had been hitherto. London was aware that 
what the Italians really wanted from the British was free 
access to the oceans. There was influential support within 
the Foreign office for some kind of concession to Rome on this 
point, such as Italian membership on the Suez Canal Board and 
even the cession to Spain of Gibraltar, but only provided, and 
this is crucial, that Britain got Ceuta, the other Pillar of 
Hercules, in return. These would have only been superficial 
changes, therefore, designed to give the impression rather 
than the substance of major concessions, as the Royal Navy 
would have retained its control of the exits from the 
Mediterranean through bases in Egypt and Spanish Morocco. It 
was the release of this control that the Italians really 
wanted, but that was something the British were not prepared 
to offer short of total defeat in war. 2 
On 30 May, the French proposed a joint approach to Mussolini 
for the last time, even though all negotiations with Italy had 
been severed and Ciano had explicitly told the French 
ambassador in Rome that Mussolini would decline to enter into 
negotiations with the French even if they offered to cede 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. No long debate was provoked 
this time. The War Cabinet simply agreed with Halifax that it 
was useless to try to restrain the French from making a 
unilateral demarche aimed purely at averting Italian 
intervention if they so wished, provided that the British were 
'Shorrock, p. 282. 
2 PRO FO 371/24958, R6198/438/22, minute by Nichols, 22 
May 1940 & Dilks (ed. ), Cadogan Diaries, p. 290. 
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not committed by anything they might offer the Italians. ' 
With British assent, therefore, the French made their final 
approach to keep Italy out of the war on 1 June, and, as Ciano 
had warned it would be, it was sharply rebuffed. 2 Having 
finally taken the decision to commit Italy to entering the 
war, Mussolini was not about to be diverted from his course. 
Countdown to War in the-Mediterranean 
With the possibility of France falling becoming disturbingly 
real, the COS addressed the issue of strategy I in a certain 
eventuality?, a euphemism for the collapse of French 
resistance, in a crucial memorandum dated 25 May. The paper Is 
key message was that Britain could, and should, f ight on 
against Germany even if France fell, but, only slightly less 
importantly, the COS took this opportunity to urge that, in 
continuing the fight alone, 'We should endeavour to maintain 
our position in all our overseas possessions I as well as 
defending Britain itself. If Paris surrendered, the COS were 
sure that Italy would intervene and expected that a joint 
Italo-German effort to overthrow Britain's position in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East would follow. The situation in 
the region would undoubtedly be grim, but it was considered 
vital, primarily in the interests of economic warfare, that 
every effort be made to retain control of ingress to and 
egress from the inland sea at both its western and eastern 
ends. The War Cabinet approved the COS paper on 27 May, and, 
by so doing, made the resolution, so critical to the future of 
the war, that, even without the French, Britain would stand 
and fight in the Mediterranean and Middle East. ' 
'PRO CAB 65/7,148th Meeting, 30 May 1940,5th minute & 
146th Meeting, 29 May 1940,10th minute. 
PRO CAB 65/7,152nd Meeting, 2 June 1940,4th minute. 
3 PRO CAB 66/7, Paper 168,25 May 1940 & Bell, P. M. H., a 
Certain Eventuality: Britain and the fall of France (London, 
1974), pp. 49-50. A telegram despatched to the Cs-in-C in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East at the start of July, in 
the wake of France's surrender, confirmed that Britain's 
position in the theatre was to be maintained to the beat 
ability of the forces deployed there and promised 
reinforcements once the threat of invasion of the home 
islands had diminished (Butler, Grand Strategy, pp. 305-6). 
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War with Italy had not yet broken out, however, and, in the 
short period leading up to its eruption, the British 
Government had to decide how it should conduct its relations 
with Rome. According to Loraine, there were four broad policy 
options open to it. These were: 
(a) to take all military precautions, but to leave the 
moment of the commencement of hostilities to Mussolini. 
(b) to offer concrete concessions to Italy on a very 
large scale in a desperate last attempt to induce the 
Duce to break from Germany. 
(c) to restrict supplies to Italy of raw materials for 
armaments and of deficiency commodities. 
(d) to issue an ultimatum to Mussolini demanding that he 
explain Ital Y Is military preparations or face the 
consequences. 
As we have seen, there was little or no support in the British 
Government for option (b) , and, as for option (d) , in order to 
demand that Turkey fulfil its treaty obligation to intervene 
in the looming war in the Mediterranean, the Allies needed to 
be able to demonstrate that Italy was clearly the aggressor, 2 
something which the issuing of an ultimatum to Rome would 
obviously undermine. Halifax therefore explained to the War 
Cabinet on 31 May that current policy was a mixture of (a) and 
(c) , and urged that this should remain so. The War Cabinet, 
without difficulty, agreed. 3 
Option (a) had, of course, effectively been in operation since 
April, and, by the end of May, all three Services were on 
alert f or war with Italy to break out at any moment and 
frontiers were being patrolled. ' For the Foreign Secretary to 
have informed the War Cabinet that Britain was also pursuing 
option (c), however, seems rather bizarre in the light of the 
recent modifications made to economic control in the 
Mediterranean, but, in reality, it was not. Although the 
Butler Committee initially agreed, as it put it, that I it 
'PRO CAB 65/7,149th Meeting, 31 May 1940,7th minute. 
2 PRO FO 371/24944, R6067/58/22, minute by Sargent, 14 
May 1940. 
PRO CAB 65/7,149th Meeting, 31 May 1940,7th minute. 
'Playfair, p. 98. 
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would be a mistake to answer petulance by petulance', ' steps 
had been taken almost as soon as negotiations with Italy had 
been broken off on 28 May to prevent the Italians from 
obtaining raw materials and other goods of military importance 
from British, Imperial and Allied sources, and to reconsider 
urgently the whole issue of blockade policy in the 
Mediterranean. 2 As a result, Hugh Dalton, the new Minister of 
Economic Warfare, asked the War Cabinet for permission on 2 
June to intercept Italian ships carrying key war materials 
being imported in amounts far exceeding pre-war requirements, 
in effect a system of forcible rationing. Such a step had 
been eschewed by the British Government since the start of the 
war for fear that it would provoke immediate Italian 
intervention, but now, with Italy's imminent entry into the 
war a certainty anyway, the War Cabinet approved Dalton's 
request, provided the French also agreed to it. 3 
The French did not reply until 5 June, but it was in the 
positive. The War Cabinet therefore confirmed its earlier 
decision to authorise the interception of Italian ships 
carrying key war materials being imported in amounts far 
exceeding pre-war requirements, this action to be justified to 
the world at large as based upon belligerent rights of 
contraband control rather than indications of imminent Italian 
intervention. The Italian Government was to be given no prior 
warning and merchant vessels were to be stopped even if 
escorted by warships, to counter the threat of which a 
battleship and a cruiser had been ordered to Gibraltar. 4 The 
next day, at the suggestion of Halifax and Dalton, the War 
Cabinet extended its decision to intercept certain Italian 
ships to cover all Italian ships, inward or outward bound, on 
'PRO FO 837/500, minute by Drogheda, 29 May 1940. 
PRO CAB 68/6, Paper 162,4? June 1940, p. 2. 
PRO CAB 65/7,152nd Meeting, 2 June 1940,4th minute. 
4 PRO CAB 65/7,155th Meeting, 5 June 1940, ist minute & 
154th Meeting, 4 June 1940,6th minute. 
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the grounds that this would be easier to explain and justify 
as a reversion to standard economic control practice. ' 
On 8 June, the War Cabinet tightened British control of 
Italian shipping still further with the decision to order the 
diversion of the SS Umbria, reported to be carrying to Italian 
East Africa 5,000 tons of bombs, 15 tons of detonators, and 
1,750 tons of cement, none of it liable to seizure under 
international law, into Port Sudan, where she would be 
detained, at least temporarily. Two days later, the decision 
regarding the Umbria was taken to its logical conclusion with 
the order that steps should now be taken whenever possible to 
bring all Italian ships into control ports and to detain them 
there for the time being on some pretext connected with 
2 contraband control. At the moment the Italians intervened, 
therefore, the machinery of economic control was already 
beginning to operate as if Italy were a belligerent. 
At 4: 45pm on 10 June, at long last, Ciano informed Loraine 
that Italy would consider itself at war with Britain from 
12: 01am the next day. when asked if this unconventional 
approach was to be interpreted as a declaration of war, Ciano 
replied that it was. A similar communication was made to the 
French ambassador. Later that day, Mussolini addressed the 
Italian people, informing them of the declarations of war and 
stating that Italy had no intention of attacking any of its 
neutral neighbours. 3 
The breach that the British Government had laboured so hard to 
avoid had finally been made, but rather than being met with 
consternation and alarm, as it might have been had it come a 
'PRO CAB 65/7,156th Meeting, 6 June 1,940,6th minute. 
2 PRO CAB 65/7,158th Meeting, 8 June 1940,5th minute & 
160th Meeting, 10 June 1940,6th minute. 
3 PRO FO 434/7, Part XXII, Nos. 51 & 53, telegrams from 
Loraine, 10 June 1940. 
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month or two earlier, it was met with fortitude and stoicism., 
With their backs firmly against the wall, and heartened by 
Roosevelt's promise in the wake of Italian intervention that 
the USA would henceforth give the Allies all the material aid 
it could, 2 the British, under Churchill's resolute leadership, 
were discovering a grim determination to fight on at all 
costs. Mussolini had miscalculated in believing that the war 
did not have long to run in the early summer of 1940 and, 
consequently, Italian intervention would lead the Duce, his 
regime, and his country not to glory and expansion, but to 
defeat and disaster. 
1BUL NC 2/24A, diary entry for 11 June 1940. See also 
the reaction in both houses of parliament in Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 361,11 June 
1940, cols. 1163-9 & House of Lords, Sth Series, Vol. 116,11 
June 1940, cols. 517-23, and details of a speech broadcast to 
the nation by the Minister of Information in response to 
Italy's declaration of war in The-Times, 11 June 1940, p-3, 
col. 5. 
2 Churchill, War Papers - Vol. 2, Churchill to 
Roosevelt, 11 June 1940, p. 287. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSIONS 
General Thoughts on British Policy Towards Italy 
In their bid to strengthen Italian neutrality from September 
1939 to June 1940, three broad options were open to the 
British and their French allies: an attempt to buy permanent 
Italian neutrality or alliance by means of major political 
and/or territorial concessions to Rome; the adoption of a 
hard-line stance aimed at intimidating the Italian Government 
into maintaining its aloofness from the conflict; and a more 
passive approach, seeking through an attitude of goodwill and 
compromise to leave the way open for Rome to gravitate 
increasingly towards the western European powers as strong 
anti-German sentiment in Italy, insensitive German behaviour 
towards Rome, and the anticipated growth in Anglo-French 
military strength vis-a-vis Germany as the war progressed 
weakened Italy's alliance with the Third Reich and encouraged 
either permanent Italian neutrality or intervention on the 
side of the western European democracies. 
The British believed, or at least hoped, that, so long as the 
Allies did not antagonise the Italians or do anything to 
provoke Italian intervention, material factors, such as the 
opposition of the bulk of the Italian people to war and 
Italy's lack of preparedness for a major conflict, would be 
sufficient to restrain Mussolini from endeavouring to enter 
the struggle. For almost all of the period of Italian non- 
belligerence, that is from the start of the war to late May 
1940, the British Government therefore placed its faith in the 
third of these options. To be sure, London introduced 
elements of the first and second of these options into its 
policy in spring 1940, but the institution of a more vigorous 
form of military deterrence in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East from April 1940 was rather limited and did not signify 
much of a change in policy overall, and the effort to preserve 
Italian neutrality by offering to discuss political issues 
with Rome in late May was very much a last ditch effort. 
These measures have already been discussed in some detail, so 
this concluding chapter will focus upon assessing, in the 
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context of the other options open to London as well as on its 
own, what predominantly characterised British policy for 
dealing with Italian non-belligerence; the adoption of an 
attitude of goodwill and compromise aimed at avoiding 
provoking Italian intervention and enabling Rome to move 
closer towards the Allies as the war progressed. 
This approach is certainly open to criticism. For example, 
some historians have questioned its passivity and what they 
see as the complacency of the British in assuming, at least 
before spring 1940, both that material factors would ensure 
continued Italian neutrality, so long as Rome was not 
provoked, and that Italy would drift away from Germany over 
time. ' There-is an element of validity to this charge, as the 
occasional over-optimism of British views of the trend of 
Italian foreign policy highlights, but it ignores the fact 
that the grounds upon which it was assumed that Italy would 
remain neutral and would drift apart from Berlin were by no 
means unreasonable, as we have seen, and also disregards the 
solid arguments put forward by the British against the 
adoption of a more active policy towards Italy. 
In -any case, British policy towards Italy was far from 
entirely passive. In spring 1940, many active attempts to 
preserve Italian neutrality were made, but, even before this, 
there was the effort to expand Anglo-Italian trade aimed at 
raising the probability of Italy remaining aloof from the war 
by increasing Italian reliance upon Britain as an economic 
partner and demonstrating the profitability of neutrality. 
The decision to base active efforts to strengthen Italian 
neutrality for most of the non-belligerence period upon 
attempts to increase trade with Italy can be criticised on 
several grounds, however. First, as Patrizi warned the 
British in February 1940, Italy was too weak economically to 
expand its export trade greatly enough to 'cash in' on 
'See, for example, De Felice, Mussolini, pp. 737-8 
Shorrock, pp. 276-7. 
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neutrality to any major extent. ' Second, it was generally a 
lengthy process to secure trade agreements and then for the 
full impact of those agreements to take effect. The 
Americans, for example, had tried to make trade deals with 
Nazi Germany in the late Thirties in an effort to encourage 
Hitler towards peace, but these had been unsuccessful, partly 
because, as Roosevelt commented, 'These trade treaties are 
just too goddamned slow, the world is marching too fast. 
They're just too slow'. 2 Third, much as Britain's attempts to 
increase its trade with Italy were appreciated by many Italian 
industrialists, agriculturalists, and even Fascist ministers, 
the man ultimately responsible for Italy's decision whether to 
intervene or not, Mussolini, showed little interest in the 
possibilities of financial profit opened up by non- 
belligerence. ' Finally, and, ý as Robert Mallett has quite 
rightly argued, most importantly, 4 one must consider the 
German factor. As we have seen, the Germans played a key role 
in scuppering the comprehensive British scheme for agreement 
with Italy on economic issues in February 1940 and crucially 
followed this up by arranging for the provision via land of 
almost all Italy's coal requirements. Indeed, Mallett argues 
that the existence of the alliance with Berlin and the Duce's 
commitment to it meant that an Anglo-Italian economic 
agreement that greatly assisted the British war effort could 
never have been reached. ' In the light of Italy's agreement 
with France, this is perhaps overstating the case somewhat, 
but the fact remains that, by seeking to reach an agreement 
which would incorporate the open sale of arms to Rome's ally, 
London was certain to spur the Germans into actively opposing 
'PRO FO 371/24938, R2054/58/22, minute by Martelli, 12 
February 1940 
2 As cited in Schmitz, D. F., The United-States and 
Fascist Italy, 1922-1940 (London, 1988), p. 195. 
Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, p. 413. 
4 Mallett, 'Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations', 
pp. 137-67. 
5 Mallett, 'Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations',. 
pp. 160-1. 
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their endeavours by means of pressure and the offer of 
alternative arrangements for meeting Italian requirements, in 
which circumstances, Italy was always more likely, for 
economic, political and psychological reasons, to choose to 
strengthen its economic relations with the Reich rather than 
Britain. ' 
The way in which the British set about trying to increase 
Anglo-Italian trade can also be criticised. By endeavouring 
to expand trade with Italy predominantly at the expense of 
Italo-German commerce, restricting Italian access to many of 
the goods from British and Empire sources in the quantities 
the Italian Government wanted, and taking a firm line on the 
issue of the form of payment for goods, London protected its 
financial and economic warfare interests but undermined yet 
further the already questionable prospects of its efforts to 
expand trade with Italy cementing Italian neutrality. 
All these criticisms are valid, but,, in defence of the British 
Government, the following two points must be made. First, in 
regard to the decision to base active efforts to strengthen 
Italian neutrality for most of the non-belligerence period 
upon attempts to increase trade with Italy even though the 
prospects of success were not good, one can argue that, given 
the refusal to adopt a wholehearted policy of deterrence or to 
engage in political talks before late spring 1940, London had 
few other options open to it were it to attempt actively to 
strengthen Italian neutrality. Second, in response to the 
charge that the British undermined the prospects of success of 
their trade policy yet further, ýit must be pointed out that 
even the success of French efforts to expand their trade with 
Italy greatly during the non-belligerence period, which was 
achieved largely at the expense of Allied financial and 
'Theoretically, the British might have tried to buy 
large quantities of arms from Italy in secret, thereby 
perhaps avoiding vigorous German efforts to scupper their 
plans, but this was impractical within the context of a 
comprehensive agreement. After all, how would the Italians 
have explained to Berlin how they were managing to continue 
to meet their requirements of coal in the wake of the 
cessation of seaborne German supplies? 
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blockade interests, failed to prevent Italian intervention. 
This surely suggests that the British were right to safeguard 
their economic warfare and fiscal interests, in spite of the 
impact of so doing upon their trade policy, as it meant that 
Britain lost little from endeavouring to increase Anglo- 
Italian trade. 
The general policy London adopted towards non-belligerent 
Italy has also been accused of being too weak and appeasing 
for the Allies' good. ' Certainly, Britain conducted its 
relations with Italy in a generally more appeasing manner than 
it did those with the other Great Power neutrals, Japan, the 
USA, and the USSR, but London had reasons for considering that 
it could afford to be less conciliatory with these other 
states. In the case of Japan, the possibility of Tokyo 
attacking British or French possessions in the Far East and 
aligning itself with Berlin was felt to be small while the 
detested Nazi-Soviet Pact was in force and, even more 
important, while the Japanese remained deeply embroiled in 
China. As for the USA, the British Government knew that the 
vast majority of Americans wanted the Allies to win and so 
felt able to presume upon Washington's goodwill to some 
extent. In any event, British policy towards the Japanese and 
Americans was not that much firmer than that towards the 
Italians, specific concessions being made over the blockade to 
Tokyo and Washington as well as to Rome, for example. Policy 
towards the Soviets during the first and last weeks of the 
period of Italian non-belligerence was also moderately 
forthcoming, though from early December 1939 to late March 
1940, it became considerably tougher, aid being sent to the 
Finns and consideration being given to the bombing of 
oilfields in the Caucasus, for instance, both of which carried 
with them the threat of war with Russia. This stance was 
based, however, upon -beliefs prevalent within the British 
Government during the Russo-Finnish War that there was little 
point in trying to effect a rapprochement with the Soviets, as 
they were no different in their outlook, methods and aims than 
'See, for example, Dalton, H., The Fateful Years: 
Memoirs 1931-1945 (London, 1957), p. 339. 
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the Nazis, and that Russian military capabilities were not 
great, which meant that war with the USSR, though not 
desirable, was worth risking if the potential gains of so 
doing were considered to be great enough. ' In contrast to the 
above, Italy was not as furiously upset as Japan by the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact, was not already embroiled in a major war, was not 
essentially favourable to the Allied cause, but was equally 
considered not to be totally alienated from it, and, albeit 
perhaps bizarrely with the benefit of hindsight, was deemed 
capable of complicating the western European powers' military 
predicament more seriously than the USSR. It was therefore 
only logical that Rome should be treated with greater care 
than Tokyo, Washington, and Moscow. 
In any case, the cost to the British of the more conciliatory 
policy it pursued towards Italy was not great. For example, 
although the desire to improve relations with Rome led to a 
number of concessions being made over the blockade, these were 
generally minor and did little to undermine vital Allied 
interests or create an impression of British weakness. 2 
Certainly, the abandonment of contraband control within the 
'For British policy towards Japan, see Woodward, L., 
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War - Vol. 2 
(London, 1971), pp. 85-92, Best, A., Britain, -JaT)an and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding war in East Asia. 1936-41 (London, 1995), 
pp. 87-110 & Lowe, P., Great Britai and the Origins of tha 
Pacific War: A study of British policy in East Asia 1937- 
1941 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 103-35. 
For policy towards the USA, see Woodward, 1, pp. 155-74, 
333-46, Reynolds, D., The Creation of the Anglo-American 
Alliance, 1937-41: A study in competitive co-operation 
(London, 1981), pp. 63-120 & Rock, W. R., Chamberlain and 
Roosevelt: British foreign policy and the-United States, 
1937-1940 (Columbus, 1988), pp. 209-91. 
For the USSR, see Woodward, 1, pp. 31-42,106-113,453- 
61, Kitchen, M., British Policy Towards the Soviet Union 
During the Second World War (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 1-31 & 
Keeble, C., Britain and the Soviet Union. 1917-89 
(Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 158-63. 
2 For instance, although the hold-back guarantee system 
reduced the Allies, physical control over contraband, and 
thus made it practically easier for material to slip through 
to the enemy, neutrals would generally return goods to the 
Allies when requested so as to avoid problems in the future 
(Medlicott, p. 89). 
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Mediterranean in May 1940 can hardly be seen as a minor 
concession, but it must be remembered that this was envisaged 
as only a short-term measure and that control was still 
exercised on the bulk of goods entering the inland sea at the 
source of supply. In any case, Italy was extremely cautious 
in breaking the blockade for fear of Allied countermeasures 
which would impede its own rearmament programme. ' Some 
assistance in getting around the blockade was undoubtedly 
given to Germany by the Italians, such as with the export by 
air of high value, small bulk goods to Iberia and Latin 
America via Italy, 2 but, overall, and in spite of the growing 
concern in London and Paris in spring 1940 about the level of 
assistance being given by Rome to Berlin in breaking the 
blockade, the Third Reich gained little economic advantage 
from Italy's non-belligerence. 3 
In the realm of military affairs also, British policy towards 
Italy has been attacked as too appeasing for Britain's good. 
Wavell wrote towards the end of 1940, for example, that 
'Preparations against the eventuality of ITALY joining in the 
war were considerably hampered by the instructions received 
from the Home Government that nothing whatever was to be done 
that might impair our relations with ITALY' .4 There is 
undoubtedly some truth to this, but one must not forget that 
it was in late 1939-early 1940 that the administrative plans 
for a large expansion of British land and air forces in the 
Middle East were drawn up, approved and initiated, something 
which led the official historian of the war in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East to conclude that the British 
benefited greatly from Italy's period of non-belligerence. ' 
In any event, the success that Britain's armed forces enjoyed 
'Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, p. 37. 
Medlicott, p-119. 
3Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, pp. 36,50. 
4 PRO ADM 199/799, 'Despatch on Middle East Operations' 
by Wavell, 10 December 1940, p. 3. 
5Playfair, p. 40. 
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once the fighting actually started in the theatre demonstrates 
that they did not suffer in any serious way from problems with 
preparation. 
The British Government's determination to avoid provoking Rome 
also played a very important part in determining Allied 
strategy in the early stages of the war by resolving London to 
oppose French plans for a landing in the Balkans. It must be 
remembered that there were serious military objections to this 
operation as well, though, and even its greatest advocate, 
General Weygand, later acknowledged in his memoirs that it was 
unlikely to have been a success. ' In the light of how 
disastrously events turned out when the British deployed large 
forces to Greece in 1941, moreover, it was perhaps very much 
to the Allies advantage rather than detriment that the British 
desire not to antagonise the Italians was strong enough to 
prompt them to resist Paris, schemes as forcefully as they 
did. 
Thus, overall, the general policy the British adopted for 
dealing with Italian neutrality did not create a dangerous 
impression of weakness or do any great harm to the Allied war 
effort. Indeed, London was always keen in conducting its 
relations with Rome to safeguard what it perceived to be its 
vital interests and to avoid any overly strong impression of 
weakness, as is further shown, for example, by its trade 
policy towards Italy and the handling of the issue of 
political discussions. 
A final criticism of the approach taken by London for dealing 
with Italian neutrality is that the British were naive in 
hoping that an attitude of goodwill and minor concessions 
would have much impact upon the men who formulated Italian 
policy, especially the Duce. Given the fact that Rome moved 
closer to Germany from early 1940 despite continued Anglo- 
French cordiality, this would certainly seem to be a 
legitimate accusation, but it must be borne in mind that 
'Weygand, Recalled to Service, p. 38. 
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Italo-Allied relations did improve in the final months of 1939 
and that Ciano told Loraine shortly after the war started that 
each example of British goodwill helped him with Mussolini. ' 
Even when Italian policy began to develop along lines 
distinctly unfavourable to the Allies, moreover, t. LILV-- 
continuation-of the attitude of friendliness was not so much 
down to naivety, at least 
- 
from late March 1940, as the belief 
that to adopt a more hostile demeanour would only exacerbate 
the situation and might even provoke Italian intervention by 
giving the Duce a reason with which to explain to those who 
still opposed entry into the war why Italy must now fight. 
A strong defence can therefore be made against criticism of 
the policy the British Government adopted towards Italy from 
the start of the war to late May 1940, but, in the final 
analysis, that policy still failed to achieve its prime 
objective, the prevention of Italian intervention on the side 
of Germany. The reason for that failure does not lie 
primarily with British policy, however. To be sure, Loraine 
commented in his diary on 11 June 194 0 that, I If anything lost 
us the chance of keeping Italy out of the war it was M. E. W. & 
the Contraband Committee. Myself I think they did', but the 
dispute over the blockade, damaging as it undoubtedly was to 
Anglo-Italian relations, can surely not be blamed for Italy's 
entry into the war, for, as Sir Percy indeed noted shortly 
after his comment above, Mussolini 'never meant to allow my 
12 mission to succeed . 
The Duce wanted f rom the very start of the war to intervene on 
Germany's side as soon as he could do so with a realistic 
prospect of success, and the fact that he retained this desire 
long enough to see it through unquestionably denotes a failure 
on the part of the British and their French allies. That 
failure was less diplomatic than military, however. Much as 
the western European powers suffered as a result of the 
ineffectiveness of their policy towards Italy in permanently 
'Dilks (ed. ), Cadogan Diaries, p. 209. 
2 PRO FO 1011/246, diary entry for 11 June 1940. 
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weakening the Axis and suppressing the Duce's desire to 
intervene, of even greater cost was the failure of their armed 
forces in the face of German aggression in spring 1940. 
Although Mussolini had been moving Italy steadily closer to 
intervention since the beginning of 1940, it was only the 
stunning success of the Wehrmacht in April and especially May 
that year that finally convinced him to risk entering the war 
and, perhaps equally importantly, broke almost all resistance 
in Italy to f ighting. Had the Allied armed forces fared 
considerably better against the Germans and prevented the 
creation of a situation in which the Italians believed that 
they had the opportunity to wage the short-lived war that they 
considered they could cope with rather than a lengthy conflict 
that they knew they could not endure, the probability is 
surely that Italy would have continued to remain aloof from 
the struggle in the face of the massive material factors 
militating against intervention. It was the Allies' 
shortcomings on the battlefield more than in policy, 
therefore, that explain the failure of efforts to prevent 
Italy from entering the Second World War, for, as Sir Edward 
Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary in the earlier global 
conflict, put it, 'Diplomacy in war is futile without military 
success to back it'. ' 
Other Policy Options Open to the British 
Although a strong defence can be made of the policy London 
actually adopted towards Italy for the bulk of the period of 
non-belligerence, given the inability of that policy to 
prevent Italian intervention, it is important to consider 
policy options open to the British but not pursued by them to 
establish whether they would have been any more successful in 
avoiding Italy's entry into the war. Only then can a fully 
fair assessment of the approach London adopted be given. 
The two obvious policy options rejected by the British 
Government were an active attempt to buy permanent Italian 
'As cited in Dilks, D. (ed. ), Retreat from Power: 
Studies in Britain's foreign policy of the twentiCth centurv 
- Vol. 2: After 1939 (London, 1981), p-2. 
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neutrality or alliance before late spring 1940 and the 
adoption of a wholehearted hard-line approach towards Italy 
aimed at intimidating Rome into remaining aloof from the 
conflict. There was a third option, however, which could have 
been exercised in conjunction with a policy of goodwill and 
compromise towards Italy, though not the Duce, but which 
London nevertheless eschewed. This was to take moves aimed at 
facilitating or encouraging the removal from power of 
Mussolini, and it is this option which will be considered 
first. 
Moves to Topple Mussolini 
Given that Mussolini was the major obstacle to any meaningful 
rapprochement between Italy and the Allies, and by far the 
most important factor propelling Rome towards intervention, 
facts of which the British were' aware, it is perhaps 
surprising that more consideration was not given by London to 
moves aimed at removing the Duce from power, either by helping 
to engineer a coup by the Crown, the armed services or the 
anti -intervention moderates within the Fascist* Party, or by 
encouraging a popular revolution. Had this been achieved, 
there can be little doubt that the prospects of success for 
the general policy Britain adopted towards Italy during the 
non-belligerence period would have improved considerably. 
That is not to say that Mussolini's removal would have led 
inevitably to alliance between Rome and the Allies, as such a 
development would have remained unlikely at least until fear 
of German military might in Italy had diminished, ' but it 
would certainly have dramatically reduced the probability of 
the Italians intervening on Germany's side, for, as Noble 
commented in February 1940, 'there is no one else in Italy 
(other than the Duce) who would have a hope of bringing the 
country in on the same side as Germany and very f ew people who 
would want to'. 2 
'Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 48-9. 
2 PRO FO 371/24938, R1497/58/22, minute by Noble, 2 
February 1940. 
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The idea of conspiring to remove the Duce from power was, as 
we have seen, only seriously mooted within the Foreign office 
in early 1940, and was ruled out swiftly on the grounds that 
it would entail too great risks of provoking a definite split 
with Rome and a possible declaration of war. Besides, there 
was a belief in London at this time that the Duce might be 
forced to take a back seat anyway, due either to deteriorating 
health or to him being edged ever more into the background by 
the Ciano-led moderates within the Fascist Party. Even if 
this did not occur, moreover, the British still hoped in early 
1940 that German insensitivity, anti-German feeling in Italy, 
and growing Allied military strength would lead Mussolini to 
distance himself increasingly from the Axis without any 
drastic measures having to be taken by the Allies. 
There were thus good reasons to eschew any attempt to topple 
Mussolini, at least until it became clear by spring 1940 that 
the Duce was not drifting away from the Axis but strengthening 
it, and was not about to collapse due to ill health or be 
pushed aside by the moderates. With Germany beginning to take 
the upper hand in the war at this time, however, the British 
Government became even less willing to pursue policies that 
obviously risked provoking Italian intervention, and so gave 
no serious thought to efforts to bring about a change of 
leadership in Italy. 
In any case, London's prospects of engineering Mussolini's 
removal from power during Italy's period of non-belligerence 
were minimal. The only basis upon which the British could 
realistically have hoped to encourage a coup or revolution was 
the possibility of imminent intervention which so many groups 
in Italy opposed, yet, before late March 1940, intervention 
did not seem imminent, or even guaranteed, and, by mid May, 
Germany's stunning successes were beginning to weaken 
opposition to it anyway. There was thus only a small window 
of opportunity, probably too small for anything concrete to be 
achieved, during which there was any real chance of British 
appeals for the Duce to be toppled receiving any kind of 
favourable hearing in Italy. 
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Even had the British endeavoured to spark a coup or 
revolution, moreover, they could surely have only f anned 
already existing flames, not started a fire of their own, yet 
there is scant evidence of any such f lames to be fanned during 
the non-belligerence period. Ciano noted in his diary towards 
the end of September 1939, for example, 'Never has the country 
been more solidly behind the regime and the Duce. To speak of 
assassinations, plots, defeatism, etc., would be an attempt to 
give body to a shadow'. ' Fascism retained popular support, 
moreover, until Italy began to suffer humiliating military 
defeats at the end of 1940, and, even then, Mussolini appears 
to have remained fairly popular for some time, with the blame 
for Italy's woes going primarily to his subordinates. 2 There 
was thus little popular desire to remove the Duce, but, even 
if there had been, almost twenty years of authoritarian and 
repressive Fascist rule had ensured that, to quote sumner 
Welles, no effective means existed whereby the will of the 
Italian people could combat the fatal determination of their 
Dictator,. 3 
The possibility Of a popular revolution against Mussolini, at 
least in the absence of any attempt by him to drag Italy into 
the war before the stunning German successes in April and May 
1940 had softened up opposition to intervention, can therefore 
effectively be ruled out. So too can a Fascist-led coup. 
Although many senior Fascists, including Balbo, De Bono, and 
De Vecchi, the three surviving members of the quadrumvirate 
which had led the March on Rome, were strongly opposed to 
intervention, ' the only one in any realistic position to oust 
the Duce was Ciano. However, despite his fierce opposition to 
the pro-German, pro -intervention line favoured by his father- 
in-law, and the fact that he entertained a desire to succeed 
him some day, Italy's Foreign Minister was ultimately 
'Ciano, Diajaý, 23 September 1939, p. 157. 
2Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 246-7. 
3MUggeridge, M. (ed. ), Ciano's Diary 1939-1943 (London, 
1947), p. ix. 
'Segr6, p. 377. 
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furiously loyal to Mussolini, 'whom I love and to whom I owe 
so much,, as he put it in his diary in early March 1940. 
Besides, Ciano lacked sufficient power independent of his 
father-in-law ever to attempt seriously to replace him, ' and 
it was generally realised. in any event that the continuation 
of Fascist rule in Italy was dependent upon Mussolini 
retaining his position as the Duce. ' 
A potentially more promising means by which Mussolini could 
have been removed from power during the period of non- 
belligerence was a coup by the Crown. Indeed, in March 1940, 
with Italian intervention becoming more likely in the near 
future, the King considered taking action to give things a 
3 different direction'. It seems, however, that the action 
envisaged by Victor Emmanuel stopped far short of a coup, but 
instead merely involved getting the Fascist Grand Council to 
vote down Mussolini's proposed policy of entering the war. 
The probable effectiveness of such a move in the face of 
Germany's successes in May 1940 has to be questioned, and it 
was, in fact, these very victories that persuaded the King to 
drop any notion of taking action aimed at preventing Italian 
intervention. ' 
In the light of Victor Emanuel's balking at a political 
intervention which was far less drastic than a coup, it seemsý 
'Knox, tiussolini Unleashed, pp. 46-7 & Ciano,, Dia 7 
March 1940, p. 218. 
2 Gallo, p. 312. It must be mentioned here that although 
senior Fascists, most notably Ciano, Grandi and Bottai, 
Played a key role in bringing about the vote at the meeting 
of the Fascist Grand Council on 24 July 1943 that reduced 
Mussolini's dictatorial powers and reasserted the authority 
of the Fascist organs of state, parliament and the Crown, 
they only took such action after being dismissed from the 
government in February and their prime aim in taking it was 
to enable Italy to get out of the war rather then to 
overthrow the Duce. the actual removal from power of whom 
was effected by the King the following day (Cassels, A., 
Edscist ItalY, 2nd edn. (Illinois, 1985), pp. 107-9). 
Ciano, Dia , 14 March 1940, p. 221. 
'Mack Smith, Italy-and its Monarch , pp. 287-8. 
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extremely unlikely that he would have been willing in 1939-40 
to overthrow Mussolini in order to prevent Italy entering the 
war. His character was simply not suited to such bold action. 
He loved the quiet life, disliked having to take 
responsibility for anything, and was almost always ultimately 
prepared to trust the Duce's judgment on important political 
issues. ' He was concerned, moreover, about the possible 
repercussions of a coup, fearing that Mussolini's removal 
could open the way for republicanism in Italy2 or that it 
would provoke the Germans into invading the country in support 
of pro-Axis factions. 3 Eventually, the King did dismiss the 
Duce, of course, though the fact that he only did so in July 
1943, in the wake of the invasion of Sicily and af ter two 
years of mounting pressure, particularly from autumn 1942, to 
do something to get Italy out of the war and stop the ever 
increasing suffering it was imposing upon his country and 
people, ' demonstrates perhaps better than anything else his 
reticence to act until he absolutely had to. 
Victor Emmanuel may have had the constitutional authority to 
overthrow Mussolini, but the executive power to do so would 
have come from the armed services, most particularly the Army, 
whose first loyalty was undoubtedly to the King rather than 
the Duce. 5 Given that might is more important than right in 
effecting coups, there was therefore a possibility of Italy's 
armed services acting independently to remove Mussolini. As 
in all the other cases, however, that possibility was very 
small. Not only were the Italian armed forces 'by long 
tradition averse from political intervention', but Marshal 
Badoglio, their professional head, and therefore the man best 
able to engineer a military coup, was a dedicated careerist 
'Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, p. 282. 
Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, p., 294. 
3 Clark, M., Modern Italv 1871-1982 (London, 1984), 
p. 296. 
Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, pp. 294-306. 
5overy & Wheatcroft, p. 150. 
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who lacked initiative or backbone'. ' This made him most 
reluctant to stand up to the Duce for long on any major 
political issue, and it is indeed this very quality which 
primarily explains his elevated position. 2 To be sure, 
Badoglio and Italy's Service chiefs were prepared to voice 
sufficiently strong opposition to Italian intervention to 
dissuade Mussolini from attempting to enter the war both in 
late summer 1939 and in April 1940, but this was done on 
purely practical grounds and so hardly constitutes a military 
challenge to the Duce's political authority. Such a challenge 
only began to be considered seriously when the war in the 
Mediterranean turned definitively against the Axis from autumn 
1942,3 and, even then, the military proved unwilling to act 
until the King finally decided to take the lead in dismissing 
Mussolini. In the light of these facts, independent action by 
the armed services during the non-belligerence period to 
topple the Duce must surely be effectively discounted, at 
least in the absence of any attempt by Mussolini to drag Italy 
into the war before the spectacular Nazi victories of April 
and May 1940 had weakened the practical arguments for opposing 
intervention. 
Thus any British attempt to engineer Mussolini's removal from 
power in 1939-40 would almost certainly have had no chance of 
success. Indeed, this was probably the case as late as autumn 
1942 at least, something of which the British Government, to 
its credit, was aware. ' London's decision to eschew trying to 
bring about a change of leadership in Rome must surely, 
therefore, be seen as the correct one within the context of 
the general approach adopted by the British towards non- 
belligerent Italy. 
'Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, pp. 297,291. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 184-5. 
Lamb, Mussolini, pp. 305-7. 
4 Varsori, A., 'Italy, Britain and the Problem of a 
Separate Peace during the Second World War' in Journal of 
Italian Histo , Vol. 1 (1978), p. 466. 
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A Political Deal with Rome 
A second policy option rejected by the British the prospects 
of which must be considered was a wholehearted attempt, before 
spring 1940, to buy permanent Italian neutrality or alliance 
by means of political and/or territorial concessions. During 
spring 1940, as we have seen, the Allies did make formal 
efforts to reach a deal with Rome based upon such concessions, 
but the fact that these coincided with, and, indeed, were 
largely prompted by, the stunning German military successes 
that secured Nazi predominance in Europe and opened the way 
for Mussolini to enter the war effectively guaranteed their 
failure. Circumstances earlier in the war, however, were less 
unfavourable for a deal between Italy and the western European 
powers, and, indeed, it will be remembered that the French did 
tentatively offer in early September 1939 to discuss Italy's 
claims. The fact that Paris made no formal proposals and was 
content to leave it to the Italians to take the initiative in 
actually opening talks, however, indicates that this did not 
really constitute a concerted effort to reach a deal with 
Rome. Instead, the Allies swiftly decided that no major 
attempt would be made to secure a new Treaty of London, a 
decision, as has been shown, which was based upon solid, 
rational grounds, particularly the belief, reiterated by 
Halifax after Italy had entered the war, that the western 
European democracies could never have offered the Duce enough 
to tempt him into an agreement. ' It remains interesting and 
important to consider, though, what would have happened had 
the Allies ignored these grounds and actively tried to bribe 
the Italians away from the Axis during the Phoney War period. 
In the First World War, the Allies had, of course, managed to 
reach an agreement with the Italian Government even though it 
had begun the conflict formally allied to the Central Powers, 
and Rosaria Quartararo has claimed in her book, Roma tra 
Londra e Berlino, that, had the British and French seriously 
endeavoured before spring 1940 to reach a deal with Rome based 
upon political and territorial concessions, they would have 
'Dilks (ed. ), Cadocran Diaries, pp. 291-2. 
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enjoyed similar success. According to Quartararo, Mussolini 
was ready to denounce the German alliance and transform non- 
belligerence into permanent neutrality, or even into armed 
intervention on the Anglo-French side. This is an interesting 
argument, but one that is presented in a fundamentally 
unconvincing manner. Quartararo repeatedly makes assertions 
f or which there is no or little evidence, such as that the 
Italian aid sent to Finland was primarily an attempt by 
Mussolini to strengthen links with the Allies. She also 
ignores or discounts the wealth of evidence indicating the 
Duce's commitment to the Axis and his burning desire to enter 
the war on Germany's side, and even makes a number of outright 
factual errors, such as that the British were desperate to 
intervene in the Balkans and worked to win the unwilling 
French round to their point of view on the issue. ' To be 
sure, Quartararo's thesis can not be definitively disproved, 
as the Allies never made a serious attempt to do a deal with 
the Duce before spring 1940, but the evidence overwhelmingly 
suggests that, if they had, they would have found Mussolini 
totally opposed to any agreement to join the western European 
powers or turn non-belligerence into permanent neutrality. 
Certainly, there are no serious indications that the Duce 
wanted to do a bilateral deal with the Allies at any point 
during the non-belligerence period. Shortly after declaring 
neutrality in 1914, the Italian Government had begun actively 
to solicit for offers from the western European powers for its 
support, 2 but Mussolini had no intention of following that 
precedent. Ciano noted early in the war that 'Whenever he 
(Mussolini] reads an article that compares his policy with 
that of 1914 he reacts violently in favour of Germany', 3 and 
Bastianini's only instructions from the Duce on taking up the 
post of ambassador in London were to adopt a reserved 
'Quartararo, Roma, pp. 519-625. 
overy & Wheatcroft, p. 146. 
'Ciano, Dia ,7 September 1939, p. 148. 
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cordiality'. ' Nor was Mussolini's unwillingness to enter into 
political talks with the Allies merely an indication of 
reluctance to take the first step, for it will be remembered 
that when the French took the lead at the very start of the 
war, by tentatively offering the possibility of discussions on 
some of Italy's claims against France, this elicited a 
negative response from Rome. 
There were several reasons why the Duce was opposed to a deal 
with Britain and France. In regard to an agreement 
transforming non-belligerence into permanent neutrality, one 
must consider Mussolini's burning desire to lead Italy in war 
and the enormous discomfort he felt at having to remain aloof 
from the conflict for as long as he did. As we have seen, his 
aim was always to fight at some point, barring only the 
possibility of him taking the lead in organising a general 
peace settlement before the war reached a critical stage. The 
Duce and his regime had surely espoused the virtues of war too 
loudly and too frequently in the twenty years of Fascist rule 
to sign an agreement renouncing it as a policy option. ' 
Any deal struck between the Allies and Italy before spring 
1940, then, would almost certainly have had to encompass 
Italian intervention on the Anglo-French side in order to sate 
Mussolini's desire to lead his country in war. This would 
have required an enormous volte face on the part of the 
Italian Government, yet Rome had abandoned its alliance with 
the Central Powers in the First World War in favour of 
intervention on the Allied side, so why not again? 
Largely because the position of Italy amongst the combatants 
in 1939-40 was very different than it had been in 1914-15. To 
be sure, Italy had renewed the Triple Alliance with Germany 
and Austria, first made in 1882, as late as 1912, but it had 
moved to a more independent position amongst the European 
Great Powers in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
"cordialit. 1 riservatal; Bastianini, pp. 69-70. 
Gallo, pp. 310-12. 
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improving its relations with the British, Russians, and 
particularly the French, to whom, in 1902, Rome had promised 
neutrality in the event of France being attacked or otherwise 
forced into war. ' During the same period, Italian relations 
with Austria had deteriorated sharply, due to friction over 
the Balkans and Vienna's continued rule over the predominantly 
Italian Trentino, and this had even resulted in a naval and 
arms race between the two supposed allies. 2 When war had 
broken out in 1914, therefore, Rome had been, if anything, 
more inclined towards the Allies, and, although the Italian 
Government had entered into negotiations with Vienna as well 
as the Entente powers in 1914-15, these former had been with 
a view to cementing Italian neutrality rather than intervening 
on the side of the Central Powers and had primarily been seen 
as a means of allaying Austrian and German suspicions as to 
Italy's intentions and strengthening Rome's bargaining 
position with the Allies. 3 
In the First World War, then, intervention on the Allied side 
had perhaps been the most likely path for the Italian 
Government to take once it had declared its neutrality. In 
1939-40, however, Mussolini's regime was far more closely tied 
to Nazi Germany than the Italian Government in 1914-15 had 
been to the Central Powers, and further alienated from the 
western European democracies. For the Duce to have allied 
Italy with Britain and France would therefore have involved a 
far greater reversal of policy than that effected by Rome in 
'Mack Smith, Italy: A modern history, pp. 263-5, Seton- 
Watson, C., Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 
(London, 1967), p. 328 & Renzi, W. A., 'Italy's Neutrality and 
Entrance into the Great War: A re-examination' in American 
Historical Review, Vol. 73 (1967-68), p. 1416. 
2 Renzi, 'Italy's Neutrality,, p. 1417 & Mack Smith, 
Italy: A modern histor , pp. 266-7. 
3 Valiani, L., 'Italian-Austro-Hungarian Negotiations 
1914-19151 in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1 
(1966), pp. 113-36, Lowe, C. J. & Dockrill, M. L., The Mirage 
of Power --Vol. 2: British foreign policy 1914-22 (London, 
1972), p. 176 & Renzi, 'Italy's Neutrality', p. 1427. 
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the Great War and this was a step the Duce was not remotely 
inclined to take, even during his anti-German moods. ' 
Although it may well be true that Mussolini lacked attachment 
2 to principles, and even that, in his relationship with 
Hitler, 'Each saw the other as an instrument in his own power 
game; manipulation rather than friendship bound them 
3 together" there were several reasons why the Italian 
dictator was never likely to make a definitive break from 
Germany. First, much as he was, in reality, nothing of the 
sort, the Duce was most keen that he should be perceived as a 
man of honour and principle. As Ciano told his PPS, Anfuso, 
'The thing that torments him the most is to be seen as a 
traitor: an Italian traitor', 4 and to have struck a deal with 
the Allies would undoubtedly have been, and been seen as, a 
betrayal of the alliance with Germany. Second, as Loraine 
subsequently pointed out in reflecting upon the failure of his 
mission in Italy, Mussolini 'could not abjure the Axis or the 
alliance [with Germany] without a humiliating loss of 
prestige'. 5 The trend of Italian foreign policy since the mid 
1930s had been to move ever closer to Nazi Germany, so to have 
suddenly effected a volte face, especially within a year of 
the signature of the Pact of Steel, would have done enormous 
damage to the credibility of the Duce as a leader, and, 
indeed, to the integrity of Italy as a diplomatic partner. A 
third reason why Mussolini was not at all inclined to do a 
deal with the Allies stemmed from his view of global politics. 
As Loraine again later pointed out, 
a strong affinity existed between the Fascist and Nazi 
regimes owing to the similarity of their structure, 
'De Felice, Mussolini, p. 678. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. l. 
Overy & Wheatcroft, p. 169. 
4 'La cosa che lo tormenta di piO ý di passare per 
traditore: italiano-traditorel; Anfuso, F., Da Palazzo 
Venezia al Lago di Garda (1936-1945) (Bologna, 1957), p. 114. 
5 PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy, by 
Loraine, 12 Atigust 1940, para. 154. 
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doctrines and methods, the basic resemblance of their 
outlook on European and world politics, and the belief 
which they so studiously fostered not only in the 
effeteness and obsolescence of ... the West, but also in the necessary collapse of democratic and liberal forms of 
government under the forceful thrust, political and 
military, of the totalitarian States, led by their 
resolute dictators, rejuvenated, toughened and 
disciplined by the rigid internal hegemony of a single 
party. ' 
This shared Weltanschauung not only provided a psychological 
bond between the Duce and the Nazis, but, because it was 
espoused as official Fascist doctrine, had to be seen by the 
Italian people to be true. This gave Mussolini yet greater 
reason to hope for the defeat of the western European powers, 
especially if Italy could play a part in it, and led him to 
wonder whether his regime could survive an Allied victory, 
even if Italy joined their side. 2 
In the f inal analysis, however, all three of the above reasons 
Mussolini had for not abandoning the Axis in favour of a deal 
with the Allies could possibly have been overcome had the 
temptation been great enough. They could perhaps all have 
been dealt with, for example, by a propaganda campaign 
stressing how Berlin's behaviour since the signing of the Pact 
of Steel had created irreparable breaches in the alliance and 
demonstrated that the Nazi regime was in fact different than 
the Fascist one. Perhaps the key reason, therefore, why the 
Duce was never likely to be interested in a deal with the 
3 Allies was fear of German military might. This was certainly 
a major factor behind his refusal to consider the Anglo-French 
offers to discuss Italy's claims in late spring 1940, but, 
even before this time, Mussolini was fearful of acting too 
obviously in favour of the Allies in any way in case this 
4 brought about a German invasion and conquest of Italy. Fear 
'PRO FO 1011/69, 'Report on Mission to Italy' by 
Loraine, 12 August 1940, para. 48. 
2C1 iadakis, 'Neutrality', p. 180. 
'Andr6, 'La Politica Esteral, p. 117. 
Alfieri, D., Due Dittatori di Fronte (Milan, 1948), 
p. 40. 
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of German retribution for betraying the Axis was not just 
limited to the Duce, moreover, but was widely shared, and 
played an important part in preventing Ciano and those others 
most opposed to the Nazi alliance during the non-belligerence 
period from trying as vigorously as they might have to 
undermine it. ' 
The only thing that would have removed Italian fear of Germany 
as an obstacle to a deal between Rome and the Allies was a 
clear demonstration from the western European powers that they 
were more than a match militarily for the Wehrmacht, and so, 
as Gamelin was aware, Italy was extremely unlikely even to 
consider breaking from Germany until it had seen the initial 
results of the first major clash of arms between the Germans 
and the Allies. 2 In the First World War, the Italian 
Government had only begun to solicit offers for its support in 
London in the wake of the Allied victory at the First Battle 
of the Marne, which halted the German offensive into France, 3 
and it had not been prepared to commit Italy to intervention 
until events in early 1915 had made it confident that the 
Allies were going to win. ' In the Second World War, however, 
the Allies provided very little, if any, hard evidence before 
spring 1940 to suggest that they were likely to defeat 
Germany, and so the possibility of a political deal being 
struck with Rome in the early stages of the conflict can 
effectively be discounted. 
Thus, contrary to the thesis put forward so unconvincingly by 
Rosaria Quartararo, there was no realistic prospect, even 
before the stunning German military successes of April and May 
1940, of -the Allies buying either permanent Italian neutrality 
or alliance by means of political and/or territorial 
concessions. This being the case, the British Government was 
'Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 48-9. 
'Villelume, Journal, 12 October 1939, p. 64. 
3 Lowe & Marzari, pp. 138-9. 
4 Lowe & Dockrill, p. 177. 
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surely wise in its refusal before spring 1940 to consider a 
political agreement with Rome unless the Italian Government 
took the first step, and, indeed, prudent during spring 1940, 
when reversing that policy, not to offer specific, major 
concessions. 
A Hard-line Policy 
The f inal policy option which was open to the British and 
French but which they elected not to pursue was the adoption 
of a hard-line approach in dealings with Rome, involving such 
measures as a more aggressive military policy in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East and a much firmer position in 
regard to the blockade. The rationale behind such a stance is 
obvious; if the Italian Government was extremely reluctant to 
enter a major European war in 1939, there was clear potential 
for the Allies to work on Italian fear of fighting them in the 
hope of raising it to such a pitch that intervention became 
even less desirable to the Italian leadership. As we have 
seen, however, it was only in spring 1940 that the western 
European powers made any real attempt to exploit Italian 
concern at fighting them, and the limited measures introduced 
then were totally overshadowed by the Wehrmacht's stunning 
successes. 
The British Government certainly had good reasons for 
eschewing a hard-line policy towards Italy. As we have seen, 
it believed that the growth in Anglo-French military power 
following the introduction of full mobilisation would make 
Rome increasingly reluctant to fight the Allies as time went 
by anyway, thus rendering any flaunting by the western 
European powers of their might unnecessary. Moreover, any 
attempt to play upon Italian fears was bound to infuriate 
Mussolini, his government, and the Italian people, and thus 
threaten the hope held by many in Britain that Italy would 
gravitate increasingly towards the Allies as a result of 
German insensitivity and anti-German feeling in the country. 
Perhaps the greatest objection to a hard-line policy towards 
Italy, though, was the concern that, by angering the Italian 
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leadership and risking rallying the anti-war Italian public 
behind its bellicose Duce, it would precipitate an 
intervention that might not otherwise take place. Not every 
important British figure shared this apprehension, however. 
Wavell, for example, who favoured a tough approach to Italy 
throughout the non-belligerence period, later commented, in 
somewhat exaggerated language, 
I am sure that a more robust attitude towards Italy during the period of waiting instead of our weak-kneed 
and apologetic attempts at appeasement would certainly 
not have increased the danger of war and might perhaps have lessened it. And our preparations would have been less hampered. ' 
It is impossible to prove definitively how Rome would have 
reacted to a firm Allied stance, of course, but it is perhaps 
probable that Wavell was right. The decision for non- 
belligerence had, after all, been based solely upon Italy's 
military unpreparedness for a major war against Britain and 
France, and that restriction would have remained in force, at 
least until late spring 1940, when the German successes 
changed the situation radically, regardless of the policy 
adopted by the western European powers. There is reason to 
believe, moreover, that Mussolini, much as he would have 
resented it, would have been impressed by a hard-line Anglo- 
French approach, as he had clearly been unnerved whenever the 
western European democracies had toughened their stance 
towards Italy in the past. In autumn 1935, for example, he 
had responded to the British reinforcement of the 
Mediterranean in anticipation of Italy's invasion of Abyssinia 
by privately reassuring London that he meant no harm. 2 The 
Duce had been similarly perturbed by Britain's introduction of 
conscription and the Anglo-French agreements with Greece and 
Turkey in spring 1939, for he had whined about western 
European aggression towards Italy. 3 
'As cited in Connell, pp. 234-5. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Emoire, p. 69. 
Mack Smith, Mussolini's Ro an Empire, P. 156. 
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Even if a hard-line Allied approach from autumn 1939 had 
intimidated Rome and thereby strengthened Italian neutrality 
during the Phoney War, however, it seems fair to argue that 
the German military successes of spring 1940 were so startling 
that they would have diminished Italian fear of fighting the 
western European powers just as effectively as they did in 
reality and that Italy would therefore still have intervened 
in or around early summer 1940. The Allied war effort in the 
opening months of the conflict might well have benefited from 
not having to make concessions to conciliate Italy, but, given 
that the British made every effort to safeguard their vital 
interests while pursuing a policy of goodwill and compromise 
towards Rome anyway, the advantage of a hard-line policy that 
successfully intimidated the Italians during the Phoney War 
over the policy actually adopted by London would not have been 
that great. 
The possibility that Mussolini would have responded to a hard- 
line Anglo-French policy by attempting to drag Italy into the 
war before spring 1940 can not be discounted, moreover, for, 
as one historian has put it, the Duce 'could overreact if he 
found Italy's or his own prestige called in question, and in 
such moments could gratuitously take up a position from which 
it was hard to retreat without loss of face I .' Had the Allies 
decided to issue an ultimatum to Rome at the start of the war 
to denounce the Axis and declare itself properly neutral, for 
example, or had they insisted upon draconian guarantees of 
Italian neutrality, the Duce would surely have had to suppress 
his fears about fighting and endeavoured to declare war. 
Given the strength of anti-war feeling in Italy in the autumn 
of 1939, however, the possibility can not be ruled out that an 
attempt to enter the war might have brought about a revolution 
or a coup. Bocchini, the Chief of Police, told Ciano at the 
end of August, for example, of his concern about uprisings in 
connection with the preservation of neutrality, in which he 
expected 'the carabinieri and police would make common cause 
'Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 83. 
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with the people 1 .1 Alternatively, Italy's military leaders, 
whose fear of fighting the western European powers at this 
time was compounded by the Italian intelligence service's 
marked exaggeration of Anglo-French military strength 
throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East, ' might have 
threatened to oust Mussolini from power rather than embark 
upon a war which they saw as suicidal. In such circumstances, 
the Duce would either have fallen, had to back down, or tried 
to impose his will upon an unwilling public and/or armed 
services by force, any of which would have been greatly to the 
Allies' benefit in terms of reducing Italy's ability or 
willingness to intervene. In the light of what has already 
been said above about the possibility of Mussolini being 
toppled, though, it is perhaps far more likely that an attempt 
by the Duce to drag Italy into the war in autumn 1939 in 
response to a hard-line Allied stance would have met little 
real opposition, and that Italy would thus have been involved 
militarily from the start of the war. 
** * ** ** 
Thus other policy options open to the British but rejected by 
them had no more realistic a chance of keeping Italy out of 
the war, let alone winning its support, than the approach 
actually adopted by London, at least in the light of how the 
war against Germany developed in the spring of 1940. These 
options all carried dangers, moreover, and their rejection was 
based upon solid, rational grounds, and so, in the final 
analysis, one is drawn to the conclusion that the broad policy 
chosen by the British Government for attempting to preserve 
Italian neutrality for as long as possible was, in all 
probability, the wisest and most promising available to it. 
'Ciano, Diary, 30 August 1939, p. 140. 
Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel, p. 78. 
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Final Reflections on British Policy Towards Italy 
Although the general policy actually adopted towards Italy by 
London was probably the most prudent in terms of trying to 
maintain Italian neutrality for as long as possible, one can 
nevertheless argue that the British would have been better 
advised to have taken a different approach to the question of 
Italy's non-belligerence. This may initially seem a somewhat 
bizarre comment to make at this point, but it is not, for 
there is good reason to contend that, had the Allies forced 
Italy to become involved militarily from the start of the war, 
rather than worsening their predicament, as London and Paris 
feared it would, it would have been to the western European 
powers, great advantage. 
For a start, Italian involvement would have brought the 
benefits claimed for it before the war, most particularly 
increased economic pressure upon Germany caused by the need to 
prop up the Italian war effort. Furthermore, in the light of 
Italy's overall military ineffectiveness and vulnerability to 
British and French attack from June 1940, in conditions far 
less favourable to the Allies than existed in autumn 1939,1 
the likelihood is surely that Italian involvement from the 
start of the war would not, in f act, have added greatly to the 
Allies I military burden and might well have opened the way for 
the western European powers to achieve early military 
successes. Indeed, it is possible that a string of defeats 
for Italy before Germany had dramatically gained the upper 
hand against the Allies might have changed the entire course 
of the war. Mussolini might, for example, have been persuaded 
to seek peace, or his regime may even have been toppled. It 
is perhaps more likely, however, that German intervention in 
support of Italy would have prevented such drastic action, 
though this in itself would have been of great benefit to the 
'Consider, for example, the impunity with which French 
naval and British air forces bombarded Italy in June 1940, 
the crippling of the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 
1940, the two month British campaign in winter 1940-41 which 
destroyed the Italian army in Libya and captured Cyrenaica, 
or the conquest of Italian East Africa within five months in 
early 1941. 
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Allied cause, as it would have increased the strain on the 
Reich's war effort yet further. 
To take the speculation one step further, it is perfectly 
possible that in seeking to relieve Anglo-French pressure on 
Italy, the Germans would have launched their offensive in the 
West in 1939, as indeed Hitler was keen to do anyway. ' The 
significance of this is that the German plan before mid 
February 1940 was a 'pedestrian replay of the Schlieffen 
plan' 2 which the Allies were expecting and had deployed their 
forces to counter. The probable outcome of the Nazi assault 
in the West in these circumstances would therefore have been 
3 a stalemate and war of attrition as in 1914. The impact this 
would have had upon the war is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict, though it seems fair to suppose that 
the conditions which resulted would have favoured the Allies 
rather more than those which obtained in the wake of the 
actual German offensive in May 1940. 
Nor is this all this speculation merely fanciful, for it must 
be remembered that the British and French did adopt the idea 
of the Mediterranean offensive and consider forcing an 
unwilling Italy to f ight during the late spring and early 
summer of 1939. Had the Second World War broken out then, or 
had, say, Admiral Backhouse, a staunch supporter of the 
Mediterranean offensive, not died and been replaced by Pound, 
a fierce opponent, it is not inconceivable that the Italians 
would have been compelled to enter the war from the beginning. 
'Mercer, D. (ed. ), Chronicle of the Second World War 
(Hants., 1990), pp. 26,30,36. Hitler originally intended 
to attack in the West in November 1939, ordering 
preparations to be made in early October and even setting 12 
November as the date for the commencement of the attack 
before bad weather resulted in the operation being postponed 
just five days before it was due to start. 
Murray, 'Role of Italy', p. 48. 
3 Deighton, L., Blitzkrieq: From the rise of Hitlox--= 
the fall of Dunkirk (London, 1979), pp. 243-55. 
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As we have seen, however, the idea of the Mediterranean 
offensive lapsed in mid to late summer 1939, as did any 
thought of forcing Italy into the war if it wished to remain 
aloof from it. One historian has commented on this that it 
was 
one more sad commentary on a British leadership, military 
as well as civilian, which saw danger in every policy, 
which preached caution at every turn, and which was 
completely unwilling to take the slightest risk in 
defence of its far flung interests. ' 
This is perhaps too harsh a judgment, though, as the lapse of 
the Mediterranean offensive and the decision to favour Italian 
neutrality in late summer 1939 was not based upon cowardice or 
lack of moral fibre, but upon solid, rational arguments which 
were accepted not just by the great majority of policymakers 
in London, but by the bulk of ministers and military men in 
Paris also. To be sure, in reaching their decision, the 
British and French, though aware of Italian military 
deficiencies, nevertheless exaggerated the true capabilities 
of Italy's armed forces, an error of profound significance, 
but, in defence of London and Paris, Berlin misjudged Italian 
2 capabilities also. Perhaps the British, French and Germans 
all fell victim to Mussolini's incessant bluff, posturing and 
propaganda about the supposed might of Fascist Italy, though 
maybe more likely in explaining the widespread exaggeration of 
Italian military capabilities is the fact that Italy's overall 
military performance once it entered the war was so poor that 
one must wonder whether anyone, other than the most bigoted 
Italophobe, truly believed before the war that the Italians, 
members, albeit minor ones, of the elite group of so-called 
Great Powers, would prove as militarily impotent as they 
actually did. 
In any event, more advantageous as it might have been for the 
Allies to have forced the Italians to enter the war in autumn 
1939, the fact that Italy spent the first nine and a half 
'Murray, 'Role of Italy', p. 48. 
2 May, E. R., 'Capabilities and Proclivities' in May, 
E. R. (ed. ), Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence assessment 
before the two world wars, (Princeton, 1984), p. 511. 
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months of the conflict as a non-belligerent and intervened in 
June 1940 ultimately proved to be far from disastrous, at 
least for the British. Having decided to favour Italian 
neutrality, the policy London adopted for preserving it did 
little harm to Britain's war effort or vital interests, as we 
have seen. The stoicism with which the British, under 
Churchill's resolute leadership, generally greeted Italian 
intervention, moreover, was subsequently shown to be more than 
justified. With the fall of France in late June 1940, 
Britain's decision to fight on defied logic. Germany 
dominated the Continent and there was no obvious way in which 
the British could break that domination without an extremely 
lengthy and massively costly struggle. Furthermore, Britain 
itself soon came under attack from the Luftwaffe and its 
supply lines were relentlessly assaulted by U-boats and 
raiders. In this darkest of hours, the British desperately 
needed reasons to carry on with the struggle. The hope of 
American intervention was perhaps the greatest of these, but 
that did not come until the end of 1941. The RAF's bombing 
campaign against Germany and efforts to encourage rebellion 
amongst the subjugated peoples of Europe were others, as they 
enabled the British to believe that they were at least 
fighting back, but these had little impact in the early years 
of the war. The intervention of Italy, therefore, was perhaps 
crucial to Britain's willingness to stay in the war in late 
1940 and early 1941. This was because it provided the British 
with a theatre of operations in which all its armed forces 
could fight with a good chance of success, something which was 
crucial to the maintenance of morale. Attlee later commented, 
for example,, 'People sometimes forget ... 
how greatly Wavell's 
victory over the Italians [in 1940-41] raised our spirits when 
things everywhere were very dark', 1 and another Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, noted in his memoirs that Wavell Is 
, successes and our naval victories over the Italians at 
Taranto and Matapan gave us some gleams of hope in a hard 
'Attlee, C. R., As It HaT)T)ened (London, 1954), p. 138. 
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winter'. ' Italian involvement continued to be important even 
after American entry into the war, moreover, as the 
Mediterranean and Middle East was the only theatre in which 
Allied land forces could, or at least chose, to f ight the 
Germans before mid 1944. Given that Germany derived almost no 
concrete benefits from Italian intervention, it is little 
2 
wonder that Hitler later looked back on it with regret . 
Thus, even though events might have turned out more f avourably 
for the British, and certainly for the French, had Italy been 
forced to fight in autumn 1939, the fact that it was not, and 
the failure of Allied policy to prevent Italian intervention 
in early summer 1940, ultimately proved to be most 
advantageous to the British war effort from mid 1940 on. 
Perhaps it is sometimes better to fail than to succeed. 
'Macmillan, H., The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (New York, 
1967), p. 66. 
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